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Introduction: A translational approach to the transfer of political 
concepts 
 
 My research is aimed at evaluating whether, how and to what extent the 
concept of democracy acquires different meanings according to the cultural context in 
which it is used. Democracy nowadays is considered the only acceptable form of 
government and is also held to be a universal value that everyone should pursue in 
such a way that the concept cannot be questioned in any case. On the other hand, the 
concept's capability to include different lifestyles and demands coming from other 
cultures is still broadly debated. It is thus extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
come to a shared definition of democracy, and, on the contrary, well-established 
definitions are being questioned and made more complex by highlighting some of 
their contradictory points. In the present work I will analyse the transfer of the 
concept of democracy in other cultural contexts using a translational approach
1
 to find 
out how translation influences such relocation. In order to do so, I will examine the 
term democracy in the case of an English translation of the 2012 Egyptian 
Constitution. 
 In the first chapter, a brief overview of modern and contemporary Western 
political thought on democracy will provide a general description of the contexts in 
which nowadays discourses on democracy are shaped and take place. Such account 
will outline the stages of formation of 'mainstream democracy', analysing the key 
political thinkers who contributed to the development of the contemporary notion of 
western liberal democracy. I will then consider some internal streams of thought such 
as classical liberalism, communitarianism and multiculturalism, which initiated a 
gradual process of redefinition of the concept to make it more inclusive of 
differences. One aspect that led to a first questioning of the concept has been the 
ongoing migration flows to Europe and North America, which first raised the 
problem of establishing peaceful coexistence among communities extremely different 
from the national population. Such a renewed interest in this matter shows the need to 
                                                         
1
 The analysis of the meaning of democracy has already been carried out with a discourse analysis 
approach by Dunne, 2003; while Schaffer, 1998 has resorted to conceptual analysis. The translational 
approach I propose here appears to assume a different point of view in that it tries to uncover the 
political implications of translation that are not considered in other studies.  
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make the democratic model more capable of including an increasing number of 
minorities. In this sense, even though the value of democracy is perceived to be stable 
and universally recognised, it is extremely problematic to come to an acceptable and 
universal definition and, on the contrary, the meaning of democracy is widely debated 
in different contexts and at various levels, both in the west and in other cultural 
contexts. Such developments seem to suggest that translation of the concept into 
different languages might not be sufficient to guarantee that democracy is understood 
and accepted by other cultures keeping the same original meaning. 
 With such considerations in mind, in the second chapter, I will consider the 
paradigm of equivalence in translation to bring to light its illusory and constructed 
character. I will thus analyse the political implications of translation that will 
ultimately constitute the theoretical framework for a translational approach to the 
transfer of democracy into other cultural contexts. Despite the fact that the paradigm 
of equivalence is still extensively used to describe the translation process, scholars 
today tend to emphasise its illusory and constructed character. Such a questioning 
however does not entail claiming the impossibility or inexistence of translation, 
which on the contrary is increasingly necessary and ubiquitous. The aim for 
criticising the paradigm of equivalence is rather to make apparent the metaphorical 
and metonymic aspects of language, so that, when translating, in order to favour the 
reader's comprehension, the original is modified using such concepts that can only 
partly be considered 'similar', 'akin' or 'equivalent', and that for the rest also produce 
changes of meaning in the target culture. As a consequence, language also determines 
the metonymics of translation, being translation a communicative process that 
modifies the original meaning. Theoretical survey of such aspects will lead to 
conclude that the paradigm of equivalence should be considered a political 
instrument, since it contributes to make the meaning of words well established and 
certain instead of highlighting its unstable, illusory and constructed character not only 
at a terminological and register level, but also lexically, syntactically and textually. If 
we define politics as an activity aimed at establishing and maintaining an order to 
ensure peaceful coexistence within a social group based on certain well known and 
generally shared rules, translation acquires a political value, however for the most 
part unconsciously. This is because, by translating we make an attempt to transfer 
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content in such a way that does not question the dominant universe of meaning within 
a given culture. If translation did not endorse such a cultural adaptation, it would 
result in a major disruption of the order and of the shared rules and, at a language 
level, a text would be ultimately discarded as being deviant, difficult to understand or 
not relevant. The translational study of political terms seems to be an interesting 
method that could help establish whether some terms are in a more stable condition of 
equivalence compared to others and why such equivalence is more easily found in 
some fields and contexts rather than in others.  
 In the third chapter, I will analyse the question of transferring democracy into 
other cultural contexts by introducing the still open discussion on the necessity and 
possibility to go beyond a normative understanding of political theory. Normative 
liberal political theory is considered the main starting point to evaluate the quality of 
democracy in the whole world and, according to it, the stages of democratisation 
occurred in Western countries in the past should be used as preconditions for the 
establishment of democracy in cultures and countries where democracy is poor or 
does not exist yet. In this thinking, the degree and the quality of democratisation in 
such countries could be measured based on value standards developed in the so called 
'advanced democracies'. I will introduce the theoretical questioning of 'mainstream 
democracy' presenting a variety of non-Western, post-colonial and Arab 
reinterpretations that aim at breaking the paradigm of normative liberal democracy. 
After such brief outline of the ongoing debate that aims at countering the traditional 
notion of liberal democracy, I will consider how the meaning of the concept of 
democracy, when transferred into other cultural contexts, is modified and 
reinterpreted based on the cultural, social and political situation locally. In order to do 
so, I will analyse the meaning of democracy in the 2012 Egyptian Constitution issued 
by the Freedom and Justice Party, in close connection with the Society of the Muslim 
Brothers. In this sense, democracy, that has recently been a matter of renewed interest 
in the international theoretical panorama, is redefined in terms of its meaning and 
outreach, also based on the cultural and political demands of the local governments. 
This process of redefinition is particularly interesting from a linguistic and 
translational point of view, since it seems to reproduce some of the effects of the 
6 
 
metonymics of translation and deals with the need to change the meaning of the 
translated words to adapt them to the target cultural context. 
Finally, I will analyse the way in which the notion of democracy in the 2012 Egyptian 
Constitution gets retold and strengthened through its translation into English by Dr. 
Nivien Saleh, a German-Egyptian academic scholar of Global politics and 
management who works in the United States. 
In order to perform text analysis, I will utilise the socio-narrative theory adapted by 
Mona Baker to analyse translations with a constructivist approach. In this sense, 
translation will not be intended as an operation of transferring meaning from the 
source to the target text, so that the original value is preserved. This is because, even 
though translators could deliberately aim at safeguarding authenticity and know, 
understand and speak the languages they work with, they would not be able to 
translate 'objectively'. Partial/personal translation is inevitable due to the impossibility 
to control a large number of variables that include, but are not limited to, cultural 
aspects related to the translator's training, their interests and opinions and, ultimately, 
their experiences in life. More generally, one should also take into account the 
interventions of the individuals who interact while writing, editing, translating, 
publishing, reading, interpreting and receiving the translated texts. In this dissertation 
I will claim that the transfer of meanings from one language into another (which is 
ultimately termed as 'translation') is always influenced by factors that inevitably cause 
a textual transformation in the first place. Secondly, since I will claim that any text 
can influence, modify and definitively intervene on its own production environment, I 
will also maintain that the translated text, together with its subsequent changes and 
modifications, will have an impact on its broader cultural context, also by affecting 
the behaviour of individuals and groups.  
This implies that the very same way in which translation is conceived subsequently 
influences the broader cultural context. In this perspective, translation will be 
considered a communicative cultural process that, while introducing new elements 
into a different context, uses the transfer of meanings at the language level as a 
strategy to endorse the cultural adaptation of the original text. In this way, the 
translated texts will abide by the standards which are generally accepted in the 
receiving culture, thus influencing and being influenced by the local recurring 
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discourses and topics shared by the individuals and the communities who receive 
them. Despite this being the case for the whole target text, such process can be easily 
identified in the translation of certain terms that are deemed to be particularly relevant 
within the universe of shared meanings at a cultural level. Although such terms could 
be easily considered equivalent to their original meaning, they can also undergo, as 
well as cause, extensive changes, and one such term is precisely 'democracy'. While 
considering translation as a communicative process, which is subject to the 
interpretation of a number of individuals, I will also claim the absence of a neutral 
point of view and, consequently, the impossibility to produce a text which is actually 
equivalent to its original. 
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1 - THE PROBLEM OF DEMOCRACY 
 
 1 .1  The  mea ning  and  def in i t io n o f  democracy  
 
 The modern notion of democracy will be presented here as a changing 
concept, being continually redefined and extended to large or small cultural contexts 
since its very origins. In this sense, democracy has served as a gathering point of 
different, sometimes diverging, values and interpretations of political and social 
justice in time and space
2
. Democracy in its modern version has always been a 
contested concept
3
 which, even though, on the one hand, is defined according to 
times, places and local needs, it is also, on the other, considered a universal value
4
 
that all people should bear in mind and struggle for. Such aspects have made it 
increasingly difficult to come to a shared definition and are still kindling the debate 
over what might be the most inclusive preconditions, as well as stages and actions 
that are necessary to establish and maintain democracy globally.  
 In an attempt to find its true and definitive origins, scholars refer back to 
Ancient Greek models of democratic governance and reinterpret them to find possible 
connections, best practices and viable solutions for modern democracy
5
. Apart from 
research into its etymological and historical origins in ancient times, democracy in its 
modern interpretations stands out to be a significant form of government in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In those ages, contractualist theorists
6
 propose 
to pursue the principle of equality and the preservation of natural rights and Jean-Jack 
Rousseau's theorisation
7
 of the social contract, inspired by the Ancient Greek model,  
envisages democracy as a possible form of government. 
                                                         
2 For a general overview of the concept of democracy in Western political thought see Sartori, 1962, 
and 1987; Birch, 1993; Held, 2006; Dahl, Shapiro, Cheibub, 2006; MacPherson, 2011.  
3 Sartori, 1962. 
4 Sen, 1999. 
5 See, for instance, Robinson, 2004; Hansen, 1991; Raaflaub, Ober, Wallace, 2007; Ober, Hedrick, 
1996. 
6 Hobbes, 1651/1929; Locke, 1690. 
7 Rousseau, 1762/2010. 
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Such notions were questioned by the utilitarian
8
 understanding of liberty as the 
pursuit of the highest levels of individual happiness and the idea of democracy as a 
'tyranny of the majority'
9
.  
During the nineteenth century, political and economic liberal and utilitarian theories 
of lassez-faire were challenged both internally and externally by socialist theories
10
. 
 In the twentieth century, such social, political and economic theories competed 
against one another for their establishment in different parts of the world and shaped 
national political debates differently according to their local social and economic 
contexts and needs.  
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century a new procedural concept of 
liberal democracy
11
 took shape and established itself as the most influential form of 
government in different parts of the world. Despite its global dissemination and 
success, such procedural democracy has been constantly criticised by liberal
12
, 
libertarian
13
, and communitarian
14
, as well as participatory deliberative
15
 and 
multicultural
16
 stances.  
In the next paragraphs, such processes and developments will be described by 
analysing the formation of the notion of modern democracy in Western political 
thought. More specifically, in paragraph 1.2, the main features will be highlighted by 
introducing western political scholars who contributed to the establishment of the 
mainstream model of liberal democracy from Rousseau's definition to Huntington's 
1991 study of the waves of democratisation. In paragraph 1.3, the consequences of a 
first questioning of liberal democracy and its consecutive readjustment to diversity 
and cultural demands will be analysed as a way to ensure  inclusiveness and pluralism 
to newly established minorities. 
                                                         
8 Bentham, 1891; Mill, 1859/2001. 
9
 Tocqueville, 1835/2009. 
10
 Marx, 1887; Marx & Engels, 1888.  
11
 Dahl, 1973, 1989, 2006a, 2006b; Rawls, 1958, 1971/1999; Habermas, 1994, 1996; Fukuyama, 1992. 
12
 Schumpeter, 1943/1976; Hayek, 1982. 
13
 Rothbard, 1976/2006; 1998; Nozick, 1974; Dworkin, 1977. 
14
 MacIntyre, 1981; Walzer, 1983, Mouffe, 1993; Mouffe & Laclau, 1985; Bell, 2000; 2006; Bell, 
Brown, Jayasuriya & Jones, 1995; Bell & Jayasuriya, 1995. 
15
 Bohman & Rehg, 1997; Bohman, 1998; Gutmann & Thompson, 2002; 2004; Cohen, 2009; Fishkin, 
1988; 2009; Dryzek, 2006; 2008. 
16
 Taylor, 1984; 1993; Kymlicka, 1995; Benhabib, 2004; Parekh, 2000.  
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1 . 2  The  def in i t ion  of  democracy  f rom Ro ussea u to  
H unt ingto n   
 
 The modern notion of democracy is thought to be originated and inspired in 
the eighteenth century, by the American and French Revolutions, and as a 
consequence of the adoptions of the United States Constitution in 1787 and of the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in 1789. Later in the 
nineteenth century, universal male suffrage is established in France as a consequence 
of the 1848 Revolution, which leads other European states to claim for democratic 
provisions and for the adoption of national constitutions.  
 The Genevan philosopher and writer Jean-Jacques Rousseau greatly 
influences the revolutionary movement in France with his treatise "Du contrat social 
ou Principes du droit politique", ['Of The Social Contract, Or Principles of Political 
Right']
17
. In his work, he sets out to find the best way to constitute a legitimate 
political authority to counter the social problems of the time, which he views close to 
the ones of the state of nature. In his work, Rousseau defines the concept of the social 
contract as  
a form of association that will bring the whole common force to bear on defending and 
protecting each associate’s person and goods, doing this in such a way that each of them, 
while uniting himself with all, still obeys only himself and remains as free as before
18
. 
Rousseau considers the social contract as the only way for individuals to have their 
interests mutually recognised and protected. The conditions of such contract, 
according to the philosopher, are such that «the slightest change would make them 
null and void»
19
 and even if they are not made openly explicit, «they are everywhere 
the same and everywhere tacitly accepted and recognised»
20
. If such agreement was 
infringed, each individual would go back to the state of nature, thus regaining his 
rights and liberties. Rousseau views the social contract as a necessary «total 
alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community» for 
the sake of survival.  
                                                         
17
 Rousseau, 1762/2010. 
18
 Rousseau, 1762/2010:6. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid. 
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In his work, he defines the sovereign as the individual or group retaining the supreme 
power and goes on to describe the possible forms of government that the sovereign, 
as the holder of the supreme power, could decide to subscribe to: 
(A) The sovereign may put the government in the hands of the whole people or of a majority 
of them, so that among the citizens the magistrates outnumber the merely private individuals. 
This form of government is called democracy. (B) Or the sovereign may restrict the 
government to a small number of citizens, so that the private citizens outnumber magistrates; 
and this is called aristocracy. (C) Or the sovereign may concentrate the whole government in 
the hands of a single magistrate from whom all the others—·i.e. all the other governmental 
officials·—hold their power. This third form is the most usual, and is called monarchy, or 
royal government.
21
 
According to the philosopher, even if democracy is to be considered the best of the 
three possible forms of government, it is also the most difficult to achieve since «it’s 
against the natural order for the many to govern and the few to be governed», and 
people could never continually dedicate themselves to public affairs. Moreover, the 
conditions for democracy to exist are extremely demanding, since they would require 
the existence of a small state where people could easily gather and be informed about 
public matters, «simplicity of moeurs, to prevent complexity and controversy in 
public affairs», «equality in rank and fortune», and «little or no luxury» because it 
corrupts individuals, given that the rich would have more wealth and the poor would 
desire to get it. Such corruption, according to Rousseau, is generated by the fact that 
the very same person who makes the laws, also executes them, and that the people 
concentrate on particular, private matters instead of focussing on general concerns. 
This deviation of democracy could only be avoided by the «vigilance and courage» of 
virtuous individuals, since «a people that would always govern well wouldn’t need to 
be governed». Failure to guard and supervise would thus result in the democratic 
government being easily «subject to civil wars and internal agitations». In a real 
democracy, according to Rousseau, in agreement with the practice of the ancient 
Athenian democracy, the best method to select representatives is through «election by 
                                                         
21
 Rousseau, 1762/2010:33. 
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lottery»
22
, given that all people are equally virtuous, and retain the same «talents as 
well as principles and fortunes»
23
. 
 The principle of equality envisaged by Rousseau and the idea of a common 
good attainable by a social contract is countered in the same period by Jeremy 
Bentham. In his 'A Fragment on Government'
24
, the British philosopher and jurist 
criticises Sir William Blackstone's 'Commentaries on the Laws of England' for failing 
to give a meaningful and precise account on the nature and justification of authority. 
According to Bentham, Blackstone fails to consider the real reason of the people in 
the state of nature for renouncing their power: 
With respect to actions in general, there is no property in them that is calculated so readily to 
engage, and so firmly to fix the attention of an observer, as the tendency they may have to, or 
divergency (if one may so say) from, that which maybe styled the common end of all of them. 
The end I mean is Happiness: and this tendency in any act is what we style its utility: as this 
divergency is that to which we give the name of mischievousness.
25
 
What makes people all the same, in Bentham's opinion, is a common propensity to 
pursue happiness, so that when one acts in order to achieve his utility, he is 
considered a good man. On the contrary, when any action does not help, but rather 
eliminates the possibility to realize one's own happiness, it is judged to be a damaging 
enterprise and thus punishable by law. 
With respect then to such actions in particular as are among the objects of the Law, to point 
out to a man the utility of them or the mischievousness, is the only way to make him see 
clearly that property of them which every man is in search of; the only way, in short, to give 
him satisfaction.
26
 
Following from such assumption, Bentham finds that it is through utility as a general 
and universal principle, «recognized by all men»
27
, that it is possible to govern «such 
arrangement as shall be made of the several institutions or combinations of 
institutions»
28
. According to the British philosopher, such arrangement based on 
                                                         
22
 Rousseau, 1762/2010:34. 
23
 Rousseau, 1762/2010:57. 
24
 Bentham, 1891. 
25
 Bentham, 1891:118. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Bentham, 1891:119. 
28
 Ibid. 
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utility could «serve the jurisprudence of any one country, would serve with little 
variation for that of any other»
29
. 
 Rousseau's likening of modern democracy to the Athenian model is criticised 
by the Swiss-French politician Benjamin Constant in 1819. In his speech 'De la 
liberté des Anciens comparée à celle des Modernes', ['The Liberty of the Ancients 
Compared with that of the Moderns']
30
, Constant argues that «since the liberty we 
need is different from that of the ancients, it needs to be organised differently from 
ancient liberty»
31
. More specifically, he claims that in ancient times, «the more time 
and energy a man dedicated to exercising his political rights, the freer he thought 
himself to be»
32
. On the contrary, liberty in the modern times is considered to be 
related to the time a man can dedicate to his private interests. Because of this 
difference, in the modern age, a representative system is constituted, so that men 
designate «a few individuals to do what»
33
 they cannot or do not want to do 
themselves. However, such lack of interest of the modern man in public affairs, 
«absorbed in the enjoyment of our private independence and the pursuit of our 
particular interests»
34
, could result in surrendering too easily our right to share in 
political power»
35
, to the advantage of our representatives who «are so ready to spare 
us every sort of trouble except the trouble of obeying and paying»
36
. On the contrary, 
when citizens take an active part in preserving their interests, their spirits are 
enlarged, their thoughts ennobled and they enjoy intellectual equality
37
. 
According to Constant, one should be able to combine the enjoyment of the two kinds 
of liberties, so that  
the people who resort to the representative system so as to enjoy the liberty that suits them, 
should exercise an active and constant surveillance over their representatives, and reserve for 
                                                         
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Constant, 1819/2010. 
31
 Constant, 1819/2010:12. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Constant, 1819/2010:12-13. 
36
 Constant, 1819/2010:13. 
37
 Ibid. 
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themselves the right—at times that aren’t too far apart—to discard them if they betray their 
trust, and to revoke any powers they have abused
38
. 
In this sense, Constant suggests that the modern man should be wary of a legislator 
who «has simply brought peace to the people»
39
, since his work is not complete 
«when the populace is satisfied»
40
. Rather, institutions should also educate morally 
their citizens, and make sure they contribute to the government, «by respecting their 
individual rights, securing their independence, refraining from troubling their 
work»
41
. 
 In 1830s a different comparative attempt is undertaken by the French political 
thinker and historian Alexis de Tocqueville, who, in his work 'De la démocratie en 
Amérique', ['Democracy in America']
42
, examines the conditions of the establishment 
and flourishing of democracy in the United States. Tocqueville is particularly 
interested in finding out the causes for the United States' exceptional «equality of 
conditions»
43
. At the same moment, while considering such conditions «having 
reached its extreme limits as in the United States»
44
, he observes a different trend in 
Europe, which, although increasingly closer to the American democratic experience, 
has not reached the same results yet:  
It seems to me beyond doubt that sooner or later, we will arrive, like the Americans, at a 
nearly complete equality of conditions. From that, I do not conclude that one day we are 
necessarily called to draw from such a social state the political consequences that the 
Americans have drawn from it. I am very far from believing that they have found the only 
form of government that democracy may take; but in the two countries the generating cause of 
laws and mores is the same; that is enough for us to have an immense interest in knowing 
what that generating cause has produced in each of them
45
.  
According to the historian, in France the revolution in terms of social change, only 
happened superficially, and was not extended to «the laws, ideas, habits and 
                                                         
38
 Constant, 1819/2010:12. 
39
 Constant, 1819/2010:14. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
Ibid. 
42
 Tocqueville, 1835/2009 and 1840/2009. 
43
 Tocqueville, 1835/2009:80. 
44
 Ibid. 
45
 Tocqueville, 1835/2009:89. 
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mores»
46
. Tocqueville thus aims at analysing the American democracy, the one that 
has «reached the most complete and most peaceful development»
47
, so as to «find 
lessons there from which we would be able to profit»
48
. More specifically, the French 
historian considers it necessary for modern leaders  
to instruct democracy, to revive its beliefs if possible, to purify its mores, to regulate its 
movements, [...] knowledge of its true interests for its blind instincts; to adapt its government 
to times and places; to modify it according to circumstances and men
49
. 
Among the differences Tocqueville finds in America is the fact that equality is 
widespread in property, since inheritance law is such that it equally distributes land 
among all of a family's siblings. Equality is also found in education, so that «a great 
multitude of individuals [...] have about the same number of notions in matters of 
religion, history, the sciences, political economy, legislation, and government»
50
. 
Such aspect, according to Tocqueville, not only contributes to weaken aristocracy, but 
also, and more importantly, results in political equality
51
. Such a «manly and 
legitimate passion for equality»
52
 also outdoes the relevance of liberty, which, 
according to Tocqueville, is «not the principal and constant object of their desire»
53
, 
since «without equality nothing can satisfy them, and rather than lose it, they would 
agree to perish»
54
. 
Another relevant aspect in American democracy is that of the power of the majority, 
«based in part on the idea that there is more enlightenment and wisdom in many men 
combined than in one man alone»
55
, and, on the other hand, depending on the 
«principle that the interests of the greatest number must be preferred to those of the 
few»
56
. In this sense, accordance and sense of equality are so strong in America, that 
the members of the minority are forced «to abandon the very object of the struggle»
57
. 
                                                         
46
 Tocqueville, 1835/2009:84. 
47
 Tocqueville, 1835/2009:89. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 Tocqueville, 1835/2009:83-84. 
50
 Tocqueville, 1835/2009:119. 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Tocqueville, 1835/2009:120. 
53
 Ibid. 
54
 Ibid. 
55
 Tocqueville, 1840/2009:404. 
56
 Tocqueville, 1840/2009:405. 
57
 Tocqueville, 1840/2009:406. 
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As a consequence to such «omnipotence of the majority»
58
, decisions are rapidly 
applied and enforced, thus making the law and public administration unstable. Such a 
negative tendency of the majority stems from an intrinsic «mildness of 
government»59 and is for Tocqueville a 'tyranny', against which American 
democracy has no protection. 
 The theme of the tyranny of the majority as a tendency of society to impinge 
on individual liberties is also examined by John Stuart Mill in his 1859 essay, 'On 
Liberty'
60
, in which he aims at analysing the «nature and limits of the power which 
can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual»
61
. A student of 
Bentham's theory of utilitarianism, Mill believes that, in order to guarantee a «good 
condition of human affairs»
62
, «protection against political despotism»
63
 and 
independence, it is necessary to determine the limits «to the legitimate interference of 
collective opinion»
64
, since «all that makes existence valuable to any one, depends on 
the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people»
65
. According to Mill, 
even if it is necessary to impose some rules of conduct to men,  
no two ages, and scarcely any two countries, have decided it alike; and the decision of one age 
or country is a wonder to another. Yet the people of any given age and country no more 
suspect any difficulty in it, than if it were a subject on which mankind had always been 
agreed.
66
  
In this sense, Mill claims that rules and the limits that appeared to be «self-evident 
and self-justifying»
67
 in a country at a given age, might not make sense in a different 
part of the world or at a different age; but rather such «universal illusion»
68
 is the 
result of the influence of customs and traditions. As a consequence, everyone would 
be inclined to think that other people «should be required to act as he, and those with 
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whom he sympathises, would like them to act»
69
, without noticing that «his standard 
of judgment is his own liking»
70
: 
To an ordinary man, however, his own preference, thus supported, is not only a perfectly 
satisfactory reason, but the only one he generally has for any of his notions of morality, taste, 
or propriety, which are not expressly written in his religious creed; and his chief guide in the 
interpretation even of that
71
. 
Such a self-centred attitude is considered inescapable by Mill, who observes that «the 
rules laid down for general observance»
72
 are actually based on the «likings and 
dislikings of society, or of some powerful portion of it»
73
, thus actually enacting the 
'tyranny of the majority': 
They have occupied themselves rather in inquiring what things society ought to like or dislike, 
than in questioning whether its likings or dislikings should be a law to individuals. They 
preferred endeavouring to alter the feelings of mankind on the particular points on which they 
were themselves heretical, rather than make common cause in defence of freedom, with 
heretics generally
74
. 
In agreement with Bentham's assertions, Mill thus argues that utility is «the ultimate 
appeal on all ethical questions»
75
 and as such, in its broadest and more inclusive 
sense, it justifies «the subjection of individual spontaneity to external control»
76
. In 
this sense, the liberty of an individual could be infringed upon only in case his actions 
damage other individuals: 
The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with 
the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, 
is to prevent harm to others
77
. 
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Based on such principle, Mill more specifically describes the areas of human liberty 
that should be protected and that include the «domain of consciousness»
78
, regarding 
the liberty «of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, 
scientific, moral, or theological»
79
, as well as «the liberty of expressing and 
publishing opinions»
80
. In addition to it, the principle also refers to «liberty of tastes 
and pursuits»
81
, so that an individual is considered free to choose his way of life 
without being hindered by society, so long as he does not act unwisely or incorrectly. 
Finally, the principle also includes protection of «freedom to unite, for any purpose 
not involving harm to others»
82
.  
Mill's defence of individual liberties stems directly from his opinion on the value of 
the State depending on the conditions of the single individuals who live in it. In this 
sense, the small men, whose State «postpones the interests of their mental expansion 
and elevation to a little more of administrative skill»
83
, are diminished so that they 
become «more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes»
84
. 
However, such men are also incapable of accomplishing important objectives in life. 
 Bentham and Mill's utilitarian theory, together with Adam Smith's economic 
liberalism, contribute to further establishing political philosophical liberalism, that is 
initiated in the early modern age with contractualist theories, and that inspires the 
American and French Revolutions in the late eighteenth century. During the 
nineteenth century, such liberal theories disseminate democratic and constitutional 
ideals throughout Europe, and, at the economic level, come to support capitalist 
lassez-faire models of production. However, at the same time, the growing rates of 
poverty and unemployment in the industrialised cities lead to reconsider economic 
liberal theories in the light of social and state intervention in the economic system. In 
the second half of the nineteenth century, such socialist theories are criticised by the 
German philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who reinterpret socialism as 
an anti-capitalist social and economic system, namely communism, based on 
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common ownership of the means of production and on the abolition of social classes. 
During the twentieth century, liberal capitalist theories, on the one hand, and socialist 
communist ones, on the other, have changing fortunes in different countries. In the 
Western world, liberalism has a considerable impact until the 1930s, when socialism 
advocates for state control over economy. In the Eastern part of the world, the 
constitution of the Soviet Union in the 1920s leads to the establishment of a large 
socialist and communist political system. 
 In the 1940s, the Austrian economist and political scientist Joseph Schumpeter 
analyses the Marxian social and economic theory and criticises the utilitarian notion 
of democracy supported by capitalist economics in his 1943 work 'Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy'
85
. More specifically, he questions the existence of «a 
uniquely determined common good that all people could agree on or be made to agree 
on by the force of rational argument»
86
. According to Schumpeter, different 
individuals and groups inevitably mean different things when they refer to the notion 
of the 'common good' and such difference could not possibly be «reconciled by 
rational argument because ultimate values—our conceptions of what life and what 
society should be—are beyond the range of mere logic».87 The Austrian economist 
argues that such way of assuming the rationality and logic of democracy is rather a 
strategy to make certain national values universal, by extending the concept of 
democracy to other contexts:
 
Democracy, when motivated in this way, ceases to be a mere method that can be discussed 
rationally like a steam engine or a disinfectant. It actually becomes what from another 
standpoint I have held it incapable of becoming, viz., an ideal or rather a part of an ideal 
schema of things. The very word may become a flag, a symbol of all a man holds dear, of 
everything that he loves about his nation whether rationally contingent to it or not. [...] There 
is the fact that the forms and phrases of classical democracy are for many nations associated 
with events and developments in their history which are enthusiastically approved by large 
majorities
88
. 
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Not only is the assumption of the rationality of people not questioned at all, but fair 
competition through elections is conceived to be the only possible method for a 
democracy to flourish, thus restricting «the kind of competition for leadership which 
is to define democracy, to free competition for a free vote»
89
:  
We now take the view that the role of the people is to produce a government, or else an 
intermediate body which in turn will produce a national executive or government. And we 
define: the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political 
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle 
for the people’s vote.90 
Schumpeter likens the political electoral competition to some unfair cases of 
economic competition and claims that the way democracy is thought of is «a 
completely unrealistic ideal»
91
. Since a perfect electoral system, which could 
completely and exactly reflect the decisions of the people, is impossible to attain, 
Schumpeter concludes that it is only possible to enact an impure democratic process, 
that, even if it takes account of the opinions of the majority, it is inattentive to any 
other minority claims: 
Between this ideal case which does not exist and the cases in which all competition with the 
established leader is prevented by force, there is a continuous range of variation within which 
the democratic method of government shades off into the autocratic one by imperceptible 
steps
92
. 
To this regard he also argues that «no society tolerates absolute freedom even of 
conscience and of speech, no society reduces that sphere to zero»93, but rather such 
freedoms are accommodated to varying degrees. On this account, it is also possible to 
conclude that «the democratic method does not necessarily guarantee a greater 
amount of individual freedom than another political method would permit in similar 
circumstances»
94
. Such reflections lead Schumpeter to assert the need to commit to a 
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«strictly, relativist view»
95
, according to which «there is no absolutely general case 
for or against the democratic method». He thus claims that 
democracy thrives in social patterns that display certain characteristics and it might well be 
doubted whether there is any sense in asking how it would fare in others that lack those 
characteristics—or how the people in those other patterns would fare with it. 96 
The German economist maintains that the democratic method could work 
satisfactorily only upon certain conditions, within the only possible context of «the 
great industrial nations of the modern type»
97
. Such requirements, for Schumpeter, 
regard the high quality, knowledge and goodness of political representatives
98
 and the 
range of political decisions to be taken, which should be based on the actual 
capacities of the people dealing with politics, and not surpass them
99
. Another 
necessary condition in order for democracy to work adequately is also the presence of 
a «well-trained bureaucracy of good standing and tradition, endowed with a strong 
sense of duty and a no less strong esprit de corps, [...] strong enough to guide and, if 
need be, to instruct the politicians who head the ministries»
100
. Finally, Schumpeter 
also advocates for «Democratic Self-control», so that «all the groups that count in a 
nation are willing to accept any legislative measure»
101
. 
The German economist also claims that a successful democracy should be supported 
by the ethical consistency of «electorates and parliaments»
102
, that have to «be on an 
intellectual and moral level high enough to be proof against the offerings of the crook 
and the crank, or else men who are neither will be driven into the ways of both»
103
. 
To counter deviating practice, however, there needs to be a «minimum of democratic 
self-control»
104
 supported by «a national character and national habits of a certain 
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type»
105
, which in some place might not have the possibility to arise and «which the 
democratic method itself cannot be relied on to produce»
106
. 
 With the end of World War II and the Allied victory in 1945, two general 
areas of economic and political influence gradually take shape, which respectively 
refer to the Soviet Union and the United States. While the Soviet Union exerts a 
centralised communist political and economic control over its satellite states in 
Central and Eastern Europe, the United States commit to extend liberal and 
democratic ideals to Western European states. At the same time, decolonisation of 
former colonies and occupied territories start with the gradual constitution of a variety 
of independent countries and, at stages, is countered by coloniser countries which try 
to retain their economic and political control over them. The economic and political 
opposition between the Eastern and Western blocs, known as the Cold War, shapes 
political thought throughout the second half of the twentieth century and, in spite of 
the openings to capitalist economy in the Eastern part of the world, such antagonism 
still continues to wield a considerable influence. Following and reflecting such 
opposition, during the 1950s and throughout the second half of the twentieth century, 
the debate over the concept of democracy unravels along different strands of thought, 
in order, on the one hand, to support and justify a general call for democratisation, 
and, on the other, to criticise and go beyond normative Western political thought. 
In the 1950s, a group of political theorists sets out to study the democratic theory in 
more detail, thus initiating a normative procedural strand of thought that tries to both 
establish and optimise the conditions upon which a successful democratic 
government can be constituted.  
In his 1956 work entitled 'A Preface to Democratic Theory'
107
, the American political 
scientist Robert Alan Dahl proposes the study of democracy as a way to both 
maximize a set of democratic goals and describe actually democratic countries, thus 
adopting both a normative and a descriptive method
108
. Dahl criticises the modern 
«procedural rule for the perfect or ideal attainment of political equality and popular 
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sovereignty»
109
 which is «no more than an exercise in axiomatics»
110
 and defines the 
democratic theory as «concerned with processes by which ordinary citizens exert a 
relatively high degree of control over leaders»
111
.  
The American scholar then proposes to study «the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for maximizing democracy in the real world»
112
 and he asserts that, in order to do so, 
one should consider the conditions in which political equality is increased, so that 
«the preference of each member of an organization is assigned equal value»
113
. 
Because constant inequalities between individuals could never be overcome, he 
acknowledges the impossibility for any country to actually become democratic
114
. 
However, he maintains that it is still possible to maximize the conditions of political 
equality. He thus claims that the closest possible expression of it is that particular 
situation in which the opinion of each individual has the same value as that of all 
others and identifies it in competitive elections
115
. Dahl then analyses the electoral 
procedures and systems and poses a number of conditions for political equality to be 
maximised
116
. However, since, according to Dahl, those ideal conditions could never 
be achieved in the real world, he introduces the notion of a 'polyarchal democracy', in 
which both democratic and undemocratic processes are present
117
. The American 
scholar thus defines 'polyarchy' as a political system in which the ideal conditions 
which he has previously formulated «exist to a relatively high degree»
118
. In this 
sense, «the theory of polyarchy, an inadequate, incomplete, primitive ordering of the 
common store of knowledge about democracy»
119
 could be considered a theory of an 
incomplete democracy, which in any case could contribute to the construction of «a 
satisfactory theory about political equality»
120
.  
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In further years, Dahl goes on to define more specifically the idea of polyarchies as  
«relatively (but incompletely) democratized regimes, or, [...] regimes that have been 
substantially popularized and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively 
open to public contestation»
121
. He thus defines democratization «as consisting of 
several broad historical transformations»
122
 and sets out the stages a country has to 
undergo in order to become a polyarchy: 
One is the transformation of hegemonies and competitive oligarchies into near-polyarchies. 
This was, in essence, the process at work in the Western world during the nineteenth century. 
A second is the transformation of near-polyarchies into full polyarchies. This was what 
occurred in Europe in the three decades or so that spanned the end of the last century and the 
First World War. A third is the further democratization of full polyarchies. This historical 
moment can perhaps be dated to the rapid development of the democratic welfare state after 
the onset of the Great Depression; interrupted by the Second World War, the process seems to 
have renewed itself in the late 1960s in the form of rapidly rising demands, notably among 
young people, for the democratization of a variety of social institutions
123
. 
According to this view, «hegemonic regimes and competitive oligarchies»
124
 could 
become polyarchies, so that they increase «the opportunities for effective 
participation and contestation»
125
. Furthermore, the history of democratisation of 
Western countries is considered to be a model suitable for all other countries in the 
world that have not democratised yet. 
Even if that basic notion of polyarchy remains unchanged in Dahl's democratic 
theory, in later works he constantly redefines the conditions for a polyarchy to exist. 
In his 1989 work 'Democracy and its critics'
126
, the American political scientist 
develops the concept of 'adequate and equal opportunity', which is the necessary 
condition of the citizens  «for expressing their preferences as to the final outcome»
127
 
as well as «for placing questions on the agenda and for expressing reasons for 
endorsing one outcome rather than another»
128
. According to him, «to deny any 
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citizen adequate opportunities for effective participation means that because their 
preferences are unknown or incorrectly perceived, they cannot be taken into 
account»
129
. In this sense, preventing a citizen from enjoying equal opportunities 
would be discriminating and would make it impossible for a state to become a 
polyarchy. In his work Dahl poses seven sets of conditions
130
 for polyarchies to exist 
which refer to historical, social, and economic aspects and which include a country's 
peaceful transition into an independent state; reduced intervention by military forces; 
economic and social development in order to increase literacy and education; reduced 
presence of political inequalities through making contestation accepted and political 
activists independent; the absence of foreign control
131
. 
In his 2006 book 'On Political Equality'
132
, Dahl focuses on the concept of political 
equality assuming that «if we believe in democracy as a goal or ideal, then implicitly 
we must view political equality as a goal or ideal»
133
. According to him, not only 
such assumptions appear «to be highly reasonable»
134
, but they also set «feasible and 
realistic»
135
 goals «within our human reach»
136
, given the «historical advance of 
‘‘democratic’’ systems and the expansion of citizenship to include more and more 
adults»
137
. 
In his work Dahl considers «the importance of some widespread—even universal—
human drives»
138
 to political equality and analyses also «some fundamental aspects of 
human beings and human societies that impose persistent barriers to political 
equality»
139
. The American scholar envisages «an alternative and more hopeful 
future», in which there could be «a cultural shift that would lead to a substantial 
reduction in the political inequalities that now prevail among American citizens»
140
. 
Starting from the definition of 'intrinsic equality' as  
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the moral judgment that all human beings are of equal intrinsic worth, that no person is 
intrinsically superior to another, and that the good or interests of each person must be given 
equal consideration
141
. 
Dahl moves on to consider the political implications of such idea by restricting his 
«focus to the government of a state»
142
. He thus claims that 
among adults no persons are so definitely better qualified than others to govern that they 
should be entrusted with complete and final authority over the government of the state
143
. 
Dahl advances that no person should be given complete and final authority because of 
the fact that they are better prepared to govern, but rather «free discussion and 
controversy are [...] essential to the pursuit of truth—or, if you prefer, to reasonably 
justifiable judgments»
144
, because a government in which citizens do not control 
leaders would be worse than modern authoritarian regimes.  
In his book Dahl claims that in order for modern states to be democratic, there needs 
to be a concept of ideal democracy, or democratic ideal objectives, that include a set 
of peculiar features. Firstly, all the members of an association should have the 
opportunity to give their opinions before policies are implemented
145
. Secondly,  
when having to decide on policies, all the members should have the opportunity to 
participate in voting and all votes should be equally valued and counted
146
. Third, all 
members should be given sufficient time and opportunity to get informed about 
possible alternative policies
147
. In addition, the demos should be able to choose the 
topics of discussion in the agenda, and, more generally, to participate freely and be 
actually included in all the activities mentioned earlier
148
. Finally, such previous 
political activities should be protected by the presence of fundamental rights
149
. 
Dahl, however, acknowledges that such ideal features of democracy are always 
countered by a variety of unjust occurrences in the real world: 
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Always and everywhere, the goal of political equality among the citizens of a political unit 
faces formidable obstacles: the distribution of political resources, skills, and incentives; 
irreducible limits on time; the size of political systems; the prevalence of market economies; 
the existence of international systems that may be important but are not democratic; and the 
inevitability of severe crises
150
. 
For this reason, in order to ensure that democracies around the world could get as 
close as possible to the democratic ideal, the American political scientist proposes a 
set of procedures, which include the presence of «elected representatives», the 
arrangement of «free, fair, and frequent elections»; the possibility to express one's 
own opinions freely, the existence of «alternative sources of information», the 
possibility for people to associate autonomously, and the «inclusion of all members of 
the demos»
151
. 
 In the late 1950s, the American moral philosopher John Rawls criticises the 
utilitarian concept of justice and analyses practices and procedures of justice, 
proposing a different view of it and introducing his idea of 'justice as fairness'
152
. He 
defines it as 
the mutual acceptance, from a general position, of the principles on which a practice is 
founded, and how this in turn requires the exclusion from consideration of claims violating 
the principles of justice
153
. 
 
In his early paper, Rawls asserts that such concept of justice could be generally 
accepted,  
since in the life of every society there must be at least some relations in which the parties 
consider themselves to be circumstanced and related as the concept of justice as fairness 
requires
154
. 
According to Rawls, such notion of justice could be applicable to describe all 
societies, because the difference among them resides «not in having or in failing to 
have this notion but in the range of cases to which they apply it and in the emphasis 
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which they give to it as compared with other moral concepts»
155
. In this view, 
societies differ not for the fact that some of them do not have the idea of justice, but 
because they apply the principles in different ways and to diverse areas of interest.  
In his later and highly influential 1971 work, 'A Theory of Justice'
156
, Rawls proposes 
a more systematic theory of 'justice as fairness’, reinterpreting the notion of social 
contract and trying to solve the conflicts between liberty and equality. The American 
philosopher sets out to solve the problem of distributive justice, that is the problem of 
distributing goods to society according to just criteria.  
Revising the traditional theory of the social contract, he explains his concept of 
justice as fairness through a mental experiment, «a purely hypothetical situation 
characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice»
157
, that he calls «original 
position of equality»
158
 describing it as follows: 
No one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know 
his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his  intelligence, strength, and the 
like [...] the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological 
propensities
159
.  
Rawls advances that in order eliminate conflicts of interests in defining what should 
be considered just for a society, the principles of justice should be «chosen behind a 
veil of ignorance»
160
. In this sense, such principles are established without knowing 
one's own social and economic conditions in order to obtain a fair agreement: 
This ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the 
outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. Since all are similarly 
situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles 
of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain. [...] The original position is, one might 
say, the appropriate initial status quo, and thus the fundamental agreements reached in it are 
fair
161
. 
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According to Rawls, even if «no society can [...] be a scheme of cooperation which 
men enter voluntarily in a literal sense»
162
, a society that is able to reach a consensus 
over the definition of justice as fairness could be very close to such an ideal situation, 
because «its members are autonomous and the obligations they recognize self-
imposed»
163
. In this sense, the parties involved in the agreement should be «rational 
and mutually disinterested»
164
, so that while they know that they have some rational 
plan of life, they do not know the details of this plan»
165
. They know, in fact, 
that in general they must try to protect their liberties, widen their opportunities, and enlarge 
their means for promoting their aims whatever these are. Guided by the theory of the good 
and the general facts of moral psychology, their deliberations are no longer guesswork. They 
can make a rational decision in the ordinary sense
166
. 
Rawls makes the case for «the assumption of mutually disinterested rationality»
167
 
claiming that when people are in the original position, they are not moved by 
affection or rancor»
168
 nor are they «envious or vain»
169
, but rather they try to 
«advance their system of ends as far as possible [...] by attempting to win for 
themselves the highest index of primary social goods»
170
.  
In order to be assumed to be rational, however, the parties necessarily have to be 
capable of referring to a common and publicly well-known sense of justice, so that 
they can respect the principles they chose and «insure the integrity of the agreement 
made in the original position»
171.
  
After such initial setting, Rawls proceeds to introduce the two principles which, in his 
opinion, naturally stem from the condition of the original position 
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the first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds 
that social and economic inequalities, [...] are just only if they result in compensating benefits 
for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society
172
. 
While, according to the first principle of equality, everyone should receive the same 
fundamental rights and duties, the second principle of difference holds it that, «since 
everyone’s well-being depends upon a scheme of cooperation without which no one 
could have a satisfactory life»
173
, social and economic inequalities should not impinge 
on the will of the disadvantaged to cooperate and actively participate in the society. In 
this sense, Rawls argues that it is thus possible  
to say that one conception of justice is more reasonable than another, or justifiable with 
respect to it, if rational persons in the initial situation would choose its principles over those of 
the other for the role of justice
174
. 
The theory of justice as fairness for Rawls is thus one «of rational choice»
175
, in 
which it is possible to define justice «only if we know the beliefs and interests of the 
parties, their relations with respect to one another, the alternatives between which 
they are to choose, the procedure whereby they make up their minds»
176
.  
According to Rawls, the best institutional arrangements to accommodate the two 
principles of equality and difference are the democratic ones
177
, since,  
assuming the framework of institutions required by equal liberty and fair equality of 
opportunity, the higher expectations of those better situated are just if and only if they work as 
part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of 
society
178
.  
25. The Rationality of the Parties  
The democratic institution are then considered to better serve in reconciling the two 
aspects of equality and liberty. Further than that, the American philosopher  holds that 
constitutional democracy is a suitable and «workable political conception»
179
 that 
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provides for «a reasonable approximation to an extension of our considered 
judgments»
180
.  
Rawls also remarks the fact that the application of the two principles to institutional 
contexts is bound to produce indeterminate results
181
, since «it is not always clear 
which of several constitutions, or economic and social arrangements, would be 
chosen»
182
. However, even when this was the case, justice should be considered 
«likewise indeterminate»
183
. Such indeterminacy should not be considered as a defect, 
but rather as some expectable result
184
, so that «on many questions of social and 
economic policy we must fall back upon a notion of quasi-pure procedural justice»
185
.
 
 
In later works
186
, Rawls responds to some of the criticisms that are moved to him for 
giving a metaphysically and philosophically-biased  justification for his notion of 
justice as fairness. He thus reasserts the peculiar political characteristics of his 
concept, by claiming that the concept «tries to draw solely upon basic intuitive ideas 
that are embedded in the political institutions of a constitutional democratic 
regime»
187
. In this sense, Rawls claims that such concept should avoid to be 
embedded in any kind of religious and philosophical interpretation: 
The idea is that in a constitutional democracy the public conception of justice should be, so 
far as possible, independent of controversial philosophical and religious doctrines. [...] the 
public conception of justice is to be political, not metaphysical
188
. 
In a similar way, when responding to the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas who 
doubted on the possibility to come to an actually shared and neutral original position 
in Rawls's theory
189
, his American counterpart claims that the theory of justice as 
fairness could «be formulated independently of any particular comprehensive 
doctrine, religious, philosophical, or moral»
190
. In this sense, even if it could be 
considered to «be derived from, or supported by, or otherwise related to one or more 
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comprehensive doctrines»
191
, it should not be viewed as depending upon, or as 
presupposing»
192
 any particular ideological or moral assumption. 
 Another proceduralist view of democracy is advanced by the German 
philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas, who, in his article 'Three Normative 
Models of Democracy'
193
, criticises both liberal and republican normative democratic 
theories and proposes a comprehensive redefinition of the concept in the light of both 
traditions. Habermas's objective is to «sketch a proceduralist view of democracy and 
deliberative politics»
194
, namely 'discourse theory', that put together «pragmatic 
considerations, compromises, discourses of self-understanding and justice»
195
, 
assuming that «reasonable or fair results are»
196
 always achievable. The German 
philosopher aims at grounding the normative features of the theory, not on reason or 
ethical choices, but on «the very structure of communicative actions»
197
. In this sense, 
he argues that, in discourse theory, the success of deliberative politics depends «not 
on a collectively acting citizenry but on the institutionalization of the corresponding 
procedures and conditions of communication»
198
.  
Through his discourse theory, Habermas aims at analysing «the higher-level 
intersubjectivity of communication processes»
199
 in formal democratic institutions as 
well as in «informal networks of the public sphere»
200
, which have to be taken into 
account in the process of will and opinion-formation. Habermas explains that the 
process of opinion-formation always influences legislation by means of civil society: 
Informal public opinion-formation generates “influence”; influence is transformed into 
“communicative power” through the channels of political elections; and communicative 
power is again transformed into “administrative power” through legislation. As in the liberal 
model, the boundaries between “state” and “society” are respected; but in this case, civil 
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society provides the social basis of autonomous public spheres that remain as distinct from the 
economic system as from the administration
201
.  
Habermas puts particular emphasis of the concept of solidarity, which, according to 
him, would prevail over the two other «mechanisms of social integration - money and 
administrative power». Solidarity thus could not only and «no longer be drawn solely 
from sources of communicative action», but should also be encouraged by «widely 
expanded and differentiated public spheres as well as through legally institutionalized 
procedures of democratic deliberation and decision-making». In this view, apart from 
fostering informal settings of opinion-formation, solidarity, more than money and 
administrative power, also plays a key role in the establishment of a wide variety of 
formal institutionalised deliberative arenas. 
The establishment of democratic procedures through discourse theory can only be 
possible by means of  «detection, identification, and interpretation of those problems 
that affect society as a whole» with the intervention of a «self-organizing legal 
community». Such subjectless and decentralized forms of communication can be 
thought of as means to «regulate the flow of deliberations in such a way that their 
fallible results enjoy the presumption of rationality»
202
. 
In his later book 'Between Facts and Norms'
203
, he describes such assumption of 
rationality as the ideal to initiate a «reconstructive sociology of democracy»
204
. 
According to Habermas, it is possible to «identify particles and fragments of an 
"existing reason" already incorporated in political practices, however distorted these 
maybe»
205
. In his approach, he gives relevance to «the rules of discourse and forms of 
argumentation»
206
 that make it possible to reach an understanding and the normative 
aspect of his theory originates from «the structure of linguistic communication and 
the communicative mode of sociation»
207
. 
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Through language, understanding and society the normative aspect of democratic 
procedure can then be established «in a pragmatic shape»
208
 and «the realization of 
the system of rights is measured by the forms in which this content is 
institutionalized»
209
. Such a pragmatic system can be legitimated only by the presence 
of discursive opinion and will-formation procedures whose quality can function as an 
integrative social factor. However, in order for deliberative politics to reach good 
quality, according to Habermas, an «interplay between democratically 
institutionalized will-formation and informal opinion-formation»
210
 is necessary, so 
that the one aspect complements the other.  
Habermas defends a notion of discourse theory that does not require communication 
to occur only through formal procedural means, but he claims for the need to ensure 
the presence of informal communicative channels too. He believes that the interplay 
between the two areas of discursive communication has to be safeguarded and that it 
has to be «the power holder [that, BQ] must remain neutral with respect to competing 
and mutually incompatible conceptions of the good life»
211
. Because neutrality refers 
to «the priority of justice over the good», one has to correctly «distinguish procedural 
constraints on public discourses from a constraint or limitation on the range of topics 
open to public discourse»
212
. In this sense, both informal and formal opinion and will-
formation activities «should be open to ethically relevant questions of the good life, 
of collective identity, and of need interpretation»
213
. 
 The proceduralist strand of thought had a great impact and resonance on the 
study of democracy and on political disciplines throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century. Having yet undergone continuous revisions to make procedural 
definitions more inclusive, it still constitutes the mainstream political thought, so that 
in the 1990s liberal democracy is thought by the political scientist Yoshihiro Francis 
Fukuyama to be «the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" and the "final 
form of human government," and as such it constitutes the "end of history"»
214
. 
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Fukuyama argues that unlike the preceding forms of government that «were 
characterized by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their eventual 
collapse»
215
, liberal democracy does not suffer «from such fundamental internal 
contradictions»
216
. The social problems experienced by modern stable democracies in 
Europe and North America, according to Fukuyama, are not due to the contradictions 
of democracy as a form of government, but rather to the «incomplete implementation 
of the twin principles of liberty and equality»
217
. 
Although he recognises that Islam is «a systematic and coherent ideology, just like 
liberalism and communism»
218
, Fukuyama asserts that it has no appeal outside its 
geographical area of influence, and that liberal democracy is «the only coherent 
political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe»
219
. 
Such thrust would result from the 
development of human societies from simple tribal ones based on slavery and subsistence 
agriculture, through various theocracies, monarchies, and feudal aristocracies, up through 
modern liberal democracy and technologically driven capitalism
220
. 
Having undergone technological and economic development, the world population 
becomes «more cosmopolitan and better educated»
221
, and increased living standards 
make people «demand not simply more wealth but recognition of their status»
222
. 
In his work, Fukuyama aims at demonstrating the world's advancements toward 
democracy, and establishing which countries can be considered democratic and which 
are still to initiate the process of democratization. He thus proposes a formal 
definition of democracy: 
In judging which countries are democratic, we will use a strictly formal definition of 
democracy. A country is democratic if it grants its people the right to choose their own 
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government through periodic, secret-ballot, multi-party elections, on the basis of universal 
and equal adult suffrage
223
. 
According to him, liberal democracy is to put an end to the ongoing dialogue on the 
best form of government: 
If human societies over the centuries evolve toward or converge on a single form of socio-
political organization like liberal democracy, if there do not appear to be viable alternatives to 
liberal democracy, and if people living in liberal democracies express no radical discontent 
with their lives, we can say that the dialogue has reached a final and definitive conclusion
224
. 
In this view, cultural relativism, which «seemed plausible to our century because for 
the first time Europe found itself forced to confront non-European cultures in a 
serious way through the experience of colonialism and de-colonization»
225
, has no 
reason to exist anymore, nor should it keep «undermining democratic and tolerant 
values»
226
. Relativism, however, could be permanently put aside with the «continuing 
convergence in the types of institutions governing most advanced societies; and [...] 
the homogenization of mankind»
227
. 
 Just from a cultural relativist perspective, the procedural definition of 
democracy is also used by the American political scientist Samuel Phillips 
Huntington in his 1991 'The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth 
Century'
228
, to identify the occurrence of three different waves of democratisation in 
the modern world. Drawing on Dahl's definition of polyarchy as involving «the two 
dimensions - contestation and participation»
229
, Huntington defines a wave of 
democratisation as 
a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified 
period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during 
that period of time. A wave also usually involves liberalization or partial democratization in 
political systems that do not become fully democratic
230
. 
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Starting from such definition, Huntington sets out to examine a number of 
benchmarks to consider «what extent political systems are democratic, to compare 
systems, and to analyze whether systems are becoming more or less democratic»
231
. 
Huntington identifies three distinct waves of democratisation in the modern world
232
: 
the first one spans about a century and goes from 1828 to 1926. In such period, as a 
result of the French and American revolutions, there is a gradual constitution of 
national democratic institutions. The second short wave starts during the World War 
II from the Allies' occupation of some European and Asian countries, and goes from 
1946 to 1962. The American scientist then identifies a third still ongoing wave of 
democratisation that starts with «the end of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974»
233
, 
and that over the last fifteen years has led to widespread liberalisation of autocratic 
regimes in some countries, and to the replacement of authoritarian regimes with 
democratic ones «in approximately thirty countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin 
America»
234
. 
After defining the three different waves, Huntington sets out to analyse the causes 
that during the 1960s and 1970s initiated such new and fast third democratisation 
process. First, he observes that, «in a world where democratic values were widely 
accepted»
235
, authoritarian regimes have increasing problems in trying to legitimate 
their governments. Secondly, during the 1960s there has been an exceptional global 
economic growth «which raised living standards, [and, BQ] increased education»
236
. 
Thirdly, Huntington sees in the Second Vatican Council a strong change «in the 
doctrine and activities of the Catholic Church»
237
 that, unlike its past attitude, can 
oppose authoritarianism and propose «social, economic and political reform»
238
. 
Furthermore, according to Huntington, the politics of external actors such as the 
European Community and the Soviet Union, starts to open up to political and 
economic liberal values
239
. Finally, the first new transitions to democracy since 1974 
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have produced «"snowballing" or demonstration effects»
240
, that, «enhanced by new 
means of international communication»
241
, have stimulated political change in other 
countries. 
From the analysis of such causes and comparison with the previous two waves, 
Huntington concludes that the third one is a more peaceful, «Catholic wave»
242
 in 
which «compromise, elections and nonviolence [...] in varying degrees [...] 
characterized most of the transformations, replacements, and transplacements of that 
wave»
243
. 
1 .3  Libera l ,  communitar ia n a nd  mult icult ura l  cr i t ic i sm s to  
'ma inst rea m democracy '  
 
 The normative political theory of liberal democracy described above comes to 
be considered mainstream democracy during the second half of the twentieth century. 
However, it is also criticised by a variety of scholars, who contribute to redefining it 
accordingly. Such criticisms could be grouped into different broad and interlacing 
strands of thought that refer to both internal liberal and libertarian thinkers, as well as 
external post-structuralist, multicultural and postcolonial standings.  
 Criticism came from the part of classical liberalism, from which Friedrich 
Hayek, in his three-volume work 'Law, Legislation and Liberty'
244
, criticises the 
popular contemporary notion of liberal democracy arguing that  
we have [...] become so used to regard as democratic only the particular set of institutions 
which today prevails in all Western democracies, and in which a majority of a representative 
body lays down the law and directs government, that we regard this as the only possible form 
of democracy. As a consequence we do not care to dwell on the fact that this system not only 
has produced many results which nobody likes, even in those countries in which on the whole 
it has worked well, but also has proved unworkable in most countries where these democratic 
institutions were not restrained by strong traditions about the appropriate tasks of the 
representative assemblies. Because we rightly believe in the basic ideal of democracy we feel 
usually bound to defend the particular institutions which have long been accepted as its 
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embodiment, and hesitate to criticize them because this might weaken the respect for an ideal 
we wish to preserve
245
. 
According to Hayek, the contemporary notion of democracy has become so well 
established as an ideal, more than a form of government, that it is impossible for 
people today to think without it. However, the economist and philosopher's objective 
is to show that «what in a society of free men can alone justify coercion is a 
predominant opinion on the principles which ought to govern and restrain individual 
conduct»246. However, in such a democracy as the one practiced today some problems 
are bound to arise. 
The first sets of questions refer to what was previously called, 'the tyranny of the 
majority', or «the necessity of forming organized majorities for supporting a 
programme of particular actions in favour of special groups»
247
, that Hayek considers 
to have «introduced a new source of arbitrariness and partiality»
248
. Such paradoxical 
aspect of democracy results from «the possession of unlimited power»
249
 of the 
people, since «the majority of the representative assembly, in order to remain a 
majority, must do what it can to buy the support [...] by granting [...] special 
benefits»
250
. Such distortion, according to Hayek would produce «an unintended 
outcome [...] rather than a deliberate decision of the majority or anybody else»
251
. An 
unrestricted democratic government would thus become «the playball of all the 
separate interests it has to satisfy to secure majority support»
252
. 
As a consequence of the tyranny of the majority, the unrestricted power of democratic 
representatives would inevitably lead to «legalized corruption»
253
, since politicians 
who want to maintain their positions, and to «buy majority support»
254
, are forced to 
dispense «gratuities at the expense of somebody else who cannot be readily 
identified»
255
. Moreover, when such forms of democracy are transferred to other 
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cultures where there exist traditions different from those where the concept was 
originated, they have not been successful
256
. 
In the light of such drawbacks of modern democracy, Hayek defends classical 
liberalism and argues that  
Under the influence of socialist agitation in the course of the last hundred years the very sense 
in which many of the key words describing political ideals are used has so changed meaning 
that one must today hesitate to use even words like 'liberty', 'justice', 'democracy' or 'law', 
because they no longer convey the meaning they once did
257
. 
Hayek thus criticises the call for social justice that contribute to making liberal terms 
such as 'liberty' or 'democracy' blurred in such a way that they have lost their 
meaning
258
. With regard to democracy, such concept is not anymore intended as «a 
procedure of arriving at agreement on common action»
259
, but rather it prescribes 
«what the aim of those activities ought to be»
260
. In this sense, Hayek claims that 
democracy has «largely lost the capacity of serving as a protection against arbitrary 
power»
261
, because it has been long used to describe «systems that lead to the creation 
of new privileges by coalitions or organized interests»
262
, causing more and more 
people to turn against it
263
. 
Hayek thus proposes to preserve the original ideal, by inventing a new name for it
264
, 
and use the word «demarchy to describe [...] [it, BQ] by a name that is not tainted by 
long abuse»
265
. 
 In the 1970s, the American political theorist Murray Rothbard examines 
classical liberalism and initiates a modern libertarian movement. In what is 
considered the modern libertarian manifesto, 'For a New Liberty'
266
, Rothbard 
presents modern libertarianism as a creed that «emerged from the “classical liberal” 
movements of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, [...] from the English 
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Revolution of the seventeenth century»
267
.  Moreover, he considers its initiator to be 
John Locke with his assertion of the «natural rights of each individual to his person 
and property»
268
. The founding principle of modern libertarianism is the 
'nonaggression axiom': the fact that «no man or group of men may aggress against the 
person or property of anyone else»
269
. Rothbard conceives of aggression as «the 
initiation of the use or threat of physical violence against the person or property of 
anyone else»
270
. Consequently, he also states that the libertarian creed also defends 
free speech and all the other connected civil liberties: 
The freedom to speak, publish, assemble, and to engage in such “victimless crimes” as 
pornography, sexual deviation, and prostitution (which the libertarian does not regard as 
“crimes” at all, since he defines a “crime” as violent invasion of someone else’s person or 
property). Furthermore, he regards conscription as slavery on a massive scale. And since war, 
especially modern war, entails the mass slaughter of civilians, the libertarian regards such 
conflicts as mass murder and therefore totally illegitimate
271
. 
In this sense, according to Rothbard, for the right to self-ownership, each individual is 
the owner of their body, and they are able to control it without any external or social 
intervention. In this thinking, «each individual must think, learn, value, and choose 
his or her ends and means in order to survive and flourish»
272
.  
Since the State had the power to «commit actions that almost everyone agrees would 
be immoral, illegal, and criminal if committed by any person or group in society»
273
, 
one of the libertarian tasks is to demystify and desanctify the State
274
 and  
to demonstrate repeatedly and in depth that not only the emperor but even the “democratic” 
State has no clothes; that all governments subsist by exploitive rule over the public; and that 
such rule is the reverse of objective necessity
275
. 
The State is thus considered as a tyrannical authority equal to a king or a dictator. 
Rothbard also advances the inexistence of society as such, but only «of  interacting 
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individuals»
276
 controlled by «a group of oligarchs—in practice, government 
bureaucrats»
277
 who are capable of expropriating them of their property. As a 
consequence, from an economic point of view, Rothbard supports free exchange and 
laissez-faire capitalism. 
The American theorist also claims that there is no historical evidence to justify the 
aggression of totalitarian states only for the fact that they are considered to be less 
democratic. In this sense, Rothbard argues against the assumption that «in any 
conflict, the State which is more democratic or allows more internal freedom is 
necessarily or even presumptively the victim of aggression by the more dictatorial or 
totalitarian State»
278
.  
In his later work, 'The Ethics of Liberty'
279
, the American political theorist criticises 
the contemporary widespread assumption that political scientists «can avoid the 
necessity of moral judgments, and that he can help frame public policy without 
committing himself to any ethical position»
280
. Rothbard maintains that  
the avoidance of explicit ethical judgments leads political scientists to one overriding implicit 
value judgment-that in favor of the political status quo as it happens to prevail in any given 
society. At the very least, his lack of a systematic political ethics precludes the political 
scientist from persuading anyone of the value of any change from the status quo
281
. 
In his view, not only such assumption of neutrality is bound to hide their support for 
the mainstream political order, given the fact that every individual has different and 
«personal scale of values»
282
, but, further than that, such political scientists would 
prove to have a limited persuasive capacity.  
Rothbard then makes it clear that the libertarians' fundamental value is that of liberty 
as «a moral principle, grounded in the nature of man»
283
, that is related to justice, and 
to «the abolition of aggressive violence in the affairs of men»
284
. 
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Given the absolute priority and urge for libertarians to free people of all possible 
constrictions, Rothbard also advocates the immediate elimination of the State. The 
American theorist also explains that such undertaking should not be considered as 
«unrealistic or "Utopian", because--in contrast to such goals as the "elimination of 
poverty"- its achievement is entirely dependent on man's will»
285
. 
 In his 1974 work 'Anarchy, State, and Utopia'
286
, the libertarian political 
philosopher Robert Nozick also criticises mainstream liberal democracy, for its 
extensive allowance of State control. Nozick claims that such pervasive presence of 
the state in modern liberal democracies violates the «persons' rights not to be forced 
to do certain things, and is unjustified»
287
. 
The philosopher therefore proposes the constitution of a 'minimal state' that allows for 
«the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of 
contracts, and so on»
288
. In this way, not only the state could not possibly force 
«some citizens to aid others»
289
, but it would also be prevented from prohibiting 
certain kinds of «activities to people for their own good or protection»
290
, while 
ensuring that voluntary actions are always possible. 
According to Nozick, Rothbard's anarchist position imagined as a state of nature, is 
actually untenable to attain, because «even though no one intended this or tried to 
bring it about»
291
, the constitution of a minimal form of state would always appear 
«by a process which need not violate anyone's rights»
292
. 
Nozick thus aims to study such original state, «investigating its nature and defects»
293
 
in order to decide «whether there should be a state rather than anarchy»
294
. In his 
view,  
if one could show that the state would be superior even to this most favored situation of 
anarchy, the best that realistically can be hoped for, or would arise by a process involving no 
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morally impermissible steps, or would be an improvement if it arose, this would provide a 
rationale for the state's existence; it would justify the state
295
. 
With this objective in mind, Nozick starts a «hypothetical account»
296
 on how a 
minimal state should be considered to be a democratic one «without any blatant 
violation of anyone's rights»
297
. More specifically such transformation of the state of 
nature would be made possible because of the fact that groups of individuals seeking 
for protection would necessarily and gradually constitute into associations. Such a 
bond between individuals would also create a moral constraint and would ultimately 
depend on the «fundamental mode of relationship among persons»
298
.  
In the last part of his work, Nozick suggests that such a «morally favored state, the 
only morally legitimate state»
299
 is the best way to keep the utopian aspirations of free 
individuals safe from the limited state of nature, in that it treats them as  
inviolate individuals, who may not be used in certain ways by others as means or tools or 
instruments or resources; it treats us as persons having individual rights with the dignity this 
constitutes. Treating us with respect by respecting our rights, it allows us, individually or with 
whom we choose, to choose our life and to realize our ends and our conception of ourselves, 
insofar as we can, aided by the voluntary cooperation of other individuals possessing the same 
dignity
300
. 
 During the 1970s, a critique of utilitarianism comes also from the American 
philosopher of law Ronald Dworkin, who, in his book 'Taking Rights Seriously'
301
 
questions the popular positivist interpretation of rights. Dworkin asserts that «the idea 
of a right to liberty is a misconceived concept that does disservice to political 
thought»
302
 because, on the one hand, it establishes a necessary conflict between 
liberty and other sets of rights, and, on the other, it simplifies and generalises the 
reason for protecting only certain liberties at the expense of others
303
. In this sense, 
the American philosopher believes that in a state governed according to liberal 
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egalitarian principles, the key issue is that of establishing «what inequalities in goods, 
opportunities and liberties are permitted in such a state and why»
304
. With the aim of 
contrasting the idea of universal rights, Dworkin thus introduces the need for a just 
society to «recognize a variety of individual rights, some grounded on very different 
sorts of moral considerations from others»
305
. 
In his opinion, representative democracy and the majoritarian principle cannot take 
into proper account «the intensity, as distinct from the number, of particular 
preferences, and because techniques of political persuasion, backed by money, may 
corrupt the accuracy with which votes represent the genuine preferences of those who 
have voted»
306
. More specifically, Dworkin argues that in democratic systems it is 
impossible to understand whether votes and preferences in general are guided by 
personal or external factors. As a consequence, there would be no valid method to 
only consider the first set, thus ignoring external constraints. According to the 
philosopher, «personal and external preferences are sometimes so inextricably 
combined [...] that the discrimination is psychologically as well as institutionally 
impossible»
307
. 
In order to overcome this impasse, Dworkin proposes an alternative anti-utilitarian 
general theory of rights, introducing the concept of «an individual political right»
308
, 
that aims at protecting «the fundamental right of citizens to equal concern and respect 
by prohibiting decisions that seem, antecedently, likely to have been reached by 
virtue of the external components of the preferences democracy reveals»
309
. The 
external components of preferences are to be referred to as «political or moral 
theories, which the political process cannot discriminate or eliminate»
310
. In this 
sense, Dworkin suggests that, instead of presupposing that there is only «a single 
right answer to complex questions of law and political morality»
311
, one should think 
that «there is sometimes no single right answer, but only answers»
312
. In his opinion a 
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«wiser and more realistic»
313
 way to consider such controversial questions would be 
to assume that there is always «a set of answers and arguments that must be 
acknowledged to be, from any objective or neutral standpoint, equally good»
314
. 
In his later book 'Is Democracy Possible Here?'
315
, Dworkin claims that the «majority 
rule is by no means always an appropriate decisionmaking procedure»
316
 and that 
«the idea of equal political power is a myth»
317
. However, he also argues that the 
principles of liberty and equality, that «almost all Americans—and almost all citizens 
of other nations with similar political cultures—can embrace»318, could not be 
rejected «without abandoning ethical or religious commitments»
319
. Since he deems it 
unrealistic to renounce such beliefs, he introduces the concept of dignity to describe 
the modern liberal understanding of justice. In this light, and considering it 
impossible to escape moral political positions, Dworkin finally suggests that  
any adequate theory of human rights insists that a nation not injure anyone in the way its laws 
and traditions forbid it to injure its own citizens; that only a tolerant secular state respects the 
personal responsibility of its citizens for ethical value; that a legitimate state must aim at ex 
ante equality through a tax structure inspired by the old political ideal of a collective 
insurance pool; and that democracy requires a culture of political argument and respect, not 
just naked majority rule
320
. 
 The Scottish moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, in his 1981 work 'After 
Virtue'
321
, although being far from considering the relativity of moral political 
positions, comes to similar conclusions. He argues that in the modern world there is 
great confusion both in «the language of morality»
322
 and in «the language of natural 
science»
323
, and that, as a consequence, people continue to use words as «simulacra of 
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morality»
324
, without actually managing to understand both moral theoretical and 
practical issues.  
MacIntyre claims that moral statements of modern times have three peculiar features. 
The first is the «conceptual incommensurability of the rival arguments», since they 
stem from «rival premises», there is supposed to be «no rational way of weighing the 
claims of one as against another». According to the Scottish philosopher, «each 
premise employs some quite different normative or evaluative concept from the 
others, so that the claims made upon us are of quite different kinds»
325
. The second 
characteristic that MacIntyre identifies in modern moral arguments is the tendency to 
present them in an impersonal fashion, as if they presuppose «the existence of 
impersonal criteria - the existence, independently of the preferences or attitudes of 
speaker and hearer, of standards of justice or generosity or duty»
326
. Thirdly, such 
incommensurable premises of the rival arguments appear to «have a wide variety of 
historical origins»
327
. 
Given such features typical of moral arguments in modern times, MacIntyre draws on 
the Aristotelian conception of justice to claim that whenever it is impossible to reach 
practical agreement on the notion of justice, it is also impossible to constitute an 
actually political community: 
Agreement on what the relevant rules are to be is always a prerequisite for agreement upon 
the nature and content of a particular virtue. But this prior agreement in rules is [...] something 
which our individualist culture is unable to secure328.  
Thus, even if modern society nowadays has a consistent number of rules to abide by, 
still «basic controversies cannot [...] be rationally resolved»
329
. 
 The American political philosopher Michael Walzer holds similar conceptions 
of justice in his 1983 book 'Spheres of Justice'
330
, where he analyses Marx's 
materialism and communism to devise a theory of distributive justice in which 
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individuals came «together to share, divide, and exchange»
331
. In this sense, Walzer 
makes a connection between patterns of distribution and cultural differences. 
According to him, 
different political arrangements enforce, and different ideologies justify, different 
distributions of membership, power, honor, ritual eminence, divine grace, kinship and love, 
knowledge, wealth, physical security, work and leisure, rewards and punishments, and a host 
of goods more narrowly and materially conceived - food, shelter, clothing, transportation, 
medical care, commodities of every sort, and all the odd things (paintings, rare books, postage 
stamps) that human being collect
332
. 
In his view, distributive systems always entail a series of interconnected distributive 
criteria, and the market is only one part of them. Distribution can thus be considered 
to follow different patterns according to different criteria, such as «desert, 
qualification, birth and blood, friendship, need, free exchange, political loyalty, 
democratic decision»
333
, that have always been «invoked by competing groups, 
confused with one another»
334
. 
In this thinking, equality is not intended to be as «an identity of possessions»
335
, but 
rather as «a complex relation of persons, mediated by goods we make, share, and 
divide among ourselves»
336
, that the American philosopher terms 'equal complexity'. 
Equality thus comes to indicate «a diversity of distributive criteria that mirrors the 
diversity of social goods»
337
. Since, according to Walzer, «social goods have social 
meanings, [...] we find our way to distributive justice through an interpretation of 
those meanings»
338
, while looking for internal distributive principles.  The activity of 
exchanging goods, for Walzer, has to take place within fixed distributive spheres that 
are not supposed to communicate or overlap. In this sense, «to convert one good into 
another, when there is no intrinsic connection between the two, is to invade the sphere 
where another company of men and women properly rules»
339
. As an example, «the 
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use of political power to gain access to other goods is a tyrannical use»
340
. 
Furthermore, in order for goods' exchanges to take place correctly, such activities 
could occur following the principles of free exchange, desert, and need. 
According to Walzer, once the distributive spheres of justice have been properly 
defined and limited so that they are autonomous, in the political sphere, the only 
possible system would necessarily be democracy
341
. In his view, democracy is «a way 
of allocating power and legitimating its use - or better, it is the political way of 
allocating power»
342
. The only possible way for citizens to be allocated resources is 
by convincing politicians of the soundness of one's arguments. Thus the American 
philosopher asserts that  
democracy puts a premium on speech, persuasion, rhetorical skill. Ideally, the citizen who 
makes the most persuasive argument - that is the argument that actually persuades the largest 
number of citizens - gets his way. But he can't use force, or pull rank, or distribute money; he 
must talk about the issues at hand. And all the other citizens must talk, too, or at least have a 
chance to talk
343
.  
Walzer calls such struggle for competitive arguments «the rule of reasons»
344
, which 
requires that «all non-political goods have to be deposited outside: weapons and 
wallets, titles and degrees»
345
. In this sense, a democratic decision can only be 
reached by «the politically most skilful»
346
 citizens, leaving «democratic politics [...] 
a monopoly of politicians»
347
. 
Since Walzer considers justice as «relative to social meanings»
348
, in line with 
MacIntyre's moral understanding of community, he views the existence of different 
communities as necessarily separated and enclosed into fences: 
There are an infinite number of possible cultures, religions, political arrangements, 
geographical conditions, and so on. A given society is just if its substantive life is lived in a 
certain way - that is, in a way faithful to the shared understandings of the members. (When 
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people disagree about the meaning of social goods, when understandings are controversial, 
then justice requires that the society be faithful to the disagreements, providing institutional 
channels for their expression, adjudicative mechanisms, and alternative distributions.)
349
 
Different cultures and communities have different meanings of justice exactly 
because «a community's culture is the story of its members [...] so as to make sense of 
all the different pieces of their social life»
350
. In this understanding only through the 
constitutions of boundaries it is possible to come to a shared definition of justice: 
«Good fences make just societies»
351
. However, since «we never know exactly where 
to put the fences» for the fact that they continually change, the goods and social 
meanings that communities exchange are artefacts that have to be remade all the 
times
352
. As a consequence to the occurrence of «shifts in social meaning [...] we have 
no choice but to live with the continual probes and incursions through which these 
shifts are worked out»
353
. 
 During the late 1990s and throughout the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, the normative theory of liberal democracy is rediscussed also by an internal 
liberal 'deliberative' group of thinkers. Drawing on Habermas's notion of deliberative 
and pragmatic politics, such liberal scholars try to improve and increase 
communication between political representatives and citizens, and to encourage 
actual deliberation and participation of citizens in making political decisions. 
 In 1997, the two American scholars James Bohman and William Rehg edit a 
first collection of essays on deliberative democracy
354
 and define it as «the idea that 
legitimate lawmaking issues from the public deliberation of citizens»
355
, in 
accordance with «ideals of rational legislation, participatory politics, and civic self-
governance»
356
. Their original assumption is that «a democracy based on public 
deliberation presupposes that citizens or their representatives can take counsel 
together about what laws and policies they ought to pursue as a commonwealth»
357
. 
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Considered as such, deliberative democracy should not be considered as a mere «self-
interested competition governed by bargaining and aggregative mechanisms»
358
, but 
rather as a way of  coming «to affirm a common good in some sense»
359
, while 
safeguarding «a variety of individual interests»
360
.  
 In his 1998 survey of deliberative democracy
361
, the philosopher James 
Bohman asserts that it could be an «appealing basis for genuine reform and 
innovation»
362
 of the debate on democracy. He also states that the objective of 
deliberation is that of reaching consensus, intended as «the agreement of all those 
affected by a decision»
363
. He thus defines deliberative democracy as «a family of 
views according to which the public deliberation of free and equal citizens is the core 
of legitimate political decision making and self government»
364
. Deliberation in this 
sense is conceived as resting upon «the ideal of public reason»
365
, requiring that 
legitimate decision be viewed as acceptable by everyone through «free public 
reasoning»
366
 of equals. 
The three aspects that were analysed by the deliberative strand of thought related basically to 
the study of the moral and epistemic justification of deliberative procedures; to the 
implementation of such deliberative procedures in already existing public political 
institutions; and the study of  empirical problems as well as the comparison of potentially and 
different deliberative protocols
367
. 
 Political scholars Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson intervene against the 
«effort to keep democratic theory procedurally pure»
368
, and claim that «any adequate 
theory must include substantive as well as procedural principles»
369
. They thus 
propose a theory of deliberative democracy that offers such an approach that, apart 
from procedural norms, also includes «substantive principles (such as basic liberty 
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and fair opportunity) that extend fairness to persons (for the sake of reciprocity, 
mutual respect, or fairness itself)»
370
. 
In a later work
371
, the two theorists also set out a series of moral political features that 
a deliberative democracy should have. First, since individuals should  be considered 
and treated as independent and active subjects who participate in the governance of 
their community, «leaders should [...] give reasons for their decisions, and respond to 
the reasons that citizens give in return»
372
. Second, such reasons should be 
«accessible to all the citizens to whom they are addressed»
373
 in the sense that they 
should be given publicly and clearly, so that everybody can «understand its essential 
content»
374
.Third, since decisions made in deliberative democracy should last for 
some time, the deliberation that precedes the poll should be carried out in a 
responsible way to positively influence the resolutions of the government. Fourth, 
deliberation should also be dynamic, in order to keep «open the possibility of a 
continuing dialogue»
375
, so that citizens' criticism could make it possible to do away 
with past decisions and advance other new proposals. As a consequence, dialogue 
would always follow «the principle of the economy of moral disagreement»
376
, 
according to which «citizens and their representatives should try to find justifications 
that minimize their differences with their opponents»
377
. 
 In a similar fashion, the American political philosopher Joshua Cohen 
supports a view of deliberative democracy «as a fundamental political ideal and not 
simply as a derivative ideal that can be explained in terms of the values of fairness or 
equality of respect»
378
. In order to do so, he thus proposes to formulate both «an ideal 
deliberative procedure and the requirements for institutionalizing such a 
procedure»
379
. Cohen asserts that, in order to be «democratically legitimate»
380
, an 
ideally deliberative procedure should ensure that outcomes «be the object of a free 
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and reasoned agreement among equals»
381
. Starting from consideration of the formal 
requirements of deliberative democracy, Cohen identifies «three general aspects of 
deliberation»
382
: deciding on an agenda, proposing «alternative solutions to the 
problems on the agenda»
383
, «supporting those solutions with reasons»
384
, and finally, 
selecting one of the options.  
First of all, Cohen argues that an ideal deliberation can be deemed free only if the 
participants abide by the rules and preconditions for deliberation and accept that, 
having contributed to the decision on a specific issue, they would coherently comply 
with such decisions
385
. Second, an ideal deliberation should be reasoned in the sense 
that participants should «state their reasons for advancing proposals, supporting them 
or criticizing them»
386
, so that they are aware that the very fact of giving reasons in an 
effective way «will settle the fate of their proposal»
387
. As a consequence, they should 
be aware of the fact that if they do not provide adequate reasons for their proposals, 
the latter may be rejected
388
. Third, an ideal deliberation presupposes that participants 
are equal not only because they have «equal standing at each stage of the deliberative 
process»
389
, but also because the unequal «existing distribution of power and 
resources does not shape their chances to contribute to deliberation, nor does that 
distribution play an authoritative role in their deliberation»
390
. Finally, an ideal 
deliberation should purposely aim at reaching «a rationally motivated consensus»
391
. 
 The political scientist James Fishkin tries to apply the ideal of a rational 
deliberation to case studies and aims at devising practical deliberative tools to ensure 
a more inclusive deliberation. After introducing the concept of 'deliberative opinion 
poll'
392
 in 1988, in his 2009 work, 'When the People Speak'
393
, he decides to carry out 
a series of deliberative projects in different countries such as the US, China, Britain, 
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Denmark, Australia, Italy, Bulgaria, Northern Ireland, and in the European Union. In 
his work, Fishkin claims that, while some electoral strategies could be deemed legal 
from the perspective of traditional democracy, from the standpoint of deliberative 
politics, they could not be accepted:  
They muffle or distort, providing a platform for special interests to impersonate the public 
will - to mobilize letter or phone calls, emails, text messages, or Internet tabulations of 
opinion that appear to be representative of the general public, but are really only from specific 
and well-organized interest groups. [...] Elites and interest groups attempt to mold public 
opinion by using focus-group-tested messages in order later to invoke those same opinions as 
a democratic mandate. From the standpoint of some democratic theories these practices are 
entirely appropriate.[...] But from the perspective outlined here - deliberative democracy- they 
detour democracy from the dull aspiration to realize political equality and deliberation
394
. 
In order to counter such trends in politics, Fishkin carries out opinion poll projects 
aiming at including in deliberation «everyone under conditions where they are 
effectively motivated to really think about the issue»
395
. In this sense, the American 
scientist observes that since «respondents to polls do not like to admit that they “don’t 
know”»396, they will most of the times choose an option randomly «rather than 
respond that they have never thought about the issue»
397
. 
Furthermore, even if many people already have their own opinions on a variety of 
matters, according to Fishkin, «some of them are very much “top of the head,” vague 
impressions of sound bites and headlines»
398
, that could be easily manipulated «by 
the persuasion industry»
399
. On the other hand, however, it would be impossible for 
democratic countries to inform transparently all its citizens because it would «take too 
many meetings»
400
. 
Fishkin's solution is that of selecting a «random sample of a population»
401
 to be 
«convened together for many hours of deliberation, both in small groups and plenary 
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sessions»
402
. During these sessions, people in groups can ask questions «to competing 
candidates, experts, or policymakers in the plenaries»
403
. At the end of the process, 
they have to give their informed opinion on the matters. 
According to Fishkin, such a method could be advantageous to deliberative 
democracy in different ways: 
While ordinary citizens are subject to the incentives for rational ignorance, those chosen in the 
microcosm face an entirely different situation—once they are chosen. They are all part of a 
smaller group whose members do, individually, have influence. Each participant in what we 
call a Deliberative Poll has the influence of one person’s voice in a small group of fifteen or 
so [...]. Once selected, the corrosive calculations of rational ignorance no longer apply to 
members of the microcosm. Within the microcosm, democracy is reframed on a human scale 
where individual voices can seem important enough to effectively motivate individual 
effort
404
. 
In this view, once the democratic stances are made relevant by giving more 
responsibility to individuals, they are more interested into political issues. As a 
consequence, not only do they try to get more informed, but, while participating in 
the process, they can also be less easily manipulated by the persuasion industry and 
feel much more empowered compared to traditional elections. 
 Another deliberative application has also recently developed in comparative 
studies of democratization, in order to include the principles of deliberation in the 
promotion of democracy in the world. The political scientist John Dryzek, who 
advocates the notions of 'transnational deliberative democracy'
405
 and 'deliberative 
capacity building'
406
 claims that «deliberation capacity can be distributed in variable 
ways in the deliberative systems of states and other polities»
407
. He has thus 
established a way for «evaluating the degree to which a polity’s deliberative system is 
authentic, inclusive, and consequential»
408
. Dryzek argues that most scholars of 
democratization evaluate the presence of democracy «in terms of electoral 
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competition»
409
, in order to measure «the degree to which ostensibly democratic 
political systems fall short of liberal electoralist ideals»
410
. In this sense, he claims 
that «democratic legitimacy resides in the right, ability, and opportunity of those 
subject to a collective decision to participate in deliberation about the content of that 
decision»
411
. Dryzek terms as 'deliberative' those communications that «can induce 
reflection about the preferences that individuals hold, are non-coercive, and able to 
relate the particular interests of individuals and groups to more universal 
principles»
412
. He then defines 'deliberative capacity' «as the extent to which a 
political system possesses structures to host deliberation that is authentic, inclusive, 
and consequential»
413
, so that it stimulates discussions that are non-coercive, 
reciprocal and consensus-based. 
The American scientist views deliberative capacity as «instrumental in democratic 
transition, and crucial to democratic consolidation and deepening»
414
, because it may 
well serve in analysing not only «authoritarian regimes»
415
, but also «new and old 
democratic states, and [...] governance that eludes states»
416
. According to Dryzek, 
such method could prove to be very useful in the assessment of democratization in 
«legislatures, cabinets, corporatist councils [...] as well as government executives, and 
constitutional courts»
417. However, «citizens’ juries, citizens’ assemblies, deliberative 
polls, consensus conferences, and stakeholder dialogues can also contribute»
418
. 
Moreover, even though he gives priority to «reasoned argument»
419
 and excludes 
«some kinds of communication, such as lies, threats, and commands, [...] [as, BQ] 
intrinsically anti-deliberative»
420
, he also acknowledges the use of «a variety of forms 
of communication, such as rhetoric, testimony (the telling of stories), and humor»
421
. 
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According to him, even though such different forms of communication do not occur 
as a reasoned argumentation, they «can be effective in inducing reflection»
422
. 
 Deliberative democracy is criticised by the Belgian political theorist Chantal 
Mouffe, who, in her 1993 work 'The Return of the Political'
423
, questions  «the 
conception of politics that informs a great deal of [Western, BQ] democratic thinking 
today»
424
 for not being capable of bringing back into the theory of liberal democracy 
and universal values, the «manifold ethnic, religious and nationalist conflicts that they 
thought belonged to a bygone age»
425
. According to Mouffe, the «rationalist, 
universalist and individualist»
426
 liberal thinking's  «main shortcoming is that it 
cannot but remain blind to the specificity of the political in its dimension of 
conflict/decision, and that it cannot perceive the constitutive role of antagonism in 
social life»
427
. Instead of conceiving the political as «restricted to a certain type of 
institution, or [...] constituting a specific sphere»
428
, Mouffe considers it as an 
inherent dimension proper to «every human society and that determines our very 
ontological condition»
429
. In this sense, one should accept the fact that it is impossible 
«to create or maintain a pluralistic democratic order»
430
 without conflict and 
antagonism, and without acknowledging the fact that «the opponent should be 
considered not as an enemy to be destroyed, but as an adversary whose existence is 
legitimate and must be tolerated»
431
. In her view, the danger of trying to establish 
«consensus and unanimity»
432
 is that a «lack of democratic political struggles with 
which to identify»
433 
would inevitably produce alternative «forms of identification, of 
ethnic, nationalist or religious nature»
434
. As a consequence, «the opponent cannot be 
perceived as an adversary to contend with, but only as an enemy to be destroyed»
435
:  
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Democracy is in peril not only when there is insufficient consensus and allegiance to the 
values it embodies, but also when its agonistic dynamic is hindered by an apparent excess of 
consensus, which usually masks a disquieting apathy. It is also endangered by the growing 
marginalization of entire groups whose status as an 'underclass' practically puts them outside 
the political community.[...] A healthy democratic process calls for a vibrant clash of political 
positions and an open conflict of interests. If such is missing, it can too easily be replaced by a 
confrontation between non-negotiable moral values and essentialist identities
436
. 
In Mouffe's opinion, the only possible way to restore a healthy kind of democracy 
would be by breaking «with rationalism, individualism and universalism»
437
, to make 
them «plural, discursively constructed and entangled with power relations»
438
. Only 
in such a way could it be possible to ensure a real 'pluralism of values'
439
, because 
conflict would not be considered as an obstacle to endless and full harmony, but 
rather an integral part to a partial and temporal agreement. 
Stemming from such an understanding is also the belief that an individual could never 
possibly establish a fixed identity, because there would always be «a certain degree of 
openness and ambiguity in the way the different subject positions are articulated»
440
. 
In this sense, Mouffe also criticises «the abstract Enlightenment universalism of an 
undifferentiated human nature»
441
, because it has become a hindrance, rather than a 
common good. Claiming the importance of «the expression of differences»
442
, she 
thus argues that rights could not possibly be universalised. In order to reconcile the 
needs of different struggles who would «not spontaneously converge»
443
, such as 
antiracism or antisexism, only the establishment of «democratic equivalence»
444
, 
considered as new 'common sense' would happen to be actually effective. 
 Throughout the second half of the twentieth century and in the first decade of 
the twenty-first, criticisms to the political theory of liberal democracy contribute to 
the redefinition of its normative principles to make them more inclusive of diversity. 
Such redefinition entails not only a structural and procedural revision of the notion of 
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democracy, in order to ensure increased participation of citizens; but also a 
questioning of democracy in the light of the development and end of colonialism and 
the consecutive constitution of postcolonial independent national states. Such aspects 
have two main interrelated consequences: on the one hand, migration flows especially 
to (former) colonialist European and North American countries pose the problem of 
establishing peaceful coexistence among communities that are different from the 
national population by making the democratic model more inclusive. On the other 
hand, the normative liberal political theory, which is considered the main starting 
point to evaluate the quality of democracy in cultures and countries where democracy 
is poor or does not exist yet, starts to be questioned as an effective and objective 
political method by poststructuralist and postcolonial scholars. 
 The possibility to recognise and include diversity in Western democratic 
countries as a consequence of different migration flows has been analysed in a variety 
of multiculturalist political theories. The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, in his 
essay 'The Politics of Recognition'
445
, focuses on the analysis of the need for 
recognition «on behalf of minority or “subaltern” groups, in some forms of feminism 
and in what is today called the politics of “multiculturalism”»446. He argues that such 
«politics of equal recognition»
447
 has been brought to attention by the establishment 
of democracy as the best form of government and in the modern time it entails 
«demands for the equal status of cultures and of genders»
448
. According to Taylor, the 
emphasis that the idea of democracy puts on equality and equal recognition has also 
originated the notion of authenticity, caused by «a displacement of the moral accent 
in this idea»
449
. Such displacement is related to the fact that «being in touch with our 
feelings»
450
 becomes of an «independent and crucial moral significance»
451
. It comes 
to be something we have to attain if we are to be true and full human beings»
452
. 
However, «before the late eighteenth century, no one thought that the differences 
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between human beings had this kind of moral significance»
453
. In this sense, 
differences between people are accepted and integrated in such a way that they are 
not noticed or perceived to be morally relevant: 
In those earlier societies, what we would now call identity was largely fixed by one’s social 
position. That is, the background that explained what people recognized as important to 
themselves was to a great extent determined by their place in society, and whatever roles or 
activities attached to this position
454
. 
In such societies the fact that «people didn’t speak of “identity” and “recognition”»455 
does not mean that they «didn’t have (what we call) identities, or because these didn’t 
depend on recognition, but rather because these were then too unproblematic to be 
thematized as such»
456
. 
Taylor claims that the emphasis given to equal recognition by democracy is not a 
positive attainment and would not help solve the problems of peaceful coexistence. 
Rather, the stress on identity makes such generalised and simplified ways of 
categorising people stronger and more visible, thus leading to the marginalisation of 
those individuals to whom such recognition is not granted: 
Equal recognition is not just the appropriate mode for a healthy democratic society. Its refusal 
can inflict damage on those who are denied it, according to a widespread modern view, as I 
indicated at the outset. The projection of an inferior or demeaning image on another can 
actually distort and oppress, to the extent that the image is internalized
457
. 
According to equal recognition policies, everyone should have «an identical basket of 
rights and immunities»458, so that difference is eliminated. However, Taylor also 
criticises the politics of difference, since even if it entails that «everyone should be 
recognized for his or her unique identity»459, they are supposed to have an identity 
that is «assimilated to a dominant or majority identity»460, thus ignoring or glossing 
over their very same distinctness. Taylor asserts that «underlying the demand is a 
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principle of universal equality»
461
. In this sense, the politics of difference demand that 
one acknowledges only what is «universally present—everyone has an identity—
through recognizing what is peculiar to each. The universal demand powers an 
acknowledgment of specificity»
462
 which reveals to be extremely difficult to be 
accounted for when integrated into differential politics. The presence of such a 
«universal human potential»
463
, was «a capacity that all humans share» and entails 
that everyone «deserves respect»
464
, even the people who, for different reasons, are 
«incapable of realizing their potential in the normal way»
465
. 
Taylor observes that, even if they share the same objective of respect, the politics of 
equal recognition and that of difference are at odds with one another because while 
the first requires that «we treat people in a difference- blind fashion»
466
, the latter 
insists upon recognising and fostering particularity
467
. However, he goes on to assert 
that the politics of difference, considered as the possibility for different groups to 
enjoy their rights in a different way and to a different extent from the standard 
mainstream culture, is inadmissible
468
. Rather, advocates of an equal recognition 
strategy would claim for the neutrality of their approach, instead of  noticing that «the 
politics of equal dignity is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture»
469
. To this 
extent, since the requirements for dignity are based on cultural standards, «only the 
minority or suppressed cultures are being forced to take alien form»
470
, and «the 
supposedly fair and difference-blind society is not only inhuman (because 
suppressing identities) but also, in a subtle and unconscious way, itself highly 
discriminatory»
471
. 
Taylor thus suggests that in places where not all people are part of the favoured 
national mainstream group, when proposing to pursue the common good, society 
should be «also capable of respecting diversity, especially when dealing with those 
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who do not share its common goals; and provided it can offer adequate safeguards for 
fundamental rights»
472
. According to the Canadian philosopher, even if such an 
approach would inevitably generate  
tensions and difficulties in pursuing these objectives together, but such a pursuit is not 
impossible, and the problems are not in principle greater than those encountered by any liberal 
society that has to combine, for example, liberty and equality, or prosperity and justice
473
. 
In this sense, Taylor aims at doing away with the liberal politics of equal respect, that 
he considers «inhospitable to difference»
474
 for the fact of not being able to guarantee 
the survival of «the members of distinct societies»
475
. He also proposes «other models 
of liberal society» that advocate the defence only of some basic rights extended to 
everyone, but that «distinguish these fundamental rights from the broad range of 
immunities and presumptions of uniform treatment that have sprung up in modern 
cultures of judicial review»
476
.  In this sense, such liberal theories should not focus on 
procedural democracy, but should rather be «grounded very much on judgments 
about what makes a good life—judgments in which the integrity of cultures has an 
important place»
477
. In this understanding, the liberal politics of equal recognition 
also aim at acknowledging equal worth to every individual
478
. However, Taylor 
argues that matter-of-fact study of the other carried out in comparison with familiar 
standards would not produce «real judgments of worth»
479
, because they «suppose a 
fused horizon of standards»
480
. In this sense, assuming that every culture has the same 
value would entail an ethnocentric analysis of the other for its being similar to one's 
own culture
481
. The Canadian philosopher thus criticises the tendency of multicultural 
scholars for their «peremptory demand for favorable judgments of worth»
482
 that is 
«paradoxically—perhaps one should say tragically—homogenizing»483. Such 
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presuppositions entail the presence of certain standards to make judgements: «those 
of North Atlantic civilization»
484
, that are ethnocentric and do not actually result in 
any sort of redefinition of the standards. 
The Canadian political philosopher, Will Kymlicka, also criticises the American 
colour-blind approach to the politics of recognition. In his 1995 book 'Multicultural 
Citizenship'
485
 Kymlicka argues against the Western philosophical creation of «an 
idealized model of the polis in which fellow citizens share a common descent 
language and culture»
486
. Because of such ideal illusory condition, he claims that, in 
order to achieve such homogenising objective, «governments throughout history have 
pursued a variety of policies regarding cultural minorities»
487
, such as expulsion or 
ethnic cleansing, genocide, coercive assimilation, as well as «physical segregation 
and economic discrimination, and denied political rights»
488
. Even if in the twentieth 
century minorities have been treated in a less violent way, through the stipulation of 
bilateral treaties that have «regulated the treatment of fellow nationals in other 
countries»
489
, such provisions are only limited to some aspects of life and are not 
sufficient to ensure that migrants live with dignity. With the conception of human 
rights «cultural minorities would be protected indirectly, by guaranteeing basic civil 
and political rights to all individuals regardless of group membership»
490
. According 
to Kymlicka, such policy tools have been devised as an extension «of the way 
religious minorities were protected»
491
, so that both identity and religion could be 
practiced in private life
492
. However, Kymlicka asserts that such an approach would 
hinder «any legal or governmental recognition of ethnic groups, or any use of ethnic 
criteria in the distribution of rights, resources, and duties»
493
. The Canadian 
philosopher thus claims that it would also be advisable to introduce, together with the 
protection of fundamental human rights, other side, group-specific rights in order to 
safeguard minorities: 
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legitimate, and indeed unavoidable, to supplement traditional human rights with minority 
rights. A comprehensive theory of justice in a multicultural state will include both universal 
rights, assigned to individuals regardless of group membership, and certain group-
differentiated rights or 'special status' for minority cultures
494
. 
He thus aims at explaining how such differentiated minority rights can be reconciled 
with democracy, liberty and social justice
495
. Kymlicka believes that a view of 
liberalism inspired by «commitment to freedom of choice and (one form of) personal 
autonomy»
496
 is not contrary to, but rather requires «a concern with cultural 
membership»
497
. This is because, in his opinion, «individual choice is dependent on 
the presence of a societal culture, defined by language and history»
498
, and some 
people are intimately bound to their own culturally-oriented lifestyles and traditions. 
He thus deems it necessary to defend a liberal theory of minority rights to protect 
through external interventions the interests of «ethnic groups and national 
minorities»
499
, without setting any kind of «internal restrictions»
500
. 
 The political theorist Seyla Benhabib attempts to reconcile the liberal 
democratic theory and the notion of cosmopolitanism with the question of pluralism 
and difference. In her 2004 work 'The Rights of The Others'
501
, following the Kantian 
concept of cosmopolitan federalism, Benhabib focuses on the notion of political 
membership, that she intends as «the principles and practices for incorporating aliens 
and strangers, immigrants and newcomers, refugees and asylum seekers, into existing 
polities»
502
. In this sense, she questions the concept of national membership and 
citizenship and claims that «a cosmopolitan theory of justice cannot be restricted to 
schemes of just distribution on a global scale, but must also incorporate a vision of 
just membership»
503
. In Benhabib's opinion a just membership requires, first of all, 
the recognition of «the moral claim of refugees and asylees to first admittance»
504
, so 
                                                         
494
 Kymlikca, 1995:6. 
495
 Ibid. 
496
 Kymlikca, 1995:7. 
497
 Kymlikca, 1995:8. 
498
 Ibid. 
499
 Kymlikca, 1995:7. 
500
 Ibid. 
501
 Benhabib, 2004. 
502
 Benhabib, 2004:1. 
503
 Ibid. Italics in the original. 
504
 Ibid. Italics in the original. 
65 
 
as to grant them acceptance and assistance within the national borders. To this extent, 
Benhabib argues that  
the right to political membership must be accommodated by practices that are non-
discriminatory in scope, transparent in formulation and execution, and justiciable when 
violated by states and other state-like organs
505
. 
At the same time, however, it would be necessary to have «a regime of porous 
borders for immigrants»
506
, so that the government could «regulate the transition 
from first admission to full membership»
507
. A third condition for the constitution of 
a just membership is related to the necessary maintenance of national borders, «an 
injunction against denationalization and the loss of citizenship rights»
508
. This is due 
to the fact that in order for a democratic government to be effective it has to be able to 
extend its provisions and control only to «the territory under its jurisdiction»
509
. 
Finally, every person should be entitled to «certain inalienable rights, regardless of 
the status of their political membership»
510
. In this sense, everyone should be granted 
human fundamental rights even if they have not become full members yet. 
The problem of a just membership, for Benhabib, is strongly connected to what she 
calls «the paradox of democratic legitimacy»
511
 for which the pursuit of the common 
good is limited by the inescapable preconditions of human rights: 
The republican sovereign should undertake to bind its will by a series of precommitments to a 
set of formal and substantive norms, usually referred to as “human rights.” The rights and 
claims of others – be they “auxiliaries to the commonwealth,” as women, slaves, and 
propertyless males were considered to be, or be they subjugated peoples or foreigners – are 
then negotiated upon this terrain flanked by human rights on the one hand and sovereignty 
assertions on the other
512
. 
Given such unavoidable paradox, Benhabib proposes to diminish its problematic 
import «through a renegotiation and reiteration of the dual commitments to human 
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rights and sovereign selfdetermination»
513
. Since, in her opinion, the illusions of 
democracy are related to the homogeneous nature of the individuals and to «territorial 
self-sufficiency»
514
, she aims at challenging such illusions through the redefinition of 
national rights according to the needs of immigrants in order to «initiate self-reflexive 
transformations on the part of the polity involved»
515
. To this extent, Benhabib 
supports the establishment of a «disaggregated citizenship» through which people 
could «develop and sustain multiple allegiances and networks across nation-state 
boundaries, in inter- as well as transnational contexts»
516
. Her idea of 
cosmopolitanism is based on the existence of one polis «furthered by such multiple, 
overlapping allegiances which are sustained across communities of language, 
ethnicity, religion, and nationality»
517
.  
In this understanding, a just democratic rule should be carried out through continuous 
and active participation and «attachment to representative institutions, which exhibit 
accountability, transparency, and responsibility toward a given constituency that 
authorizes them in its own name»
518
. Democracy can thus be defined as the people's 
«ongoing process of constitutional self-creation»
519
, that makes «fluid and 
negotiable»
520
 the traditional fixed borders between exclusion and inclusion, «through 
processes of continuous and multiple democratic iterations»
521
. The political theorist 
thus defines 'democratic iterations' as 
the complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and exchange through which 
universalist rights claims and principles are contested and contextualized, invoked and 
revoked, posited and positioned, throughout legal and political institutions, as well as in the 
associations of civil society. These can take place in the “strong” public bodies of legislatives, 
the judiciary, and the executive, as well as in the informal and “weak” publics of civil society 
associations and the media
522
. 
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Through the concept of democratic iterations Benhabib introduces a communicative 
and deliberative interpretation of the democratic process, since she assumes that 
through discussion and argument it is possible to renegotiate and include marginal 
positions. The term 'iteration', borrowed by Derrida's philosophy of language with 
which he describes «the process of repeating a term or a concept»
523
, does not 
«simply produce a replica of the first original usage and its intended meaning: rather 
every repetition is a form of variation»
524
. In line with Derrida, Benhabib explains the 
process of iteration as one of interpretation, including a change of the meaning of 
some notions and the eventual demise of some others: 
The iteration and interpretation of norms, and of every aspect of the universe of value, 
however, are never merely acts of repetition. Every act of iteration involves making sense of 
an authoritative original in a new and different context. The antecedent thereby is repositioned 
and resignified via subsequent usages and references. Meaning is enhanced and transformed; 
conversely, when the creative appropriation of that authoritative original ceases or stops 
making sense, then the original loses its authority upon us as well. Iteration is the 
reappropriation of the “origin”; it is at the same time its dissolution as the original and its 
preservation through its continuous deployment
525
.  
In this sense, Benhabib intends democratic iterations as «linguistic, legal, cultural, 
and political repetitions-in-transformation»
526
 that do not only «change established 
understandings but also transform»
527
 what are perceived to be original meanings.  
 A different communicative approach to the solution of political problems in 
the light of cultural diversity is proposed by the political theorist Bhikhu Parekh, who, 
in his 2000 book 'Rethinking Multiculturalism'
528
, defines multiculturalism as «a 
perspective on human life»
529
 based on three main assumptions. The first one is the 
fact that individuals are inescapably influenced by their own cultures,  
                                                         
523
 Ibid. 
524
 Ibid. 
525
 Benhabib, 2004:180. 
526
 Ibid. 
527
 Ibid. 
528
 Parekh, 2000. 
529
 Parekh, 2000:336. 
68 
 
in the sense that they grow up and live within a culturally structured world, organize their 
lives and social relations in terms of its system of meaning and significance, and place 
considerable value on their cultural identity
530
.  
Secondly, Parekh claims that, because «different cultures represent different systems 
of meaning and visions of the good life»
531
, they are limited and could never account 
for all the «human capacities and emotions»
532
, but could only grasp «a part of the 
totality of human existence»
533
. As a consequence, every culture «needs others to 
understand itself better, expand its intellectual and moral horizon, stretch its 
imagination and guard it against the obvious temptation to absolutize itself»
534
. In this 
understanding, experiencing difference would enrich and expand one's own 
understanding of themselves: 
No culture is wholly worthless, that it deserves at least some respect because of what it means 
to its members and the creative energy it displays, that no culture is perfect and has a right to 
impose itself on others, and that cultures are generally best changed from within
535
. 
Thirdly, all the cultures, though retaining a certain variable degree of coherence and 
identity, are also «internally plural and represent a continuing conversation between 
their different traditions and strands of thought»
536
.  
In accordance with such presuppositions, Parekh suggests that «from a multicultural 
perspective, no political doctrine or ideology can represent the full truth of human 
life»
537
, since each of them represents a narrow and partial account of what should be 
considered as just and good. In this sense, he asserts that «since multicultural 
societies represent an interplay of different cultures, they cannot be theorized or 
managed from within any one of them»
538
. 
According to Parekh, multicultural societies should accept «the reality and 
desirability of cultural diversity»
539
 and structure their «political life accordingly»
540
. 
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In order to allow for communication between different cultures the political theorist 
argues that such societies should not only be «dialogically constituted», but they 
should also make sure that such dialogue is continuous and effective to «stretch the 
boundaries of the prevailing forms of thought, and generate a body of collectively 
acceptable principles, institutions and policies»
541
. In order to be effective such 
dialogue requires  
certain institutional preconditions such as freedom of expression, agreed procedures and basic 
ethical norms, participatory public spaces, equal rights, a responsive and popularly 
accountable structure of authority, and empowerment of citizens
542
.  
Such preconditions also require that individuals retain a series of «essential political 
virtues»
543
, such as  
mutual respect and concern, tolerance, self-restraint, willingness to enter into unfamiliar 
worlds of thought, love of diversity, a mind open to new ideas and a heart open to others 
needs, and the ability to persuade and live with unresolved differences
544
. 
Through such process of negotiation and dialogue, a multicultural society could reach 
a stable and long-lasting «common sense of belonging among its citizens»
545
, that 
should not be based on cultural or ethnic differences, but «on a shared commitment to 
the political community»
546
. 
 The criticisms to the mainstream notion of liberal democracy described above 
have contributed to make the normative political theory of democracy more capable 
of including cultural minorities. This seems to suggest that nowadays diversity has 
been granted a more relevant role in political theory. However, since multiculturalism 
resorts to identity politics in order to give diversity its due significance, it could be 
concluded that its underlying epistemology still supports mainstream liberal 
democracy. For instance, according to Monceri, theories of multiculturalism end up 
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being «unable to radically think of diversity»
547
, because, in their understanding, «not 
all differences matter, but only the set of them that can be ‘categorized’ on the basis 
of selected affinities or similarities»
548
. This way of creating identities to include 
them in the political system would entail that those differences that are not 
statistically relevant or even recognised as such are automatically excluded. In this 
sense, such theories of multiculturalism do not question the basic assumptions of 
liberal democracy which is still considered the only possible model of good 
governance globally
549
.  
In this sense, the assumptions underlying the modern mainstream notion of liberal 
democracy are considered to be transferable to poorly democratic local contexts 
because of a universal common political epistemology which all reasonable and 
decent individuals would recognise as valuable. According to such view, when 
transferring democracy into different cultural contexts it would still be conceivable to 
maintain an equivalence in its definition and meaning based on the fact that there is 
always the possibility to find common and shared understandings among human 
beings.  
From a linguistics perspective, while such transfer of concepts entails the possibility 
to reach a common understanding between different languages, it also acts as if such 
correspondence of meaning could totally remove all obstacles posed by differences, 
thus ignoring the possibility that there might also be a lack of understanding in the 
translation process. In the next chapter, the notion of equivalence in meaning will be 
analysed from a translational point of view, by examining the most relevant stages of 
the debate on equivalence in the history of translation theory. After such brief outline, 
the recent developments in the politics of translation will be introduced to consider 
the political implications of the paradigm of equivalence in translation.   
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2 - Translation and politics: the paradigm of equivalence 
 
2 .1  The  or ig ina l  and  the  tra ns la ted t ext  in  the  West ern 
tra ns lat io n  tra dit io n  
 
 The problem of establishing the best kind of relationship between the original 
and the translated texts has always dominated the debate on the practice of translation 
since the first reflections on this topic in the Western translation tradition, starting 
from the classical Roman writings on translation in the first century b.C until today's 
discourses in translation studies. Such relationship has always been described as one 
of recreating a certain degree of sameness in the translated text, but it was only in the 
1950s that the first systematic studies on translation aimed at acquiring a scientific 
and standardised way to consider translation, ultimately using the term 'equivalence' 
to describe the relationship between the original (termed as 'source text') and its 
translation (or 'target text').  
In general, however, when examining translation theories from its origins until now, 
it can be concluded that the degree of autonomy of a translation from its original 
varies depending on the historical period and on the cultural and political context in 
which reflections on translation are formulated. Moreover, the debate on the best 
methods of translating shows that thoughts and theories of translation are closely 
interrelated in space and time, so that they are gradually adjusted to fit different 
contexts, disciplines and objectives and are also reinterpreted accordingly. Until the 
1970s, theories of Western translation thought have also retained a certain degree of 
prescriptiveness and normativeness so that they mainly consist of instructions and 
suggestions on the best methods to translate and of strategies a translator should use 
in order to make a good translation
1
. 
 Scholars of translation
2
 describe the first stages of classical translation thought 
from the Roman period to the twentieth century as being characterised by the 
alternating recourse to two opposite kinds of strategies termed as literal, or word-for-
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word, and free, loose, or sense-for-sense translation; that have also informed later 
debates on translation. Despite this could be easily accepted as a general description 
of the extremely long period of time we are considering, it also results to be an 
uncomplicated view of past translation traditions that does not consider the specific 
contexts in which they were conceived. What follows is a brief and not at all 
complete overview of the key authors who contributed to create a history of Western 
translation thought.  
The origins of Western translation theories are traditionally dated back to the first 
century b.C.
 3
, when the distinction between word-for-word and sense-for-sense 
strategies is thought to be originally posed by the Latin orator and philosopher 
Marcus Tullius Cicero in 46 b.C., in his 'De Optimo Genere Oratorum'
4
. In his work, 
Cicero advocates for a translation that should reproduce the sense of the original 
keeping the beauty of the target language without translating literally:  
I have converted [...] not recasting them as a translator [interpres], but as an orator, keeping 
the same meanings but with their forms - their figures, so to speak - in words adapted to our 
idiom. I have not thought it necessary to pay out one word for another in this process, but 
have conserved the character and the force of the language. Nor have I thought it fitting to 
count them out to the reader, but to weigh them out
5
.  
Cicero makes a distinction between interpreters, also known as grammarians, who 
were used to translate literally or word for word, and orators, whose approach focused 
on preserving the general sense of the original without sticking to the meaning of 
each single word. Such a method needs to be introduced in the wider context of that 
time, when, as a consequence of the Romans' conquests in Ancient Greece, the great 
influence exerted by the Greek culture on its Roman conquerors posed the problem of 
dealing with a large amount of writings in Greek
6
. Roman artists, poets, philosophers 
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and orators were at the same time attracted by and not feeling at the same level as 
Greek artists and authors. Such an ambivalent feeling was also reflected in the 
strategy they chose to translate Greek writings, since, by adjusting the original to the 
Latin tastes and traditions, they managed to appropriate Greek texts and make them 
Roman.  
At that time, translation
7
 was used to study two different disciplines: not only Latin 
and Greek grammar, for language learning, but also rhetoric, for examining speech 
models and content both in science and literature
8
. Educated Romans were bilingual 
and studied both Latin and Greek; in this case, at a basic level of education, the 
approach to translation favoured a word-for-word strategy in order to show the 
different grammatical features and patterns of the two languages
9
. Apart from 
grammar, translation also served another discipline, rhetoric, the highest level of 
Roman education, which focused on speech models and strategies
10
. In this case, 
according to Cicero, the Greek classics have to be translated following the Latin 
tastes and traditions, by reinterpreting the original through making it easily 
understandable to the audience.  
Cicero's writing on translation had an educational purpose and was directed to orators 
and scholars whose aim was to learn how to speak in public, with Cicero thus 
favouring this second approach to translation
11
. His opinion is also part of a general 
public debate of his time, when his thought, also influenced by personal and 
professional happenings, is at rivalry with the Atticists' word-for-word translation 
strategies, and considers translation an elite activity to create a Roman identity and to 
show control over the Greek culture
12,13
.  
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theories see Copeland, 1991; Lianeri & Zajko, 2008; McElduff & Sciarrino, 2011; and McElduff, 
2013. 
8 Copeland, 1991; McElduff, 2013. 
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13 Cicero's translation strategy in Rome was also supported by Horace in his 'Art of Poetry', where he 
advocated for a free translation that created new meanings and models in Latin, without exactly 
reproducing Greek poetry like a trustworthy interpreter or grammarian. 
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 The Roman sense-for-sense strategy also affected patristic translation of 
sacred documents; however, while for Roman orators the translated texts acquired a 
high degree of autonomy from its Greek originals, in the Middle Ages, translation 
moved in the opposite direction, and focused on the importance of the original sacred 
texts. In fact, while a word-for-word strategy could have altered the original meaning 
and caused misunderstandings, a meaning-oriented approach would have conveyed 
the real sense of the texts. For instance, in his 'De optimo genere interpretandi'
14
, a 
letter to the ex-senator Pammachius, in 395 a.D., Saint Jerome defends his translation 
of a letter from Pope Epiphanius to John of Jerusalem, after being accused of having 
falsified the original. In his defence, Saint Jerome quotes the Gospels' different 
versions of the same events, and also ecclesiastical and Latin authors, among whom 
Cicero and Horace, while publicly claiming to favour a meaning-oriented strategy: 
«Indeed, I not only admit, but freely proclaim that in translation [interpretatione] 
from Greek - except in the case of Sacred Scripture, where the very order of the 
words is a mystery - I render not word for word, but sense for sense»
15
.  
One can notice that while Saint Jerome advocates for a free translation of 
ecclesiastical and sacred documents, he makes an exception for the Bible, the Sacred 
Scripture, because in that case even the word order is held to be a mystery, and also 
possibly because modifying the meaning of such an important original text would 
lead to a charge of heresy
16
. In his defence, he also introduces criticisms to the 
existing biblical translations as part of his future plan to retranslate the Bible into 
Latin directly from Hebrew
17
. His translation, known as the Vulgate, later became the 
official Catholic version of the Bible and replaced the Old Latin one.  
The choice of a sense-for-sense translation strategy to appropriate Greek culture and 
make it Roman had by then lost its original purpose, and the conflicting and 
ambivalent attitude towards Greek texts was substituted by a search for truth and 
fidelity inspired by God's nature
18
. Such «theory of conservation of textual meaning 
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without the impediment of linguistic multiplicity»
19
 can also be noticed in Saint 
Augustine's 'De Doctrina Christiana', written between 395 and 426 a.D. with the aim 
to provide guidance and rules for the correct interpretation of the Scripture. In the 
second book, while telling about the legend of seventy Hellenistic Jews working in 
separate cells who produced the very same translation, Augustine argues that they  
enjoyed so much of the presence and power of the Holy Spirit in their work of translation, 
that among that number of men there was but one voice [...], and yet nothing was found in 
the manuscript of any one of them that was not found in the same words and in the same 
order of words in all the rest
20
.  
The faithfulness Augustine talks about does not require precise adherence to the 
original text, but rather it entails the presence and inspiration of God to guide the 
translators when carrying out their task
21
, so that  
even if anything is found in the original Hebrew in a different form from that in which these 
men have expressed it, I think we must give way to the dispensation of Providence which 
used these men to bring it about
22
.  
 The prominence of the sacred original texts was a common and indisputable 
feature of translation throughout the Middle Ages and literalism gradually started to 
gain ground as the accepted translation strategy for key philosophical and religious 
texts. During this period philosophy and theology were brought together in order to 
reconcile authoritative Latin classics with the sacred texts in an effort to find the 
unique truth. The use of literalism was a way for the Roman Catholic Church to keep 
its dominating religious position clear of a number of attacks and threats throughout 
the Middle Ages. During the High Middle Ages new religious orders proposed a 
return to a simpler and more modest monasticism and were alternatively accepted or 
persecuted for being heretical. In addition, at later stages, the Avignon Papacy and the 
Great Schism marked the rise of the state power with the consequent spread of 
national vernaculars in spite of Latin. A long and debated contention on the correct 
interpretation of the sacred scriptures and on the possibility to translate the Bible into 
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vernacular languages started, leading to controversies over the fidelity, referred to the 
faithfulness to the words of the author
23
, and the truth of translation, dealing with the 
content and the correct meaning of sacred texts
24
.  
In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, John Wycliffe and his rebellious religious 
movement, known as the Lollards, uses a meaning-oriented strategy for their 
unauthorised version of the Sacred Scripture into English vernacular. At that time, a 
sense-for-sense strategy was not considered acceptable by the Roman Catholic 
Church for translating the Bible and the other most important sacred documents. In 
the prologue of the Wycliffite Bible the purpose of the translator is:  
with Goddis helpe, to make the sentence as trewe and open in English as it is in Latyn, either 
more trewe and more open than it is in Latyn; and I preie, for charité and for comoun profyt 
of Cristene soulis, that if ony wiys man fynde ony defaute of the truthe of translacioun, let 
him sette in the trewe sentence and opin of Holi Writ
25
.  
In the preceding passage, one can notice that the most important task of the translator 
is to find the true («trewe») translation, that should be 'open', and even clearer than its 
Latin original. The sense-for-sense translation strategy is then introduced as a way to 
achieve this purpose:  
First it is to knowe that the best translating is out of Latyn into English to translate aftir the 
sentence and not oneli aftir the wordis, so that the sentence be as opin (either openere) in 
English as in Latyn and go not fer fro the lettre; and if the lettre mai not be suid in the 
translating, let the sentence evere be hool and open, for the wordis owen to serve to the 
entent and sentence and ellis the wordis ben superflu either false
26
.  
This religious and political power struggle ruled throughout the Middle Ages and 
culminated in the sixteenth century in the Protestant Reformation. While in the early 
decades of the sixteenth century the Church of England separated from the Roman 
Church under Henry VIII; John Calvin's ideas and Martin Luther's 'Ninety-five 
Theses' started to gain consensus in great part of Europe. Luther, who translated the 
New and Old Testament into East Middle German, respectively in 1522 and 1534,  
was criticised by the Roman Catholic Church for having falsified the original sacred 
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texts. In his defence, the German monk wrote in 1530 his famous 'Sendbrief vom 
Dolmetschen' ['Open Letter on Translation']
27
, where, following Saint Jerome's 'De 
optimo genere interpretandi', he rejects the word-for-word strategy and adopts a 
meaning-oriented one, to « convey the sense of the text—if the translation is to be 
clear and accurate»
28
. In spite of Saint Jerome's open claim on the impossibility to 
translate the Bible using a sense-for-sense strategy, Luther equates his predecessor's 
condition with his own and states that: «The literal Latin is a great barrier to speaking 
proper German»
29
. The German monk defends his choice asserting that, when 
translating, it is necessary to use a common language to favour understanding: 
We must ask the mother in the home, the children on the street, the common person in the 
market about this
30
. We must be guided by their tongue, the manner of their speech, and do 
our translating accordingly. Then they will understand it and recognize that we are speaking 
German to them
31
.  
 The struggle over the correct interpretation of classical philosophical and 
religious texts in the sixteenth-century France knew changing fortunes, with Francis 
I's early tolerance of the Huguenots, and his later support for the Roman Catholic 
Church and persecution of heretic scholars and writers. Among the French humanists 
who are persecuted and condemned at that time is the scholar and translator Etienne 
Dolet, who writes in 1540 'La maniere de bien traduire d'une langue en aultre' ['The 
Way of Translating well from a language into another']
32
, the first systematic work on 
the practice of translation in a European vernacular
33
.  
Inspired by Greek and Latin classical texts and authors, and also by the French 
political agenda that aimed at extending the use of the French vernacular of Paris to 
France as a whole
34
, Dolet initially plans to write a treatise called 'l'Orateur Francoys' 
['The French Orator']. He only actually manages to  complete three of the nine 
chapters he intended to write and in the one about translation
35
 he provides 
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prescriptive norms on how to translate classical Greek and Latin texts into the French 
vernacular. While in general, at that time, translation was attached to an original-
centred literal strategy, Dolet criticises such method and proposes the use of the 
sense-for-sense approach:  
You should not enter into slavery to the point of rendering word for word. Whoever 
translates in this way does so because his mind is poor and deficient.[...][A translator, BQ] 
will work with sentences and not care about the order of the words, and he will see to it that 
the author’s intention is expressed while miraculously preserving the characteristics of both 
languages. [...] if you express the intention of the author you translate you will be above 
reproach, even if you distort the syntax. I shall not pass over in silence the folly of some 
translators who bow to servitude instead of acting freely. They are such fools that they try to 
render line by line, or verse by verse. When they make this mistake they often adulterate the 
meaning of the author they translate and convey neither the elegance nor the perfection of 
either language. You must guard against this vice with all your might, since all it 
demonstrates is the translator’s ignorance. 
In this passage, Dolet compares word-for-word translation to enslavement and folly 
and describes the translator who uses that approach as ignorant and poor in spirit. In 
his treatise, the humanist scholar also stresses the importance of other aspects in 
translation, such as the translator's deep understanding of the original, the complete 
knowledge and command of the languages he translates from and into; the avoidance 
of Latin and Greek words and calques when translating into vernacular; and the 
respect for oratory and rhetoric norms in the translator's rendering of classics
36
.  
Dolet's appeal to a meaning-oriented strategy and the norms he introduces in his work 
are part of a broader political agenda, in which French humanists transfer a 
«rhetorical ideal of translation»
37
 into the French vernacular, in order to counter 
standard literal trends and strategies in translation and favour the creation of a 
national language
38
. Translation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was mostly 
dedicated to Greek and Latin literature, with humanistic ideals of classic authors such 
as Cicero and Horace informing the artists' sense-for-sense strategies. Such meaning-
oriented approaches were reinterpreted in order to create free versions and 
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adaptations of classical texts from antiquity and reinscribe them into different 
national narratives. Translators would freely admit modifying the originals to create 
new pieces of literature that could fit local customs and traditions, and the resulting 
translations were commonly known as 'les belles infideles', the French for 'the 
beautiful but unfaithful'.  
This humanist translation tradition is held to be initiated by the French translator 
Nicolas Perrot D'Ablancourt
39
 who, in his preface to Tacitus
40
 explains that, 
whenever a word-for-word approach is impossible or infelicitous, he recurs to 
meaning-oriented strategies that comply with the French literary tastes and traditions 
of his times: 
I have followed him [Tacitus, BQ] step by step, and rather as a slave than as a companion, 
although I might have allowed myself more freedom since I was not translating a passage, 
but a Book, every part of which must be linked together and fused in the same body [...] 
Hence one must take heed that an Author's grace not be lost through too much 
scrupulousness, and that the fear of being unfaithful to him in some one thing not result in 
infidelity to the whole [...]. This means, however, that the best translations seem to be the 
least unfaithful
41
.  
In the paragraph above, D'Ablancourt identifies two types of faithfulness: one is 
directed to the words ('scrupulousness') and is related to literalist translation 
strategies; while the other has to do with the text's general message or the author's 
intention ('the whole').  
In his preface to Lucian
42
, the French translator argues for a meaning-oriented 
strategy, even though he also recognises that such methods may not fall in the 
category of translation proper: 
I do not always cleave to the words or thoughts of this Author; whilst keeping in sight his 
purpose, I fit things to our air and manner. Diverse times require not only different words, 
but different thoughts; and Ambassadors are accustomed to dress in the fashion of the 
country where they have been sent for fear of appearing ridiculous to those whom they 
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endevor to please. Nevertheless, this is not properly a Translation; but it rates more highly 
than a Translation; and the Ancients did not translate otherwise
43
.  
The French tradition of 'les belles infideles' also influenced the English poets of the 
seventeenth century, who criticised literal renderings of Greek and Latin verses into 
the English vernacular and advocated for a meaning-oriented translation strategy. 
However, while D'Ablancourt's reflections are guided by two recurring themes: first, 
unfaithfulness of language to guard faithfulness to the author's purpose and message, 
and second, a translation has to surpass its original and make it better; in the 
seventeenth century, English poets adopted a sense-for-sense approach to best 
recreate the spirit of the original
44
. For instance, Abraham Cowley, in his preface to 
the 'Pindaric Odes'
45
, attacks the word-for-word renderings of poetry, that sound 
«little better than prose to our ears
46
», and identifies such literal trend in translation as 
the cause for all translations to be «so much inferior to their originals
47
». Similarly to 
D'Ablancourt, Cowley has doubts on what translation actually is, and at times also 
calls it 'imitation'. He appeals for the use of «our wit or invention (not deserting still 
his subject)
48
» and openly claims to have «taken, left out, and added, what I please; 
nor make it so much my aim to let the reader know precisely what he spoke, as what 
was his way and manner of speaking
49
», but rather to experiment on how Pindaric 
Odes «will look in an English habit
50
».  
During the seventeenth-century, another English poet and translator, John Dryden, 
contributes to the debate over the best method to translate poetry and furthers 
Cowley's reflections on translation as an imitative activity. In his preface to Ovid's 
Epistles, Dryden introduces a categorisation of translation strategies into three types:  
Metaphrase, or turning an Authour word by word, and Line by Line, from one Language into 
another. Thus, or near this manner, was Horace his Art of Poetry translated by Ben. Johnson. 
The second way is that of Paraphrase, or Translation with Latitude, where the Authour is 
kept in view by the Translator, so as never to be lost, but his words are not so strictly 
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follow'd as his sense, and that too is admitted to be amplyfied, but not alter'd. Such is Mr. 
Wallers Translation of Virgils Fourth Aeneid. The Third way is that of Imitation, where the 
Translator (if now he has not lost that Name) assumes the liberty not only to vary from the 
words and sence, but to forsake them both as he sees occasion: and taking only some general 
hints from the Original, to run division on the ground-work, as he pleases. Such is Mr. 
Cowleys practice in turning two Odes of Pindar, and one of Horace into English51.  
Dryden criticises both metaphrase, dismissing it as a slavish copying of words, and 
imitation, given its lack of respect for the author's memory and reputation
52
. He then 
suggests that the best method to translate is paraphrase, considering it a middle way 
between metaphrase and imitation: «Imitation and verbal Version are, in my opinion, 
the two extremes, which ought to be avoided: and therefore when I have propos’d the 
mean betwixt them, it will be seen how far his Argument will reach
53
». In his later 
dedication to Virgil's 'Aeneid'
54
, the English translator also shifts towards a more 
literal rendering, and explains that he has  
thought fit to steer betwixt the two extremes of paraphrase and literal translation; to keep as 
near my author as I could, without losing all his graces, the most eminent of which are in the 
beauty of his words; and those words, I must add, are always figurative. Such of these as 
would retain their elegance in our tongue, I have endeavor'd to graft on it; but most of them 
are of necessity to be lost, because they wall not shine in any way but their own55. 
Dryden's reason for prescribing a general middle way in translation is to safeguard the 
spirit of the author: «The sense of an Author, generally speaking, is to be Sacred and 
Inviolable
56
», so that translators have to understand the language of the poet, and «his 
particular turn of Thoughts and of Expression, which are the Characters that 
distinguish, and as it were individuate him from all other Writers
57
». Once translators 
have gained thorough understanding of the author's spirit, they have «to look into our 
selves, to conform our Genius to his, to give his thought either the same turn, if our 
tongue will bear it, or, if not, to vary but the dress, not to alter or destroy the 
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substance
58
». Dryden's via media is a way of overcoming difficulties in literal 
translation, given the impossibility to translate word-for-word keeping the beauty of 
the text, so that «The like Care must be taken of the more outward Ornaments, the 
Words; when they appear (which is but seldom) literally graceful, it were an injury to 
the Author that they should be chang’d59». Whenever literal translation is not 
possible, «There is [...] a Liberty to be allowed for the Expression; neither is it 
necessary that Words and Lines should be confin’d to the measure of their 
Original
60
».  
 In the eighteenth century, the paraphrastic translation strategy is also 
encouraged by Alexander Fraser Tytler, who in 1797 writes his 'Essay on the 
principles of translation'
61
, the first English systematic treatise on translation. 
Following Dryden's distinction between the two extremes of literal and free 
translation, he advocates for a meaning-oriented strategy that enables the reader to 
perfectly understand and easily read the translated text:  
As these two opinions form opposite extremes, it is not improbable that the point of 
perfection should be found between the two. I would therefore describe a good translation to 
be, That, in which the merit of the original work is so completely transfused into another 
language, as to be as distinctly apprehended, and as strongly felt, by a native of the country 
to which that language belongs, as it is by those who speak the language of the original 
work62. 
 Tytler also gives his three general rules of translation: the first and most important is 
«that the translation should give a complete transcript of the ideas of the original 
work
63
», translators are not allowed to cut what they please or add their own opinions, 
but should only intervene with caution and take out accessory concepts, or 
supplement the text uniquely to strengthen the author's opinion
64
. When an 
ambiguous meaning is to be rendered, the translator should not, in any case, keep 
such ambiguity in his translation, but rather interpret the text according to the author's 
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spirit and beliefs and following the context of the obscure passage
65
. The second rule 
is «that the style and manner of writing should be of the same character with that of 
the original
66
».  The style and register of the translated text should reflect the original 
ones:  
If we are justly offended at hearing Virgil speak in the style of the Evening Post or the Daily 
Advertiser, what must we think of the translator who makes the solemn and sententious 
Tacitus express himself in the low cant of the streets, or in the dialect of the waiters of a 
tavern?
67
 
Tytler admits that it is more difficult to follow this second principle, since it entails a 
good command of both languages involved in translation. The third law is «that the 
translation should have all the ease of the original composition
68
», and is considered 
by Tytler the most difficult to abide to, since «To one who walks in trammels, it is not 
easy to exhibit an air of grace and freedom
69
». In order to follow the last rule, the 
English poet advises that a translator should «adopt the very soul of his author, which 
must speak through his own organs
70
». 
 The importance of the spirit of the original text and the idea that translation 
would always entail losses to make up for in the eighteenth and nineteenth-century 
England continues to animate the debates over the status of the original and of the 
translated text
71
. The controversy between Francis Newman and Matthew Arnold 
over the translation of Homer best represents the intellectual climate of those times. 
Newman translates Homer's Iliad
72
 into English using archaic, old-ballads English to 
recreate the same emotions the Iliad would give to Greek readers of the ancient times, 
since «the substance of what he [Homer, BQ] tells is often of less importance to us 
than the manner in which he tells it; and it becomes a first-rate duty of a translator to 
adhere closely to his manner and habit of thought, as also to his moral sentiments
73
». 
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In particular, Newman chooses old-English-ballads language to translate Homer in 
order to be historically faithful to the original and because  
the style of Homer himself is direct, popular, forcible, quaint, flowing, garrulous, abounding 
with formulas, redundant in particles and affirmatory interjections, as also in grammatical 
connectives of time, place, and argument. In all these respects it is similar to the old English 
ballad, and is in sharp contrast to the polished style of Pope, Sotheby, and Cowper, the best 
known English translators of Homer
74
.  
To express Homer's style and manner suitably, «we need a diction sufficiently 
antiquated to obtain pardon of the reader for its (the text's) frequent homeliness
75
». 
In 1861, the English poet and translator Matthew Arnold, in his lecture 'On 
Translating Homer'
76
, openly criticises Newman's translation strategy for pretending 
to be faithful in that it tries «to retain every peculiarity of the original, so far as he is 
able, with the greater care the more foreign it may happen to be; so that it may never 
be forgotten that he is imitating, and imitating in a different material
77
». According to 
Arnold a common translator could never really understand what Homer's works were 
and meant to Greek people of his time, since: «the Greeks are dead; the unlearned 
Englishman has not the data for judging; and no man can safely confide in his own 
single judgment of his own work
78
». Only scholars and experts could tell what 
Homer's writings meant to them: «No one can tell him [the translator, BQ] how 
Homer affected the Greeks; but there are those who can tell him how Homer affects 
them. These are scholars; who possess, at the same time with knowledge of Greek, 
adequate poetical taste and feeling»
79
. With such elitist attitude towards translation, 
Arnold also states the indisputable superiority of the original that is part of the general 
thinking of that time and that is still nowadays highly considered: «No translation will 
seem to them of much worth compared with the original; but they alone can say 
whether the translation produces more or less the same effect upon them as the 
original. They are the only competent tribunal in the matter
80
». 
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 Arnorld's argument can be similarly found in the eighteenth and nineteenth-
century German tradition, where the imitative and paraphrastic English and French 
translation methods are criticised for not really communicating the foreign text, but 
shaping it so as to make it belong to the receiving cultures. For instance, in 1766's 
'Fragments'
81
, the writer, translator and philosopher Johann Gottefried Herder 
disapproves of the French translators  «who are much too proud of their own taste
82
» 
and  
adapt all things to it, rather than try to adapt themselves to the taste of another time. Homer 
must enter France a captive and dress according to their fashion, so as not to offend their 
eyes. He has let them take his venerable beard and his old simple clothes away from him. He 
has to conform to French customs, and where his peasant coarseness still shows he is treated 
as a barbarian. But we poor Germans, who are still almost an audience without a fatherland, 
who are still without tyrants to dictate our taste, want to see him the way he is 
83
.  
 In a similar manner, in his preface to Aeschylus' 'Agamennon'
84,
 published in 
1816, Wilhelm Von Humboldt despises «the eclectic manner in which translators 
often choose arbitrarily among the hundreds of variants in manuscripts and critical 
emendations, trusting to a feeling which, of necessity, often leads them astray
85
». His 
interest is to translate the original, while reconstituting «a document, if not in its true 
and original form, at least as close as possible to the earliest source accessible. It must 
therefore be the product of one mind, the result of historical precision and 
conscientiousness, of the whole treasure of scholarship that underscores it
86
». Such 
interest of the German tradition in maintaining the true spirit of the author and of his 
works was supported by historical studies and withheld a nationalist claim to develop 
and improve the German language thanks to Latin and Greek classics, since «as 
understanding of language increases understanding of a nation widens
87
». 
The eighteenth-century German tradition, in general, and in particular, Humboldt's 
pioneering view on language inspired later linguistic studies on the connection 
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between culture and language by Edward Sapir
88
 and on the theory of linguistic 
relativity and Benjamin Lee Whorf
89
, since they introduced the idea that different 
languages reflected the spirit of a different nation and that «no word in one language 
is completely equivalent to a word in another language [...] Each language expresses a 
concept in a slightly different manner, with such and such a denotation, and each 
language places it on a rung that is higher or lower on the ladder of feeling
90
». Far 
from asserting the impossibility of translation, Humboldt holds that translation 
is one of the most necessary tasks to be performed in a literature, partly because it introduces 
forms of art and human life that would otherwise have remained totally unknown to those 
who do not know a language, and above all because it increases the significance and the 
expressiveness of one’s own language. For it is a marvelous feature of languages that they all 
first reach into the usual habits of life, after which they can be improved on ad infinitum into 
something nobler and more complex by the spirit of the nation that shapes them91. 
In order to make the spirit of a language known and inspire another nation, Humboldt 
prescribes that the best translation strategy is «simple fidelity
92
» and «love for the 
original
93
», which would consequently lead to a translation that has a «certain 
colouring,[...] merely a touch of the foreign
94
» that French and English paraphrastic 
and imitative strategies do not include. Fidelity of the translator starts to signal a turn 
to literalist strategies so that a foreign text, even when translated, resists the receiving 
culture's appropriation and, on the contrary, introduces new and unfamiliar terms and 
notions into it.  
 This attitude towards translation reflects the themes of the broader Romantic 
literary movement of that time and is encouraged by critics and translators, such as 
August Wilhelm Schlegel, who criticises the English and French free and imitative 
translation strategy
95
 and defends «diligence and skill in translating
96
» from the 
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charge of «mental sluggishness and servility
97
». In accordance with Humboldt's view 
of language, Schlegel also examines the question of language innovation through 
translation
98
, while supporting a literal translation strategy:  
much has [...] initially been condemned as corrupting a language, which later entered into 
that very language and proved itself to be rather an ennobling factor. Proposals to introduce 
into a language an element that is not yet available in it, should therefore not be rejected 
without thorough consideration
99
. 
He suggests that if a translator did not want to incur «the justified reproach that you 
are not speaking a valid language that is recognized as such, but rather a jargon of 
your own invention
100
», «the innovation proposed should not be allowed to contradict 
what is already firmly established
101
».  
The foreignizing translation strategy is considered by Romantic literary critics and 
historians the best possible translation method and was also held to be the arrival 
point of the Western translation tradition. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, in his 'West-
Östlicher Diwan', ['West-Easterly Divan']
102
 classifies translation into three 
historically-marked strategies based on the degree of preservation of foreign features 
in the translation. The first stage is that of Luther's Bible translation in plain prose, 
while the second, which he calls 'parodistic'
103
, consists of a translation with the aim 
to appropriate the foreign text. Goethe claims that: 
Because we cannot linger for very long in either a perfect or an imperfect state but must, 
after all, undergo one transformation after another, we experienced the third epoch of 
translation, which is the final and highest of the three. In such periods, the goal of the 
translation is to achieve perfect identity with the original, so that the one does not exist 
instead of the other but in the other's place
104
. 
 The most systematic theorisation of this German nineteenth-century 
translation tradition is Friedrich Schleiermacher's lecture 'Über die verschiedenen 
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Methoden des Ubersetzens' ['On the different methods of translating']
105
 at the Berlin 
Academy of Sciences in 1813. The German theologian and translator is the first to 
make a functionalist distinction between interpreters, who generally deal with 
business and commercial oral communication, and translators, who work on scientific 
and artistic texts
106
. In his lecture, while considering the «translator proper» the one 
«who truly wishes to bring together [...] his writer and his reader»
107
, Schleiermacher 
asserts that, when translating,  
there are only two possibilities. Either the translator leaves the author in peace as much as 
possible and moves the reader toward him; or he leaves the reader in peace as much as 
possible and moves the writer toward him [...], and besides these two methods there can exist 
no third one that might serve some particular end
108
.  
Following his German contemporaries, Schleiermacher advances that a translator 
should choose the first strategy, since, apart from bilingual individuals, who would 
not need texts to be translated, but would rather read the originals, «all other people», 
when reading a foreign text «as fluently as they might read a foreign tongue, will yet 
retain a feeling of the foreign». This «sense of encountering the foreign» should be 
also recreated in the translated text, using a language «that not only departs from the 
quotidian but lets one perceive that it was not left to develop freely but rather was 
bent to a foreign likeness». Despite the German translator admits that such strategy 
may appear extremely humiliating to the skilled translator, he also claims that 
«achieving this with art and measure, with detriment neither to oneself nor to the 
language, is perhaps the greatest difficulty our translator must confront»
109
.  
Humboldt's study of languages and Schleiermacher's notion of understanding and 
translation influences later discourses on the concept of translatability and, in the 
early decades of the twentieth century, drives translators to experiment with 
foreignizing strategies to give new life to national cultural and literary movements
110
. 
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Modernist ideas inform arts and literature and lead to a process of reinterpretation and 
rewriting of past models. During this period the degree of autonomy of the translated 
text from its original increases, with translations being considered the revitalization of 
the foreign text.  
The first move in this direction is the assertion of the 'afterlife' of the translated text 
by the German philosopher and translator Walter Benjamin, in his 'Die Aufgabe des 
Übersetzers' ['The Task of the Translator: an introduction to the translation of 
Baudelaire's Tableaux Parisiens']
111
,  in 1923. In his preface, Benjamin assimilates 
the process of translation to that of cognition and argues that as when recognising 
images of reality, there can be no objectivity; when translating, there could be no 
identity to the original, but only a search for similarity in a process of transformation:  
To grasp the genuine relationship between an original and a translation requires an 
investigation analogous to the argumentation by which a critique of cognition would have to 
prove the impossibility of an image theory. There it is a matter of showing that in cognition 
there could be no objectivity, not even a claim to it, if it dealt with images of reality; here it 
can be demonstrated that no translation would be possible if in its ultimate essence it strove 
for likeness to the original. For in its afterlife—which could not be called that if it were not a 
transformation and a renewal of something living—the original undergoes a change. Even 
words with fixed meaning can undergo a maturing process112. 
In order for the translator to reproduce in the translation an «echo of the original
113
», 
Benjamin agrees with his German predecessors with the use of literal translation 
strategies. While it would not be «the highest praise of a translation [...] to say that it 
reads as if it had originally been written in that language»; literalness would ensure 
that the translation «reflects the great longing for linguistic complementation». 
According to Benjamin,  
the real translation is transparent; it does not cover the original, does not black its light, but 
allows the pure language, as though reinforced by its own medium to shine upon the original 
all the more fully. This may be achieved, above all, by a literal rendering of the syntax which 
proves words rather than sentences to be the primary element of the translator
114
. 
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Benjamin asserts that literal translation should focus on words rather than on sentence 
structures and he also maintains that such strategy should create a 'pure language', 
that allows the language of the original to enter the receiving culture and change it, by 
conveying an «alien meaning»
115
. The task of the translator, for Benjamin, would 
ultimately be to «release in his own language that pure language which is under the 
spell of another, to liberate the language imprisoned in a work in his re-creation of 
that work. For the sake of pure language he [the translator, BQ] breaks through 
decayed barriers of his own language
116
». In this sense, pure language, through the 
use of literalisms, would make it possible for the translator to change and renew the 
language of the receiving culture.  
Benjamin's view of translation also aims at surpassing the ceaseless dichotomy 
between freedom and fidelity, respectively reflecting meaning-oriented and literalist 
translation strategies. According to the German  translator,  
just as a tangent touches a circle lightly and at but one point, with this touch rather than with 
the point setting the law according to which it is to continue on its straight path to infinity, a 
translation touches the original lightly and only at the infinitely small point of the sense, 
thereupon pursuing its own course according to the laws of fidelity in the freedom of 
linguistic flux117. 
In this view, freedom and fidelity are not incompatible, but, on the contrary, they can 
coexist, so that when they converge at the same point a translation is made possible. 
Such point of convergence signals the translatability of a text, because literalisms are 
able to convey the sense of the original in its afterlife
118
. 
 Benjamin's reflections on literal translation as a strategy to innovate cultures 
and languages has been inscribed in different early twentieth-century cultural and 
political agendas, such as it has been the case with German nationalism at the time of 
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the Napoleonic wars as a way to resist the French cultural domination
119
, or with 
Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig's version of the Hebrew Bible, with the aim of 
distinguishing the German Jewish culture from the Christian one, through archaisms 
and other stylistic techniques
120
. 
The use of an archaic style as a simile of the language of ancient foreign texts is also 
experimented by the expatriate American poet and critic Ezra Pound in translating 
from Italian into English Guido Cavalcanti's sonnets and ballads. In his 1929 essay, 
'Guido's relations'
121
, Pound explains the reason for using a pre-Elizabethan English 
to translate Cavalcanti's thirteenth-century Italian:  
There is no question of giving Guido in an English contemporary to himself, the ultimate 
Britons were at that date unbreeched, painted in woad, and grunting in an idiom far more 
difficult for us to master than the Langue d’Oc of the Plantagenets or the Lingua di Si122. 
According to Pound, translating Cavalcanti's Italian into the corresponding English of 
the same age would do it wrong because, at that time, the English language was not as 
clear and explicit as the thirteenth-century Italian was. On the contrary, a «pre-
Elizabethan English, or a period when the writers were still intent on clarity and 
explicitness
123
» would help him to convey a similar «fervour»
124
 that «simply does 
not occur in English poetry in those centuries
125
». By doing this, Pound seeks to 
evoke more the impression he is given when reading the originals, than the real voice 
of the author, which, in any case, his readers would not be able to reconstruct: 
By taking these Italian sonnets, which are not metrically the equivalent of the English sonnet, 
by sacrificing, or losing, or simply not feeling and understanding their cogency, their 
sobriety, and by seeking simply that far from quickly or so-easily-as-it-looks attainable thing, 
the perfect melody, careless of exactitude of idea, or careless as to which profound and 
fundamental idea you, at that moment, utter, perhaps in precise enough phrases, by cutting 
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away the apparently non-functioning phrases (whose appearance deceives) you find yourself 
in the English seicento song-books126. 
Aware, as he is, that his choice might lead to misrepresentations of the degree of 
antiquity to be conveyed, since «Guido’s thirteenth-century language is to twentieth-
century Italian sense much less archaic than any fourteenth-, fifteenth-, or early 
sixteenth-century English is for us»; Pound believes that the task of a translator is to 
suggest a possible interpretation of the original to the reader. The translator, through 
their «interpretative translation», «show where the treasure lies, he can guide the 
reader in choice of what tongue is to be studied, and he can very materially assist the 
hurried student who has a smattering of a language and the energy to read the original 
text alongside the metrical gloze», but he would always be «impotent to do all the 
work for the linguistically lazy reader»
127
. Pound imagines his experimental 
translations to be read together with their originals, so that the reader could make up 
for himself the changes and his imagination and creativity could be stimulated by 
acknowledging the translator's choices and methods. 
 The 1920s literal stylistic experiments in translation, sometimes part of 
national and cultural political agendas, in the 1930s initiates more self-conscious 
reflections on the translatability of the foreign texts and on the ideological 
implications of translation. The Argentinean writer Jorge Luis Borges, in his 1935 
essay 'The Translators of The Thousand and One Nights'
128
, compares different literal 
versions of the renown 'Arabian Nights' and, by analysing terms, grammar and 
syntax, he demonstrates that different translations produce different interpretations of 
the original text
129
. Such 'interpretative translations', as Pound would call them, shed 
light on the underlying ideological assumptions that influence translators, and that 
Borges finds extremely interesting and worth examining. Instead of considering 
infidelity a negative feature of translation, the Argentinean writer is mostly interested 
into studying the differences in «happy and creative infidelity, that must matter to 
us
130
». 
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 At the end of the 1930s, translation starts to be considered more systematically 
and raises the interest of different scholars, writers and literary critics
131
. The 
philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, in his 'The Misery and Splendour of Translation'
132
, 
describes translation as «an apparatus, a technical device that brings us closer to the 
work without ever trying to repeat or replace it
133
», it is «not the work, but a path 
toward the work
134
». The Spanish philosopher calls for a new  definition of 
translation as «a literary genre apart, different from the rest, with its own norms and 
own ends
135
».  
In his 1937 philosophical dialogue, Ortega y Gasset analyses the essence and the use 
of translation by initially stating the impossibility to translate at all, given the general 
utopian nature of man:  
Isn’t the act of translating necessarily a utopian task? The truth is, I’ve become more and 
more convinced that everything Man does is utopian. Although he is principally involved in 
trying to know, he never fully succeeds in knowing anything. When deciding what is fair, he 
inevitably falls into cunning. He thinks he loves and then discovers he only promised to. 
Don’t misunderstand my words to be a satire on morals, as if I would criticize my colleagues 
because they don’t do what they propose. My intention is, precisely, the opposite; rather than 
blame them for their failure, I would suggest that none of these things can be done, for they 
are impossible in their very essence, and they will always remain mere intention, vain 
aspiration, an invalid posture
136
. 
Ortega's argument goes on to claim that it is impossible to produce duplicates of the 
original texts and that, given the imperfect nature of man, it is only possible to have 
multiple translations of the same foreign text
137
. Following Schleiermacher's defence 
of literalist foreignizing strategies, he also claims that «it is only when we force the 
reader from his linguistic habits and oblige him to move within those of the author 
that there is actually translation
138
». 
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According to the philosopher, the most urgent enterprise for translators of his time is 
translation of the Greeks and Romans, that having «lost the character of models
139
», 
could in any case contribute to the rebirth of the humanities. However, Greek and 
Latin should not be translated as models, but as exemplary errors, 
because Man is a historical entity and like every historical reality—not definitively, but for 
the time being—he is an error. To acquire a historical consciousness of oneself and to learn 
to see oneself as an error are the same thing. And since—for the time being and relatively 
speaking—always being an error is the truth of Man, only a historical consciousness can 
place him into his truth and rescue him. But it is useless to hope that present Man by simply 
looking at himself will discover himself as an error. One can only educate his optics for 
human truth, for authentic humanism, by making him look closely and well at the error that 
others were and, especially, at the error that the best ones were140. 
In Ortega's view, ancient models could serve as an advising comparison in order for 
the modern man not to make the same errors of the past.  
The interest in the translation of ancient philosophical classics, in the mid 1940s, 
brings the philosopher Martin Heidegger, in his essay 'The Anaximander 
Fragment'
141
, to analyse and compare different translations of a fragment attributed to 
the Greek pre-Socratic thinker Anaximander, «considered the oldest fragment of 
Western thinking
142
». In his 1946 essay, Heidegger argues that previous translations 
of the fragment by renowned scholars are influenced by later Platonic and 
Aristotelian assumptions:  
The unexpressed standard for considering and judging the early thinkers is the philosophy of 
Plato and Aristotle. These are taken as the Greek philosophers who set the standards both 
before and after themselves. Traversing Christian theology, this view becomes firmly 
entrenched as a universal conviction, one which to this day has not been shaken. In the 
meantime, even when philological and historical research treat philosophers before Plato and 
Aristotle in greater detail, Platonic and Aristotelian representations and concepts, in modern 
transformations, still guide the interpretation.[...] Simply ignoring these later notions will not 
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help in the course of translating from one language to another, if we do not first of all see 
how it stands with the matter to be translated.
143
 
Heidegger also claims that, before translating, one should be aware of his own 
incorrect beliefs and assumptions and abandon them: «in order to translate at all what 
comes to language in the fragment, we must, before we do any actual translating, 
consciously cast aside all inadequate presuppositions
144
». However, a translator 
should also be able to build a significant dialogue with the original to understand 
what things are the same in his worldview:  
Even to cast aside all presuppositions whenever we find them inadequate is insufficient so 
long as we fail to gain access to what comes to language in the fragment. Dialogue with early 
Greek thinking will be fruitful only when such listening occurs. It is proper to dialogue that 
its conversation speak of the same thing; indeed, that it speak out of participation in the 
Same
145
. 
 The word 'Same' here is not to be intended as the identical, but as a condition of 
similarity that enables thoughtful dialogue between recent and past times: «Where we 
can speak of the Same in terms of things which are not identical, the fundamental 
condition of a thoughtful dialogue between recent and early times is automatically 
fulfilled
146
». A thoughtful dialogue with the original, for Heidegger, would make it 
possible to translate it; but, since thinking entails «poetizing
147
», that is a creative 
activity, «art [that, BQ] shapes its work within the realm of language
148
», translation 
and the experience of language would also «retain the appearance of violence
149
». 
Violence, according to Heidegger, would be inevitable in order to make the original 
speak for itself, and it is reflected through the use of literal translation strategies
150
. 
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2 .2  The  or ig in  a nd  deve lo pment  o f  t he  pa rad ig m of  
equiva lence  in  t rans lat io n  
 
 Even though during the 1940s and 1950s debates over the best translation 
strategy and translatability continue especially in the field of literature
151
, with Borges 
and Heidegger's comparisons of different translations and Ortega y Gasset's 
reflections, translation starts to be considered a growing and progressively 
autonomous discipline or genre and is studied in a more historically-defined pattern.  
With the gradual institutionalisation of translation, which starts following the 
structuralist linguistics studies in the early twentieth century,  the discourses on the 
word-for-word, literal strategies versus the loose, free, meaning-oriented ones 
continues to inform later debates on translation.  
However, even though it appears to be possible to group translation into only two 
opposing categories, closer observation of their uses in different historical periods has 
shown that one could recognise different foundational translation thoughts and 
beliefs, and consequently diverse strategic choices, falling within each of the two 
categories. In order to make these aspects more apparent, it seems useful to recall a 
number of elements that contributed to the varying nature of the notion of translation 
and translation strategies in the Western translation thought.  
First of all, it is important to notice that, instead of being an independent activity, 
translation was ubiquitous and necessary in a number of disciplines that included not 
only, as one could easily imagine, grammar, philology, literature and literary critique, 
but also rhetoric, theology and philosophy.  
Secondly, one could find it useful to consider the purposes of translation based on 
two elements that are strongly linked together: one being the purpose for the 
translation of a specific text, and the other the aim of the broader political agenda that 
in turns was served through translation. In fact, narrower textual objectives, such as 
faithfulness to the message, fidelity to the author and the reader's ease of 
understanding, were always closely connected with the broader political, cultural and 
religious agendas, such as the appropriation of a culture, the creation of nations or 
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peoples, the power struggle over the custody of religious truths, the defence of 
national languages and minority cultures, the renewal of national languages.  
These first two aspects contributed to establish, in any historical periods, specific 
standards and common translation practices, according to which it was possible to 
determine what was translatable and what, on the contrary, was not allowed or worth 
to be translated. Moreover, only by abiding to such norms was it possible to produce 
what was perceived to be a 'good translation'. 
Thirdly,  in some contexts literal and meaning-oriented strategies were part of a 
power struggle between groups of conflicting interests, thus proving to be 
irreconcilable and opposed. However, it is also worth mentioning that, in other 
historical periods, far from being incompatible and exclusive, such strategies were 
used together in the very same translated text as mutually integrating methods.  
Finally, depending on the historical periods, such strategies were variably applied at 
different linguistic levels, such as words, sentences, paragraphs, or full texts, and to 
different text types, such as commentaries, literary prose or poetry, sacred texts, etc. 
The discourses on translation presented so far informed modern and contemporary 
theories and models and, specifically, the notion and the degree of autonomy of the 
translated texts from their originals, that have been  rethought in the 1950s in order to 
fit the paradigm of equivalence in translation. 
Such notion has always been disputed starting from its very early appearance at the 
end of the 1950s and seems to be part of the broader and interdisciplinary 
controversies of the twentieth century between linguistic universalist and relativist 
scholarly positions.  
Throughout the first part of the twentieth century, debates on the best translation 
strategies dominated in disciplines such as philology, literature and literary critique, 
mostly propounding literalist or foreignizing methods. During this period, such 
debates also regarded the translatability of foreign literary texts and were broadly 
discussed in other disciplines such as philosophy, ethnography and anthropology. 
Such discussions also led to the establishment of linguistics as an independent 
'science of language' in the 1920s, and to later applications of linguistic theories to the 
practice of translation in the 1950s. Linguistic studies on translation originated the 
paradigm of equivalence as a consistent and scientific formulation of the practice of 
98 
 
translation. Parallel to these developments, however, other linguistic, philosophical 
and anthropological reflections on translatability influenced the debate and at times 
contributed to question and redefine the paradigm of equivalence as a less stable 
concept since the early decades on the twentieth century.  
Humboldt's nineteenth-century notion of different languages representing different 
nations inspires many scholars and is also interpreted in varying manners during the 
twentieth century. For instance, in the 1920s and 1930s, the American anthropologist 
and linguist Edward Sapir studies the connection between languages and cultures
152
 
and the linguistic influences of some languages over others. In later years, Sapir's 
student Benjamin Lee Whorf formulates the principle of linguistic relativity
153
, that 
claims that people's worldviews and ways of thinking are influenced by the language 
or languages they spoke.  
Humboldt's idea is also restated in the 1916 'Course of General Linguistics'
154
 by the 
linguist Ferdinand De Saussure: «the culture of a nation exerts an influence on its 
language, and the language, on the other hand, is largely responsible for the 
nation
155
». In this work, compiled after Saussure's death from his lectures at the 
University of Geneva, a systematic theory of linguistic signs is developed that 
initiates a new «science of language
156
»:  
Language, unlike speaking, is something that we can study separately. Although dead 
languages are no longer spoken, we can easily assimilate their linguistic organisms. 
We can dispense with the other elements of speech; indeed, the science of language is 
possible only if the other elements are excluded157. 
Saussure hypothesizes that one could focus on language more scientifically by casting 
aside all contextual details and studying linguistic signs synchronically.  
The Swiss linguist defines language, or 'langue', a «self-contained whole and a 
principle of classification
158
», the orderly part of human speech, that he calls 
'langage'. On the contrary, human speech is considered «many-sided and 
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heterogeneous
159
», the «social product of the faculty of speech and a collection of 
necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social body to permit individuals 
to exercise that faculty
160
». Apart from language, the human speech, for Saussure, is 
also made of linguistic utterances and «articulation of words
161
», the actual speaking, 
or 'parole', that is considered the individual and «executive side
162
» of human speech.  
Following his first distinction between 'langue' and 'parole', Saussure goes on to 
define a linguistic unit or sign as a «double entity
163
» formed by the association of 
two terms: «not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image
164
». The latter, 
according to Saussure, is not to be mistaken for the material sound, but is rather «a 
psychological imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our senses
165
». He 
then proposes to «retain the word sign [signe] to designate the whole and to replace 
concept and sound-image respectively by signified [signifié] and signifier [signifiant]; 
the last two terms have the advantage of indicating the opposition that separates them 
from each other and from the whole of which they are part»166.  
Toward the end of the 1950s, a general growing interest for translation in the field of 
structural linguistics arises and Saussure's considerations on the 'science of language' 
are applied to translation by the Russian formalist linguist Roman Jakobson. In his 
1959 seminal paper 'On Linguistic Aspects of Translation'
167
, Jakobson examines the 
concept of meaning from a structuralist perspective, taking on Saussure's 
investigation on the 'double entity' of a linguistic sign.   
«Against those who assign meaning (signatum) not to the sign, but to the thing 
itself
168
», thus criticising approaches such as Sapir and Whorf's, the Russian linguist 
restates that  
there is no signatum without signum. The meaning of the word "cheese" cannot be inferred 
from a nonlinguistic acquaintance with cheddar or with camembert without the assistance of 
the verbal code. An array of linguistic signs is needed to introduce an unfamiliar word
169
. 
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According to Jakobson, the meaning of a word cannot simply be guessed by 
experiencing the thing it refers to, but it has to be mediated by a verbal definition or 
clarification of it. Quoting Dewey's 1946 article on  'Peirce's Theory of Linguistic 
Signs, Thought, and Meaning'
170
, Jakobson asserts that «for us, both as linguists and 
as ordinary word-users, the meaning of any linguistic sign is its translation into some 
further, alternative sign, especially a sign "in which it is more fully developed"». 
In his essay, Jakobson also identifies three different ways of interpreting signs, 
corresponding to three types of translation which could be carried out into the same 
language, into another language or into another non-verbal systems of symbols: the 
first kind is «intralingual translation or rewording», that «is an interpretation of verbal 
signs by means of other signs of the same language». The second is «interlingual 
translation or translation proper», an «interpretation of verbal signs by means of 
some other language
171
». The third is «intersemiotic translation or transmutation», an 
«interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems»
172
. 
In Jakobson's view, any language would be able to convey any possible meanings and 
messages embedded in it, because languages only differ in code-units, such as words 
or expressions
173
, and differences arise «essentially in what they must convey and not 
in what they may convey
174
». 
In this sense, Jakobson agrees that when translating single code-units it is impossible 
to achieve complete equivalence, because both in intralingual and interlingual 
translation, «a word or an idiomatic phrase-word [...] may be fully interpreted only by 
means of  an equivalent combination of code-units
175
». In this sense, only messages 
could be adequately translated into other code-units or messages: 
Most frequently [...] translation from one language into another substitutes messages in one 
language not for separate code-units but for entire messages in some other language. Such a 
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translation is a reported speech; the translator recodes and transmits a message received from 
another source. Thus translation involves two equivalent messages in two different codes176. 
According to Jakobson, equivalence could only be reached between messages and not 
between languages and establishing equivalence of sense ('message') in the difference 
between two code-units is the task of linguists: «Equivalence in difference is the 
cardinal problem of language and the pivotal concern of linguistics», because «no 
linguistic specimen may be interpreted by the science of language without a 
translation of its signs into other signs of the same system or into signs of another 
system»
177
.  
Such assertions also implies that in order to translate, one should also be aware of the 
differences between languages: 
Any comparison of two languages implies an examination of their mutual translatability; 
widespread practice of interlingual communication, particularly translating activities, must 
be kept under constant scrutiny by linguistic science
178
.  
Jakobson criticises Benjamin Lee Whorf for asserting his «dogma of 
untranslatability
179
» and invites linguists to study the differences between languages 
so to establish their 'mutual translatability': 
It is difficult to overestimate the urgent need for and the theoretical and practical significance 
of differential bilingual dictionaries with careful comparative definition of all the 
corresponding units in their intention and extension. Likewise differential bilingual 
grammars should define what unifies and what differentiates the two languages in their 
selection and delimitation of grammatical concepts. 
 In line with Jakobson's urge to compile bilingual dictionaries and comparative 
grammars, in 1958, the Canadian linguists Jean-Paul Vinay and Jean Darbelnet 
publish their 'Stylistique comparée du français et de l'anglais', ['Comparative 
Stylistics of French and English: A Methodology for Translation'
180
], to provide 
translators working with English and French with different translational procedures. 
In their manual, they introduce two general methods of translation, namely «direct, or 
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literal translation», and «oblique translation», and present particular translation 
procedures for each general category. While the first kind of translation is «based on 
parallel categories, [...] or on parallel concepts», with occasional gaps or lacunae in 
the receiving language; the second kind is described as based on «structural or 
metalinguistic differences»
181
 in translation.  
After classifying translation strategies into two different groups, Vinay and Darbelnet 
introduce a number of translational techniques, which refer to either direct or oblique 
translation: as for direct translation, in order «to overcome a lacuna», their model 
includes 'borrowing', through which «foreign terms may be used» and introduces in 
the receiving culture; 'calque', which is a special kind of borrowing, translated 
literally into the receiving culture
182
; and 'literal translation', a word-for-word 
translation of the text to maintain close adherence to it
183
. With regard to oblique 
translation strategies, the Canadian linguists include: 'transposition', which entails the 
substitution of a word class with another, keeping the meaning  unaltered
184
; 
'modulation', which consists of modifying the form of the message, by changing its 
point of view
185
; 'equivalence', that is used to render onomatopoeic or idiomatic 
expressions by changing style and content
186
; 'adaptation', used in case a whole 
situation in the original does not exist in the receiving culture and has to be 
substituted with a more relevant one
187
.  
While Jakobson considers equivalence as the ultimate aim of a linguist and a key 
concept in the study of meaning, Vinay and Darbelnet's model considers equivalence 
as one of the strategies a translator could use to render idiomatic and onomatopoeic 
expressions and locates it as a special case of loose 'oblique' translation. In both cases, 
equivalence is held to be an achievable objective and starts to be studied in a more 
scientific and systematic manner. 
During the same period, philosophical and literary critique reflections move in a 
different direction. The analytic philosopher, Willard Van Orman Quine, in his work 
                                                         
181
 All citations Vinay and Darbelnet, 1958/2004:128. 
182
 All citations Vinay and Darbelnet, 1958/2004:129. 
183
 Vinay and Darbelnet, 1958/2004:130. 
184
 Vinay and Darbelnet, 1958/2004:132. 
185
 Vinay and Darbelnet, 1958/2004:133. 
186
 Vinay and Darbelnet, 1958/2004:134. 
187
 Vinay and Darbelnet, 1958/2004:134-135. 
103 
 
'Word and Object'
188
 asserts the principle of indeterminacy of translation. Quine 
derives his reflections from the very structure of language as a context-based code of 
communication and claims that, since it is impossible to gain certainty of the meaning 
of an object through external observation and experience, also translation of words is 
unpredictable and indeterminable. In one of his best known examples, Quine argues 
that  
Manuals for translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, all 
compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another. In 
countless places they will diverge in giving, as their respective translations of a sentence of 
the one language, sentences of the other language which stand to each other in no plausible 
sort of equivalence however loose189.  
Far from claiming the impossibility to translate at all, Quine rather proposes that, 
since one could never be sure about the meaning of a word that varies with context, 
translations should not be evaluated as being good or bad, and multiple translations of 
the same text should be equally considered possible. However, he also acknowledges 
that the discrepancy between different translations of the same text could 
proportionally decrease in case contextual details were present: «the firmer the direct 
links of a sentence with non-verbal stimulation, of course, the less drastically its 
translations can diverge from one another
190
». 
In order to explain his concept of 'indeterminacy of reference', Quine uses an example 
of what he calls 'radical translation', that is the «translation of the language of a 
hitherto untouched people
191
»: the Arunta native speaker, who, in the presence of a 
linguist, utter the word 'gagavai', while a rabbit is passing by. While the linguist could 
imagine that the word 'gagavai' means 'rabbit' in Arunta, still other translations could 
be possible and compatible with the same context, such as «Lo, a rabbit
192
», 'food', 'a 
rabbit-part', 'a rabbit-stage'
193
, etc. Even if a linguist tried to circumscribe all the 
possible situations and thus exclude some hypotheses through observation, he would 
never be sure to recreate the same conditions, since he would translate «not by 
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identity of stimulus meanings, but by significant approximation of stimulus 
meanings
194
». Even if he wanted to test his conclusions by asking the native speakers, 
he could only do so after having mastered the language. However, his command of 
the language would circularly depend on hypotheses that were previously inferred by 
earlier observation
195
. 
 Another philosophical stance is that of Hans-Georg Gadamer, who in his 
'Wahrheit und Methode', ['Truth and Method']
196
, first published in 1960, introduces 
his hermeneutic approach. The German philosopher draws from Heidegger's notion of 
'hermeneutic circle' as the process of understanding stemming from a dialogue 
between text and context and also takes on Dilthey's idea of understanding as an 
interpretation based on personal experience and historical context. In his work, 
Gadamer criticises the use of the scientific method, usually employed in natural 
sciences, for evaluating human sciences and arts, claiming that  
the human sciences are connected to modes of experience that lie outside science: with the 
experiences of philosophy, of art, and of history itself. These are all modes of experience in 
which a truth is communicated that cannot be verified by the methodological means proper 
to science
197
. 
Gadamer's objective is to «defend the experience of truth that comes to us through the 
work of art against the aesthetic theory that lets itself be restricted to a scientific  
conception of truth»
198
. The work of art, according to Gadamer, should not be 
measured «by the yardstick of a progressive knowledge of regularity»
199
 and «by the 
inductive procedure of the natural sciences»
200
, because such procedures do «not 
suffice to guarantee the truth»
201
. The German philosopher claims that understanding 
always entails recourse to one's own prejudices that are inescapably part of each 
human being. However, even though this shows the limitations of the way one 
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understands and gets to know anything, in Gadamer's opinion, it is still extremely 
important to question knowledge to become aware of such limits. 
Thus there is undoubtedly no understanding that is free of all prejudices, however much the 
will of our knowledge must be directed toward escaping their thrall. [...] The fact that in such 
knowledge the knower's own being comes into play certainly shows the limits of method, but 
not of science. Rather, what the tool of method does not achieve must—and really can—be 
achieved by a discipline of questioning and inquiring, a discipline that guarantees truth
202
.  
In this sense, to understand a text one should not only rely on «simply filing things in 
pigeonholes» and use «a superior knowledge of the subject matter», but they should 
undergo a hermeneutical experience and genuinely encounter that which «asserts 
itself as truth». Such an encounter, however, should not be understood as «an 
achievement of empathy in which one divines the inner life of the speaker», but rather 
as a «determination by situation and context» that «pertains not to the speaker but to 
what is spoken»
203
.  
Gadamer uses the concept of translation, «the transformation of something alien and 
dead into total contemporaneity and familiarity»
204
 to describe this process of 
understanding: 
The translation process fundamentally contains the whole secret of how human beings come 
to an understanding of the world and communicate with each other. Translation is an 
indissoluble unity of implicit acts of anticipating, of grasping meaning as a whole 
beforehand, and explicitly laying down what was thus grasped in advance
205
. 
Language is thus considered «the medium in which substantive understanding and 
agreement take place between two people»
206
 and the process of translation, broadly 
defined, is held to be extremely enlightening of any verbal process  
the translator must translate the meaning to be understood into the context in which the other 
speaker lives. This does not, of course, mean that he is at liberty to falsify the meaning of 
what the other person says. Rather, the meaning must be preserved, but since it must be 
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understood within a new language world, it must establish its validity within it in a new 
way
207
. 
In this sense, Gadamer views every translation as an interpretation, or «the 
culmination of the interpretation that the translator has made of the words given 
him»
208
, happening not «between the partners of the conversation, but between 
interpreters, who can really have an encounter in a common world of 
understanding»
209
.  
As a consequence, translation, as any interpretation and act of understanding,  is also 
the result of a 'fusion of different horizons' that includes not only the translator's 
present perspective, but also other historical horizons that are continually questioned 
when encountering the past
210
. In the case of translation, such 'fusion of horizons' 
should not be considered a simple reproduction or a «re-awakening of the original 
process in the writer's mind»
211
, but rather a  «re-creation of the text guided by the 
way the translator understands what it says»
212
. 
In this sense, faithfulness would not guarantee the removal of «the fundamental gulf 
between the two languages»
213
, since, as in conversations, «the distance between 
one's own opinion and its contrary is ultimately unbridgeable»
214
 and, «however 
faithful we try to be, we have to make difficult decisions»
215
 by favouring some 
aspects of the original to the detriment of others: 
In our translation if we want to emphasize a feature of the original that is important to us, 
then we can do so only by playing down or entirely suppressing other features. But this is 
precisely the activity that we call interpretation. Translation, like all interpretation, is a 
highlighting. A translator must understand that highlighting is part of his task. Obviously he 
must not leave open whatever is not clear to him. He must show his colors
216
.  
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Such highlighting for Gadamer also entails making ambiguous passages «clearer and 
flatter than the original» and an act of renunciation by the translator, who, in order to 
be clear and open, would not be «able to express all the dimensions of his text» and 
would miss «some of the overtones that vibrate in the original».  
For Gadamer, the translator is a special kind of interpreter who has to constantly face 
«an extreme case of hermeneutical difficulty—i.e., of alienness and its conquest», by 
seeking «the best solution» and reaching, as in usual conversations, a compromise «in 
the to and fro of dialogue, [...] in the to and fro of weighing and balancing 
possibilities»
217
. Such interpretation, for Gadamer, could be called a 'hermeneutical 
conversation', in which the two interlocutors in translation, the original text and the 
translator, find a common language as the result of their 'fusion of horizons'.  
The structures are clearly analogous. Reaching an understanding in conversation presupposes 
that both partners are ready for it and are trying to recognize the full value of what is alien 
and opposed to them. If this happens mutually, and each of the partners, while 
simultaneously holding on to his own arguments, weighs the counterarguments, it is finally 
possible to achieve—in an imperceptible but not arbitrary reciprocal translation of the other's 
position (we call this an exchange of views)—a common diction and a common dictum218. 
A common language for Gadamer can be obtained also in the case of written texts, 
because in his opinion «writing is the abstract ideality of language»
219
 that should not 
be considered as «a repetition of something past but the sharing of a present 
meaning»
220
. 
Gadamer's view of translation as interpretation is addressed at literary claims of 
untranslatability and has deeply influenced later translation scholars in the 1970s and 
1980s, such as George Steiner and Antoine Berman. 
 However, during this period, diverse strains of thought in different disciplines 
concur in shaping the discourse on translation: on the one hand, the context-based 
nature of language, at times, supports the indeterminacy of translation and 
untranslatability, while, on the other hand, meaning is considered a common ground 
for different languages to communicate and equivalence as an attainable task for the 
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translator. In the aftermath of the 1950s discourses on translation try to reconcile both 
positions and, throughout the 1960s, such objective in the field of translation is 
pursued by privileging the scientific and institutionalising import of linguistics and 
subsuming the indeterminist elements mentioned before under systematic translation 
models. Such trend reflects the favourable reception of Noam Chomsky's generative 
linguistic theory that he first formulates in his 1957 seminal work 'Syntactic 
Structures'
221
 and that leads linguistic indeterminism to be resolved in his dynamic 
context-based model. Chomsky's generative-transformational model is devised to 
analyse English and aims in the first place to prove the autonomy of grammar from 
meaning, since, according to him, it is possible to create grammatically correct 
sentences that have no meaning at all. The American linguist asserted that «the notion 
"grammatical" cannot be identified with "meaningful" or "significant" in any 
semantic sense
222
». He then gives the following example: 
Sentences ( I) and (2) are equally nonsensical, but any speaker of English will recognize that 
only the former is grammatical.  
( I) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.  
(2) Furiously sleep ideas green colorless
223
. 
Chomsky considers language in general and sentences in particular to be governed by 
different interconnected levels of rules: phrase-structure, transformational and 
morphophonemic. According to Chomsky, sentences can be broken down into 
smaller constituents and analysed according to phrase-structure rules. Moreover, 
sentences can also be analysed on the basis of the morphophonemic rules. 
Morphophonemic and phrase-sentence rules can be connected together by a 
mediating level of rules, called transformational: 
We consequently view grammars as having a tripartite structure. A grammar has a sequence 
of rules from which phrase structure can be reconstructed and a sequence of 
morphophonemic rules that convert strings of morphemes into strings of phonemes. 
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Connecting these sequences, there is a sequence of transformational rules that carry strings 
with phrase structure into new strings to which the morphophonemic rules can apply224. 
The transformational level of rules is the one «where the kernel sentences underlying 
a given sentence can be thought of, in a sense, as the 'elementary content elements' 
out of which this sentence is constructed»
225
. By reducing phrase-sentence structure 
to «a kernel of basic sentences (simple, declarative, active, with no complex verb or 
noun phrases), deriving all other sentences from these (more properly, from the 
strings that underlie them) by transformation
226
», the American linguist aims at 
simplifying «the description of English and gain new and important insight into its 
formal structure
227
». 
 Chomsky's generative-transformational model, together with Saussure's claim 
for a science of language, and Jakobson's linguistic insights on translation have 
greatly influenced later theorists of translation who aim at constituting a 'science of 
translation'. The first systematic work is Eugene Nida's 1964 'Toward a Science of 
Translating'
228
, where the American translator sets out to initiate the 'science of 
translating' by clearly stating his linguistic approach: 
Is translating [...] an art or a science? [...] though no one will deny the artistic elements in 
good translating, linguists and philologists are becoming increasingly aware that the 
processes of translation are amenable to rigorous description. When we speak of "the science 
of translating", we are of course concerned with the descriptive aspect: for just as linguistics 
may be classified as a descriptive, so the transference of a message from one language to 
another is likewise a valid subject for scientific description. Those who have insisted that 
translation is an art, and nothing more, have often failed to probe beneath the surface of the 
obvious principles and procedures that govern its functioning. Similarly, those who have 
espoused an entirely opposite view have rarely studied translating enough to appreciate the 
artistic sensitivity which is an indispensable ingredient in any first-rate translation of a 
literary work. 
Nida acknowledges the tradition of literary translation and recognises the artistic 
elements as important aspects of good translating; however, in accordance with the 
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linguistic scholars who inspire him, he also sees the possibility of a scientific 
descriptive approach to translation
229
.  
The American translator construes his theory of translation from his long experience 
as a Bible translator since the 1940s and uses his material on the Bible to give 
examples of translation. Influenced by theories of meaning in linguistics, semantics 
and anthropology, he acknowledges the work of Sapir and Whorf as a way to study 
language related to culture, and meanings as «they occur  in all types of human 
behavior
230
». Moreover, Nida claims that it is a mistake to believe that «one could not 
understand a word apart from some nonlinguistic acquaintance with it; and that such 
an acquaintance [...] involved evidence from one or more sciences
231
». In order to 
refute such belief, Nida cites Jakobson and asserts that for some words it is 
impossible to find a contextual referent, but one can still understand their meanings: 
«Of course such evidence is often quite impossible to adduce, as in the case of such 
words as ambrosia, dragon, unicorn, and mermaid, and in no instance is it necessary, 
for the meaning is of the symbol and not for the referent».  
Nida acquires a «functional definition of meaning» that, apart from being regarded as 
a useful tool with which to analyse meaning, it also appears to him to suggest «the 
very process by which terms acquire meaning, namely through contextual 
conditioning» and is «a healthy antidote to traditional mentalism, for language as a 
mode of action is described as a system of symbols which signal behavior, and not 
merely as countersigns of or indices to thought»
232
. He therefore acquires Leonard 
Bloomfield's definition of meaning: 
In the study of meaning, attention has therefore shifted from concern with the referents to the 
distribution of the form within the total behavior, so that, as Bloomfield (1943, p.102) states, 
'The features of situation and action which are common to all utterances of a speech form are 
the meaning of that speech form'233. 
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When defining translation, Nida claims the impossibility to judge what a good 
translation is, since it depends on different factors:  
definitions or descriptions of translating are not served by deterministic rules; rather, they 
depend on probabilistic rules. One cannot, therefore, state that a particular translation is good 
or bad without taking into consideration a myriad of factors, which in turn must be weighted 
in a number of different ways, with appreciably different answers. Hence there will always 
be a variety of valid answers to the question. "Is this a good translation?"
234
 
In his 1964 work, he also asserts that the task of the translator should always be to 
translate creating «an effective blend of "matter and manner", for these two aspects of 
any message are inseparably united
235
». 
The two extremes of translation, for Nida, are represented by formal equivalence or 
correspondence, that is «basically source-oriented; [...] designed to reveal as much as 
possible of the form and content of the original message»
236
; and dynamic 
equivalence, that «may be described as one concerning which a bilingual and 
bicultural person can justifiably say [...], "the closest natural equivalent to the source-
language message"»
237
. Despite Nida ideally backing a balance between form and 
content, it is also possible to notice a focus on equivalence of response rather than on 
equivalence of form, since he considers 'natural' a rendering that «must fit (1) the 
receptor language and culture as a whole; (2) the context of the particular message, 
and (3) the receptor-language audience
238
».  
His later work, 'The Theory and Practice of Translation'
239
, shows a stronger 
propensity for dynamic equivalence, since Nida claims that, while in the past 
translators have focused on rendering the form of the text rather than its message,  
the new focus [...] has shifted from the form of the message to the response of the receptor. 
Therefore, what one must determine is the response of the receptor to the translated message. 
This response must then be compared with the way in which the original receptors 
presumably reacted to the message when it was given in its original setting
240
. 
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According to Nida, this reader-oriented focus would make it possible to give a more 
systematic and scientific definition of translation that encompasses «reproducing in 
the receptor language the closest natural equivalent of the source-language message, 
first in terms of meaning and secondly in terms of style
241
». However, it is important 
to notice that the concept of equivalence in Nida is a sort of identity, but rather a 
similarity of response, allowing for extensive modification of the form of a text:  
The translator must strive for equivalence rather than identity. In a sense this is just another 
way of emphasizing the reproduction of the message rather than the conservation of the form 
of the utterance, but it reinforces the need for radical alteration of a phrase
242
. 
Even though he shows a certain degree of concern for founding his assumptions on 
'probabilistic' rather than 'deterministic rules', and despite his  idea of translation as a 
combination of formal and dynamic equivalence constituents depending on the 
peculiarities of the text and situations, Nida uses Chomsky's categorisation of 
language as a stable and unchanging subject matter
243
.  
Toward the end of the 1950s, the British linguist Halliday, drawing from Firth's 
notion of language as a social and behavioural system, proposes a different 
descriptive way of analysing language and meaning, an alternative to Chomsky's 
generative-transformational grammar. In line with his master Firth, who rejected 
Saussure's distinction between 'langue' and 'parole' and the Chomskian notion of 
language as a static mental system, in one of his first papers 'Some aspects of 
systematic description and comparison in grammatical analysis'
244
, Halliday asserts 
that 
there can be no universal formal-linguistic categories (there might theoretically be categories 
formally identified as common to all languages studied heretofore, but such identification is 
not yet a practical possibility), while non-formal-linguistic categories, if they are to figure in 
the description at all, must be implicitly regarded as universal
245
. 
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Clearly rejecting the utility of formal linguistic categorization, Halliday allows the 
existence of universal non-formal linguistic categories that serve for the purpose of 
language description. Moreover, in his 1961 paper 'Categories of the theory of 
grammar'
246
, the British-Australian linguist introduces four relevant categories for 
grammatical analysis, namely unit, structure, class and system, that could include all 
the possible sets of data to be analysed. In order to classify data he also introduces 
three different scales of abstraction: rank, or hierarchy; exponence, or taxonomy; and  
delicacy, or cline. Most relevant to the questioning of the concept of language as a 
stable entity appears to be the notion of delicacy, which Halliday also defines «a 
continuum carrying potentially infinite gradation»
247
 «a variable»
248
, «the scale of 
differentiation, or depth in detail»
249
 that serves to relate categories to each other and 
to contextual elements. Such variable seems to signal a probabilistic and 
indeterministic approach to grammatical categories: 
the nature of language is not to operate with relations of “always this and never that”. 
Grammatical theory takes this into account by introducing a special scale, that of delicacy, to 
handle the improbability of certainty; this frees the rest of the theory from what would 
otherwise be the weakening effect of this feature of language
250
. 
Far from using his classification in a definite manner, Halliday also highlights the 
potential connection of grammar, a closed system, to language, which, on the 
contrary, he considers an open network, by claiming that 
It may well be that the nature of language is such that this “most delicate grammar” will 
evaporate in distinctions which are so slenderly statistical that the system has, in effect, been 
replaced by the open set
251
. 
 An initial questioning of Nida's static linguistic theory of translation comes in 
the 1965 with Catford's application of Firth and Halliday's systemic-functional 
models of linguistics to translation in his work 'A linguistic Theory of Translation'
252
. 
Although he considers translation as a branch of Comparative Linguistics and not, 
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like Nida, a distinct autonomous discipline, Catford continues to consider the 
paradigm of equivalence a key aspect of translation theory. He defines translation as 
«the replacement of textual material in one language (SL)
253
 by equivalent textual 
material in another language (TL)»
254
, with a textual translation equivalent being 
«any TL form (text or portion of text) which is observed to be the equivalent of a 
given SL form (text or portion of text)»
255
.  
In order to define the concept of equivalence, the Scottish linguist and phonetician 
follows Nida's categorisation and makes a distinction between a textual equivalent, 
that is «any TL text or portion of text which is observed on a particular occasion [...] 
to be the equivalent of a given SL text or portion of text»
256
, and a formal 
correspondent, that is «any TL category (unit, class, structure, element of structure, 
etc.) which can be said to occupy, as nearly as possible, the 'same' place in the 
'economy' of the TL as the given SL category occupies in the SL»
257
. However, 
differently from Nida, Catford considers equivalence as depending on contextual 
details and meaning as «a property of a language».  As a consequence, «an SL text 
has an SL meaning, and a TL text has a TL meaning», and the meaning is defined as 
«the total network of relations entered into by any linguistic form—text, item-in-text, 
structure, element of structure, class, term in system—or whatever it may be».  
In this sense, according to Catford, «the view that SL and TL texts 'have the same 
meaning' or that 'transference of meaning' occurs in translation is untenable»
258
, 
because, «since every language is formally sui generis and formal correspondence is, 
at best, a rough approximation», «the formal meanings of SL items and TL items can 
rarely be the same». In a similar way, since formal meanings are also related to the 
context, the «contextual meaning of an item», which is «the groupment of relevant 
situational features» that «varies from one language to another, [...] is rarely the same 
in any two languages»
259
.  
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Equivalence, as conceived by Catford, could not be described in terms of ST and TT 
or SL and TL items having «'the same meaning' in the linguistic sense», but as being 
«interchangeable in a given situation» through retaining «the greatest possible 
overlap of situational range»260. The establishment of a translation equivalence could 
thus be conceived in terms of probability, a «translation rule»261, that is «an 
extrapolation of the probability values of textual translation equivalences»262.  
In this context, Catford introduces the concept of shifts in translation which he 
defines as «departures from formal correspondence in the process of going from the 
SL to the TL»
263
. Such shifts are, according to Catford, an inevitable occurrence of 
translation and also depend on the «'sameness' or otherwise of the cultures (in the 
widest and loosest sense) to which SL and TL belong»
264
. However, while «any 
speech-act takes place in a specific bio-socio-physical environment, at a specific time 
and place, between specific participants and so on»
265
, on the other hand, 
the text which is (for the linguist) the central item in the speech-act is, or may be, relatable 
not only to features of this immediate situation, but also to features at greater and greater 
distances (so to speak) reaching out, ultimately, into the total cultural background of the 
situation. The 'situation', in other words, may be thought of as a series of concentric circles, 
or spheres, of relevance to the text
266
.  
While he regards speech as immediately and closely related to the situation, Catford 
views a text as a particular speech-act that has broader scope and more extensive 
contextual referents. 
The concepts of equivalence and situation, for Catford, are closely related to two 
other concepts, namely translatability and function, since «translation fails—or 
untranslatability occurs—when it is impossible to build functionally relevant features 
of the situation into the contextual meaning of the TL text»
267
. The question of 
translatability described by Catford seems to be «a cline rather than a clear-cut 
                                                         
260
 All citations Catford, 1965:49. 
261
 Catford, 1965:31. 
262
 Ibid. 
263
 Catford, 1965:73. 
264
 Catford, 1965:52. 
265
 Ibid. 
266
 Ibid. Italics in the original. 
267
 Catford, 1965:93. 
116 
 
dichotomy»
268
 with texts and items being «more or less translatable rather than 
absolutely translatable or untranslatable»
269
. However, following Catford, 
translatability is, at least partly, dependable on the cultural and subjective opinion, 
given that «a decision, in any particular case, as to what is functionally relevant in 
this sense must in our present state of knowledge remain to some extent a matter of 
opinion»
270
.  
The two main reasons for untranslatability to occur, according to Catford, are either 
linguistic, since the absence of «a TL equivalent is due entirely to differences 
between the source language and the target language»271; or cultural, in which case «a 
situational feature, functionally relevant for the SL text, is completely absent from the 
culture of which the TL is a part»272 and «is usually less 'absolute' than linguistic 
untranslatability»273. 
 After Catford's study on the shifts of translation, in the second part of the 
1960s the notion of equivalence starts to be considered as a less stable concept and, 
even though it is still highly regarded throughout the 1970s and the 1980s
274
, it also 
comes to be gradually questioned.  
For instance, the Czech literary theoretician Jiří Levý considers shifts as a necessary 
occurrence in translation and starts to analyse the existence of a number of different 
equivalent terms depending on the context and on the stylistic conventions. In his 
1967 paper 'Translation as a decision process'275, he applies the game theory to the 
case of literary translation, starting from the impossibility to find perfectly equivalent 
terms in two different languages. For example, when trying to explain the notion of 
paradigm, as the finite group of terms which may all translate a particular term in the 
original, he argues that  
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a paradigm is, of course, not a set of completely equivalent elements, but a set ordered 
according to different criteria (e.g., stylistic levels, connotative extensions of meaning, etc.); 
otherwise, no choice would be possible
276
.  
In this case, shifts in translation are an integral part of the translational process and 
are considered to be the only way one could possibly carry out a translation.  
According to Levý, the translation decisions progressively made by a translator are 
«not random but context-bound»
277
, since «every interpretation has the structure of 
problem solving»
278
. The translator would have to «choose from a class of possible 
meanings of the word or motif, from different conceptions of a character, of style, or 
of the author’s philosophical views»279. However, his choice could be simplified if he 
was able to restrict his translational options through relying them to the context. 
Levý's work on translation clearly exemplifies a gradual opening to the debate over 
the issue of equivalence by scholars of translation and of the related disciplines, such 
as literature, literary critique, linguistics and philosophy. In the following decades, 
equivalence comes to be more openly questioned and such debate also mark the 
institutionalisation of the discipline of Translation Studies in the 1970s. In the next 
paragraph, such questioning will be described as the result of a broad and 
interdisciplinary narrative that comes to gradually put aside the importance of 
equivalence by replacing it with other paradigms. 
 
2 .3  The  quest io ning  of  t he  para d igm of  equiva lence  
 
 During the 1970s and throughout the 1980s and 1990s the paradigm of 
equivalence comes to be further discussed and questioned by different strands of 
thought. In the last decades of the twentieth century there is a spread of interest into 
the field of translation by scholars of different academic disciplines
280
. Influenced by 
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the developments in linguistics and related fields, translation scholars thus introduce 
functional and descriptive translation models. From a different perspective, literary 
translation studies following poststructuralist reflections, start to integrate 
philosophical hermeneutics tenets on the scientific nature of translation and discuss 
old and new theoretical issues such as fidelity, untranslatability and autonomy of the 
translated text. Moreover, the Hallidayan functional-systemic model is applied to 
machine and corpus-based translation, as well as to the study of translated texts in 
general through a variety of register and text analysis methodologies. 
Nida's formal and dynamic equivalence and Catford's distinction between formal 
correspondence and textual equivalence prompt translation scholars to reinterpret 
these categories considering different aspects such as function, communication and 
systems. Although the concept of function is first introduced by Nida and Catford in 
the 1960s, the functional element in translation theory and practice growingly raises 
interest among scholars especially in Germany in the early 1970s and becomes a key 
aspect of translation during the 1980s and 1990s.  
 In 1971 the German linguist and translation scholar Katharina Reiss describes 
interlingual translation «as a bilingual mediated process of communication, which 
ordinarily aims at the production of a TL [target language] text that is functionally 
equivalent to an SL text [source language]»
281
. Reiss also describes the three-stage 
process a translator should go through in order to establish the real functions of the 
original text. The first step a translator should take is the «establishment of the “text-
type”»282, by choosing among three that existed «in every speech community with a 
culture based on the written word» and «every author of a text ought to decide in 
principle on one of the three forms before beginning to formulate his text». The three 
text-types are informative, that aimed at communicating content; expressive, dealing 
with «artistically organised content» and operative, that have «a persuasive 
character»
283
. As for the second stage, the translator has to establish the text variety, 
related to «specifically structured sociocultural patterns of communication belonging 
to specific language communities»284. The third stage includes an analysis of the style 
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or « textual surface »
285
, that, according to Reiss is extremely important because the 
translator has to use «strategy and tactics [...] directed by type and variety»
286
 in order 
to reflect their functions. 
Reiss also admits the existence of two general aims: one is for the translator to keep 
the same function of the source text, the other is to change the original function. In 
the first case she asserts that, according to the text types established 
if the SL text is written to convey contents, these contents should also be conveyed in the TL 
text. Mode of translating: translation according to the sense and meaning in order to 
maintain the invariability of the content. [...] 
If the SL text is written in order to convey artistic contents, then the contents in the TL 
should be conveyed in an analogously artistic organization. The translator identifies with the 
artistic and creative intention of the SL author in order to maintain the artistic quality of the 
text.[...] 
If the SL text is written to convey persuasively structured contents in order to trigger off 
impulses of behavior, then the contents conveyed in the TL must be capable of triggering off 
analogous impulses of behavior in the TL reader
287
. 
In the second case, «if the aims pursued in the translation are different from those of 
the original»
288
, the translation will reflect such differences, since «there is now no 
attempt any more to strive for a functional equivalence between the SL and the TL 
text, but for adequacy of the TL  reverbalization in accordance with the “foreign 
function”. It follows that, besides a text typology relevant to translating, a translation 
typology should be worked out»289. 
 Reiss's functional theory was developed during the 1970s and 1980s in 
collaboration with Hans Vermeer
290
, taking up Holz-Mänttäri's theory of translational 
action. In her 1984 'Translatorisches Handeln: Theorie und Methode'
291
, 
['Translational Action: Theory and Method'], Holz-Mänttäri views translation as a 
                                                         
285
 Reiss, 1971/2004:174. 
286
 Ibid. 
287
 Reiss, 1971/2004:175-176. Italics in the original. 
288
 Reiss, 1971/2004:169. 
289
 Ibid. 
290
 Reiss & Vermeer, 1984. 
291
 Holz-Mänttäri, 1984. 
120 
 
particular communicative action, a 'translational action'
292
, that is part of a broader 
theory of communication. The distinctive feature of translation is its focus on the 
source text with the aim to transmit its message. She thus analyses the role of the 
different professionals involved in translation, such as the initiator, the commissioner, 
the author, the translator, the readers and receivers; and examines their diverse 
purposes in the communicative act of translating.  
 Drawing on Reiss's functional theory and on Holz-Mänttäri's theory of 
translational action, Vermeer formulates his Skopos theory, that considers translation 
as an action with its own objective: 
the word skopos, [...], is a technical term for the aim or purpose of a translation [...]. Further, 
an action leads to a result, a new situation or event, and possibly to a "new" object. 
Translational action leads to a "target text" (not necessarily a verbal one); translation leads to 
a translatum (i.e. the resulting translated text), as a particular variety of target text
293
. 
According to Vermeer, the concept of skopos, instead of that of equivalence, could 
best describe the relationship between the source text that «is oriented towards, and is 
in any case bound to, the source culture»; and the target text, that «is oriented towards 
the target culture, and [...] ultimately defines its adequacy». In this sense, he argues 
that «source and target texts may diverge from each other quite considerably», not 
only in terms of rendering, but also based on their different purposes.  
In an attempt to thoroughly describe the process of translation as a market-oriented 
activity and to establish fixed protocols for a professional translator, Vermeer asserts 
that «the aim of any translational action, and the mode in which it is to be realizes, are 
negotiated with the client who commissions the action»
294
. From this also follows that 
the translator is an expert «responsible for the performance of the commissioned 
task»
295
 and «his voice must therefore be respected»
296
, for he is to decide the role of 
the source text in his translation. Vermeer's focus on the translator's choices aims at 
increasing «the accountability of the translator, in that his translation must function in 
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such a way that the given goal is attained»
297
, with the ultimate objective of founding 
his theory on the «ethos of the translator»
298
. 
 With his Skopos theory, Vermeer seeks to come to an end with the still ongoing 
debate between literal versus free translation and aims at making more explicit the 
consequences of pursuing fidelity or equivalence between source and target: 
 “Fidelity” to the source text (whatever the interpretation or definition of fidelity) is one 
possible and legitimate skopos or commission. Formulated in this way, neither skopos nor 
commission are new concepts as such—both simply make explicit something which has 
always existed. Yet they do specify something that has hitherto either been implicitly put into 
practice more unconsciously than  consciously, or else been neglected or even rejected 
altogether: that is, the fact that one translates according to a particular purpose, which 
implies translating in a certain manner, without giving way freely to every impulse; the fact 
that there must always be a clearly defined goal. The two concepts also serve to relativize a 
viewpoint that has often been seen as the only valid one: that a source text should be 
translated “as literally as possible”299. 
In the same way, Vermeer also views the strategy of adapting the source text to the 
target culture and expectations only as another possibility of translating and not a 
fixed prescriptive method, since «the theory equally well accommodates the opposite 
type of translation»
300
. Speaking against the claim that translation has in itself no 
purpose, Vermeer replaces the notion of equivalence with the one of skopos and 
claims that a translator should always be aware of the purpose of his translation in 
order to translate well. In this sense, equivalence starts to lose its momentum and 
comes to be viewed as a particular strategy of translation among many other methods: 
«Everything between these two extremes [literal versus free translation, BQ] is 
likewise possible, including hybrid cases»
301
.  
In the 1990s, the functional translation approach is taken up by Christiane Nord who, 
in her manual 'Text Analysis in Translation'
302
, applies Reiss and Vermeer's 
functional model to text analysis. With the aim of providing a guide for translation 
teaching, Nord proposes a functional analytical model that considers translation as 
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intercultural communication. Given its functional nature, Nord's model especially 
focuses on the roles of what she calls the 'initiator' of the translation and the 
translator, «since they are the most important factors in the production of a 
translation»
303
.  
The German translation scholar argues that the translation is usually started by an 
initiator because he wants or needs it for a specific purpose. In this case, «it is this 
purpose that determines the requirements to be met by the translation»
304
. Nord 
criticises «equivalence-based translation theory» that considers the rendering of a 
source-text as being influenced only by «its effect on the ST recipient, or the function 
assigned to it by the author». Rather, she takes on Vermeer's Skopos theory to assert 
that the function of a text is «determined by the initiator's needs»
305
 and also by the 
translator's decision on the possibility to produce a TT that meets the conditions 
posed by the initiator. Nord claims that 
the function of the target text is not arrived at automatically from an analysis of the source 
text, but is pragmatically defined by the purpose of the intercultural communication
306
. 
The German translator also gives importance to the specific cultural features related 
to the function of source and target texts: 
Being culture-bound linguistic signs, both the source text and the target text are determined 
by the communicative situation in which they serve to convey a message
307
. 
More importantly, for Nord, since especially in written translation the ST and TT 
functions could diverge, the translator who «wants to find out whether the text is 
suitable for the new situation in the target culture, [...] has to take into consideration 
the factors and constituents of the original situation»
308
. However, apart from 
focusing on the original text, she also stresses the fact that since the function of a text 
«is determined by the situation in which the text serves as an instrument of 
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communication [...], the translating instructions should contain as much information 
as possible about the situational factors of the TT reception»
309
.  
In turns, the translator should be viewed as «a very special kind of recipient»
310
 with 
«perfect command of both the source and the target culture (including language)»
311
 
and with the ability «to simulate a communicative situation that is determined not by 
his own but by somebody else's needs and purposes»
312
. 
With the aim of choosing the best textual translation strategy, Nord proposes a first 
classification of texts based on the initiator's purpose into two macro-categories or 
types of translation, that also recall the usual distinction between word-for-word, or 
literal, and sense-for-sense, or free translation strategies. In her view, the purpose of a 
target text could basically be that of documenting «a source culture communication 
between the author and the ST recipient»
313
, in which case a 'documentary translation' 
type would include culture-specific terms and literal translation strategies. 
Alternatively, a target text could serve «as an independent message transmitting 
instrument in a new communicative action in the target culture»
314
, in which case free 
translation strategies would not make the target-text recipient aware of reading a 
translated source text originally functioning in a different cultural context, with 
possibly different purposes. 
 By focusing their investigations on the function of the translated texts, 
functional translation scholars contribute to relativising the concept of equivalence 
and to making it more dependent on the particular translational context. Another input 
in this sense, coming from a different field of research, is George Steiner's 
philosophical interpretation of translation as a 'hermeneutic motion'.  In his 1975 
influential book 'After Babel: Aspects of language and translation'
315
, Steiner takes on 
Gadamer's critique of equating human sciences to the natural ones and using the 
scientific method to analyse them. He then claims that «the theory of translation in 
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not [...] an applied linguistics»
316
, but rather «a new field in the theory and practice of 
literature»
317
. In this sense, Steiner sets out to «show that the study of language is not 
now a science» and that «very likely, it never will be a science». He then criticises 
generative linguistic models in general and Chomsky's universal linguistic theory in 
particular, arguing that it is impossible to speak of a 'theory of translation', «in any 
rigorous sense of the term»
318
, because 
we have no working model of the fundamental neurochemistry and historical aetiology of 
human speech. We have no anthropological evidence as to the causes or chronology of its 
thousandfold diversification. Our models of the learning process and of memory are 
ingenious but also of the most preliminary, conjectural kind. We know next to nothing of the 
organization and storage of different languages when they coexist in the same mind
319
. 
More specifically, Steiner questions the universalist approach to linguistics posing 
two arguments. First, the American philosopher claims that language should be 
considered only one possible idiolectic means of communication, that «is in perpetual 
change», «the most salient model of Heraclitean flux» that «alters at every moment in 
perceived time»
320
. Considered through his perspective, then, the «universalist 
argument [...] of ever-deepening formalization and abstraction» is destined to «be 
contingent or subverted by anomalies», so that «instead of being rigorous and 
exhaustive, the description of 'universal linguistic traits' has often proved to be no 
more than an open-ended catalogue»
321
. In this sense, the scientific universalist 
approach to language, according to Steiner, would «fail to account for the nature and 
possibility of relations between languages as they actually exist and differ»
322
. 
Secondly, the universalist predisposition to abstraction and generalisation of 
linguistic transformational generative models masks the forcing of «all languages into 
the mould of English»
323
. Since most of the research and observation on languages 
are carried out in English and based on English grammar and syntax, Steiner 
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considers such inclination as «a profound bias towards 'monolingualism'»
324
. This 
«sophistication of actual techniques»
325
, according to the philosopher, make «the 
whole approach [...] at once 'rudimentary'  and a prioristic»
326
. 
Such an approach leads universalist linguists to formulate a scientific theory of 
translation that, in Steiner's opinion, is not be able to successfully describe what 
actually happens in translation. This is due to the fact that, even if «there are instances 
of arrested or sharply diminished mobility: certain sacred or magical tongues can be 
preserved in a condition of artificial stasis»
327
,  «ordinary language is, literally at 
every moment, subject to mutation»
328
. Rather, a 'theory of translation' devised as a 
non-formalised and flexible «historical-psychological model»
329
 allows the 
philosopher to expand the notion of translation. Instead of defining it in terms of the 
transfer of meaning from one natural language into another, Steiner outlines 
translation in a different, more comprehensive way, arguing that 
'Translation', properly understood, is a special case of the arc of communication which every 
successful speech-act closes within a given language. On the inter-lingual level, translation 
will pose concentrated, visibly intractable problems; but these same problems abound, at a 
more covert or conventionally neglected level, intra-lingually
330
. 
In this sense, translation should be considered as an act of communication that takes 
place both in written and oral texts, so that «when we read or hear any language-
statement from the past, be it Leviticus or last year's best-seller, we translate»
331
. Any 
human being should thus be considered a translator, who renders any piece of 
communication into their own biased and incomplete words: 
When an individual speaks, he is effecting a partial description of the world. Communication 
depends on a more or less complete, more or less conscious translation of this partiality, on a 
matching, more or less perfunctory, with other 'partialities'. A 'complete translation', i.e. a 
definitive insight into and generalization of the way in which any human being relates word 
to object would require a complete access to him on the part of his interlocutor. The latter 
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would have to experience a 'total mental change'. This is both logically and substantively a 
meaningless notion. It could never be shown to have taken place
332
. 
According to Steiner, total and complete understanding of any piece of 
communication is then impossible to attain and one would be wrong to pretend or to 
even think it achievable. Such an assumption also entails a deep questioning of the 
concept of equivalence and shifts attention to the act of interpretation. Instead of 
concluding the impossibility of translation, Steiner views translation as «a manifold 
act of interpretation»
333
, «where our sensibility appropriates its [BQ 'the text's] object 
while, in this appropriation, guarding, quickening that object's life» in a process «of 
'original repetition'». Steiner equates interpretation to a musical realization, «a new 
poiesis», that «differs from all other performances of the same composition» and «is 
at the same time reproductive and innovatory»
334
. In order to interpret and appropriate 
a text, one always uses «a complex aggregate of knowledge, familiarity, and re-
creative intuition», that, in any case, would never guard individuals against 
«characteristic penumbras and margins of failure», or 'intractable' elements that, due 
to time or space barriers, «will elude complete comprehension or revival». This 
results in the «received message» being «thinned and distorted»
335
. 
Thus, even if the appropriation of a text could always be achievable, it would also be 
«nearly impossible to paraphrase or systematize»
336
 it, so that, according to Steiner, 
only an 'inexact'
337
 theory of translation, «part deductive, part intuitive»
338
 could be 
devised, dependant both on historical and psychological factors. The American 
philosopher also terms his model as «an 'understanding of understanding'»
339
 or «a 
hermeneutic motion»
340
, that is «the act of elicitation and appropriative transfer of 
meaning»
341
. Such act, according to Steiner is «a fourfold hermeneia, Aristotle’s term 
for discourse which signifies because it interprets» that is «conceptually and 
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practically inherent in even the rudiments of translation». The four stages of the 
hermeneutic motion are those of trust (élancement), penetration, embodiment, and  
restitution, and could make it possible to «overcome the sterile triadic model» of 
literalism, paraphrase and free imitation that have «dominated the history and theory 
of the subject», without retaining any «precision or philosophic basis»
342
. 
The first stage of hermeneutic motion is that of an «initiative trust, an investment of 
belief [...] in the meaningfulness» by the translator, who assumes that «the transfer 
will not be void». Steiner also calls such trust an «operative convention» based on 
«phenomenological assumptions about the coherence of the world, about the presence 
of meaning in very different, perhaps formally antithetical semantic systems, about 
the validity of analogy and parallel»
343
. After trust, the second stage is that of 
aggression, an «incursive and extractive move»
344
 by the translator who, in order to 
understand, recognise and interpret, has to assault the text. The third movement is that 
of comprehension «not only cognitively but by encirclement and ingestion»
345
. The 
translator incorporates and assimilates the text by placing it in a new and different 
context through «a complete domestication, an at-homeness at the core»
346
. Such 
placing also entails running the «risk of being transformed»
347
, so that, while adapting 
the text to a different culture, the translator «may be mastered and made lame»
348
 by 
what he has imported. In order to complete the hermeneutic motion, otherwise left 
with a loss in the third movement, the fourth stage of reciprocity allows the translator 
to balance the process through enhancement: 
The enactment of reciprocity in order to restore balance is the crux of the métier and morals 
of translation. But it is very difficult to put abstractly. The appropriative “rapture” of the 
translator—the word has in it, of course, the root and meaning of violent transport—leaves 
the original with a dialectically enigmatic residue. Unquestionably there is a dimension of 
loss, of breakage—hence, as we have seen, the fear of translation, the taboos on revelatory 
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export which hedge sacred texts, ritual nominations, and formulas in many cultures. But the 
residue is also, and decisively, positive. The work translated is enhanced
349
. 
Steiner's description of translation as an act of interpretation strongly relates on his 
notion of language influenced by subtle interlingual as well as  intralingual 
differentiations due to «social status, ideology, profession, age, and sex»
350
 and 
ultimately connects to «the deeper-lying enigma of human individuality, of the bio-
genetic or bio-social evidence that no two human beings are totally identical»
351
. 
Language is then considered as the result of the fusion of «idiolects into the partial 
consensus of shared speech-forms»
352
 of a community immersed in the same culture. 
As a consequence, translation is regarded as a special case of a broader transformative 
and communicative action that contributes to establish a shared consensus in the 
community through recourse to a variety of linguistic tools:  
There is between 'translation proper' and 'transmutation' a vast terrain of 'partial 
transformation'. The verbal signs in the original message or statement are modified by one of 
a multitude of means or by a combination of means. These include paraphrase, graphic 
illustration, pastiche, imitation, thematic variation, parody, citation in a supporting or 
undermining context, false attribution (accidental or deliberate), plagiarism, collage, and 
many others. This zone of partial transformation, of derivation, of alternate restatement 
determines much of our sensibility and literacy. It is, quite simply, the matrix of culture
353
.  
The partial transformation implicit in translation, in Steiner's broadened definition of 
it, contributes at all times to determine a shared consensus, that is culture, through 
'original repetition', and when such consensus is not reached, «when antithetical 
meanings are forced upon the same word [...] , language loses credibility». Such 
occurrence is exemplified by Steiner in the language of ideology, that, according to 
him, is broadly marked by the use of «polysemy, the capacity of the same word to 
mean different things», and that makes it possible to alter «the conceptual reach and 
valuation of a word [...] by political decree». According to Steiner, «competing 
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ideologies rarely create new terminologies»
354
, but rather they struggle to change the 
meaning of mainstream terms in their favour: 
In the idiom of fascism and communism, 'peace', 'freedom', 'progress', 'popular will' are as 
prominent as in the language of representative democracy. But they have their fiercely 
disparate meanings. The words of the adversary are appropriated and hurled against him. 
Translation in the ordinary sense becomes impossible
355
.  
In this sense, equivalence starts to be considered as a negotiation of meaning between 
competing ideologies or power groups, thus becoming a variable model, increasingly 
dependent on social and cultural factors. 
 While being gradually introduced in the discourses on language and 
translation, and similarly to what happened with the appearance of functional 
translation theories, the cultural and social elements determine a shift of attention 
from equivalence, that is not anymore considered as an absolute scientific principle, 
to the receptor of the translated text. An input in this sense, within the newly founded 
academic discipline of Translation studies is Itamar Even-Zohar's Polysystem 
Theory
356
, that takes on the ideas of the 1920s Russian Formalists and analyses the 
cultural implications in the field of literature. According to Even-Zohar, literature 
should be considered a polysystem, defined as a heterogeneous aggregate of different 
systems, interacting, changing and competing one against another for the 
establishment of a literary canon.  
Translated literature is then considered one of the systems that contribute to the 
development and transformation of the literary polysystem. More than that, « it 
participates actively in shaping the center of the polysystem» and, according to Even-
Zohar, it should be conceived «not only as an integral system within any literary 
polysystem, but as a most active system within it». The degree of importance and 
influence of translated literature within such polysystem depends on the social, 
cultural, literary and historical elements, and also helps determine the translation 
strategy within given frameworks. Even though «one would be tempted to deduce 
from the peripheral position of translated literature in the study of literature that it 
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also permanently occupies a peripheral position in the literary polysystem, [...] this is 
by no means the case», since in fact, depending on a number of contextual factors, 
«translated literature» may become «central or peripheral, and [...] this position» 
could be «connected with innovatory (“primary”) or conservatory (“secondary”) 
repertoires»
357
. In this view, not only translation strategy plays an important role, but 
also the way in which originals are chosen in order to be translated:  
My argument is that translated works do correlate in at least two ways: (a) in the way their 
source texts are selected by the target literature, the principles of selection never being 
uncorrelatable with the home co-systems of the target literature (to put it in the most cautious 
way); and (b) in the way they adopt specific norms, behaviors, and policies—in short, in 
their use of the literary repertoire—which results from their relations with the other home co-
systems. These are not confined to the linguistic level only, but are manifest on any selection 
level as well. Thus, translated literature may possess a repertoire of its own
358
. 
In Even-Zohar's view, translated literature may retain either a central or a peripheral 
position in a given literary polysystem. In the first case, translation «is likely to 
become one of the means of elaborating the new repertoire»
359
 and it would also be 
«an integral part of innovatory forces»
360
 that introduce new models and ideas into 
the receiving culture: 
Through the foreign works, features (both principles and elements) are introduced into the 
home literature which did not exist there before. These include possibly not only new models 
of reality to replace the old and established ones that are no longer effective, but a whole 
range of other features as well, such as a new (poetic) language, or compositional patterns 
and techniques. It is clear that the very principles of selecting the works to be translated are 
determined by the situation governing the (home) polysystem: the texts are chosen according 
to their compatibility with the new approaches and the supposedly innovatory role they may 
assume within the target literature
361
. 
Translated literature can assume a central position in three cases: in the presence of a 
young non-crystallized literary polysystem «in the process of being established»362; or 
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in the case of a peripheral and/or weak section of literature; or in times of crisis «or 
literary vacuums»363. 
In case a given translated literature retained a peripheral position, it would refer to 
'secondary models' and it would be «modelled according to norms already 
conventionally established by an already dominant type in the target literature». 
Instead of being a means through which «new ideas, items, characteristics can be 
introduced into a literature», translation would then become «a major factor of 
conservatism» and would contribute «to preserve traditional taste». 
Even-Zohar's distinction between central and peripheral position is not absolute in the 
sense that it should always be «wholly one or the other», since he views translation as 
a stratified system. In this sense, «while one section of translated literature may 
assume a central position, another may remain quite peripheral», and, in general, 
«when there is intense interference, it is the portion of translated literature deriving 
from a major source literature which is likely to assume a central position»
364
. Even-
Zohar criticised the tenets of a «static and ahistorical conception of translation» that 
would fail to adequately respond to the needs of translation theory and to flexibly 
analyse and show the change literary polysystems are exposed to due to translated 
literature. The concepts of adequacy and equivalence are thus made dependent on the 
contextual situation and, more specifically, on the way translation is perceived within 
a given culture. For example, when translated literature holds a central position, «the 
translator’s main concern [...] is not just to look for ready-made models in his home 
repertoire into which the source texts would be transferable. Instead, he is prepared in 
such cases to violate the home conventions». In this case, foreignizing strategies 
would make the translation more adequate and faithful to the original, while, from the 
reader's perspective, such violation of conventional translational norms might make 
the text «too foreign and revolutionary»
365
. In this case, 
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if the new trend is defeated in the literary struggle, the translation made according to its 
conceptions and tastes will never really gain ground. But if the new trend is victorious, the 
repertoire (code) of translated literature may be enriched and become more flexible
366
.  
On the contrary, if translational norms were such as not to allow for innovation, 
«items lacking in a target literature may remain untransferable»
367
, thus resulting in 
the absence of a given translated literature section coming from a relatively new and 
too different culture. In any case, when translational norms come to gradually open 
up to innovation, the notion of adequacy and equivalence increasingly acquire a 
similar meaning in different cultures, so that they «may overlap to a relatively high 
degree»
368
. 
Even-Zohar's reflections on literary polysystems contribute to making translational 
working concepts subject to cultural and social aspects so that even the definition of 
what translation and translated works are should not «be  answered a priori in terms 
of an a-historical out-of-context idealized state; [BQ, but] it must be determined on 
the grounds of the operations governing the poly system»
369
. Thus translation can «no 
longer [BQ, be] a phenomenon whose nature and borders are given once and for 
all»
370
, but it should be considered as «an activity dependent on the relations within a 
certain cultural system»
371
. 
Even-Zohar's culturally-bound discourse on translation is taken on and furthered in 
the 1980s by his student Gideon Toury, who regards translation «as having cultural 
significance», such that «“translatorship” amounts first and foremost to being able to 
play a social role, i.e., to fulfil a function allotted by a community». In order to be a 
translator, one should thus acquire «a set of norms for determining the suitability of 
that kind of behaviour, and for manoeuvring between all the factors» that determine 
the cultural context in which one operates. Toury describes such factors as «socio-
cultural constraints» running «along a scale anchored between two extremes: general, 
relatively absolute rules, on the one hand and pure idiosyncrasies on the other. 
Between these two poles lies a vast middle-ground occupied by inter subjective 
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factors commonly designated norms»
372
. Norms are considered «the key concept and 
focal point in any attempt to account for the social relevance of activities» and also 
«the main factors ensuring the establishment and retention of social order» in social 
institutions in general, including cultures. The existence of such norms, however, do 
not entail absolute conformity to a coded conduct, since «behaviour which does not 
conform to prevailing norms is always possible too. [...] At the same time, there 
would normally be a price to pay for opting for any deviant kind of behaviour». 
Toury also notes that, since «there is no necessary identity between the norms 
themselves and any formulation of them in language», the very same awareness of the 
existence of norms through verbal formulations would also «imply other interests, 
particularly a desire to control behaviour i.e., to dictate norms rather than merely 
account for them»
373
. 
Given the dependence of norms on the cultural context where they are created, it is 
also important to note that, according to Toury, norms abide by a hierarchy, «some 
are stronger, and hence more rule-like, others are weaker, and hence almost 
idiosyncratic»374, forming a graded continuum that is also closely related to context. 
Thus, while some norms may lose importance and decline, others may «become more 
and more normative, and [...] can gain so much validity that, for all practical 
purposes, they become as binding as rules»375. In this sense, rules at any time could 
undergo «shifts of validity and force [BQ, that] often have to do with changes of 
status within a society»376. Even if such shifts determine the «socio-cultural 
specificity of norms and their basic instability»
377
, Toury holds that «one can [...] 
distinguish regularity of behaviour in recurrent situations of the same type». This is 
due to the fact that such regularities in translation behaviour can be actually noticed 
by «the persons-in-the-culture [BQ, who] can often tell when a translator has failed to 
adhere to sanctioned practices». 
The unstable validity of translational norms can also be correlated first of all to the 
fact that, since it is an «activity which inevitably involves at least two languages and 
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two cultural traditions, i.e., at least two sets of norm-systems on each level», the two 
texts would be «always different and therefore often incompatible»378, were it not for 
translational norms. The compatibility allowed for by translational norms, according 
to Toury, is a sort of 'sameness'
379
 viewed more as «a mere coincidence—or else the 
result of continuous contacts between subsystems within a culture, or between entire 
cultural systems»; than a stable universal possibility. More than that, identity, rather 
than being considered as an authentic occurrence, is seen as a superficial 
«manifestation of interference» of a culture upon another. Such sameness or identity 
in translation is, according to Toury, always conceived  in the form of equivalence. 
The translation scholar wishes to retain equivalence as a descriptive paradigm of 
translation, but he also seeks to change it  «from an ahistorical, largely prescriptive 
concept to a historical one». In this sense, instead of defining equivalence as «a single 
relationship, denoting a recurring type of invariant», Toury describes it as «any 
relation which is found to have characterized translation under a specified set of 
circumstances»
380
, thus making it a «functional-relational postulate [...] [BQ, that] has 
been realized—whether in one translated text, in the work of a single translator or 
“school” of translators, in a given historical period»381. In his approach, «it is norms 
that determine the (type and extent of) equivalence manifested by actual 
translations»
382
 and not vice versa. 
Toury also introduces a classification of translational norms, based on different 
analytical levels. The first kind is the 'initial norm', the main choice of a translator to 
favour either the source of the target text:  
a translator may subject him-/herself either to the original text, with the norms it has realized, 
or to the norms active in the target culture, or, in that section of it which would host the end 
product. If the first stance is adopted, the translation will tend to subscribe to the norms of 
the source text, and through them also to the norms of the source language and culture. [...]. 
If, on the other hand, the second stance is adopted, norms systems of the target culture are 
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triggered and set into motion. Shifts from the source text would be an almost inevitable 
price
383
. 
In Toury's opinion, it is impossible to have an absolute subscription to either the 
source or the target text, but, in fact, a translation always entails both occurrences in 
the same text, at different levels, so that, 
 whereas adherence to source norms determines a translation’s adequacy as compared to the 
source text, subscription to norms originating in the target culture determines its 
acceptability
384
.  
In this sense, any translational strategy would always be a sort of an «ad hoc 
combination of, or compromise between the two extremes»385. 
Apart from a general initial norm, translation entails the use of other types of norms, 
that reflect the various stages and levels of translation. Toury distinguishes such 
norms into two categories, preliminary and operational. While the first group of 
norms regards «the existence and actual nature of a definite translation policy»
386
; 
operational norms account for the translator's decisions made while translating and 
results in «the modes of distributing linguistic material in it [BQ, the text]—as well as 
the textual make up and verbal formulation as such»387. Toury also introduces another 
group of norms, which are textual-linguistic ones, and that regulate «the selection of 
material to formulate the target text in, or replace the original textual and linguistic 
material with»
388
.  
All such translational norms however, according to Toury, should not be conceived as 
fixed, mutually incompatible rules, because «complying with social pressures to 
constantly adjust one’s behaviour to norms that keep changing is of course far from 
simple, and most people [...] do so only up to a point»389. It is therefore possible to 
find all the types of norms used in translation together, so that «the ones that 
dominate the centre of the system, and hence direct translational behaviour of the so-
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called mainstream»
390
 are present «alongside the remnants of previous sets of norms 
and the rudiments of new ones, hovering in the periphery»391.  
During the 1980s and 1990s, driven by Halliday's systemic-functional linguistic 
model, some translation scholars propose new analytical methods of texts in 
translation, in an attempt to connect text analysis to the social and cultural differences 
involved in translation, while trying to retain the paradigm of equivalence. 
In 1977, Juliane House introduces a register analysis tool for the assessment of 
translation quality that she later revises in her 1997 work: 'Translation Quality 
Assessment: A Model Revisited'
392
. In her fully rewritten study, House considers the 
paradigm of equivalence from a functionalist perspective and introduces a 
comparative model to analyse the source and the target texts together on lexical, 
syntactic and textual levels. More precisely she sets out to implement a register 
analysis by means of the Hallidayan categories of field, tenor and mode
393
. At the 
basis of her analysis lays the distinction between two types of translation: overt and 
covert; that are to be considered as «endpoints along a continuum, such that unclear 
cases will in practice arise». According to House, in overt translation «the translator 
is explicitly a mediator», since «the resultant text is clearly her work». In this case, 
«the translator has the least leeway to alter the fabric and content of the text, but has a 
clearly recognisable role and function for the reader»
394
. House calls the equivalence 
occurring in overt translation as a second-level one, because «the translated text must 
have a different reception from that which obtains for the original, source-culture 
readership». In this sense, the target-culture readers acquire the text as if they have 
received the source-text function: 
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The translation lets them eavesdrop, so to speak, and invites them to perceive the text, as 
though they were direct addressees enabling them to appreciate the original's function, albeit 
at a distance
395
. 
In the case of covert translation, on the contrary,  
it is the task of the translator to be invisible, but at the same time to transmute the original 
such that the function it has in its original situational and cultural environment is re-created 
in the target linguaculture
396
. 
In this sense, the translator is allowed to change the text substantively, also by 
filtering culturally-specific features coming from the source culture that do not exist 
in the target one. 
 The questioning of the paradigm of equivalence by the functional and 
descriptive theories of translation, Steiner's hermeneutic motion, and linguistic tools 
for register analysis could be considered as one of the results of the growing 
relevance of and interest into the socio-cultural aspects of language, both in the theory 
and practice of translation. Starting from the 1960s and 1970s, the rise of new 
theoretical paradigms and academic disciplines, such as the poststructuralist 
philosophical thought, cultural and postcolonial studies gradually leads to the study of 
difference in translation and brings to the introduction of new interdisciplinary 
models that have difference as their core matter of observation and research. In this 
sense, the cultural elements also entail a deep reflection on power relations as well as 
political and ideological claims through translation. In the next paragraph, the cultural 
and political elements in translation studies and in some related disciplines will be 
analysed in order to describe the theoretical framework of this work. Translation will 
be defined as a metonymical communicative process that entails constant changes of 
meaning, and the concept of equivalence as an unstable space of negotiation and, 
ultimately, as a political instrument. In this sense, a translational approach to study 
the concept of democracy will be introduced as an effective tool to analyse the case 
study. 
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2 .4  Cult ura l  and  po l i t ica l  a spect s  in  tra ns lat io n  
 
 In the previous paragraph, a brief history of Western translation thought up to 
the last decades of the twentieth century has been given, trying to emphasise the 
relatedness between the degree of autonomy of a translation from its original and the 
cultural and political context in which reflections on translation are formulated. 
Secondly, the history of the paradigm of equivalence in translation has been outlined 
in order to show how the notion of equivalence is only one possible relationship 
between the original and its translation that has come to be broadly used in Western 
translation tradition since the 1950s. Such paradigm is strongly connected to 
structuralist linguistic theories of that time, and is prominent not only in academic 
disciplines dealing with language, such as linguistics and literature, but has also been 
conducive to the establishment of Translation studies as an autonomous academic 
discipline in the 1970s. The notion of equivalence still nowadays exerts a 
considerable influence on the way the activity of translation is conceived of in 
Western thought, even though it is growingly being redefined based on its cultural 
and political relatedness.  
 In this paragraph, the theoretical framework of this work will be introduced to 
provide a rationale for the translational study of political concepts in general and of 
democracy in particular and to allow for the analysis of the meaning of democracy in 
different cultural contexts.  
Later developments in the newly founded academic discipline of Translation studies 
will be considered with a broad interdisciplinary scope in order to introduce the 
cultural and political implications of translation. More specifically, the political 
aspects of translation will be introduced through the description of its general 
tendency to convey meaning by supporting mainstream discourses in the receiving 
cultural context, thus safeguarding the continuity of the existing order, instead of 
highlighting discontinuous and marginalised discourses
397
. When translating, we 
make an attempt to transfer content in such a way that does not question the dominant 
universe of meaning within a given culture. If translation did not endorse such a 
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cultural adaptation, it would result in a major disruption of the order and of the shared 
rules and, at a language level, a text would be ultimately discarded for being deviant, 
difficult to understand or not relevant. The paradigm of equivalence in translation 
could thus be considered a political instrument, since it generally contributes to 
making the meaning of words well established and certain instead of highlighting its 
unstable, illusory and constructed character. Consequently, equivalence will be 
defined as a space of cultural interpretation and political negotiation dependent on the 
relations of the individuals and groups involved in the translational process to 
accommodate a suitable combination of foreignness and normativity in the receiving 
cultural context.  
 As the paradigm of equivalence in translation comes to be gradually put aside 
by register analysis, descriptive and functionalist approaches in the recently founded 
Translation studies and by Steiner's hermeneutic motion in literature and literary 
criticism, new theoretical paradigms questioning the structuralist perspectives in other 
disciplines, such as philosophy, sociology, anthropology, psychology and history 
influence later research developments in translation. More specifically, the 
questioning of the paradigm of equivalence in translation is strongly connected to the 
gradual shift of attention from universalist and structuralist approaches to the study of 
cultural difference in such disciplines as philosophy, anthropology, literature and 
literary criticism. Language starts to be considered as an unstable and changing open 
system and translation as an act of interpretation rather than a transparent transfer of 
meanings dealing with the creation of equivalent texts. Even though capable of 
accommodating new and foreign expressions, language is thought to be generally 
conducive to the establishment and preservation of a political order. This is because, 
by favouring the use of almost unvaried and consistent lexis and grammar, linguistic 
conventions generally prove to be supportive of common well known and shared 
rules, thus fostering peaceful coexistence within social groups. 
 The French philosopher Michel Foucault introduces such reflections on 
language and order in his 1966 "Les Mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences 
humaines", ["The Order of Things: an archaeology of the human sciences"]
398
, where 
he asserts the existence of an order, a historically determined way to classify things 
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based on what is perceived to be the same or the other. According to Foucault, «there 
is no similitude and no distinction, even for the wholly untrained perception, that is 
not the result of a precise operation and of the application of a preliminary criterion». 
In this sense, the French philosopher claims that to create even «the simplest form of 
order», there has to be an episteme, «a 'system of elements'» that defines the 
parameters of resemblance and difference and «the threshold above which there is a 
difference and below which there is a similitude». Order is intended as the «inner 
law» of things, «the hidden network that determines the way they confront one 
another»
399
 and language is held to play a key role in the establishment of such order 
since. Thus, according to Foucault,  
there is nothing more tentative, nothing more empirical (superficially, at least) than the 
process of establishing an order among things; nothing that demands a sharper eye or a surer, 
better articulated language
400
. 
In this sense, the existence of an epistemologically-consistent language is considered 
a key factor for the creation of any kind of order, in such a way that, since the 
establishment of an order is in itself viewed as an indefinite, inexact and undefined 
process, it requires, in order to be successful, the use of as stable and fixed rules as 
those of language.  
In his work, Foucault compares «the theories of language, of the natural order and of 
wealth and value»
401
 to show that their common underlying episteme is strongly 
connected to the historical period they belong to. By comparing such aspects in 
different ages of Western thought, the French philosopher demonstrates the existence 
of common concurrent discontinuities in the three disciplines to signal the 
synchronous change of their common underlying episteme. He thus defines the 
episteme as a historical a priori, that should be considered  
what, in a given period, delimits in the totality of experience a field of knowledge, defines 
the mode of being of the objects that appear in that field, provides man's everyday perception 
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with theoretical powers, and defines the conditions in which he can sustain a discourse about 
things that is recognized to be true
402
. 
In particular, with regard to language, Foucault claims that the way in which it is 
conceived in the modern age differs extensively from how it was viewed in the 
Western classical thought since 
from the nineteenth century, language began to fold in upon itself, to acquire its own 
particular density, to deploy a history, an objectivity, and laws of its own. It became one 
object of knowledge among others, on the same level as living beings, wealth and value, and 
the history of events and men.
403
  
In this sense, the knowledge of language in the modern age is thought to be attainable 
by simply applying «the methods of understanding in general to a particular domain 
of objectivity»
404
. According to Foucault, language has started to be treated and 
studied as a scientific phenomenon with its own well-determined and predictable 
rules and, as such, it has undergone extensive reduction and abstraction.  
As a consequence to the objectification of language, the French philosopher 
recognises a series of peculiar tendencies in the modern age which contributes to 
compensate for such diminution: 
The critical elevation of language, which was a compensation for its subsidence within the 
object, implied that it had been brought nearer both to an act of knowing, pure of all words, 
and to the unconscious element in our discourse
405
. 
On the one hand, since language is «a necessary medium for any scientific knowledge 
that wishes to be expressed in discourse»
406
, it cannot reflect a particular science, but 
it has to be neutralized and polished
407
, to be made more scientific and transparent, so 
that 
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stripped of all its singularity, purified of all its accidents and alien elements - as though they 
did not belong to its essence - it [language, BQ] could become the exact reflection, the 
perfect double, the unmisted mirror of a non-verbal knowledge.
408
 
Consequently, during the nineteenth century, attempts are made to protect pure 
thought «from the singularities of a constituted language» that could obscure it, so 
that it comes to be analysed and coded through universal logic and symbols without 
having to turn to «grammars, vocabularies, synthetic forms, and words».  
On the other hand, Foucault also notices that, since language has «become a dense 
and consistent historical reality», its study acquires great relevance to the extent that it 
makes it possible to discover «the unspoken habits of thought, of what lies hidden in 
a people's mind». In this sense, «the truth of discourse is caught in the trap of 
philology», because in order to grasp a people's thoughts, it is necessary to separate 
them from «opinions, philosophies, and perhaps even from sciences» and study «the 
words that made them possible»
409
. Philology thus becomes «the modern form of 
criticism», since it makes it possible to analyse «the depths of discourse», in order to 
«destroy syntax, to shatter tyrannical modes of speech, to turn words around in order 
to perceive all that is being said through them and despite them»
410
. In this view, even 
though «men believe that their speech is their servant», they do not realise that they 
express their thoughts using the «grammatical arrangements of a language», that 
constitute «the a priori of what can be expressed in it», thus «submitting themselves 
to its [language, BQ] demands»
411
.  
Another important consequence of what Foucault calls the «demotion of language to 
the mere status of an object»
412
 is the emergence of literature in the nineteenth 
century as an isolated particular language, «an independent form, difficult of access, 
folded back upon the enigma of its own origin and existing wholly in reference to the 
pure act of writing»
413
. According to the French philosopher, literature should be 
considered as  
                                                         
408
 Ibid. 
409
 Foucault, 1971/1994:297. 
410
 Foucault, 1971/1994:298. 
411
 Foucault, 1971/1994:297. 
412
 Foucault, 1971/1994:296. 
413
 Foucault, 1971/1994:300. 
143 
 
the contestation of philology (of which it is nevertheless the twin figure): it leads language 
back from grammar to the naked power of speech, and there it encounters the untamed, 
imperious being of words
414
. 
While language is highly simplified and generalised through grammatical 
arrangements, thanks to literature, such reduction is made up for by expressing the 
power of words and the directness of speech that is lost with grammar and philology. 
According to Foucault, the ultimate consequence of the "demotion of language" is its 
dispersion «in a multiplicity of modes of being»
415
, since 
for philologists, words are like so many objects formed and deposited by history; for those 
who wish to achieve a formalization, language must strip itself of its concrete content and 
leave nothing visible but those forms of discourse that are universally valid; if one's intent is 
to interpret, then words become a text to be broken down, so as to allow that [sic, BQ] other 
meaning hidden in them to emerge and become clearly visible; lastly, language may 
sometimes arise for its own sake in an act of writing that designates nothing other than 
itself
416
. 
For the French philosopher, such dispersion of language into a number of different 
disciplines occurs throughout the nineteenth century and starts to be countered by 
Nietzsche's enterprise «to connect the philosophical task with a radical reflection 
upon language», so that it is univocally analysed in the field of thought. In order to 
master the fragmentation of language, there appears in the modern age a number of 
themes such as the «universal formalization of all discourse», the «integral exegesis 
of the world», or the «general theory of signs»
417
. Such themes also encompass in the 
modern age the possibility of  
a transformation without residuum, of a total reabsorption of all forms of discourse into a 
single word, of all books into a single page, of the whole world into one book
418
. 
The modern episteme, which views man as an empirical object of knowledge, 
according to Foucault, «was formed towards the end of the eighteenth century and 
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still serves as the positive ground of our knowledge»
419
. Such episteme is related not 
only to «the shift of language towards objectivity, and with its reappearance in 
multiple form»
420
 but also to «the disappearance of Discourse and its featureless 
reign»
421
. According to the philosopher, the question of language, posited «in 
literature as well as in formal reflection»
422
 rather than in philosophy in order to 
create a general theory of signs and the unity of language, also causes discourse to be 
eclipsed. The study of language as an objective and univocal reality would thus hide 
the existence of discourse and make less noticeable the way in which it is produced 
and deployed.  
In his 1970 inaugural lecture at the College de France, 'L'Ordre du Discours', ['The 
Order of Discourse']
423
, Foucault sets out to analyse the production of discourse that 
he views as «the power which is to be seized»
424
, «not simply that which translates 
struggles or systems of domination»
425
, but «the thing for which and by which there is 
struggle». In this sense, discourse should not be considered a «transparent or neutral 
element», but on the contrary as «one of the places where sexuality and politics 
exercise in a privileged way some of their most formidable powers
426
. The French 
philosopher recognises the existence of different kinds of procedures that ensure the 
control of discourse: 
In every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and 
redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and 
dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable 
materiality
427
. 
Along with a number of procedures of exclusion and marginalisation, such as that of 
prohibition
428
, as well as the distinctions between reason and madness and between 
true and false, in his inaugural lecture Foucault also observes recourse to other groups 
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of procedures that he calls 'principles of rarefaction' or classification. One such group 
is that of internal procedures, through which «discourses themselves exercise their 
own control»
429
 on events and chance. Among the internal procedures of rarefaction, 
Foucault identifies that of commentary, which constitute a society's  
major narratives, which are recounted, repeated and varied; formulae, texts and ritualised sets 
of discourses which are recited in well-defined circumstances; things said once and 
preserved because it is suspected that behind them there is a secret or a treasure
430
. 
While some discourses «vanish as soon as they have been pronounced», others «give 
rise to a certain number of new speech-acts which take them up, transform them or 
speak of them». In this sense, the procedure of commentary appears to include 
translation as an integral part of the production of discourse, since it is impossible to 
make a distinction between «the category of fundamental or creative discourses», 
namely the original texts, and «the mass of discourses which repeat, gloss, and 
comment»; rather «plenty of major texts become blurred and disappear, and 
sometimes commentaries  move into the primary position»
431
. More specifically, 
according to Foucault,  
the same literary work can give rise simultaneously to very distinct types of discourse: the 
'Odyssey' as a primary text is repeated, in the same period, in the translation by Berard, and 
in the endless 'explications de texte', and in Joyce's 'Ulysses'
432
.  
In such an understanding, translation should not be considered as a secondary text 
and, as such, a less relevant one, but rather one should comprise the possibility for a 
translated text to become a major source of reference and discourse: 
In what is broadly called commentary, the hierarchy between primary and secondary text 
plays two roles which are in solidarity with each other. On the one hand it allows the 
(endless) construction of new discourses: the dominance of the primary text, its permanence, 
its status as a discourse which can always be re-actualised, the multiple or hidden meaning 
with which is credited, the essential reticence and richness which is attributed to it, all this is 
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an open possibility of speaking. But on the other hand the commentary's only role, whatever 
the techniques used, is to say at last what was silently articulated 'beyond', in the text
433
.  
Commentary, and thus translation, is viewed by Foucault as a way to complete the 
primary source, by adding to the original text and saying something different which is 
not in it. Such a way of producing discourse generates a paradox in that «the 
commentary must say for the first time what had, nonetheless, already been said, and 
must tirelessly repeat what had, however, never been said»
434
.  
Foucault claims that in our society, there exists, «a profound logophobia», «a sort of 
mute terror against these events, against this mass of things said», that are considered 
to be «violent, discontinuous, pugnacious, disorderly as well, and perilous». 
However, the fear for this «great incessant and disordered buzzing of discourse» 
should be faced and analysed by making «three decisions which our thinking today 
tends to resist»
435
: 
We must call into question our will to truth, restore to discourse its character as an event, and 
finally throw off the sovereignty of the signifier
436
. 
To cope with such fears, Foucault calls for the questioning of one's own truths and 
beliefs, by situating them in their own limited context and by doing away with their 
formal supremacy. In order to do so, the French philosopher identifies a number of 
principles to be kept in mind while trying to reset one's way of thinking in discourse. 
He firstly recognises a principle of reversal: 
Where tradition sees the source of discourses, the principle of their swarming abundance and 
of their continuity, in those figures which seem to play a positive role, e.g., those of the 
author, the discipline, the will to truth, we must rather recognise the negative action of a 
cutting-up and a rarefaction of discourse. 
In this sense, features, personalities and representations traditionally held to positively 
impact society should rather also be considered in their reducing and limiting role. 
Secondly, discourses should be thought of as «discontinuous practices, which cross 
each other, are sometimes juxtaposed with one another, but can just as well exclude 
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or be unaware of each other», rather than processes that hide «a great unsaid or a 
great unthought which runs throughout the world». 
Third, any kind of discourse should not be based on «pre-existing significations» that 
have to be explained, since «the world is not the accomplice of our knowledge», but 
rather discourse should be considered as «a violence which we do to things, or in any 
case as a practice which we impose on them».  
The fourth principle, according to Foucault, is that of exteriority, which regards the 
analysis of discourse considering «its external conditions of possibility», and «what 
gives rise to the aleatory series of these events, and fixes its limits», rather than trying 
to analyse «its interior, hidden nucleus, towards the heart of a thought or a 
signification supposed to be manifested in it»
437
. 
 In Foucauldian terms, translation could be considered political in the sense 
that it is an act of commentary or interpretation that modifies the original text in order 
to adapt it to the production of discourse in the receiving cultural context. In such an 
understanding, in that they foster the establishment and maintenance of a political 
order, translation and the notion of equivalence in translation contribute to the 
illusory construction of discourses, also being influenced by local cultural contexts 
and ultimately by the individuals involved in the process.  
The existence of discourse as a source of power to be seized and its dependence on its 
constructed character through procedures of rarefaction and classification play a key 
role in the field of literary theory and criticism of that time. The political role of 
commentary as a principle of rarefaction of discourse is analysed by the Palestinian 
literary theorist Edward Said in order to develop the notion of Orientalism. In his 
1978 'Orientalism'
438
, Said demonstrates the existence of a mode of discourse, «a way 
of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient's special place in 
European Western  experience»
439
. More specifically, Orientalism could be viewed as 
a «style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made 
between "the Orient" and (most of the time) "the Occident"»
440
. In this sense, the 
Orient is not only considered geographically close to Europe, but it is also  
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the place of Europe's greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations 
and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the 
Other. In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting 
image, idea, personality, experience
441
. 
According to Said, the discourse of Orientalism is supported by a large number of 
«institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies 
and colonial styles»
442
. Such discourse is created and reproduced by «a very large 
mass of writers, among whom are poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, 
economists, and imperial administrators»
443
, who take the orientalist perspective 
as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political 
accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, "mind," destiny, and so on.
444
 
On a more general basis, in his 1983 essay 'Traveling Theory'
445
, Said observes and 
analyses the process of transferring ideas and theories from one culture to another. 
According to the Palestinian theorist, «like people and school of criticism, ideas and 
theories travel - from person to person, from situation to situation, from one period to 
another»
446
. Said asserts the positive aspects of such «circulation of ideas»
447
 for the 
nourishment of cultural and intellectual life «whether it takes the form of 
acknowledged or unconscious influence, creative borrowing, or wholesale 
appropriation»
448
. He however claims that an analysis of the movements and transfers 
of theories and ideas would be useful when trying to establish  
whether by virtue of having moved from one place and time to another an idea or a theory 
gains or loses in strength, and whether a theory in one historical period and national culture 
becomes altogether different for another period or situation
449
. 
According to Said «such movement into a new environment is never unimpeded», but 
rather it complicates the transfer and circulation of theories, because it implies 
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recourse to «processes of representation and institutionalization different from those 
at the point of origin». However, Said identifies a number of recurring stages 
«common to the way any theory or idea travels» that can be used for the purpose of 
analysing such processes. 
At the beginning of the process, «there is a point of origin, or what seems like one», a 
situation in which the theory is formulated or the idea is introduced into the discourse. 
Secondly, «as the idea moves from an earlier point to another time and place», it has 
to travel and cross the distance by undergoing «the pressure of various contexts where 
it will come into a new prominence». In the third phase, «the transplanted theory or 
idea» has to come to terms with a set of conditions of acceptance or resistance. Even 
though such conditions do not guarantee its total and definitive acceptance, they make 
it possible to introduce or tolerate the idea into a new cultural context, «however alien 
it might appear to be». During the last stage, «the now full (or partly) accommodated 
(or incorporated) idea» or theory is changed and translated to a certain degree, since it 
has been used in a different context and it has acquired «its new position in a new 
time and place»
450
. 
Even if one might think that Said's notion of Traveling theory carries with it a sort of 
negative implication in that the original theories and ideas, once transferred into other 
cultural contexts, change their innovative thrust and modify their significance, the 
Palestinian theorist claims that 
the exercise involved in figuring out where the theory went and how in getting there its fiery 
core was reignited is invigorating - and is also another voyage, one that is central to 
intellectual life in the late twentieth century
451
.  
Said's Traveling theory contributes to expand the notion of translation that instead of 
being considered as the transformation of an original text from a given source 
language into another target language, gradually starts to envisage the participation of 
other key factors, such as the individuals and groups that intervene in the translation 
of foreign concepts into other transnational communities; not only the translators, but 
also the readers' communities in the receiving culture.  
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 The cultural and political implications in the production of discourse observed 
with Foucault and Said are also studied from a different perspective by the 
anthropologist Talal Asad who, in his essay 'The Concept of Cultural Translation in 
British Social Anthropology'
452
, considers the «translation of cultures» as an 
enterprise that «increasingly since the 1950s has become an almost banal description 
of the distinctive task of social anthropology»
453
. Asad considers the institutionalised 
practice of cultural translation among anthropologists that study other cultures 
claiming that it does not involve only «what individual Western anthropologists say 
in their ethnographies»
454
, but also «what their countries (and perhaps they 
themselves) do in their relations with the third world»
455
. In this sense, 
anthropologists who translate a culture into their ethnographies, not only have to face 
linguistic problems in texts, but they also have to take into account «the social 
conditions they work in both in the field and in their own society»
456
.  
According to Asad, it is dangerous to assume that translating deals simply with 
substituting words of a foreign text with words carrying equivalent meaning into 
another language, so that the translation conveys the "real meaning" of the original. 
Doing so would presuppose an ideal utopian condition of equality between the 
languages and the cultures involved in the process: 
Because the languages of third world societies [...] are seen as weaker in relation to Western 
languages ( and today especially to English), they are more likely to submit to forcible 
transformation in the translation process than the other way around. The reason for this is, 
first, that in their political-economic relations with third world countries, Western nations 
have the greater ability to manipulate the latter. And, second, Western languages produce 
and deploy desired knowledge more readily than third world languages do.
457
 
The inequality of the relationship between First and Third-World countries, according 
to Asad, imbues translation with a process of interpreting implicit features of the 
foreign ethnocentrically:  
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This inequality in the power of languages, together with the fact that the anthropologist 
typically writes about an illiterate (or at any rate not an English-speaking) population for a 
largely academic, English-speaking audience, encourages a tendency [...] to read the implicit 
in alien cultures.
458
  
Asad argues that there is a tendency of capitalist societies «to push the meanings of 
various third world societies in a single direction»
459
. Even if they are willing «to read 
about another mode of life»
460
, such first-world societies also seek «to manipulate the 
text it reads according to established rules»
461
. This is because, 
the process of cultural translation is inevitably enmeshed in conditions of power - 
professional, national, international. And among these conditions is the authority of 
ethnographers (a) to present the coherence of culturally distinctive discourses as the 
integration of self- contained social systems, and (b) to uncover the implicit meanings of 
subordinated cultural discourses.
462
 
Asad focuses on the case of the translation of «scientific texts as well as social 
science, history, philosophy, and literature»
463
 from European languages into Arabic 
throughout the nineteenth century. Such phenomenon, according to him, has 
transformed the Arabic language so that it has become much more similar than ever 
to the European ones
464
. 
In order to avoid such distortions a good translator should not view «unusual 
difficulty in conveying the sense of an alien discourse»
465
 as a problem proper to the 
receiving culture and language, but they should rather «test the tolerance of her own 
language for assuming unaccustomed forms»
466
. In this sense, according to Asad, in 
order to counter «asymmetrical tendencies and pressures in the languages of 
dominated and dominant societies»
467
, anthropologists should not assume that   
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translation requires the adjustment of "foreign" discourses to their new site. In my view, they 
should retain what may be a discomforting - even scandalous - presence within the receiving 
language
468
.
 
 
According to Asad, the only way to avoid reproducing cultural and power 
asymmetries while translating is by introducing in the receiving culture annoying and 
disturbing foreign elements.  
 The cultural and political asymmetries in language are also evidenced by other 
intellectuals more specifically dealing with translation. The translator and philosopher 
Antoine Berman, in his 1985 essay 'La Traduction comme épreuve de l’étranger', 
['Translation and the Trials of the Foreign']
469
, in line with Schleiermacher's notion of 
'a feeling of the foreign'
470
, asserts that translated texts should always bring inside 
foreign elements that make their origin and otherness visible. He also claims that 
when considering the history of translated literature, translation has always been an 
enterprise that negated, instead of asserting, the foreign nature of an original text, 
as if translation, far from being the trials of the Foreign, were rather its negation, its 
acclimation, its “naturalization.” As if its most individual essence were radically repressed471.  
He thus asserts the need to reflect «on the properly ethical aim of the translating act 
(receiving the Foreign as Foreign)»
472
 and to analyse translated texts in order to show 
how (and why) this aim has, from time immemorial (although not always), been skewed, 
perverted and assimilated to something other than itself, such as the play of hypertextual 
transformations
473
. 
 
 
Such manipulation would produce «ethnocentric, annexationist translations and 
hypertextual translations (pastiche, imitation, adaptation, free rewriting)»
474
 as a 
result of «the internalized expression of a two-millennium-old tradition, as well as the 
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ethnocentric structure of every culture, every language»
475
. According to Berman, 
however, only some cultures make use of translation: 
Only languages that are “cultivated” translate, but they are also the ones that put up the 
strongest resistance to the ruckus of translation. They censor.
476
 
The French translator catches sight of the fact that only some refined and advanced 
cultures avail themselves of translation into their languages in order to master the 
difference of the original text by censoring it. 
Following the romantic authors he has studied, Berman supports a literalist 
translation strategy, thus setting it as a translational standard, and proposes a practical 
model to analyse and assess the degree of manipulation of the original text when it is 
translated: 
I propose to examine briefly the system of textual deformation that operates in every 
translation and prevents it from being a “trial of the foreign.” I shall call this examination the 
analytic of translation. Analytic in two senses of the term: a detailed analysis of the 
deforming system, and therefore an analysis in the Cartesian sense, but also in the 
psychoanalytic sense, insofar as the system is largely unconscious, present as a series of 
tendencies or forces that cause translation to deviate from its essential aim. The analytic of 
translation is consequently designed to discover these forces and to show where in the text 
they are practiced
477
. 
According to Berman, the textual deformation of an original happens to be mostly 
unconscious, since the translator is inescapably subject to a set of inclinations which 
make him stray. Such forces, however, cannot be noticed and countered by the 
translator alone, because they «form part of the translator’s being, determining the 
desire to translate»
478
. According to Berman, the only way the translator can do away 
with his unconscious thrust to manipulation is by willing to have his works analysed: 
The translator’s practice must submit to analysis if the unconscious is to be 
neutralized. It is by yielding to the “controls” (in the psychoanalytic sense) that 
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translators can hope to free themselves from the system of deformation that burdens 
their practice479.  
Berman devises an analytical tool to detect some deforming tendencies, claiming that 
even though some «may appear relevant only to French “classicizing” translation»480, 
they could be useful to analyse «all translating, at least in the western tradition [...] 
although certain tendencies may be more accentuated in one linguistic-cultural space 
than in others»481. 
 During the 1990s prior and contemporary poststructuralist and postcolonial 
reflections on the asymmetries of languages and on the cultural and political 
implications of translation are integrated in the study of different fields of translation, 
among whom literary translation plays the most relevant role. In the introduction to 
the seminal volume 'Translation, History and Culture'
482
, the editors Susan Bassnett 
and André Lefevere, in line with Mary Snell-Hornby
483
, propose what they term the 
'cultural turn in translation studies', as a call for abandoning scientific convictions 
about translation, in favour of a more culturally-oriented approach. In her article 
'Linguistic Transcoding or Cultural Transfer? A Critique of Translation Theory in 
Germany'
484
, Snell-Hornby recognises and states the decline of the «rigorously 
linguistic conception of translation as mere substitution or transcoding»
485
. She then 
introduces the illusory nature of equivalence in translation
486
 as a result of the 
German functionalist translation theories in the 1970s and 1980s. The translation 
scholar also advocates the use of a culturally-oriented approach to bridge the gap 
between isolated translation traditions, such as linguistics and literature-based ones, 
across different countries. 
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Translation starts to be considered as an interdiscipline, and cultural and postcolonial 
scholars engage in critical studies of translated texts as a way of reproducing 
imperialistic discourse. Some scholars take on the theme of linguistic and cultural 
differences to propose resistant translation strategies.  
 In her 1992 book 'Siting Translation: history, post-structuralism, and the 
colonial context'
487
, Tejaswini Niranjana inscribes translation in the colonial 
discourse, that she defines as  
the body of knowledge, modes of representation, strategies of power, law, discipline, and so 
on, that are employed in the construction and domination of "colonial subjects".
488
 
Niranjana argues that, since translation contributes to «creating coherent and 
transparent texts and subjects», it also makes the colonized cultures «seem static and 
unchanging rather than historically constructed». In this sense translation of 
«philosophy, historiography, education, missionary writings, travel writing» fosters 
the renewal and perpetuation of the colonial domination
489
.  
According to Niranjana, the postcolonial translator should be aware of such 
asymmetries and of the attempts to support essentialist anti-colonial narratives, «to 
deconstruct them, to show their complicity with the master-narrative of 
imperialism»
490
. More specifically, instead of trying to oppose the «hegemonic 
representation of the non-Western world»
491
 by recourse to nativist or essentialist 
instances of the colonies, postcolonials should propose «a richer complexity, a 
complication of our notions of the "self"»
492
. In this sense, translation should be 
considered as an opposing practice of resistance and «transformed into a disruptive, 
disseminating ['force', BQ]», by introducing difference and heterogeneity «against 
myths of purity»
493
. 
 In a different postcolonial perspective, Homi Bhabha, instead of focusing on 
the translation of cultures in Asad's sense,  proposes a notion of cultural translation as 
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a hybrid process of survival, the return of the original into «reinscription and 
redescription; an iteration that is not belated, but ironic and insurgent»
494
.  
According to the Indian scholar, difference is normally made visible in literature 
through content instead of form, thus reproducing an alienated representation and 
causing a loss of signification: 
Too often it is the slippage of signification that is celebrated in the articulation of difference, 
at the expense of this disturbing process of overpowering of content by the signifier. The 
erasure of content in the invisible but insistent structure of linguistic difference does not lead 
us to some general, formal acknowledgement of the function of the sign. The ill-fitting robe 
of language alienates content in the sense that it deprives it of an immediate access  to a 
stable or holistic reference 'outside' itself. [...] Content becomes the alienating mise-en-scène 
that reveals the signifying structure of linguistic difference.
495
 
In this sense, in translation, «the 'given' content becomes alien and estranged» and the 
language of translation is continually challenged «by its double, the untranslatable - 
alien and foreign». 
Taking into account the literature of migrant writers, Bhabha asserts that «the 
migrant's survival depends [...] on discovering 'how newness enters the world'»
496
, by 
connecting the personal experience of migration to instances of literary writing, while 
«making the linkages through the unstable elements of literature and life - the 
dangerous tryst with the 'untranslatable' - rather than arriving at ready-made 
names»
497
.  
Bhabha likens his idea of cultural translation to Benjamin's notion of the 'foreignness 
of languages' which sees translation as the representation and performance of cultural 
difference498. In such staging of cultural difference, which is cultural translation, «the 
content or subject matter is made disjunct, overwhelmed and alienated by the form of 
signification»499. In this sense, language is considered a means of introducing the 
foreign aspect as an «'unstable element of linkage', the indeterminate temporality of 
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the in-between»500. In cultural translation the meaning of the original words is 
destroyed in its original referential structure and renegotiated in a new perspective, in 
which «the purpose is, as Rudolf Pannwitz says, not 'to turn Hindi, Greek, English 
into German [but] instead to turn German into Hindi, Greek, English'»501. 
Rather than considering the narrow definition of translation as the substitution of 
words from one language into another, Bhabha views translation as «the performative 
nature of cultural communication»
502
, thus at all times revealing «the different times 
and spaces between cultural authority and its performative practices»
503
, that make 
meaning move from one culture into another. Thanks to cultural translation, it is then 
possible to desacralise «the transparent assumptions of cultural supremacy»
504
, while 
demanding «a contextual specificity, a historical differentiation within minority 
positions»
505
. 
Bhabha's notion of cultural translation considers not only the transfer of meaning 
from a text into another, but also the role of the writing subject as a living 
translational experience of cultural in-betweenness. In this sense, translation is 
increasingly viewed as an act of communication, rather than a transfer of meaning 
and content. 
 Cultural difference and asymmetries in translation are also studied by the 
Indian postcolonial philosopher and literary theorist, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 
who, in her essay 'The Politics of Translation'
506
, claims that the politics of translation 
is the result of considering language as a way to construct meaning and to «allow us 
to make sense of things, of ourselves»
507
. According to the Indian scholar, outside of 
language, beside it and around it, «random contingency»
508
 cannot be totally and 
adequately controlled. However, in the "uncanny" experience of translation that 
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contains «alterity in an unknown language spoken in a different cultural milieu»
509
 it 
is possible to get the illusion of control. 
According to Spivak, the uncanny aspect of translation, that hides and controls 
cultural difference, lies in the unbridgeable gap between logic and rhetoric: 
Logic allows us to jump from word to word by means of clearly indicated connections. 
Rhetoric must work in the silence between and around words in order to see what works and 
how much. The jagged relationship between rhetoric and logic, condition and effect of 
knowing, is a relationship by which a world is made for the agent, so that the agent can act in 
an ethical way, a political way, a day-to-day way; so that the agent can be alive, in a human 
way, in the world. Unless one can at least construct a model of this for the other language, 
there is no real translation
510
. 
Translation is thus viewed as the successful construction of a coherent model that is 
capable to inscribe the relationship between the logical and the rhetoric aspects of a 
culture. However, according to Spivak, «without a sense of the rhetoricity of 
language»511, it would be impossible to translate correctly, and rather «a species of 
neo-colonialist construction of the non-western scene is afoot»512. In order to be 
successful,  
the translator from a Third World language ['into English', BQ] should be sufficiently in 
touch with what is going on in literary production in that language to be capable of 
distinguishing between good and bad writing [...], resistant and conformist writing
513
.  
According to Spivak, the good translator should, first of all, know the literary 
environment in which the foreign language text has been conceived and written. Only 
by doing so, can they be able to realise «that what seems resistant in the space of 
English may be reactionary in the space of the original language»
514
. The Indian 
philosopher claims that, since the notions of good and bad translation depend on the 
local cultural context, in order to counter racist assumptions such as the belief that 
«all Third World women’s writing is good»515, the translator should retain «a tough 
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sense of the specific terrain of the original»
516
. In the same way «democracy changes 
into the law of force in the case of translation from the Third World»
517
. If translators 
worked without mastering the language and thinking that they can simply transfer 
content, they would be «betraying the text and showing rather dubious politics». In 
order to avoid such oversimplification of the task of translating, a specific 
«preparation for the intimacy of cultural translation» is necessary that, instead of 
encompassing only the «learned tradition of language acquisition for academic 
work», entails direct and personal experience of foreign languages and contexts. 
According to Spivak, before talking or making claims on other cultures or 
individuals, a translator should try to live the same foreign experiences to avoid «to 
bludgeon someone else by insisting on your ['the translator's', BQ] version of 
solidarity»
518
. 
In her later essay, 'Translation as Culture'
519
, she furthers such considerations by 
criticising the concept of translation as resistance arguing that, even if translation is 
considered in the narrow sense an act of reparation
520
, one should never try «to repay 
what cannot be repaid, and should not be thought of as repayable»
521
. According to 
Spivak, the tendency of postcolonial translators to force foreignness into translation, 
in order to make up for lost meaning is not enough, or should never be thought of as 
the only way to balance power asymmetries:    
This founding task of translation does not disappear by fetishizing the native language. 
Sometimes I read and hear that the subaltern can speak in their native languages. I wish 
I could be as self-assured as the intellectual, literary critic and historian, who assert this 
in English. No speech is speech if it is not heard. It is this act of hearing-to-respond that 
may be called the imperative to translate
522
. 
While the first direct response of postcolonial scholars to colonial discourse has been 
that of resisting and countering power through foreignizing strategies, Spivak 
contributes to highlight the complex aspects of the question by asserting that the 
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answer to colonialism cannot resolve itself in the obsessive search for what is native 
and original. Doing so would only reproduce neo-colonial instances in that only 
through translation into the colonial language can the postcolonial subaltern make 
himself understood and be ultimately taken into consideration:  
We often mistake this for helping people in trouble, or pressing people to pass good laws, 
even to insist on behalf of the other that the law be implemented. But the founding 
translation between people is a listening with care and patience, in the normality of the other, 
enough to notice that the other has already silently made that effort. This reveals the 
irreducible importance of idiom, which a standard language, however native, cannot annul.
523
 
Spivak thus defends the importance of the use of standardized languages to empower 
subaltern speakers, to resist «the necessary impossibility of translation»
524
, so that 
«subalternity may painstakingly translate itself into a hegemony that can make use of 
and exceed all the succour and resistance that we can organize from above»
525
.  
 From a different perspective, the American translation theorist Lawrence 
Venuti considers the asymmetries of language and power in the case of translating 
foreign texts into English. Venuti criticises the scientific tendency of linguistics-
oriented approaches in assuming that «language is defined as a set of systematic rules 
autonomous from cultural and social variation»
526
, thus considering translation as a 
series of operational norms independent of «the cultural and social formations in 
which they are executed»
527
. According to the American scholar, such tendency to 
«purify translation practices and situations of their social and historical variables»
528
 
is a way to normalize difference and make the foreign aspects similar to the domestic 
ones:  
Translating can never simply be communication between equals because it is fundamentally 
ethnocentric. [...] The very function of translating is assimilation, the inscription of a foreign 
text with domestic intelligibilities and interests.
529
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In this sense, translation is thought to unavoidably inscribe foreign texts into different 
linguistic and cultural values in order to ensure understanding. Venuti also observes 
that such domesticating strategies in translation into English usually adopts a fluent 
strategy to reproduce the illusory effect of transparency and faithfulness. However, he 
claims that «what it makes seem faithful, is in fact the translator's interpretation of the 
foreign text, the signified he has demarcated in the translation in accordance with 
target-language cultural values»
530
. 
Venuti notices that «this process of inscription operates at every stage in the 
production, circulation, and reception of the translation» and that is starts with the 
very choice of translating a specific foreign text instead of another because it 
«answers to particular domestic interests». Apart from the translation strategies that 
are chosen to render the foreign text, reception is always «further complicated by the 
diverse forms in which the translation is published, reviewed, read, and taught»
531
. 
Such complex processes of cultural representation are considered to play a key role in 
the construction of cultural identities, because 
foreign literatures tend to be dehistoricized by the selection of texts for translation, removed 
from the foreign literary traditions where they draw their significance. And foreign texts are 
often rewritten to conform to styles and themes that currently prevail in domestic 
literatures.
532
  
Such processes, according to Venuti, contribute to the establishment of cultural 
stereotypes by attaching «esteem or stigma to specific ethnic, racial, and national 
groupings»
533
 also influencing intercultural relations in «reinforcing alliances, 
antagonism, and hegemonies between nations»
534
. Furthermore, Venuti sees 
institutions to take a stronger part in the definition of cultural identity, given the fact 
that they tend to support the construction of an 'ethics of sameness' rather than one of 
difference «to ensure the continued and unruffled reproduction of the institution»
535
. 
Furthermore, he considers translation as a violent practice in that it forces the foreign 
text into another cultural context with different «values, beliefs and representations 
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that pre-exist it in the target language, always configured in hierarchies of dominance 
and marginality». In this sense, translation makes «a cultural other as the same, the 
recognizable, even the familiar», by inscribing it in «its canons and taboos, its codes 
and ideologies», thus risking to contribute to «an imperialist appropriation of foreign 
cultures for domestic agendas, cultural, economic, political». 
According to Venuti, translation could be termed as a 'cultural political practice', in 
that, through such processes, it supports «the maintenance or revision of dominant 
conceptual paradigms, research methodologies, and clinical practices in target-
language disciplines and professions»
536
. 
In postcolonial countries such peculiar features of translation are even more decisive 
in that, in such contexts, translation is «a cultural practice that is deeply implicated in 
the relations of domination and dependence, equally capable of maintaining or 
disrupting them»
537
. Even though a subordinate position might be considered as 
passive and weak, according to Venuti, colonial and postcolonial contexts retain a 
certain degree of contingency that makes it more difficult to predict and control the 
effects and functions of translated texts
538
. In such cases, the translator is especially 
responsible for «reconstructing the hierarchy of domestic values that inform the 
translation and its likely reception»
539
, so as to comply with «the linguistic and 
cultural differences that comprise the local scene»
540
. 
Taking on Schleiermacher and Berman's foreignizing strategies, and in line with 
major postcolonial translators, Venuti advocates for an ethical choice of countering 
domesticating translations by introducing discomforting, 'demystifying' and 
disturbing foreign elements into English translations. Even if the American scholar 
views it as impossible for translation to «get rid itself of its fundamental 
domestication, its basic task of rewriting the foreign text in domestic cultural 
terms»
541
, such ethnocentric aspects of translation can be used «to decenter the 
domestic terms»
542
, also «introducing variations that alienate the domestic, reveal the 
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translation to be in fact a translation, distinct from the text it replaces»
543
. According 
to him, a foreignizing strategy would make the foreignness of the text visible and 
would allow to introduce elements of difference into the ethnocentric Anglo-
American world: 
I want to suggest that in so far as foreignizing translation seeks to restrain the ethnocentric 
violence of translation, it is highly desirable today, a strategic intervention in the current state 
of world affairs, pitched against the hegemonic English-language nations and the unequal 
cultural exchanges in which they engage their global others
544
. 
In this sense, the values in the receiving culture can be «disarranged to set going 
processes of defamiliarization, canon reformation, ideological critique, and 
institutional change»
545
. According to Venuti, however, one should not seek to enact 
«an indiscriminate valorization of every foreign culture or a metaphysical concept of 
foreignness as an essential value»
546
, but rather to use such method strategically and 
only in the contexts in which it serves to interfere with domesticating translations, 
with the ultimate objective of resisting «ethnocentrism and racism, cultural narcissism 
and imperialism, in the interest of democratic geopolitical relations»
547
. 
Far from running himself into an ethnocentric narrative, Venuti also acknowledges 
that his purpose for using a foreignizing strategy to counter the Anglo-American 
domesticating tendency is «not to do away with cultural political agendas»
548
, since 
his «advocacy is itself an agenda»
549
. Moreover, in the case of translating foreign 
texts into English, a foreignizing strategy would contribute to a change in the way 
translations are produced and read because, in making the translator more visible, it 
holds him more responsible and accountable for his work
550
. 
In his 2000 essay 'Translation, Community, Utopia'
551
, Venuti analyses the dynamics 
and the relations between the translator's strategy and choices and the communities of 
readers he refers to. According to the American scholar,  
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when choosing to translate a text and while selecting the best translation strategy for it, a 
translator that is motivated by this ethical politics of difference seeks to build a community 
with foreign cultures, to share an understanding with and of them and to collaborate on 
projects founded on that understanding, going so far as to allow it to revise and develop 
domestic values and institutions
552
.   
In this sense, translators choose to translate a text when they are attracted by the 
foreign text because they feel that it could positively affect the values and institution 
of the receiving culture: 
The very impulse to seek a community abroad suggests that the translator wishes to extend or 
complete a particular domestic situation, to compensate for a defect in the translating 
language and literature, in the translating culture
553
. 
Rather symmetrically, in choosing to translate a particular text the translator has in 
mind a potential indefinite community of readers in the receiving culture which he 
aims to affect through his translation. In order to successfully influence such ideal 
community, the translator needs to reach a group of  «domestic cultural constituencies 
among which the translation will circulate»
554
. As Venuti puts it: 
To engage these constituencies, however, the translator involves the foreign text in an 
asymmetrical act of communication, weighted ideologically towards the translating culture. 
Translating is always ideological because it releases a domestic remainder, an inscription of 
values, beliefs, and representations linked to historical moments and social positions in the 
receiving culture
555
.  
In this sense, translation could be considered as an ideological interpretive form of 
communication that aims to influence domestic local communities and groups of 
interest. Considered as such, «a translation provides an ideological resolution for the 
linguistic and cultural differences of the foreign text»
556
. 
Further than that, Venuti also asserts that, since «it is unlikely that a foreign text in 
translation will be intelligible or interesting (or both simultaneously) to every 
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readership»
557
, the influence exerted by the translation could never reach the totality 
of constituencies, thus causing some of them to be excluded and giving way to the 
constitution of a hierarchical structure within such groups of interest. Given the 
inescapable reproduction of such hierarchy in the case of a translation whose manifest 
aim is «the utopian dream of a common understanding between foreign and domestic 
cultures»
558
, even when it refers to apparently non-political texts, such as to the 
literary ones, one should be wary enough to search for its less universalistic 
«technical or pragmatic purposes»
559
. 
 During the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, rather than accounting for the 
transfer of meaning and content of a text from one national language into another, 
translation has been growingly considered a political and cultural process of 
communication, that involves different contexts, communities and, ultimately, 
individuals. As a consequence, equivalence in translation has  been gradually viewed 
as an illusory undertaking, whose misleading transparency, perfection and 
attainability mask linguistic and cultural asymmetries. Rather than being a stable, 
scientific and reliable paradigm, as well as the ultimate task of translators, 
equivalence could be considered a political space of negotiation in which viable 
linguistic solutions are continually worked out to introduce acceptable amounts of 
newness and foreignness into a well-established cultural and political order.  
Considered as such, translation is a way of reproducing discourse not just at a textual 
level, but also in the transfer of ideas and theories into other cultural contexts by 
means of textual reproduction, interpretation and commentary
560
. In this sense, the 
analysis of the meaning of a concept through one of its many actualisations into a 
series of texts appears to acquire significance in that it would contribute to mapping 
its changes and transformations when introduced into a foreign cultural context
561
. 
More specifically, when a theory or a concept are reproduced through translation, it 
seems relevant to consider to what extent, in trying to convey the illusion of 
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equivalence between the source and the receiving notion of it, there is a political 
attempt to introduce foreignness into the receiving cultural context.  
Such an analysis would prove to be extremely relevant when it aims at examining the 
way in which political concepts are introduced into other cultural contexts, because it 
is through those very notions that the order of discourse could be more easily 
maintained and extended to other political settings. In such an understanding, one 
should not wonder whether concepts such as 'freedom', 'human rights', 'justice', or 
'democracy' mean the same in different cultural contexts, given the fact that, 
considering the recent developments in translation theory, such terms could not 
possibly mean the same. Rather, one should look for the reason why is there so strong 
an attempt to make such concepts mean the same. In other words, it seems relevant to 
consider and question the purpose for creating an illusory correspondence of meaning 
that puts such terms into as equivalent a relationship as possible.  
Democracy nowadays is an extremely positive and undisputed concept in the 
international geopolitical arena, so that it has become impossible to question its 
beneficial effects at every level, time and place. For this reason, to put it in 
Foucauldian terms, it seems particularly interesting to examine such common 'will to 
truth' and consider, alongside its positive effects, its limiting and constraining role 
when translated into other cultures. 
It is also important to remark that such search for equivalence in political concepts 
should not be simplistically interpreted as a mere globalising and westernising 
neocolonialist strategy, but as a more complex inscription into local political 
enterprises that, in introducing concepts, contribute to the adjustment of the foreign to 
a specific context, in order to support local political demands. As a consequence, such 
process of redefinition should be considered as a two-way strategy that, in the long 
term, is likely to propose a more inclusive and descriptive meaning of the very same 
political concepts. 
In the next chapter, a brief and not at all comprehensive account of the most recent 
theoretical discourses on democracy in non-Western and post-colonial settings will be 
given, in order to provide for an idea of the local environment in which 'mainstream 
democracy' has been questioned and discussed at the international academic level. 
During the last decades of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the twenty-
167 
 
first, liberal democracy has started to be questioned by postcolonial
562
 strands of 
thought that aim at building a non-Western democratic epistemology. After such 
presentation, a brief history of the Arab and ultimately Egyptian interpretation of the 
concept of democracy will be outlined by considering some Middle-Eastern and more 
specifically Arab scholars and intellectuals. This will allow to connect the case study 
under consideration to the current international debate over the postcolonial non-
Western definition of democracy. 
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3 - Translating democracy 
 
3 .1  No n-Western  and  po st - co lon ia l  c r i t ic i sm s  to  
'demo cracy '  
 
 During the last decade of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the 
twenty-first, multicultural theories have contributed to redefine the notion of 
democracy as a pluralist and inclusive form of government to make it more open to 
cultural diversity
1
. Multicultural perspectives have also been included in the debate 
over deliberative democracy, which has made cultural diversity one of the variables 
to shape individuals' identities. As already stated in the first chapter
2
, however, 
multicultural perspectives have not been able, so far, to do away with the basic 
assumptions of the mainstream normative liberal democracy.  
Apart from such understanding of democracy, a different branch of criticisms has 
originated from a diverse epistemological approach that rejects the input of identity 
politics and calls for an epistemological redefinition of the democratic standards. 
With this regard, democracy has been rediscussed from a different stance, which 
criticises the process of democratisation for trying to establish the universal 
conditions under which it would be possible to democratise certain countries. The 
Western normative political theory of liberal democracy, that has set the required 
standards and conditions for the development of democracy in cultures and countries 
where democracy is poor or nonexistent, has thus started to be challenged by some 
scholars who study the effects of democratisation in different parts of the world.  
 In the 1995 book 'Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia'
3
, the authors 
Bell, Brown, Jayasuriya and Jones observe that democracy activists have great 
obstacles and difficulties when trying to export liberal democracy in non-Western 
countries. In an introductory chapter
4
, Bell and Jayasuriya claim that while liberal 
democracy is almost completely accepted as the best form of government in Western 
countries, it is wrongly assumed also to be meeting «the deeper aspirations of the rest 
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of the world, [...] regardless of local needs, habits, and traditions»
5
. However, they 
argue that since such model of liberal democracy is culturally-oriented, it could not be 
immediately compatible with the demands of different cultural contexts: 
A liberal democratic political system, informed and justified by the ideals of equality and 
freedom as well as by a recognition and accommodation of 'the fact of pluralism', is a 
culturally distinct, historically contingent artifact, not readily transferable to East and 
Southeast Asian societies with different traditions, needs, and conceptions of human 
flourishing
6
.  
As a consequence, they claim that it is necessary to envision the possibility that, 
while transferring democracy into other cultures, «'Western' political practices such as 
competitive elections may be adopted selectively, without the whole gamut of liberal 
democratic practices and institutions, and if adopted, may be put to use for a unique 
set of illiberal purposes»
7
. They thus introduce the concept of 'illiberal democracy', as 
a reinterpretation of the Western conception of democracy that features «the 
dominant and intrusive role of the state in most aspects of social and economic life 
and the concomitant absence of a free public space»
8
.  
In this sense, instead of foreseeing an increased Western-style democratisation in 
Pacific Asia, they envision the possibility of a return to abrupt methods of social 
control that does not encompass the protection of individual rights. In the concluding 
chapter
9
, the four authors identify three main characteristics of such illiberal 
democracy. First, they observe the presence of «a non-neutral understanding of the 
state»
10
, according to which governments are entitled to «intervene in most if not all 
aspects of social life» to pursue the official common good. Second, law is conceived 
as an apolitical set of rules that serve to manage the country «as a corporate 
enterprise»
11
 to meet predetermined goals. Finally, the «public space and civil 
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society»
12
 are as well managed and controlled by government and are not autonomous 
critical spaces for free association. 
 During the first decade of the twentieth century, Daniel Bell further develops 
his argument on Asian diversity. In his 2000 book, 'East Meets West'
13
, Bell argues 
that «not all human rights values and practices typically endorsed by Western 
countries are automatically accepted elsewhere»
14
. However, the American 
sociologist also criticises the rejection of such Western values purported for the 
promotion of  'Asian values', «a term devised by several Asian officials and their 
supporters for the purpose of challenging Western-style civil and political 
freedoms»
15
. In this view, Western liberal democracy and human rights are held to be 
incompatible with the typically Asian values of «family and social harmony»
16
. To 
counter such view, Bell observes that such «debate on Asian values also prompted 
critical intellectuals in the region to reflect and debate over how they can locate 
themselves in a debate on human rights and democracy»
17
. Such intellectuals have 
not participated in the claims of political representatives in favour of the 'Asian 
values', but they have reinterpreted liberal democratic values in the light of 
contemporary Asian traditions and practices to explore «areas of commonality and 
difference with the West»
18
. According to Bell, such interpretations could be useful in 
trying to «get beyond the rhetoric that has dogged the Asian values debate»
19
, not 
much to make democracy acceptable for other cultures, but rather «to identify 
relatively persuasive East Asian criticisms of traditional Western approaches to 
human rights and democracy»
20
: 
The ultimate aim is to argue for the need to take into account the meanings and priorities 
East Asians typically attach to a set of political standards that have been largely shaped by 
the Western experience
21
. 
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Far from seeking to reject the use of democratic values in the name of culturally-
oriented readings of Asian countries, he also asserts that overestimating «the social 
and political importance of traditional cultural values in contemporary societies»22 
would also be counterproductive. Thus he argues: 
If the aim is to bridge the gap between political philosophy and political reality, it is 
important to distinguish between traditional values that are still relevant today and others that 
have been relegated to the dustbin of history
23
.  
While trying to do so, one should also keep in mind the complexity of the matter: 
given the fact that «modern East Asian societies are characterized by different 
mixtures of Confucian, Buddhist, Western, and other values, and that Asian societies 
may not all share the same set of pressing social needs and political concerns»24, it 
would be advisable to consider the actual relevance of the specific traditions and to 
carefully set and describe the context under examination. 
In his more recent work 'Beyond Liberal Democracy'
25
, Bell aims at showing that the 
most relevant liberal contemporary political concepts of human rights, democracy, 
and capitalism, while being transferred to East Asian societies, has been considerably 
modified and has  «not been shaped by liberalism to nearly the same extent»26 as 
Western democracies have. After analysing the reception of such concepts in East 
Asian countries, Bell concludes that, in his view, there are «morally legitimate 
alternatives to Western-style liberal democracy in the East Asian region»27, and that 
such options might prove to be significant also for Western countries, which could 
learn new ways of addressing typically Western democratic issues: 
What is right for East Asians does not simply involve implementing Western-style political 
practices when the opportunity presents itself; it involves drawing upon East Asian political 
realities and cultural traditions that are defensible to contemporary East Asians. They may 
also be defensible to contemporary Western-style liberal democrats, in which case they may 
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be worth learning from. But there may also be areas of conflict, in which case the Western-
style liberal democrat should tolerate, if not respect, areas of justifiable difference
28
. 
Whenever deviations from the normative political Western standard arise, according 
to Bell, such departures should be considered as remarkable and meaningful 
phenomena that, even if not deemed to be acceptable by Western eyes, should be 
tolerated as such, instead of being controlled. 
 The Indian economist and philosopher Amartya Sen contributes to redefine 
the concept of democracy from a different perspective. In his 2009 book 'The Idea of 
Justice'29, Sen reinterprets the Rawlsian notion of 'justice as fairness' from a social 
choice30 perspective. In his work, the Indian philosopher criticises the «dichotomy 
between those who want to ‘impose’ democracy on countries in the non-Western 
world (in these countries’ ‘own interest’, of course) and those who are opposed to 
such ‘imposition’ (because of the respect for the countries’ ‘own ways’)»31. He 
claimed that both conflicting views revolved around the much too predetermined 
assumption that «democracy belongs exclusively to the West, taking it to be a 
quintessentially ‘Western’ idea which has originated and flourished only in the 
West»
32
. According to him, failing to recognise the basic democratic principles of 
people's participation and public reasoning in other cultures, apart from the 
eighteenth-century European and American democratic experiences, would be very 
limiting: 
Indeed, in understanding the roots of democracy in the world, we have to take an interest in 
the history of people’s participation and public reasoning in different parts of the world. We 
have to look beyond thinking of democracy only in terms of European and American 
evolution. We would fail to understand the pervasive demands for participatory living, [...] if 
we take democracy to be a kind of a specialized cultural product of the West
33
. 
In this sense, even if «the institutional structure of the contemporary practice of 
democracy is largely the product of European and American experience over the last 
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few centuries»
34
, the assumption that Europe and America are the only regions in 
which democratic practices are admitted is the result of «a wrong and superficial 
diagnosis»
35
. Such bias, according to Sen, originates from three sets of causes: first, it 
appears extremely difficult to him to «define civilizations not in terms of the exact 
history of ideas and actions»
36
 but based on large and aggregated geographical areas 
thus producing imprecise and facile generalisations. Secondly, «the early Greek 
experience of balloting»
37 has influenced «many Asian regions [that, BQ] used 
balloting in the centuries that followed»
38
: 
Some of the cities in Asia – in Iran, Bactria and India – incorporated elements of democracy 
in municipal governance in the centuries following the flowering of Athenian democracy
39
. 
Moreover, Sen claims that even if elections are present also in non-Western societies, 
what makes the existence of democracy apparent in such places is the widespread 
recourse to public reasoning: 
Open deliberation also flourished in several other ancient civilizations, sometimes 
spectacularly so; for example, some of the earliest open general meetings aimed specifically 
at settling disputes between different points of view, on social and religious matters, took 
place in India in the so-called Buddhist ‘councils’, where adherents of different points of 
view got together to argue out their differences, beginning in the sixth century bc
40
. 
According to Sen, the method of assessing democracy only as an institutional system 
does not do justice even when examining the case of the Middle East, that in today's 
understanding of democracy has often been depicted as «hostile to democracy»
41
: 
If we look instead for public reasoning and tolerance of different points of view, in line with 
the broader understanding of democracy that I have been discussing, then the Middle East 
does have quite a distinguished past. We must not confuse the narrow history of Islamic 
militancy with the capacious history of the Muslim people and the tradition of political 
governance by Muslim rulers. [...] In Muslim kingdoms centred around Cairo, Baghdad and 
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Istanbul, or in Iran, India or for that matter Spain, there were many champions of public 
discussion
42
.  
In such an understanding of democracy, Sen interprets the contemporary problems in 
the Middle East, not due to its inevitable culturally-bound aversion to democracy, but 
as a result of an identity politics that has been adopted in response to «its own 
imperial past and the subjugation that followed from the dominance of an imperial 
West – a dominance that still has many remaining influences»43.  
Sen thus views democratic politics as the best method to discuss «non-sectarian 
affiliations and their rival claims over religious divisions»
44
, since it allows for 
«recognition of the multiple identities of each person, of which the religious identity 
is only one»
45
, along with other individual features such as linguistic, literary, 
professional, regional as well as «many other bases of categorization»
46
. In this sense, 
Sen's inclusive definition of democracy entails a continuous revision of past ideals to 
adjust them to contemporary needs and perceptions: 
The significance of history in this respect lies rather in the more general understanding that 
established traditions continue to exert some influence on people’s ideas, that they can 
inspire or deter, and they have to be taken into account whether we are moved by them, or 
wish to resist and transcend them, or (as the Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore discussed with 
compelling clarity) want to examine and scrutinize what we should take from the past and 
what we must reject, in the light of our contemporary concerns and priorities
47
. 
Such process of redefinition is also considered a search for universal significations in 
the global history through local and individual understandings across times and 
places. In his 1999 paper 'Democracy as a Universal Value'
48
, Sen argues that in the 
twentieth century there has been a major development of democracy that shall lead to 
«its acceptance as a universal value»
49
. The Indian philosopher identifies three main 
reasons for such an occurrence: the first is the fact that «political and social 
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participation has intrinsic value for human life and well-being»
50
. Second, democracy 
is held to be a key factor «in enhancing the hearing that people get in expressing and 
supporting their claims to political attention»
51
. Third, democratic politics is 
considered to be capable of giving «citizens an opportunity to learn from one 
another»
52
 in the construction and definition of shared values. 
 The normative political theory of liberal democracy has also been questioned 
by the postcolonial South Asian Subaltern Studies Collective in the 1980s, as well as 
by the Latin American Subaltern Group and later by the 'modernity 
/coloniality/decoloniality' Project in the 1990s. Such postcolonial strands of thought 
have been inspired by the Gramscian conception of the 'subaltern', which describes 
the condition of any person considered inferior due to any kind of diversity, based on 
race, gender, religion, poverty, and the like. Such subaltern groups reject the 
possibility for non-Western countries to develop the necessary sets of preconditions 
for democracy in the same way as they have appeared in Western countries. 
 The Indian scholar Sudipta Kaviraj, in his paper 'An Outline of a Revisionist 
Theory of Modernity'
53
, argues against the assumption that a specific set of 
preconditions for the rise of democracy «that are known to have existed at the time of 
the rise of European democracy»
54
, would serve as standard «pre-conditions for all 
other subsequent cases»
55
. According to Kaviraj, such method cannot explain «the 
sheer existence of Indian democracy»
56
, since the rise of democracy in India has 
followed a different path.  
Drawing on a revisionist historical theory of modernity, the Indian scholar claims 
that, even in modern Europe, the conditions for the rise of democracy have not 
developed in the same way, but have followed peculiarly different paths in diverse 
countries: 
Although the impulses towards a capitalist economy, urbanisation, and political democracy 
are all general tendencies in the history of modern Europe, there are different configurations 
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of their complex figuration, and even differential trajectories within the history of European 
modernity.[...] Paths of German, Italian and Russian modernity, taken in this wider and more 
complex sense, diverged significantly from the earlier English and French trajectories, and 
led to an immense historical conflict in Europe about which of these could establish itself as 
dominant and ‘‘universal’’, until this contest was decided by the violence of the second 
world war
57
.  
As a consequence, Kaviraj argues that modernity should not be considered and used 
«as a general, ubiquitous condition that has an emergently homogeneous character 
everywhere», but rather it should be explained as «a historically contingent 
combination of its constituent elements which tend to produce different histories of 
the modern»
58
. Thanks to such understanding of modernity, Kaviraj also explains the 
rise of democracy in India and its specific features quite differently. While in India 
the procedural notion of democracy has been widely respected and firmly established, 
it has not however produced complete elimination of traditional and peculiar ways of 
considering and treating authority: 
Politicians might ascend to positions of power by punctiliously/unimpeachably electoral 
procedures, but those in their field of power might extend to them forms of reverence drawn 
from a traditional, princely repertoire; and they might draw upon these older repertoires 
themselves
59
.  
According to Kaviraj, dismissing such practices as illegal and clientelistic deviations 
would not constructively explain their widespread acceptance: 
This is not just a mistake of treating one kind of authority with the deference suited to 
another; actually, this is the characteristic historical process of the previous practice existing 
within the newer one as ‘‘memory’’, and substantially altering its operation60. 
In this sense, the Indian scholar describes such complex situation as a condition of 
hybridity in which «the older and newer practices might tend in the same direction, 
and become miscible»
61
, or, «in other cases, they might be more oppositional or 
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contradictory»
62
. Kaviraj also describes the production of hybrid responses to the 
establishment of democracy in India with the concept of translation. He points out 
that, as in literary translation what is produced as the end effect is generally 
acknowledged to be more a fusion of meanings, rather than a simply one-way writing 
of the meanings of a text into an entirely different passive language»
63
; in a similar 
way «the social effectiveness of the prior practices are never entirely neutralised by 
the reception of newways of doing things»
64
. 
 In their introduction to the book 'The Multiverse of Democracy'
65
, the two 
Indian scholars Sheth and Nandy disapprove the tendency to view third world 
societies «at the receiving end of the global system»
66
 without even considering the 
option of de-linking or opting out»
67
, so that «the best they can do is to 'adapt' to the 
system»
68
. In their view, third world societies,  
for different reasons - colonization, Westernization and modernization- have not been able to 
develop political institutions of democracy on the basis of their own political-cultural 
traditions. They are now pushed to choose - lock, stock and barrel- forms of democracy 
evolved elsewhere, and to make as clean a break as possible with their own pasts. In the 
process, they connect their present with the political vision of a future which is the present of 
the Western societies, which in turn seem to have lost a sense of the future
69
. 
However, the use of a liberal democratic procedure in India, according to them, has 
produced a big linguistic, economic and cultural gap between metropolitan areas and 
rural regions, so that, while the educated and powerful elite participate in the 
centralised government, the deprived working classes are marginalised and excluded 
from the democratic discourse
70
. Such divide, in India, has caused a decreased trust in 
political institutions and conflicts between a great multitude of minority groups which 
have arisen against the national hegemonic Hindutva movement and have struggled to 
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be politically recognised
71
. Sheth and Nandy thus argue that, in order to mitigate such 
conflicts, the concept of democracy should be expanded to include the instances of 
the great number of marginalised minority groups
72
. 
 In his 2005 'Rethinking Democracy'
73
, the Indian political theorist, Rajni 
Kothari, interprets such social conflicts of identity in India as a way to redefine the 
concept of liberal democracy. He thus claims that not only the local flourishing of 
new political groups outside traditional political parties, but also the constitution of 
other social volunteer and cultural movements has to be considered a development of 
participatory democracy: 
Implicit in these new movements is a conception of politics and the public arena that [...] is 
multidimensional. These struggles are no longer limited to economic or even political 
demands, but seek to cover ecological and cultural issues as well. They include  a sustained 
attack on sources of internal decay and degeneration
74
.   
Kothari links such struggle against decay to Gandhi's struggle for independence in the 
name of 'Swaraj', or self-rule, and he interprets such new claims to be addressed both 
to international external and domestic internal homogenising forces:  
A distinctive conception of democracy will have to encompasses the many facets and 
diversities of a complex social reality, without falling prey to the homogenising and 
oppressive thrust of the modern state, economy and technology
75
. 
 The influence of such and other official and unofficial movements and groups 
in India has also been examined by the Indian scholar Partha Chatterjee, who, in his 
2004 book 'The Politics of the Governed'
76
, observes that democracy, rather than 
being the «government of, by and for the people»
77
, is a government carried out by 
the claims of interest groups, and as such, it could be termed 'the politics of the 
governed'
78
. According to Chatterjee, such governmental shift is caused by a 
widespread conflicted aspect of modern democracy throughout the world, and refers 
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to «the opposition between the universal ideal of civic nationalism, [...], and the 
particular demands of cultural identity»
79
. The protection of minority rights thus 
entails «the differential treatment of particular groups on grounds of vulnerability or 
backwardness or historical injustice, or indeed for numerous other reasons»
80
. During 
the 1980s, in India, such politics of recognition has forced governments «to deliver 
certain benefits even to people who are not proper members of civil society or of the 
republican body of true citizens»
81
. This aspect, however, has prompted the 
constitution of groups of interest demanding for benefits based on specific group 
exception politics.  
Chatterjee considers such process as a «widening of the arena of political 
mobilization, prompted by electoral considerations and often only for electoral ends, 
from formally organized structures such as political parties»
82
. In this sense, political 
claims of recognition are transferred to other non-political groups, such as «religious 
assemblies or cultural festivals, or more curiously, even associations of cinema 
fans»
83
. As a consequence, one could witness «much discomfort and apprehension»
84
 
in progressive elite circles that share an ideal understanding of democracy as freedom 
and equality. Such circles complain about the fact that «politics has been taken over 
by mobs and criminals»
85
 and abandon their «mission of the modernizing state to 
change a backward society»
86
. On the other hand, however, because of the 
«compulsions of parliamentary democracy»
87
, 
what we see is the importation of the disorderly, corrupt, and irrational practices of 
unreformed popular culture into the very hallways and chambers of civic life, all because of 
the calculations of electoral expediency
88
. 
Chatterjee views such «set of paralegal arrangements»89 as a governing strategy, since 
they make it possible to grant «civic services and welfare benefits to population 
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groups whose very habitation or livelihood lies on the other side of legality»90. Such 
politically-oriented groups include «refugees, landless people, day laborers, 
homestead, below the poverty line»91, which create communities, capable of 
producing «a new, even if somewhat hesitant, rhetoric of political claims»92.  
In his more recent book 'Lineages of Political Society'
93
, Chatterjee identifies in such 
rhetoric one of the most significant and common characteristic of «survival strategies 
adopted in the last few decades by thousands of marginal groups»
94
. In this view, «the 
imaginative power of a traditional structure of community»
95
 has successfully been 
integrated in «the modern emancipatory rhetoric of autonomy and equal rights»
96
. 
Such growing relevance of the claims in the name of «autonomy and 
representation»
97
 is commonly exploited also by «other groups of population in other 
Asian, African and South American countries»
98
 and, according to the Indian scholar, 
makes such peculiar politics compatible with «a desire for democratization»
99
.  
 By the end of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s, similar reflections 
have been started within a group of Latin American scholars, also known as the Latin 
American Subaltern Group, and later grouped in the 
Modernity/Coloniality/Decoloniality Project. Inspired by the South Asian Subaltern 
Collective and by postcolonial scholars such as Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, and 
Homi Bhabha, the Latin American scholars aim at questioning the Eurocentered 
notions of modernity and rationality and to create a different epistemological basis for 
decolonisation.  
 The Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano introduces the concept of 'coloniality 
of power'
100
 to describe the specific model of power based on «the social 
classification of the world’s population around the idea of race»101. Such a «mental 
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construction»
102
 is the key aspect of the colonial domination and proves «to be more 
durable and stable than the colonialism in whose matrix it was established»
103
. The 
racial classification as «a way of granting legitimacy to the relations of domination 
imposed by the conquest»
104
 is closely interrelated with and also reinforced by «the 
division of labor»
105
.  
Another feature of the coloniality of power, contested by Quijano, is its indissoluble 
link with modernity and rationality: 
The Eurocentric pretension to be the exclusive producer and protagonist of modernity—
because of which all modernization of non-European populations, is, therefore, a 
Europeanization—is an ethnocentric pretension and, in the long run, provincial. However, if 
it is accepted that the concept of modernity refers solely to rationality, science, technology, 
and so on, the question that we would be posing to historical experience would not be 
different than the one proposed by European ethnocentrism
106
. 
In his view, one would have to demonstrate not only that modernity is 
exclusively a European product, but that such period also features irrational 
and non-scientific aspects and factors.  
The colonial, modern, capitalist model also controls a Eurocentered supportive mode 
of production of knowledge: «a perspective of knowledge»
107
 that «was made 
globally hegemonic, traveling the same course as the dominion of the European 
bourgeois class»
108
. In this view, Eurocentered knowledge does not include «all of the 
knowledge of history of all of Europe or Western Europe in particular»
109
, nor does it 
«refer to all the modes of knowledge of all Europeans and all epochs»
110
, but it rather 
favours only some specific notions of knowledge that have later colonised the rest of 
the world.  
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In Quijano's view, the Eurocentered coloniality of power also hinders the rise of 
democratic governance in Latin America, which is strongly connected to the creation 
of the nation-state: 
A modern nation-state involves the modern institutions of citizenship and political 
democracy, but only in the way in which citizenship can function as legal, civil, and political 
equality for socially unequal people. [...] This is the specific manner of homogenizing people 
in the modern nation-state
111
. 
According to the Peruvian sociologist, in modern Europe «a considerable process of 
democratization of society was the basic condition for the nationalization»
112
, that has 
been established without difficulty thanks to the presence of a homogeneous white 
race. In North America democracy has been successfully instituted, since the 
«conflict between whites and nonwhites was not [...] sufficiently powerful to impede 
the relative, although real and important, democratization of the control of the means 
of production and of the state»
113
. Quite differently, in Argentina, instead of a 
democratic governance, an oligarchic state has been created due to «the extreme 
concentration of land possession, particularly in lands taken from indigenous 
peoples»
114
 that have made it impossible to establish «any type of democratic social 
relations among the whites themselves»
115
. According to Quijano, in other Latin 
American countries the homogenisation of national societies has been obtained not 
through the establishment of «social and political relations, but by the exclusion of a 
significant part of the population, one that since the sixteenth century had been 
racially classified and marginalized from citizenship and democracy»
116
. In such 
conditions, in Latin America the rise of nation-states and democracy has been 
generally hindered and has followed an uncertain path. Quijano claims that even at 
present times the process of democratisation in Latin America follows colonial 
patterns, so that for democratisation to take place, it would be necessary to decolonise 
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«social, political, and cultural relations that maintain and reproduce racial social 
classification [...] against American Indians, blacks, and mestizos»
117
.  
 Drawing on Quijano's reflections on the coloniality of power, in his 2000 
work 'Local Histories/Global Designs'
118
, the Argentine semiotician Walter Mignolo 
asserts that, by controlling the modes of production of knowledge, European modern 
colonial powers have managed to marginalise and eliminate other forms of 
knowledge created by subaltern communities: 
Colonial modernities [...] a period expanding from the late fifteenth century to the current 
stage of globalization, has built a frame and a conception of knowledge based on the 
distinction between epistemology and hermeneutics and, by so doing, has subalternized other 
kinds of knowledge
119
. 
In his work, Mignolo attempts to demonstrate that such Eurocentric tendencies are 
being transformed by alternative modes of knowledge, «by looking at the emergence 
of new loci of enunciation»
120
. Mignolo describes as 'border gnosis' the places of 
subaltern reasons that tries to restore «the force and creativity of knowledges 
subalternized during a long process of colonization»
121
. 
In the Introduction to 'Globalization and the Decolonial Option', Mignolo states that 
«de-colonial options»
122
, after clearly establishing the imperial stance of «abstract 
universals»
123
, should open up  
as de-linking and negativity from the perspective of the spaces that have been silenced, 
repressed, demonized, devaluated by the triumphant chant of self-promoting modern 
epistemology, politics and economy and its internal dissensions (honest liberals, theologians 
of liberation, post-moderns and post-structuralists, Marxists of different brands)
124
. 
The basic assumptions for a de-colonial project thus include the fact that «'history' is 
not only linear, and that [...] there are several histories, all simultaneous histories, 
inter-connected by imperial and colonial powers, by imperial and colonial 
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differences»
125
. In this respect, Mignolo also argues for assuming a different point of 
view, 
a different type of thinking [...], a non-linear and chronological (but spatial) 
epistemological break; it requires border epistemology (e.g. epistemic disobedience), 
a non-capitalist political economy, and a pluri-national (that is non-mono-national) 
concept of the state
126
.  
Mignolo considers democracy, and especially market democracy, to be an integral 
part of the colonial discourse together with «Christianization, civilization, progress, 
development»
127
. Such «rhetoric of modernity»
128
 is exerted «through the imposition 
of ‘salvation’»129, progress, technology, and democracy, but, particularly for Latin 
American peoples, it goes «hand in hand with the logic and practice of oppression, 
racial discrimination, political concentration of power in the hand of a 
Creole/Mestizo/an elite»
130
. 
In other places and with different populations, however, such imposition can be 
disguised as humanitarian aids and support for peace-keeping, as in the case of Iraq: 
First you destroy a country, then you provide help and promote reconstruction, third you 
promote freedom and democracy, and four you crash Islamic thinkers who would like to 
reconstruct Iraq and write the constitution on the basis of sharia and the Q’uran and not on 
the bases of the democracy and the Bible
131
. 
By promoting the rhetoric of freedom and democracy as universal values, all other 
options for government are discarded for being contrary to such essential human 
prerogatives. Liberal democracy and modernisation are thus passed off as the best 
mix to solve the problems of all countries, irrespective of people's willingness to 
recognise their positive import:  
Under the spell of neo-liberalism and the magic of the media promoting it, modernity and 
modernization, together with democracy, are being sold as a package trip to the promised 
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land of happiness [...] Yet, when people do not buy the package willingly or have other ideas 
of how economy and society should be organized, they become subject to all kinds of direct 
and indirect violence132. 
In order to counter such impositions and violence, Mignolo advocates for a 
«decolonization of knowledge»
133
. Such epistemological shift would require, on the 
one hand, to uncover «the geo-political location of theology, secular philosophy and 
scientific reason»
134
, and, on the other, to stage and deploy «the modes and principles 
of knowledge that have been denied»
135
. 
From this perspective, justice and democracy do not have to be necessarily rejected 
on the whole for being colonial devices, but they could be redefined according to a 
different epistemology that has been silenced for a long time: 
The need for political and epistemic delinking here comes to the fore, as well as 
decolonializing and de-colonial knowledges, necessary steps for imagining and building 
democratic, just, and non-imperial/colonial societies.
136
  
 In a similar way, the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos also 
argues that the Eurocentric Western epistemology should not be completely 
dismissed, but rather rediscussed and used in a counter-hegemonic way. Santos thus 
proposes the construction of what he calls an 'epistemology of the South'137, which 
he defines as  
the retrieval of new processes of production and valorisation of valid knowledges, whether 
scientific or nonscientific, and of new relations among different types of knowledge on the 
basis of the practices of the classes and social groups that have suffered, in a systematic way, 
the oppression and discrimination caused by capitalism and colonialism
138
.  
Since the «understanding of the world is much broader than the Western 
understanding of the world»
139
, and given the fact that he considers diversity in the 
world to be indeterminate and indeterminable, the Portuguese sociologist views the 
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global South not just as a «geographical concept»
140
. Rather it also encompasses other 
kinds of diversities, apart from race, thus placing emphasis on «the human suffering 
caused by capitalism and colonialism at the global level»
141
. Considered as such, the 
definition of the global South also includes 
the global North, in the form of excluded, silenced and marginalised populations, such as 
undocumented immigrants, the unemployed, ethnic or religious minorities, and victims of 
sexism, homophobia and racism
142
. 
With regard to the method to be used to construct such new epistemology of the 
global South, he observes that one should be wary of using critical theory as it is, 
since it has lost its capacity to create and oppose traditional theory using counter-
hegemonic lexis. In his view, Western critical theory normally uses adjectives to 
qualify «the proper nouns of conventional theories»
143
: 
If conventional theory speaks of development, critical theory refers to alternative, democratic 
or sustainable development; if conventional theory speaks of democracy, critical theory 
propounds radical, participative or deliberative democracy; the same is true of 
cosmopolitism, which is then qualified as subaltern, of opposition or insurgent, or rooted; the 
same regarding human rights, which turn out to be radical, collective, intercultural
144
. 
Critical theory is thus allowed to «engage in debate but not to discuss the terms of the 
debate»
145
, because the traditional terms continue to «establish the intellectual and 
political horizon»
146
, by deciding «not only what is sayable, credible, legitimate or 
realistic, but also, by implication, what is unsayable, incredible or unrealistic»
147
. 
However, since such traditional concepts are not «the unalienable property of 
conventional or liberal thinking»
148
, what counter-hegemonic movements should be 
able to do, to effectively force non-Eurocentered meanings into hegemonic concepts 
and tool, is exactly to develop an awareness of how to use them without making them 
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sound too different, unacceptable, thus resulting in meaningless or marginal 
outcomes.  
Santos then proposes a four-step process for the construction of a new epistemology 
of the South: first, he argues for a 'sociology of absences', intended as «research that 
aims to show that what does not exist is actually actively produced as non-
existent»
149
. In this sense, there are supposed to be no impossible objects, but only 
non-authoritative, non-visible, «non-intelligible or discardable»
150
 ones. Secondly, the 
Portuguese sociologist envisages a 'sociology of emergences', that consists of a 
substitution of the emptiness of non-existent objects, by «a future of plural and 
concrete possibilities, utopian and realist at one time»
151
, that can be retrieved «in 
many different cultural and philosophical traditions»
152
. The third necessary step for 
the construction of a new epistemology of the South is 'the ecology of knowledges', 
founded on the idea that there is no absolute knowledge nor ignorance, but just 
relative ones, so that «every kind of ignorance ignores a certain kind of knowledge 
and every kind of knowledge triumphs over a particular kind of ignorance»
153
. The 
final stage for the construction of a new epistemology is that of 'intercultural 
translation', «a procedure that allows for mutual intelligibility among the experiences 
of the world, both available and possible»
154
. According to Santos, translation is an 
effective practice to treat experiences and cultures of the world as being at the same 
time totalities and parts, «realities that do not exhaust themselves in those totalities or 
parts»
155
. The Portuguese sociologist identifies in translation two different directions: 
First, a deconstructive challenge which consists in identifying the Eurocentric remains 
inherited from colonialism and present in the most diverse sectors of collective life, from 
education to politics, from law to culture. Second, a reconstructive challenge which consists 
in revitalising the historical and cultural possibility of [...] legacy, interrupted by colonialism 
and neo-colonialism
156
. 
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The work of translation, according to Santos should be initially prompted by the 
understanding that there are certain degrees of sameness between different cultures. 
He terms such attitude as ‘diatopical hermeneutics’ and defines it as an activity of 
«interpreting two or more cultures, aiming to identify isomorphic concerns among 
them and the different answers they provide»
157
:  
Diatopical hermeneutics stems from the idea that all cultures are incomplete and may, 
therefore, be enriched by engaging in dialogue with or confronting other cultures.[...] The 
idea and feeling of want and incompleteness create motivation for the work of translation 
which, in order to bear fruit, must be the crossing of converging motivations with origin in 
different cultures
158
. 
In the Introduction to the book 'Democratizing Democratization: Beyond the Liberal 
Democratic Canon'
159
, Santos proposes to redefine the concept of democracy in the 
light of the results of an international project, named 'Reinventing Social 
Emancipation'
160
. In such project, experimental practices have been implemented 
transnationally in a variety of fields, such as participatory democracy, alternative 
production systems, multiculturalism, justice and citizenship; biodiversity, 
intellectual property rights and new labor internationalism. More specifically, 
participatory democratic experiments have been carried out in a number of different 
countries of the global South, with the aim of expanding the traditional definition of 
liberal democracy.  
Based on the outcomes of such experiments, the sociologist proposes a number of 
theses to question «the hegemonic canon of liberal democracy»
161
, by «giving 
credibility to counter-hegemonic democratic concepts and practices»
162
. First of all, 
Santos and Avritzer assert that «the struggle for democracy is today above all a 
struggle for the democratization of democracy»
163
, in the sense that, since unequal 
power relations are impossible to be overcome, except for illusorily and 
conventionally constructed public spaces; democracy will always be an unattainable 
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objective. Secondly, the «peaceful or conflictive coexistence in a given social field of 
different models and practices of democracy»
164
 must be safeguarded and their 
capacity to provide alternative and enriching models should be protected from 
ethnocentric claims. Third, the traditional representative democracy should be 
generally considered as a «low intensity democracy»
165
, thus favouring narrow and 
«top-down relations between the state and the citizens»
166
. As a consequence, in 
accordance with the fourth thesis, in order to widen and democratise the concept of 
democracy, it is necessary to develop «new complementarities between participatory 
democracy and representative democracy»
167
. The fifth thesis envisages the 
strengthening of counter-hegemonic democratic processes as a result of increased 
«articulations between the local and the global»
168
, including communication and 
exchange between local practices and movements and national and transnational 
institutions. Finally, the concept of 'democratizing democracy' requires a «constant 
democratic vigilance» to avoid «perversion and co-optation»
169
 at any time. 
 The redefinition of the concept of liberal democracy in the twentieth century 
from the side of the Latin American decolonial school merges with the demands for 
an increased inclusion by the procedural deliberative political thought. With this 
regard, it is possible to identify some general trends in the contemporary notion of 
democracy, which could be considered to include both the influential model of 
deliberative and participatory democracy and the remarks of postcolonial critics.  
First of all, democracy is increasingly envisaged as an unattainable ideal of equality, 
which still everyone should struggle for. In this understanding, all the observations 
coming from different strands of thought examined so far tend to recognise or 
theorise the need for equality, or at least, the necessity of diminishing what are 
perceived to be inequalities. 
Second, it appears to be indisputable that democracy as an unreachable end could be 
better approached to by fostering the communicative skills and the shared background 
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knowledge of communities in order to establish as clearly and as predictably as 
possible what their common good should be.  
Lastly, to some differing extents, the various schools of thought presuppose that only 
by increasing communication and knowledge among the individuals in the 
communities is it possible to reach a shared understanding on what the common good 
should be. In such a general communicative approach to democracy, translation, 
intended as an intercultural process of communication carrying with it political 
consequences, is growingly becoming a key factor for the establishment of shared and 
meaningful cross-cultural political concepts. 
 In the next paragraph, such general and provisional conclusions will be 
compared to the way in which the concept of democracy has been conceived in the 
modern Arab political thought. By means of the following synthetic account,  the 
analysis of the case study, namely the translation of the 2012 Egyptian Constitution 
into English, will be inscribed not only in the broader transnational political 
discourses presented before, but in the more recent international political debate over 
democracy in the Arab world and ultimately in Egypt. 
 
3 . 2  D em o c ra c y  in  th e  A ra b  W o r ld  
 
 The modern notion of democracy is conventionally thought to have appeared 
in the Arab world in the first decades of the nineteenth century, inspired by the ideals 
of the French Revolution. However, far from being uniquely the result of European 
historical events, its development in the Arab world also depends on previous notions 
of ancient Greek democracy, and is as well strongly connected to the cultural, 
political and economic situation of the broader Ottoman Empire.  
In this large region, prompted by a long economic and political crisis, during the 
second half of the eighteenth century, a period of military, cultural and economic 
change started. The relations with French institutions began around the 1720s with 
the aim of transferring military and naval innovations to the Ottoman army. However, 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, with the steady growth of such contacts 
and the dismissal of the old Ottoman military system in 1826, a period of reforms 
called 'tanzimat' started.  
191 
 
Such cultural and economic exchanges were part of the political and strategic plans 
related, on the one hand, to the ongoing struggle between France and Great Britain to 
gain control over the Mediterranean, and, on the other, to the Ottoman need to seek 
alliance with European countries to secure control over the empire from both internal 
and European external pressures. In Egypt, after Napoleon Bonaparte's French 
invasion in 1798 and the British intervention to restore the Ottoman rule with the 
establishment of Khedive Muhammad 'Alī in 1805, such changes had been hastened 
by a relatively autonomous and stable government.  
During Muhammad 'Alī's rule, a modernization process in the military, economic, 
agricultural and cultural fields took place in line with the principles of the French 
Revolution and following the technical advancements of the Industrial Revolution. 
These innovations also initiated a period of cultural renaissance throughout the Arab 
world, called 'Al-Nahḍah', that started around the 1850s and lasted until the first 
decades of the twentieth century. 'Al-Nahḍah' prompted the innovation of literary 
canons, the spread of the printing press, the renovation of educational methods, and 
the renewal of Islamic political thought. In this period of reforms, there was a 
continuous cultural and military exchange between France and Egypt, with the 
Egyptian military being trained on European technological innovations.  
 In his 'زيراب صيخلت يف زيربلإا صيلخت' ['The Extraction of Gold, or an Overview of 
Paris']
170
, the Egyptian imam and translator Rifa'a Rafi' Al-Tahtawi gives an account 
of his travel to Paris to guide a student mission. During his stay in Paris he learns 
French and starts to translate into Arabic a variety of French writings. In his work, 
Al-Tahtawi comments on the principles and values of the 1814 French Constitution, 
asserting its «great power in establishing justice, in helping the wronged and 
satisfying the poor»
171
. He thus analyses each article trying to explain the 
consequences as civilizing forces, while encouraging «everyone to learn, so that all 
may be promoted to a higher position»
172
; or, for example, granting religious 
freedom, which has made it possible for the French population to increase and to 
progress «with the many foreigners who migrated to it»
173
. Another important 
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advancement is considered to stem from free speech and press, so that anyone could 
express his opinion and «say whatever occurs to him if it does not harm others»
174
. 
The social utility of free speech and press is also referred to fostering justice in the 
community, so that  
if a man does an outstanding deed, whether good or bad, it is reported in the paper, and made 
known to all people, high and low. Thus the doer of good deeds is encouraged and the doer 
of evil ones restrained
175
. 
With the aim of reconciling the principles of equality and freedom of the French 
revolution with the values of Islam, the Egyptian scholar initiates a process of 
comparison of French concepts into Arabic terms:  
What they hold dear and call liberty is what we call equity and justice, for to rule according 
to liberty means to establish equality through judgments and laws, so that the ruler cannot 
wrong anybody, the law being the reference and the guide
176
.  
In this sense, the principle of freedom seems to be a result of the acknowledgment of 
equality and justice, as only in being aware of the rules, explicitated by the 
Constitution, could one be free. However, far from believing in justice as a universal 
common good, Al-Tahtawi asserts that justice and rules change according to the 
context: 
In general, if justice exists in any country it must be considered as relative and not absolute, 
for absolute justice as well as perfect faith, complete purity, and similar things do not exist 
anywhere, nowadays
177
.  
In his later work, ' ُُدِشْرُملاُُِنيَنبلاوُِتاَنَبللُِنيَِملأا ', ['The Honest Guide for boys and girls']
178
, 
the Egyptian translator asserts that «those who perform their duties and receive their 
proper due from others, and persevere in so doing, are characterized by justice»
179
. In 
his view, however, justice should not be intended in the way philosophers do, but 
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rather in a more comprehensive manner, that includes natural and civil laws, but is 
not limited to them: 
Some philosophers perceived [justice] as the virtue of all virtues and the basis for human 
society, modernization, and civilization. [...] The noble hadith, the saying of [the Prophet], 
may peace and prayer be upon him, [states]: "None of you is a believer until you love for 
your brother what you love for yourself." This is the highest level of justice, and it is 
consistent with the wisdom of the philosophers and the laws of the Messengers prior to 
Islam. It is supported by shari'a and nature, although the support of natural laws should not 
be taken into consideration unless it is stipulated by the Legislator
180
. 
In this sense, while the laws of the sharīʿah  are already set and given as the basic 
justice, the natural laws should be issued by the Legislator in order to be accepted and 
applied. According to Al-Tahtawi, «the laws delivered by the prophets are the essence 
of true civilization to be considered and adopted»
181
, and the basic regulations of fiqh 
are completely compatible with natural laws of civilised countries. The basic 
difference is that, while in Islam love for the country is one of the elements of faith, 
since Islam is the homeland for every Muslim, for European nations patriotism is the 
highest good: 
Similar to the science we call the fundamentals of fiqh, they have the science of 'natural 
rights' or 'natural law' - rational regulations, stipulating good and bad, upon which they base 
their civil laws. What we call the branches of fiqh, they call civil rights or laws. What we call 
justice and benevolence, they call freedom and equality. The love of religion and the desire 
to protect it, whose adherence distinguishes the people of Islam from other nations in power 
and defense, they call love of country. But for us, the people of Islam, love of country is but 
one of the branches of faith, and the protection of religion is the core of all pillars. Every 
Islamic kingdom is a homeland for all those in it who belong to Islam. It combines religion 
and patriotism. [...] In the homeland all humankind is equal 
182
. 
Al-Tahtawi intends freedom as the «license for permissible action without an 
impermissible obstacle or a prohibited objection»
183
, so that «people may do as they 
please with themselves, their time, and their work [...] restrained only by the limits 
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prescribed by law or politics»
184
. However, he asserts that people could be free only 
when they abide by the law as «members of the community»
185
, since only by doing 
so they could participate in governmental decisions «as organs relate to the body»
186
, 
and feel free in belonging. In this sense, people who cannot «tell their kings what they 
saw as inconsistent, [...], or give their views on issues»
187
 feel «like foreigners in 
government affairs»
188
. 
In the same way, equality is defined as «a natural human quality, which makes each 
one equal in civil rights to another»
189
. Since people are the same, they should all 
have the same «civil and public freedoms»
190
 and «no one is preferred over others in 
terms of survival»
191
. However, Al-Tahtawi acknowledges also the illusory character 
of such equality, as «Divine providence has already privileged some over others». 
Equality is thus perceived to be related to accountability, in the sense that «equality in 
rights is associated with equality in obligations», so that people can rely on each 
other: «Equality means trusting all the people of the kingdom, without distinction, to 
perform their obligations toward each other»
192
. In Al-Tahtawi's understanding, such 
obligations are those of both natural laws and, ultimately, of sharīʿah : 
In any case, the legal and political obligations around which the world revolves are 
based upon rational and sound principles devoid of inhibitions and doubts, because 
shari'a and politics are based on a wisdom that we can perceive, through worship, a 
wisdom that is known to God the Sustainer, most exalted and glorified. We cannot 
depend on what the mind likes or detests, unless shari'a law has stipulated its 
rightness or distastefulness
193
. 
 In the same period, the prominent scholar and politician Khayr Al-Din Al-
Tunisi, in his 'كلامملاُلاوحأُةفرعمُيفُكلاسملاُموقأ', ['The Surest Path to Knowledge regarding 
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the Conditions of Countries']
194
, gathers «all possible information about European 
inventions related to economic and administrative policies»
195
. According to him, the 
economic and political innovations of other countries shall prove to be useful for the 
Islamic umma:  
If we consider the competition of nations in the field of civilization and the keen 
rivalry of ever the greatest among them to achieve what is most beneficial and 
helpful, it becomes clear that we can properly distinguish what is most suitable for us 
only by having knowledge of those outside our own group, and especially of those 
who surround us and live close to us
196
. 
The Tunisian politician argues that, in order for the Islamic umma to flourish again, it 
is possible to «choose what is suitable to our own circumstance which at the same 
time supports and is in accordance with our shari'»
197
. In this understanding he 
criticises those Muslims who think that «all behavior and organizations of non-
Muslims must be renounced»
198
, claiming that «there is no reason to reject or ignore 
something which is correct and demonstrable simply because it comes from 
others»
199
. He sets out to prompt the development of the Islamic umma «expanding 
the scope of the sciences and knowledge, smoothing the paths to wealth in agriculture 
and commerce, promoting all the industries, and eliminating the causes of 
idleness»
200
. Al-Din thus asserts that, in order to initiate such development «the basic 
requirement is good government»
201
 that in the European countries has created safe 
and favourable conditions for the growth of employment and skilled labour:  
As for political imperfections, the kingdom's need for others stands as an obstacle to its 
independence and a weakener of its vigor, especially when linked to the need for military 
necessities [...] There is no reason for all this except European technical progress resulting 
from tanzimat based on justice and liberty. [...] These [European, BQ] institutions are based 
on two pillars - justice and liberty- both of which are the sources in our own Holy Law. It is 
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well known that these two are the prerequisites for strength and soundness in all 
kingdoms
202
. 
Al-Din argues that, in order to avoid oppression and have justice, the authority of the 
rulers must be limited. The unrestricted rule of kings may bring both European and 
Islamic countries to lose their independence. However, while Christianity which is 
«built on retirement from the world and ascetism»
203
, is not prepared to counter such 
process, in Islamic countries, sharīʿah laws can be applied, «both to religious and 
secular matters»
204
. Moreover, sharīʿah laws include the duty of shūrā, the principle 
of consultation, which even the Prophet Muhammad was obliged to follow. 
According to Al-Din, 
without this type of resistance to authority, kingship would not be proper for mankind, 
because some form of restraint is essential for the maintenance of the human species, but if 
people exercising this restraint were left to do as they please and rule as they see fit, the fruits 
to be expected from this need to have a restrainer would not appear to the umma, and the 
original state of neglect would remain unheeded. It is essential that the restrainer should in 
turn have a restrainer to provide a check
205
. 
In order to maintain such resistance to authority, the European countries have 
constituted councils and free press, while for Islamic countries such restricting role 
should be played by the 'ʿulamāʾ' and by the notables of the umma. Such institutions 
both in European and in the Islamic umma have the same objective: «to demand an 
accounting from the state in order that its conduct may be upright, even if the roads to 
this end may differ»
206
.  
In order to safeguard this process, also the presence of guidelines in the form of laws 
should be ensured, so that a wise king, supported by a council, could apply them in a 
human and reasonable way:  
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Kingdoms administered without regular and well-observed laws under the supervision of 
those qualified to loosen and bind will be limited in their best and their worst to the person of 
the king. The extent of success will depend on his ability and probity
207
. 
Without such conditions in place, according to Al-Din, the government would rest 
only on the king's integrity, and could turn into tyranny in case the ruler is corrupted. 
Thus justice appears to stem from a good compromise between the liberties of the 
rulers, the counsellors and the ruled. 
Liberty is considered the «basis for the great development of knowledge and 
civilization in European kingdoms» in two different senses: 'personal liberty' ensures 
that the individual has «complete freedom of action over one's self and property, and 
the protection of one's person, honor, and wealth», so that everyone is equal before 
the law and «no individuals need fear encroachment upon their person nor any of 
their other rights». The second liberty is political and demands that people 
«participate in the politics of the kingdom and [...] discuss the best course of 
action»
208
.  
However, to avoid confusion and «divergence of views», «the people[...] elect from 
among those possessing knowledge and virtue a group called by the Europeans the 
Chamber of General Deputies»
209
. Al-Din identifies in the 'ʿulamāʾ' and notables of 
Islam a similar group, however he observes that, in Islamic umma, such group is not 
elected, because in sharīʿah avoiding the evil is a responsibility that can be assigned 
only to some members: 
The avoidance of the reprehensible in our shari' is in the category of those responsibilities 
which can be delegated. If some members of the community assume the responsibility, then 
the obligation is removed from the rest of the community. When such a group is so 
designated, this responsibility becomes a strictly prescribed obligation upon them
210
. 
To repay the country and the ruler for such granting of liberty, the ruled has the duty 
to work «to bring about its possible consequences and benefits»
211
. In such view, 
development and knowledge stem from the very fact of giving liberties to the 
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individuals who concern «themselves with the various branches of knowledge and all 
kinds of industries [...]: agriculture, commerce, physical work, and intellectual 
activity»
212
.  
 After a period of enthusiastic calls for modernization, in the 1870s the attitude 
toward foreign powers gradually starts to change. In an attempt to reunite the 
Ottoman Empire in line with European modernization, in 1876 the Young Ottomans 
elite issues a Constitution and elects the first Chamber of Deputies. Such political 
reforms are countered not only by mainly Muslim religious and conservative groups, 
but also by the European countries which do not deem the empire ready to support 
those radical transformations. In Egypt, after Muhammad 'Alī's rule, a large amount 
of debts with European banks causes national financial institutions to be controlled by 
British and French representatives. During the 1870s and 1880s Egyptians show 
strong signs of discontent that in 1879 brings to a military mutiny and revolt led by 
Colonel Ahmad 'Urabi. Such revolt ends with the French and British occupation of 
Egypt in 1882, and the establishment of the British protectorate in the country. The 
occupation of Egypt together with the French invasion of Tunis in 1881 ensues a 
heated debate throughout the Ottoman Empire over which aspects of modernization 
should be accepted, and which are rather unacceptable.  
 Among the modernist thinkers, the Islamic scholar Jamal al-Din al-Afghani 
plays a key role in defending the possibility to reconcile Islam and science. In a 
lecture given at Sorbonne University in 1883, the philosopher Ernest Renan argues 
that Islam is in its essence contrary to science, and that, because of their barbarian 
nature, Arab people are unable to think philosophically. In his response to the 
philosopher
213
, Al-Afghani claims that, even if at the time of speaking Islam is 
responsible for holding Muslims from advancing in sciences, it has to be recognised 
that «no nation at its origin is capable of letting itself be guided by pure reason»
214
, 
and that, since it is not able to detach itself from its fears, it could not «be led either 
by force or persuasion to practice the actions that would perhaps be the most 
profitable for it, or to avoid what is harmful»
215
.  
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According to the Afghan scholar, even if it is impossible to deny the backwardness of 
Islam and Muslim society, it is in any case «by this religious education, whether it be 
Muslim, Christian, or pagan, that all nations have emerged from barbarism and 
marched toward a more advanced civilization»
216
. Moreover, even if that is the case 
at the time of writing, it should not be concluded that Islam and Muslim people could 
never change their attitude toward science. In fact, he argues, Islam is not the first 
religion to try to hinder philosophical and scientific advancements, since «a similar 
attempt [...] was made by the Christian religion, and the venerated leaders of the 
Catholic church have not yet disarmed»
217
.  
Furthermore, Al-Afghani justifies the opinions of Muslim people for holding on to 
religious beliefs: 
I know all the difficulties that the Muslims will have to surmount to achieve the same degree 
of civilization, access to the truth with the help of philosophic and scientific methods being 
forbidden to them. A true believer must, in fact, turn from the path of studies that have for 
their object scientific truth, studies on which all truth must depend, according to an opinion 
accepted at least by some in Europe. [...] Convinced, besides, that his religion contains in 
itself all morality and all sciences, he attaches himself resolutely to it and makes no effort to 
go beyond.
218
 
Al-Afghani also asserts that even if the Arabs were barbarian and irrational in their 
conquering other countries during the seventh century, they have however marked 
their «passage in the world, not only by fire and blood, but by brilliant and fruitful 
achievements that prove its [Arab race's, BQ] taste for science, for all the sciences, 
including philosophy»
219
. In this sense, it should be recognised that it has been 
through Arabic translation that Greek philosophy has been disseminated throughout 
Europe: 
The Arabs, ignorant and barbaric as they were in origin, took up what had been abandoned 
by the civilized nations, rekindled the extinguished sciences, developed them and gave them 
a brilliance they had never had.
220
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 Inspired by the thought of his master Al-Afghani, the Egyptian Islamic scholar 
Muhammad 'Abduh asserts the need for legal reforms in order to modernise Egypt. In 
his 1881 work '  امملااُ لاوحاُ فلاتخابُ نيناوقلاُ فلاتخ ', ['Laws Should Change in Accordance 
with the Conditions of Nations']
221
, 'Abduh calls for a renovation and simplification 
of the Egyptian rules, claiming that «the time has come for our government to turn its 
consideration to the laws of our courts, to make them appropriate for present 
conditions, choosing laws that are not difficult to understand»
222
. More specifically, 
the Egyptian scholar argues that since «laws vary in accordance with nations' varying 
levels of knowledge, or the lack thereof»
223
, it is not possible «to apply the law of one 
group of people to another group who differ from and surpass the first in level of 
understanding»
224
.  Such law would prove to be unacceptable for the latter group 
because it would not reflect its way of thinking, its understanding, traditions and 
customs. Failure to legislate according to the nature and the level of knowledge of a 
nation would thus inevitably lead to abuse the laws, misinterpret them and, 
ultimately, not abide by them, because of ignorance on «what these laws were 
intended to accomplish, what motivated them, and what made them necessary»
225
. On 
the contrary, people would follow the rules if they originated from their actual needs 
and values, so that such factors would serve as the real legislator: 
Scholars and political leaders of both ancient and modern times have long recognized that 
legislators and institutors of laws must always take into account customs and traditional 
habits in order to establish laws in a just and beneficial manner. Indeed, the conditions of 
nations are themselves the true legislator, the wise, regulating guide. The governing power is 
actually dependent on the capacities of its subjects; the former does not take a single step 
unless induced to do so by the latter
226
. 
In his view, thus, natural rules and regulations come to reflect the capacity that 
members of a nation acquire during their life, «including their familiar practices and 
the customs on which they have been raised»
227
. 
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In another later work, 'ديحوتلاُ ةلاسر', ['The Theology of Unity']
228
, 'Abduh aims at 
demonstrating that reason plays a key role in understanding sharīʿah and Islam. In 
order to revive the traditional decaying religious customs and prompt modernization, 
the Egyptian scholar holds that before Islam, «every people custodians of religion [...] 
had [...] little recourse to rational judgement in their custody of belief»
229
 and hardly 
ever applied scientific reasoning to their religious beliefs. As a result, there is «an 
almost total contrast between the intellectual cut and thrust of science and the forms 
of religious persuasion and assurance of heart»
230
, so that religion is considered as an 
enemy to reason. However, he argues that, with the advent of Islam and the Qur'ān, 
all that is allowed, required or forbidden by God has been explained with reasons and 
argument, thus appealing to the rational and intelligent mind of the believers. In this 
sense, «for the first time in a revealed Scripture, reason finds its brotherly place»
231
, 
because 
saving those who give place to neither reason nor faith, all Muslims are of one mind in the 
conviction that there are many things in religion which can only be believed by the way of 
reason [...], all Muslims are of one mind that though there may be in religion that which 
transcends the understanding, there is nothing which reason finds impossible
232
. 
'Abduh also claims that even if at present times there is «a complete intellectual 
confusion, [...] fostered by the general educational poverty»
233
, that leads men to 
assert false obscurantist beliefs; in the past Islam and philosophy were compatible and 
Muslim philosophers had 
full liberty of action to enjoy and give rein to their intellectual interests, the pursuit of crafts 
and the strengthening of the social order through the disclosure of the secrets hidden in the 
universe - all in accordance with the divine mandate for such exploration by thought and 
mind
234
.  
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In this view, Islam should be considered as a religion «built squarely on reason, while 
divine revelation is its surest pillar»
235
, and any other irrational claims should be 
viewed «as contentious and inspired by Satan or political passions»
236
. 
 During the early twentieth century, the general condition of distrust of foreign 
powers gradually increases, so that nationalist groups seek independence both in 
Egypt and in the Ottoman Empire. In 1908, the Young Turk Revolution aims at 
restoring the previously abolished 1876 Constitution, establishing a constitutional 
monarchy; while, in 1922, the War of Independence brings to the settlement of the 
Republic of Turkey. In Egypt, after World War I, such wariness in foreign powers is 
channelled into a revolution led by Sa'ad Zaghloul, the leader of the newly 
established nationalist liberal 'Wafd Party', that after the abolishment of the British 
protectorate in 1922, issues an Egyptian Constitution in 1923. Thanks to such 
Constitution, Egypt's form of government becomes a parliamentary constitutional 
monarchy and the Wafd Party manages to be in power until the 1950s. 
 During this time, the debate over modernization continues to kindle modern 
political thought and mainly regards the extent to which such transformations could 
rightfully change the Arab world. On the one hand, Islam is considered a backward 
religion that hinders renovation and should thus be abandoned; while, on the other, 
modernization is held to be, to varying degrees, compatible with Islam, and even to 
be impossible without its basic principles. As an example, in 1902-1903 there is a 
heated debate over the need for secularisation, that takes place between the Syrian 
Christian scholar Farah Antun, who argues for secularisation, and Muhammad 
'Abduh, who instead defends the basic principles of Islam.  
 In later years, 'Abduh's disciple and Antun's country fellow Muhammad 
Rashid Rida develops on the ideas of modernization, criticizing the sterile taqlid, or 
imitation of the regulations provided by the traditional religious texts. On the other 
hand, however, he is also suspicious of indiscriminate emulation of European 
fashions and political thought that have lead to secularism and subordination of Islam 
to modernization. In his 1932 speech ' انودِِّدجملاوُدُّدجتلاوُديدجتل ', ['Renewal, Renewing, and 
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Renewers']
237
, he disapproves of the chaotic political and cultural situation created by 
modernization and the consequent loss of values, pure language and religious 
traditions that is taking place due to Westernization: 
All of our historical origins, the true religion, our blossoming civilization, and great empire, 
we have worn out and depreciated, even abandoned and forgotten. In our attempts to acquire 
the novel and borrow the modern we have only clung to the fringes and have never been able 
to reproduce it fully. What we have of the old and the modern is a shell of imitation, like the 
shell of an almond or a walnut that lies under the outer wooden layer; it is useless in itself 
and cannot preserve the core
238
. 
According to Rida, modernization has come to a point in which renewal is not 
anymore a fruitful compromise between past traditions and innovations, but rather a 
mere reproduction of meaningless Western customs. In order to counter this process 
of devaluation, Rida proposes a new concept of renewal: 
Renewing is a law of social association; renewal is part of nature and habit. It is 
counterweighted by the preservation of the old. Each has its place. There is no contradiction 
or opposition between them, provided that each is put in its place with no neglect and 
excess
239
.  
Even though people «at all times need both the old and the new»
240
, and beneficial 
consequences or damage could stem from either of the two, it would be childish to 
completely abandon the old in favour of the new. In this sense, only rational and 
independent people choose not to abandon the old «in accordance with the rule of 
logic»
241
, unless such innovation were useful «either in itself or for something outside 
it, such as the economy, appropriateness, patriotism, and nationalism»
242
. 
Rida also criticises the attitude of false renewers who contempt Islam so much that 
they urge Muslim people «to abandon our religion and our entire shari'a», arguing 
that, since they accept that sharīʿah is abandoned in some penal or financial cases, 
Muslims «must abandon all the rest of God's regulations regarding personal status 
code, inheritance, marriage, and divorce. There is no difference [...] between the two 
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types of regulations»
243
. While strongly rejecting such possibility, Rida argues for 
«the return to the simplicity and guidance of religion as it was in the beginning; to 
reunify the Muslims around their commonality, prior to disunity and discord»
244
. In 
such an understanding, when sharīʿah laws do not explicitly provide regulations on 
certain matters, recourse to individual ijtihād  can be justified, whereas in all other 
cases taqlid, or imitation, should be accepted thus avoiding «divisive extremism that 
turns the nation into factions and mutually hostile groups»
245
. In short, 
legitimate renewal includes all that the umma and the state hold dear, such as the sciences, 
arts, and industries; financial, administrative, and military systems; land, naval, and air 
installations. All these are considered a collective duty in Islam, and the entire umma sins 
when it neglects them. The shari‘a does not restrict the umma in pursuing them. The only 
restrictions are to avoid inflicting or generating harm and transgression [...], to observe the 
[jurisprudential] principle according to which “Necessity permits the impermissible,” to 
assess the extent of this necessity, and to follow truth and justice
246
. 
 During this period the conflicts between liberal Western countries and 
socialist communist Eastern ones influences the Arab world, which is still controlled 
by European foreign powers. The intellectual debate still focuses on the possibility to 
reach full modernization, through secularisation, also following the Turkish Kemalist 
trends in the 1920s. Throughout the Arab world, communist and socialist views 
purport anti-imperialistic claims and secular solutions to counter religious 
backwardness. During the 1940s and 1950s, such ideas prompt the constitution of a 
variety of national and transnational socialist parties in Syria, Iraq and Egypt. On the 
other hand, Islamic reformist thought establishes itself as an alternative to both 
secularism and imperialism, trying to counter the loss of values and vision.  
In Egypt, the dissatisfaction with the de facto continuation of the British economic 
and political control, supported by the ruler Faruq I, and the lack of parliamentary 
authority of the liberal Wafd Party exacerbate criticisms against false modernization. 
In 1928, the imam and teacher Hasan Al-Banna, inspired by the political thought of 
Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida, constitutes the ' ةعامج نيملسملاُناوخلإا ‎' ['Society of 
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the Muslim Brothers']. Al-Banna aims at reforming society starting from the revival 
of the principles of Islam and sets out to counter Western modernization that has led 
to neglect traditional Muslim customs in favour of Western dissolute fashions. In his 
risāla ' ُرونلاُوحن '  ['Toward the Light']247, the Egyptian imam asserts that Islam contains 
in itself all the possible general and theoretical fundamentals as well as a detailed 
description of the best way of living and that in that sense it is the most complete 
guide for a good life: 
The Islamic system with respect to the individual, the nation, the family, the relationship 
between the government and its people and its relationship with other nations has managed 
to bring together that which is all encompassing and general with that which is very precise 
and elaborate and has chosen the common good as well as giving it clarity. The Islamic 
system is the most perfect and most beneficial system known to mankind. This is supported 
by history and painstaking research in every aspect of national life
248
. 
In this sense, the Islamic system should never be abandoned, but rather reacquired in 
a more authentic way, and one should not be afraid of a possible disengagement of 
foreign powers with the Egyptian nation because such choice would «disturb our 
political relations with them», since «those nations which are suspicious of us will not 
be content with us whether we follow Islam or not»:  
If they are truly our friends, and mutual trust exists between us, their own spokesmen and 
politicians have already declared that every nation is free to adopt whatever path it wishes 
within its own borders, provided it does not infringe on the rights of others. It is up to all the 
leaders of these nations to understand that the status of international Islam is the most sacred 
status known to history, and that it has laid down the most firm and solid principles to guard 
and preserve this status
249
. 
Furthermore, Al-Banna claims that abandoning Islam, subsequent secularism might 
have worked for Western countries to modernize, but that such method could not be 
considered as universal, since Islam is different from other religions: 
Among the causes which have impelled some of the Eastern Nations to deviate from Islam, 
and to choose to imitate the West, was the study of the Western Renaissance made by their 
leaders, and their conviction that it was only accomplished by overthrowing religion, 
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destroying churches, freeing themselves from papal authority, controlling the clergy and 
prelates, putting an end to all manifestations of religious authority in the nation, and a 
definite separation of religion from the general policy of the state. If this is true in the case of 
the Western nations, it can never be the case for the Islamic nations, since the nature of 
Islamic teaching is quite unlike that of any other religion. The jurisdiction of the religious 
authorities in Islam is defined and limited. They are powerless to alter its statutes or to 
subvert its institutions, such that the fundamental principles of Islam, across the centuries, 
have kept pace with time, and have advocated progress, supported learning, and defended 
scholars
250
. 
According to Al-Banna, «you cannot say that what happened in the West will also 
happen to Islam», because «the Men of Religion and Religion are not One and the 
Same». He also advances that, if the reason for adopting secularism should be the 
hostile attitude of Muslim religious authorities towards modernization and nationalist 
revival, such hostility should rather be considered «a flaw within the religious 
establishment itself»
251
 with its choosing «selfish interests and worldly ambitions 
over the welfare of the country and the nation», and not an aversion of Islam as such 
toward what is good for Muslim people. Al-Banna also observes that the influence of 
Western terminology in the field of political thought has already affected the way of 
thinking of Eastern peoples, since some expressions used to describe the Western 
religious institutions are not applicable to Islam: 
Is it not more productive for a nation to reform its religious authorities and to reconcile with 
them, rather than adopt an oppressive attitude towards them? Even if these expressions 
which have crept into our language by way of imitation, like ‘religious authorities’, are not in 
accord with our own usage, since this usage is peculiar to the West, in the sense of ‘clergy’. 
According to the Islamic usage, it includes every Muslim, for all Muslims from the least to 
the most outstanding of them, are ‘religious authorities’252. 
In the risāla 'ملاسالإاُيفُملاسلا', ['Peace in Islam']253, while recognising the positive import 
of democracy that has carried freedom and empowerment of the people, Al-Banna 
also argues that thinking such system as an ideal has brought, on the one hand, to the 
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chaos of the two World Wars, and on the other, to the dissolution of the values of 
family and society:  
The democratic system led the world for a while, encouraging many intellectuals as well as 
the masses to think of it as the ideal system. Nobody can ignore the freedom it has secured 
for peoples and nations alike, and the justice it has introduced to the human mind in allowing 
it to think freely, and to the human being as a whole in allowing him the freedom to fulfil 
himself; and, apparently, giving power to the people. Indeed, international relations after the 
First World War came as a proof of the legitimacy of these ideas and most of the world 
turned towards them wholeheartedly. However, it was not long before people realized that 
individuality and unlimited liberty can lead to chaos and many other short-comings, which 
ultimately led to the fragmentation of the social structure and family systems, and the 
eventual re-emergence of totalitarianism
254
. 
After World War II, according to Al-Banna, the weaknesses of the democratic system 
have become evident since «the inspiration and aspirations of the people were 
shattered and the system of democracy did not lead to the empowerment of the people 
but to the establishment of chosen tyrants»
255
. In his view, the values of freedom and 
equality purported by democratic systems are already present in Islam, and constitute 
part of the everyday life of a good Muslim: 
I once said, humorously, to an audience, "This prayer that we offer five times a day is 
nothing more than a daily exercise on a practical social system which contains the best of 
communism and democracy." In total surprise they asked: "How can that be?" I said that the 
best that the communist system has to offer is its promotion of equality, its attack on social 
classes, and its war on pride in private ownership upon which class is based. All these 
elements are present and completely felt by a Muslim when he enters the mosque. For when 
he first enters the mosque he knows that this holy place belongs to Allah, and Allah alone; 
and that there is no difference between one who finds shelter in it and one who only passes 
through. In it there is no young or old, no lord or slave and no discrimination nor 
classification
256
. 
This notion of equality also entails the right of any Muslim to limit the power of 
imams: «The Imam does not act as he pleases», and whenever he does not behave in 
the right way, he should be corrected by «the young boy, the old man and the women 
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who prays behind him to correct his short-comings». The Imam, on his part, is 
obliged «to bow down to the truth, and correct his mistake in the light of their 
instructions». In this sense, in Al-Banna's view «there is nothing in democracy that is 
better than [...] [such, BQ] virtues»
257
, since no other man-made system could blend 
as completely as possible those virtues of freedom and equality as Islam. 
 The Society of the Muslim Brothers knows changing fortunes throughout the 
twentieth century. During the 1930s and 1940s, its influence grows considerably in 
the Arab world, with the number of local branches rapidly increasing and a gradual 
internal institutionalisation taking place. From a small association whose main 
objective is to favour social welfare through grassroots Islamic reformation, it 
becomes a large and widely disseminated cultural and political institution, supporting 
British anti-imperialistic policies; intensively using espionage and sabotage in support 
of German Nazi politics, and later countering the constitution of the State of Israel in 
Palestine. After its official dismantlement in 1948 following the assassination of the 
Egyptian prime minister by one of its members and the killing of its founder in 1949, 
the Society of the Muslim Brothers participates in the 1952 revolution and initially 
supports the Free Officer Movement that successfully overthrows King Farouq I.  
 In his work, 'ةروثلاُ ةفسلف' ['The Philosophy of Revolution']
258
, Gamal 'Abd Al-
Nasser narrates the events of the 1952 Egyptian revolution and reflects on a variety of 
aspects. He argues that  
every nation on earth undergoes two revolutions: One political, in which it recovers its right 
of self government from an imposed despot or an army of aggression occupying its territory 
without its consent. The second revolution is social, in which the classes of society struggle 
against each other until justice for all citizens has been gained and conditions have become 
stable
259
. 
According to Nasser, for the political revolution to occur, unity and mutual support, 
«as well as self-denial for the sake of the country as a whole»
260
 are necessary, while 
social revolution takes longer and difficult struggles to happen. Social revolution can 
be established only after a period of time in which «values are shaken and creeds are 
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relaxed; fellow-countrymen struggle against each other, as individuals and classes. 
Corruption, suspicion, hatred and selfishness dominate them»
261
: 
We now live in two revolutions: one demanding that we should unite together, love one 
another and strain every nerve to reach our goal; the other forcing us,, in spite of ourselves, 
to disperse and give way to hatred, everyone thinking only of himself. This is exactly what 
happened to our society.  
While in Europe political and social revolutions have happened «in an orderly 
manner» and «the stages of this evolution systematically succeeded one another»
262
, 
in Egypt, the colonial control and modernization have invaded the country all of a 
sudden thus making it very difficult for the Egyptian society to assimilate such 
changes: 
European countries eyed us covetously and regarded us as a short cut to their colonies in the 
East and the South. Torrents of ideas and opinions burst upon us, which we, at that stage of 
our evolution, were incapable of assimilating
263
.  
In Nasser's view, the new Egyptian society has not settled yet and is «still boiling 
over and restless» in order one day to «continue its gradual evolution parallel with 
other nations which preceded it along the road»
264
. 
Nasser also admits the need for consulting with «several leaders of public opinion of 
various classes and creeds»
265
 to safeguard political change through the design of the 
Egyptian Constitution and the creation of national institutions for promoting 
production. Such developments in the whole Africa, however, are countered by the 
European colonialist powers that he intends to resist: 
 The white man, representing several European countries, is trying again to repartition the 
continent. We cannot stand aside in face of what is taking place in Africa on the assumption 
that it does not concern or affect us
266
. 
In order to enact change and make it well established in Egypt, according to Nasser, a 
third stage of development is necessary that refers to «the circle of our brethren in 
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faith». He thus advances that the pilgrimage to Makka, one of the pillars of Islam, has 
to be considered differently, not only should it be «a simple effort to buy indulgences 
after an eventful life», but it should rather be «a great political power». In this sense, 
he means to seek social and political agreement with other Muslim countries to 
counter the Western political and economic interference. According to Nasser, the 
hajj would have to become 
a regular political congress wherein the leaders of Moslem states, their public men, their 
pioneers in every field of knowledge, their writers, their leading industrialists, merchants and 
youth meet to draw up in this universal Islamic Parliament the main lines of policy for their 
countries and their cooperation together until they meet again. They should meet reverently, 
strong, free from greed but active, submissive to the Lord but powerful against their 
difficulties and their enemies, dreaming of a new life, firm believers that they have a place 
under the sun which they should occupy for life
267
. 
Only in this way it would be possible to unite in one faith millions of people, whose 
«tremendous potentialities» for international cooperation would «not deprive them of 
their loyalty to their countries but which guarantees for them and their brethren a 
limitless power»
268
. 
At the time of his ascent, Nasser starts a program of agricultural reform and 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal that leads to strong conflicts with European foreign 
powers and Israel. At the international level, in order to counter foreign intervention, 
he seeks alliance with other Arab countries in the name of pan-Arab alliance, but 
discarding the option for religious unity.  
 In 1958 pan-Arabism is realised through the creation of the United Arab 
Republic with Syria, guided by Michel Aflaq's Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party in an 
attempt to defend Arab countries from foreign pressures during the Cold War. During 
this period, anti-imperialist policies merge socialist and secular political thought 
throughout the Arab world. Arab socialist movements of that time, however, 
generally support single-party government, and they do not consider the possibility of 
multi-party competitive elections. Socialist thinkers of the time, such as Zaki Al-
Arsuzi and Michel Aflaq, consider freedom as a general value compatible with the 
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national society, and rather claim for a 'social democracy' that does not include liberal 
politics and capitalist economics. 
The socialist Syrian philosopher Michel Aflaq claims that «a constitutional 
democracy, which is not accompanied by socialist legislation» is meaningless and 
dangerous in that it could be used by «the rich and proprietors so that they may 
continue their exploitation of the peoples». On the other hand, however, dictatorship 
is also a dangerous form of government, because even if it was addressed at the 
common good of the people, it would be a «precarious system, unsuitable and self-
contradictory». This is because «it does not allow the consciousness of the people to 
grow and safeguard such reforms by their conviction and their fight»
269
.  
Aflaq argues for a redefinition of the concept of democracy and liberty that should 
not be «confused with that kind of sham liberty behind which the reactionaries hide 
together with the exploiters of the people and the collaborators with imperialism». He 
rather encourages a more practical conception of democracy, by questioning  
this empty and nebulous conception of theoretical liberty which does not differentiate 
between the people and their enemies, between the citizens of the homeland and the 
colonizers of the homeland, between those who believe in this liberty and those who take 
advantage of it for their interests while they are its archenemies
270
.  
According to Aflaq, such conception is a «bourgeois and spineless understanding of 
liberty and democracy» directed against «the exploitation of feudalists, capitalists, 
profiteers and opportunists of all brands», who try to penetrate national press and 
government in order to control and inculcate a superficial notion of freedom: 
Our view of liberty should always be a sound one. It is a new and strict liberty, which does 
not allow leaving matters unchecked. It is not negative, allowing corruption to take its course 
and let disorder grow but it is a positive and creative liberty. It is a liberty which stands 
against pressure, confusion and the plot against our national existence by our internal and 
external enemies, so that conditions remain healthy and conducive to the flowering and 
growth of this existence
271
.  
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The anti-imperialist democratic view supported by Arab socialist thinkers, inspired by 
the 1952 Egyptian revolution and by Nasser's socialist rule until 1970, is met with 
considerable approval in the Arab world, but does not actually result in a competitive 
electoral democracy. After the Arab defeat in the Six-Day War against Israel, 
Nasser's government starts to change, initiating a period of cautious liberalisation.  
 During his government, however, Nasser is deeply criticised for his 
authoritarian rule that gradually leads to eliminate all opponents in blunt and resolute 
ways. One such movement is the Society of the Muslim Brothers which, with the 
establishment of Nasser as the president of the newly enacted constitutional republic 
in 1956, after an initial period of cooperation, is abolished and has many of its 
members imprisoned following the accusation of attempting on Nasser's life. The 
Islamic claims of the Muslim Brothers to reform society are soon considered 
incompatible with Nasser's secular and nationalist views and are not taken into 
account during the following period of social reforms.  
However, during the 1950s and 1960s, the Islamic political thought of the Muslim 
Brothers' leader Sayyid Qutb, arrested, tortured and imprisoned from 1954 to 1965 
during Nasser's rule, and finally sentenced to death in 1966, exerts a considerable 
influence both in Egypt and in other Islamic countries.  
In his book, 'قيرطلاُ يفُ ملاعم', ['Milestones']
272
, Qutb claims for a religious revival 
arguing that, even in the West, democracy has «become infertile to such an extent that 
it is borrowing from the systems of the Eastern bloc». According to the Egyptian 
scholar, liberal capitalist democracies in the West, in order to survive, are forced to 
integrate, «especially in the economic system», provisions to protect social justice. At 
the same time, also socialist political systems in the Eastern bloc mainly inspired by 
Marxist communist social theories have initially «attracted not only a large number of 
people from the East but also from the West, as it was a way of life based on a 
creed». Qutb asserts that even if Marxist theories have initially managed to inspire a 
number of people because it purports community values of equality and social justice, 
«on the whole this theory conflicts with man's nature and its needs»: 
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This ideology prospers only in a degenerate society or in a society, which has become cowed 
as a result of some form of prolonged dictatorship. But now, even under these circumstances, 
its materialistic economic system is failing, although this was the only foundation on which 
its structure was based. [...] The main reason for this is the failure of the system of collective 
farming, or, one can say, the failure of a system, which is against human nature
273
. 
In Qutb's view, the economic materialistic system is not suitable for any human 
being, because it intimidates and oppresses people with dictatorship and tyrannical 
power of equality. In the same way, Qutb criticises liberal and modernist thinkers 
who try to propose a blended political system, such as 'Islamic Democracy' or 'Islamic 
Socialism' for not being able to completely do away with the corrupt and depraved 
Western social, political and economic system. Rather they try to reach a 
compromise, in finding conceptual similarities between Islamic and Western political 
institutions, thus deceiving people: 
Islam looked at them [the people, BQ] from a height, as this is its true position, and 
addressed them with extreme love and kindness, as this is its true temperament, and 
explained everything to them with complete clarity, without any ambiguity, as this is its 
method. It never said to them that it would not touch their way of living, their modes, their 
concepts and their values except perhaps slightly; it did not propose similarities with their 
system or manners to please them, as some do today when they present Islam to the people 
under the names of 'Islamic Democracy' or 'Islamic Socialism', or sometimes by saying that 
the current economic or political or legal systems in the world need not be changed except a 
little to be acceptable Islamically. The purpose of all this rationalization is to appease 
people's desires!
274
 
According to Qutb, such way of dealing with foreign political concepts is a sort of 
rationalization ultimately instrumental to respond to people's appetites and interests. 
However, in his view, Islam should not attempt to reach a compromise with Western 
principles that he conceives of as 'jahili', ignorant of the divine guidance. In this 
sense, modernity is considered as a sort of regression to pre-Islamic condition of 
ignorance and should be totally eliminated: 
It is not the function of Islam to compromise with the concepts of Jahiliyyahh which are 
current in the world or to coexist in the same land together with a Jahili system. This was not 
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the case when it first appeared in the world, nor will it be today or in the future. Jahiliyyahh, 
to whatever period it belongs, is Jahiliyyahh; that is, deviation from the worship of One God 
and the way of life prescribed by Allah Almighty. It derives its system, laws, regulations, 
habits, standards and values from a source other than Allah Almighty. On the other hand, 
Islam is submission to Allah, and its function is to invite people away from Jahiliyyahh 
toward Islam
275
. 
Jahiliyyah is thus intended as the «worship of some people by others», in such a way 
that «some people become dominant and make laws for others, regardless of whether 
these laws are against Allah's injunctions and without caring for the use or misuse of 
their authority». Rather than accept this situation for Muslim people, compromise 
should be rejected leading to the danger of creating rules that are contrary to Islamic 
values: 
Islam cannot accept any mixing with Jahiliyyahh, either in its concept or in the modes of 
living which are derived from this concept. Either Islam will remain, or Jahiliyyahh: Islam 
cannot accept or agree to a situation which is half-Islam and half-Jahiliyyahh. In this respect 
Islam's stand is very clear. It says that the truth is one and cannot be divided; if it is not the 
truth, then it must be falsehood. The mixing and co-existence of the truth and falsehood is 
impossible. Command belongs to Allah Almighty, or otherwise to Jahiliyyahh; Allah's 
Shari’ah will prevail, or else people's desires276. 
Qutb asserts that one should consider such aspects of Islam carefully when 'inviting 
people to Islam', «whether they are Believers or non-believers», since the 
fundamental feature of Islam is that it is «a comprehensive concept of life and the 
universe with its own unique characteristics», so that even if some concepts could be 
considered similar or compatible, this would be true only to some extent and 
according to some limited particular aspects, but would not entail essential 
equivalence:  
The concept of human life in all its aspects and relationships which are derived from it is also 
a complete system which has its particular characteristics. This concept is basically against 
all the new or old Jahili concepts. Although there might be some details in which there are 
similarities between Islam and the Jahili concepts, in relation to the principles from which 
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these particulars are derived, the Islamic concept is different from all other theories with 
which man has been familiar
277
. 
 During the 1970s and 1980s, with the death of Gamal 'Abdel Nasser in 1970, 
and the ascent to presidency of Anwar Sadat, the imprisoned members of the Society 
of the Muslim Brothers are gradually released. On the other hand, the socialist 
influence in the Arab world is gradually diminished, while, in Egypt, Sadat starts a 
process of Corrective Revolution which aims at expelling all nasserist members of the 
government. He then gives considerable space for a politics of 'Infitah', an opening to 
private investment by the United States to the detriment of political and economic 
relations with the Soviet Union. Thanks to Sadat's foreign policy, Egypt manages to 
regain control on the Sinai, fallen under Israeli control in 1967, and to reopen the 
Suez Canal. However, such decision, which led to the stipulation of several 
agreements and a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, causes wide discontent in the rest 
of the Arab world that feels that the values of pan-Arabism and nasserism have been 
betrayed and thus expels Egypt from the Arab League. 
 During the 1970s and until present times, the political debate in the Arab 
world sees the gradual rise of liberal and progressive Islamic thinkers and scholars 
who advance the compatibility of Islam and modern liberal thought, by going back to 
the original message of the Qur'ān and reinterpreting modernist thinking and 
concepts. Such debate is carried out both by Islamic thinkers in their home countries 
and by Middle Eastern immigrants in the West, and encompasses a wide variety of 
positions and interpretations. 
 In the late 1960s, the Sudanese scholar Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, in his 
work, 'ملاسلإاُ نمُ ةيناثلاُ ةلاسرلا', ['The Second Message of Islam']
278
 initiates a process of 
redefinition and reinterpretation of the Islamic political thought based on 
historiographical analysis of the Qur'ān, and asserts that in the sacred book two 
different and conflicting views of justice and equality are present. While the 
traditional sharīʿah rests on a backward political vision adapted to a seventh-century 
society, the classic jurisprudence ignores the more comprehensive and original 
sharīʿah law revealed during the Makkan period.  
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Based on his reinterpretation, Taha claims that economic and social equality, intended 
as the establishment of good society purported by the Islam of the second message, 
consists of a socialist claim to remove all economic and political differences between 
Muslim people. According to Taha, such concept coincides with the notion of 
democracy: 
Just as socialism is the product of the struggle between the "haves" and "have nots" in the 
material sphere, democracy is the first product of the struggle between those same extremes 
in the political sphere. Its purpose is the sharing of power. Democracy parallels socialism; 
they are as two wings of the society
279
. 
However, the Sudanese scholar also argues that since socialism «requires greater 
social awareness», it should be preceded by a democracy which, «in the beginning, 
may be exercised by only a few enlightened individuals». At the same time, such 
socialism should be supported by «the riches of developed capitalism as well as the 
advances of modern technology»
280
. 
Taha considers democracy not only as a form of government, but also as «a way of 
life», everywhere highly respected by people because it is considered the best method 
to achieve human dignity and honour: 
The dignity of man is derived from the fact that he is most capable of all living things in 
learning and developing. The value of democracy is that it is the type of government most 
capable of providing opportunities for man to realize his dignity and honor. In a dictatorship, 
however,  the government denies individuals the right to experiment and assume 
responsibility, thereby retarding their intellectual, emotional, and moral growth. In contrast, 
democracy is based on the right to make mistakes. This does not mean that people are 
encouraged to make mistakes for the sake of making mistakes, but rather is recognition of 
the fact that freedom requires a choice between various modes of action. Democracy implies 
learning how to choose, choosing well, and correcting previous mistakes
281
. 
According to the Sudanese scholar, the most relevant feature of democratic 
governments is that, contrary to what happens in dictatorship, individuals are 
encouraged to develop their own thinking and are held responsible for their choice. In 
this way, even if they are free to choose whatever solution they deemed convenient, 
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they would be forced to take responsibility for their mistakes. However, «since the 
society of mu'minin [believers, BQ] was incapable of exercising individual freedom 
in choice and action, the Prophet was appointed as a guardian to prepare them for the 
responsibility of absolute individual freedom»
282
. The supervising role of Prophet 
Muhammad aimed at instructing and preparing Muslims for democracy «for which 
they had to be sufficiently mature and intelligent»
283
.  
Taha thus asserts that, in order to train Muslims to democracy, God has introduced 
the concept of shūrā, consultation, which, however does not directly indicate 
democracy, but rather a preparatory stage: 
This is the verse of shura [consultation], and consultation, whenever mentioned, whether in 
this verse or in the following verse - "those who answered the call of their Lord, and perform 
the prayer, and their affairs are [decided] by shura [mutual consultation] and pay alms from 
what We have provided for them" (Sura 42, Verse 38) - does not refer to democracy. Shura, 
however, was a necessary stage in preparation for democracy, in due course
284
. 
Shūrā, in his view, is not a synonym for democracy, or «an original Islamic precept» 
but it rather is a subsidiary phase in which «the mature individual» prepares the 
nation to democratic rule. Thus the «original precept of democracy is based on the 
verse, "Then remind them, as you are only a reminder. You have no domination over 
them." (Sura 88, Verses 21-22)». Instead of claiming control over the population, the 
democratic ruler should realise that he is only supposed to suggest or guide them, 
without being able to ultimately prevail over them. 
Taha thus invites Muslims to consider the second message of Islam, the one of the 
Makkan period, which according to him, could make it possible to better reinterpret 
the modern world: 
The Second Message calls for a return from the subsidiary verses to the original verses, 
which were temporarily abrogated because of circumstances and material and human 
limitations. We must now elevate legislation by evolving and basing it on the original 
Qur'anic verses. In this way we shall welcome the age of socialism and democracy and open 
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the way to absolute individual freedom through worship and humane dealing with other 
people
285
. 
By considering such second universal message of Islam, Muslim people could 
successfully reconcile the religious elements with the modern institutions of socialism 
and democracy.  
 Drawing on the historical analytic methodology of his master Mahmoud 
Muhammad Taha, the Sudanese scholar 'Abdullahi Ahmad Al-Na'im calls for a 
reformation of Islam «that would enable Muslims to seek to achieve their right to 
self-determination in terms of an Islamic identity». In this sense, he aims at 
«including the application of Islamic law, without violating the rights of others to 
self-determination». According to Al-Na'im it is impossible to apply sharīʿah and, at 
the same time, protect the rights of non-Muslims, so that he aims at showing  
the negative consequences of the modern application of shari'a to demonstrate that it is not 
the appropriate vehicle for Islamic self-determination in the present context. An Islamic 
alternative to shari'a is provided as the appropriate framework for Muslims to exercise their 
right to self-determination while fully respecting the rights of others, whether within their 
own countries or in other lands
286
. 
The Sudanese scholar claims that sharīʿah cannot be considered a sacred text, just 
like the Qur'ān and the sunna, because it is rather the product of religious authorities 
of past times, whose aim was to establish a firm and consistent doctrine and way of 
conduct for their times: 
Shari'a was in fact constructed by Muslim jurists over the first three centuries of Islam. 
Although derived from the fundamental divine sources of Islam, the Qur'an and the sunna, 
shari'a is not divine because it is the product of human interpretation of those sources. 
Moreover, this process of construction through human interpretation took place within a 
specific historical context which is drastically different from our own. It should therefore be 
possible for contemporary Muslims to undertake a similar process of interpretation and 
application of the Qur'an and sunna in the present historical context
287
. 
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Following such conclusions, contemporary Muslims should initiate a personal and 
individual process of reinterpretation of the sacred texts according to their actual 
present-day cultural context.  
In his more recent work 'Islam and the Secular State'
288
, Al-Na'im argues against the 
enactment of sharīʿah as public laws, and claims the need for the adoption of secular 
government: 
Shari'a principles cannot be enacted and enforced by the state as public law and public 
policy solely on the grounds that they are believed to be part of Shari'a. If such enactment  
and enforcement is attempted, the outcome will necessarily be the political will of the state 
and not the religious law of Islam. The fact that ruling elites sometimes make such claims to 
legitimize their control of the state in the name of Islam does not mean that such claims are 
true
289
. 
According to the Sudanese scholar, it is necessary to enact an «institutional separation 
of Islam and the state, despite the unavoidable connection between Islam and politics 
in present Islamic societies». Such paradox, in Al-Na'im's view, is required by the 
fact that even in an Islamic state, non-Muslim citizens should be given the right to 
participate in the government to a variety of extents:  
The principles of popular sovereignty and democratic governance presuppose that citizens 
are sufficiently motivated and determined to participate in all aspects of self-governance, 
including organized political action to hold their government accountable and responsive to 
their wishes. This motivation and determination, which is partly influenced by the religious 
beliefs and cultural conditioning of the citizens of the state, must be founded on their 
appreciation of and commitment to the values of constitutionalism and human rights. This is 
why it is important to strive to justify my proposal from an Islamic perspective for Muslims, 
without denying the right of others to support the same position from their respective 
religious or philosophical positions
290
. 
In this sense, Al-Na'im argues in favour of a condition of reciprocity between citizens 
with different religious backgrounds that have to accept «constitutionalism and 
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democracy» as the «ultimate foundation of the state itself»
291
 and to do anything they 
can to foster their establishment: 
Significant reform of such views is necessary because of their powerful influence on social 
relations and the political behavior of Muslims, even when Shari'a principles are not directly 
enforced by the state. One premise of my approach is that Muslims are unlikely to actively 
support human rights principles and effectively engage in the process of constitutional 
democratic governance if they continue to maintain such views as part of their understanding 
of Shari'a
292
. 
Al-Na'im considers a fundamental and essential step toward real Islamic political 
reformation the acceptance and the creation of secular states instead of Islamic 
Sharīʿah-based ones in the Middle East.  
 While Al-Na'im's approach to government and Islam entails an 
acknowledgement of the limits of sharīʿah with respect to human rights and, as a 
consequence, proposes the secular approach to overcome its shortages, the Egyptian 
Qur'ānic scholar Muhammad Khalaf-Allah, in his 1973 work ' نآرق لا ة لود لاو ', ['The 
Qur'ān and the State']293 holds a different stance. He argues that since God has 
provided Muslims with «the best and most perfect of foundations and rules on which 
to build our government and to establish our state», it is possible to follow the Qur'ān 
and at the same time, to retain «absolute freedom and full independence in our 
worldly concerns and social interests». Muslims have been granted the way of 
counsel, or shūrā, to manage and decide upon their affairs, so that «those 
knowledgeable ones of status, whom we trust, [could, BQ] look into these concerns 
and decide on our behalf in every period that which serves our interests and bestows 
happiness on our people»
294
. 
Following Muhammad 'Abduh's interpretation of the concept of shūrā, he argues that 
the European and the Islamic governance are very similar apart from the fact that 
«[the Europeans] say that the umma is the source of laws», while «we say the same 
things with regard to matters for which there is no Qur'anic reference of mention in 
the sunna [...] and very few things have such references [in the Qur'ān]». As for a 
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form of government based on representatives, while Western countries have no 
choice in adopting representative democratic models, Muslims are free to choose their 
form of government by adapting it to the demands of specific times: 
[The Europeans] say there must exist those who would represent the people so that what they 
decide would be as if the people had decided it. We too say the same thing. They say that this 
is known as elections, and that they have different ways of organizing them. We have not 
been limited by the bounteous Qur'an to a specific way. We have the right to follow in every 
age the way we feel will achieve what is intended. [God] called those who represent the 
people "those in authority," which means those who are distinguished among the people, to 
whom people's interests are referred, whom the people feel safe in following. They may be 
confined to the center of government at times, as they were at the beginning of Islam
295
. 
Furthermore, in the same way, Western and Islamic governments are bound to abide 
by the decisions of their representatives, and as in Western governments it is possible 
for the people to restrain the power of the rulers, such control is also considered 
essential in Islamic rule: 
[The Europeans] say that if [the representatives] agree, the government must execute that 
which they agree upon. And the people must obey. They have the right to bring down the 
ruler if he does not execute their law. And we say the same thing. This is the real consensus 
which we consider to be one of the fundaments of our law
296
. 
However, in case a full consensus cannot be reached, both European and Islamic 
rulers should follow the principle of majority. In this sense, according to Khalaf-
Allah, even if the decisions made by the majority were incorrect or unjust, it should 
be the Islamic ruler's duty to act accordingly: 
[The Europeans] say that if they disagree, the opinion of the majority should be followed. 
We know that the Prophet acceded to the opinion of the majority, even if it was incorrect, as 
occurred during the battle of Uhud. And this position on his part, peace be upon him, trained 
us. The opinion of the majority is not the correct opinion-but it is the one on which people 
with real interests agree
297
. 
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 A similar comparative stance is advanced by the Omani Sadek Jawad 
Sulaiman, who in a 1996 interview argues that «as a concept and as a principle, shūrā 
in Islam does not differ from democracy». In his view, «both shura and democracy 
arise from the central consideration that collective deliberation is more likely to lead 
to a fair and sound result for the social good than individual preference».  
He argues that the reason for rejecting the possibility to establish an equivalence of 
meaning between the two terms is that they are not put into their own contexts 
respectively. He thus continues claiming that «both concepts also assume that 
majority judgement tend to be more comprehensive and accurate than minority 
judgment». Moreover, considered as principles, shūrā and democracy entail the 
notion of equality both in rights and duties: 
As principles, shura and democracy proceed from the core idea that all people are equal in 
rights and responsibilities. Both thereby commit to the rule of the people through application 
of the law rather than the rule of individuals or a family through autocratic decree. Both 
affirm that a more comprehensive fulfilment of the principles and values which humanity 
prospers cannot be achieved in a non-democratic, non-shura environment
298
. 
Thus shūrā is not considered «incompatible with the basic elements of a democratic 
system», since, in the Qur'ān, it is described «as a principle governing the public life 
of the society of the faithful rather than a specifically ordained system of 
governance». In this sense, he asserts that  
the more any system constitutionally, institutionally, and practically fulfils the principle of 
shura- or, for that matter, the democratic principle- the more Islamic that system becomes
299
. 
In Sulaiman's opinion, even if there are specific differences between the two 
concepts, and in general in the history of those two words, the very claim that such 
differences make it impossible for Arab people to adopt democratic forms of 
government because of their Arab or Islamic values and traditions is unfair and 
biased: 
There are cultural specifics rooted in the history of every nation that might justify differences 
in how the democratic principle is applied, but no Arab or Islamic cultural specifics that 
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explain the level of civic degeneration with which we Arabs are afflicted today. It is neither 
an Arab particularity nor an article of the Islamic faith that freedom of speech be suffocated 
in our national experience, that our people be denied free elections, that our affairs be 
conducted without the benefit of consensus, and that peaceful political activity be forbidden 
to our masses. It is neither Arabic nor Islamic that our nation's fate should rest in the hands 
of a few persons unbound by constitutional restraints
300
.  
According to Suleiman, there is a «perverse, unfair, or bad judgment» lying in such 
claim that makes Arabs inferior or not yet culturally «ready for democratic 
or Shura governance». Such claims consequently lead to conclude that Arabs do «not 
appreciate the democratic principle and values needed to embrace the rule of law, as 
opposed to the rule of individuals». Quite oppositely: 
Any nation that emerged from the civilization of Islam was enjoined to exercise Shura. Such 
nations were nurtured with the principles of justice, equality, and human dignity, values 
which sustain and enhance the human experience. Such nations simply cannot be less 
qualified to exercise democracy than other nations. 
Democracy and Shūrā are thus, according to Suleiman «synonymous in 
conception and principle», in spite of their different «details of application to conform 
to local custom». In this sense, they both reject «any government lacking the 
legitimacy of free elections, accountability, and the people's power, through the 
constitutional process, to impeach the ruler for violation of trust». 
Similarly, they both reject «hereditary rule, for wisdom and competence are never the 
monopoly of any one individual or family», as well as not accepting «government by 
force, for any rule sustained by coercion is illegitimate» and forbidding «privileges— 
political, social, economic— claimed on the basis of tribal lineage or social prestige». 
Shura and democracy are thus one and the same concept. They prod us to find better and 
better realizations of the principles of justice, equality, and human dignity in our collective 
socio-political experience. These principles merit implementation in national life across the 
entire Arab homeland. Let us hope that Shura or democracy— the choice of terms makes no 
difference— will find supporters who aspire to a new Arab renaissance301. 
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The Tunisian modernist philosopher Rachid Ghannouchi, in a 1993 paper 'The 
Participation of Islamists in a non-Islamic Government'
302
 advances against 
secularism that even when an ideal Islamic democratic state could not be enacted 
because of the presence of secular rules, it would be possible for Islamic movements 
to engage in secular states with the aim of changing the system from the inside. 
According to Ghannouchi, «the problem facing the concept of power-sharing does not 
lie in the difficulty of convincing the Islamists to accept democracy, pluralism and 
power sharing», because  
the current general trend in Islamic circles is to adopt power-sharing - even in a secular style 
government- as a means for achieving mutual goals such as national solidarity, respect for 
human rights, civil liberties, cultural, social and economic development, and the deterrence 
of external threats
303
. 
The problem being faced by modernist thinkers is that the secular rule does not allow 
Islamists to participate or form political parties to participate in the local political life, 
just like any other group: 
The real problem lies in convincing the "other", that is the ruling regimes, of the principle of 
"the people's sovereignty" and of the right of Islamists - just like other political groups - to 
form political parties, engage in political activities and compete for power or share in power 
through democratic means
304
. 
Ghannouchi asserts the right of Islamic political parties to be involved in elections, 
and he interprets as undemocratic the fact that Western 'democratic' countries as well 
as national secular elites are united in trying to prevent such political movements 
from engaging into politics:  
The punishment of the Islamic victors in the Tunisian and Algerian elections- which have 
regrettably been taking place with the consent of Western democracies and the support of 
local "secular theological elites" that are allied with the oppressive regimes in both countries 
- provides a decisive evidence that the root of the problem in the Muslim world lies in the 
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hegemony of despotism. Our main task now is to combat despotism in favor of a genuine and 
true transition to democracy
305
. 
According to Ghannouchi, the problem with electoral democracy is the fact that it is 
subject to the despotism of the majority, with the most powerful parties forming 
strong coalitions to the detriment of other weaker minority groups. 
 During the first decade of the twentieth century the debate on democracy in 
the Arab world encompasses different positions and starts to introduce in the debate 
over Islamic reformation the concept of democracy as a procedure, rather than a 
value, in an attempt to go beyond the sterile debate over crystallized anti-democratic 
Islamic positions and Western stifled secular democratic discourse. The Swiss 
contemporary scholar Tariq Ramadan argues for a different conception of reform that 
does not only entail adaptation to the developments of society, thus merely accepting 
the current situation, but that also needs to provide ethical guidance in order to have 
an impact on them. In his book 'Radical Reform'
306
, Ramadan asserts that «the 
innovative, bold, creative spirit of early times [had, BQ] given way to timid 
approaches that only consider reform in terms of adapting to the world and no longer 
with the will and energy to change it»
307
. In this sense, he asserts the importance  
to distinguish between "adaptation reform", which requires religious, philosophical, and legal 
thought just to adapt to the evolutions of societies, the sciences, and the world, and 
"transformation reform", which equips itself with the spiritual, intellectual, and scientific 
means to act on the real, to master all the fields of knowledge, and to anticipate the 
complexity of social, political, philosophical, and ethical challenges
308
.  
Ramadan aims at offering «an ethical contribution» that could change and reform the 
current situation through «more soul, humanity, and positive creativity» and by 
giving relevance «to societies, to the sciences, and to human progress»
309
 .  
The Swiss scholar argues that secularisation in Muslim countries has not brought 
positive consequences as it has previously happened in the Western ones, since, 
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instead of creating the conditions for the establishment of democracy, it has caused 
the rise of autocratic regimes: 
The Western equation secularization = freedom = religious pluralism = democracy has no 
equivalent in Muslim-majority societies where, through the historical experiences of the past 
century, the equation has tended to associate other representations that would rather sound 
like: secularization = colonialism = de-Islamization = dictatorship
310
. 
As a consequence, the Muslim thought starts to reject Western imperialism that seeks 
to impose on society its own «development models» in such a way that it «has settled 
into a role of [...] denial based on otherness». This also causes Muslim thought to lose 
its «own points of reference», without being able to «develop a vision from within, 
relying on its own richness and assets»
311
.  
On the other hand, Western liberal thought continues to propound the «distinction 
between the private and the public spheres», that lies «at the heart of Western 
societies, which are going through true identity crises». In this sense, Ramadan 
criticises Rawls for asserting that pluralism can only exist in the presence of a neutral 
public space, considered «as the achievement of secularization and liberal 
democracies». On the contrary, he claims that «no public sphere can be wholly 
neutral culturally or religiously», because specific local history, tradition, collective 
psychology inherently impose «a specific cultural shading to the given nation's public 
sphere»
312
. Such opposition brings to a contradictory situation: 
Contemporary Islamic thought is very critical of "Western models" in the name of a 
particular philosophy of life and a strong conception of ethics, but in effect it ends up 
imitating the technically highest performing models in terms of quantitative success and, 
without true critical assessment, reproducing systems based on productivist conceptions that 
are very little concerned with the quality of ethical requirements
313
. 
In the debate for democratisation, such contradictions become even more apparent 
since «assimilations and reductions occurred, preventing critical debate by 
oversimplifying it in a dualistic manner: for or against democracy», with each option 
mutually excluding and countering the other. As a consequence, in the same way 
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Islamic thought shelters behind sterile traditions, liberal thought also becomes 
dogmatic thus suffocating «critical and democratic debate». As Ramadan puts it: 
Democracy is often presented in the West as "a value" supposed to be either "Western" or 
"universal", or, with no fear of contradiction, both at the same time. Thus presented, "the 
critique of democracy" becomes suspicious and its instigators tend to be lumped with old-
time idealistic Communists defending the "dictatorship of the proletariat" or new Muslim 
radicals advocating a theocratic implementation of the sharî'ah
314
. 
According to Ramadan, democracy should not be considered as a value but as a 
procedure, «a generic system encompassing a set of organizational and institutional 
models for universal, fundamental values and principles»
315
. Further confirmation for 
such aspect comes from consideration of «the issue on an international level»
316
, 
where  
being democratic has never been enough to guarantee the promotion of peace, the respect of 
human rights, dignity, freedom, autonomy, etc.[...] The constructive critique of contemporary 
democratic models must be undertaken on that wider level, first of all, by identifying what 
they do not guarantee in terms of respecting values, which must absolutely be reformed if we 
are to be consistent. Repeating that it is the least bad system cannot justify passivity about 
denouncing its perversions and excesses
317
. 
By viewing democracy as a universal value, one would fail to consider its limitations 
as a system that could and should be optimised: «Idealistic discourse about 
"democracy" as a value struggles to hide the need for debate about democracy as a 
system apt to be both perfected and alienated»
318
. 
 From another perspective, democracy also starts to be viewed as a universal 
and indisputable value that could go beyond the sterile debate between Eastern 
Islamic undemocratic values and Western liberal democratic ones. The Moroccan 
scholar Mohammed Abed Al-Jabri, in his work 'Democracy, Human Rights and Law 
in Islamic Thought'
319
, asserts that democracy should not be viewed only as a 
procedure, but also as carrying with it different values and goals. He argues that 
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considering democracy as the result of «the reasons for its rise in Europe», thus using 
it as a replicable process elsewhere without impinging on a country's values would 
«only produce a certain interpretation of history, with some degree of success». On 
the contrary, analysing the kinds of objectives that legislators, intellectuals and 
political activists aim at achieving through democracy in the Arab world would lead 
to an aware political construction, «the making of history, which is what we need 
most». In this sense, Al-Jabri claims that democracy should be considered as a 
universal value whose positive import could not and should not be disputed:  
Democracy today is not merely a subject for history, it is also a basic necessity for the 
modern human being who is no longer a mere figure, but a citizen whose identity is defined 
by a great number of rights. [...] Therefore, democracy should be viewed not as a process that 
may be applied in one society or another, but as an essential process to be established and 
applied. It is the only atmosphere wherein the rights of citizenship can be enjoyed by the 
people, on the one hand, while it enables the rulers to enjoy the legitimacy that justifies their 
rule, on the other
320
. 
Al-Jabri thus claims that «the democratic legitimacy, today, is the only acceptable 
legitimacy; there is no alternative to it»
321
, and that «any objectives posed by the state 
today cannot be put above the ‘rights of the human being and citizen’», but rather the 
interests of the state, as well as its objectives, should «stem from these rights and be 
in their service»
322
. In his opinion, 
viewing democracy as a principle, or a system whereby man enjoys his citizenship rights, 
gives it precedence over channels and institutions wherein these rights are exercised. This is 
like a patient’s right to be cured, which takes precedence over the means by which that cure 
is effected, such as medicines and hospitals. [...] It is true that applying democracy comes 
through the so-called civil society institutions, but we should remember also that the rise of 
such institutions is part of democracy itself. The more the various democratic rights are 
exercised, the more these institutions grow; and the more these institutions dominate the 
society, the stronger the democratic system, and so on
323
. 
Considering democracy as a principle, however, does not exclude that it is also «a 
sound and positive method to regulate relations inside the society in a rational 
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manner», but it does not entail that the same procedures are applicable to any country. 
Democracy as a principle would thus make the economic and cultural changes, as 
well as «the move from one social, political or ideological position to another an easy 
and spontaneous process». As Al-Jabri puts it: 
Class and institution barriers, in such cases, become movable and easy to cross. To shift from 
the extreme right to the extreme left or the other way around, from poverty to wealth [...] is 
to shift allegiance to a person or a party, to shift from one ideology to another, to change 
attire (which has become an ideological symbol for some elites). These have all become 
quite uncontrollable, which opens the way to all possibilities
324
. 
Since without smooth transitional democratic methods, economic and political 
changes could be subject to unruly actions, the Moroccan scholar views democracy as 
«a historical necessity», and the only possible way of institutionalising and managing 
«this major process of transition»
325
. The only unacceptable alternative to it would be 
«frustration and chaos, which will lead to civil wars»
326
. He thus claims that  
free democratic expression, the recognition of difference and diversity, in addition to the 
rotation of power, are the basic conditions which ensure, or at least help to direct, the 
movement and the conflict within the process of transition properly and safely
327
. 
Civil society institutions «such as parties, societies, unions and elected councils» 
would prove useful in managing «the conflict, the movement and the transition inside 
society towards historical progress»
328
. 
 The Algerian scholar Mohammed Arkoun also criticises the polarisation 
between Islamic thought and Western liberal democracy using an epistemological 
historical approach, trying to move beyond the debate between polarised opposing 
positions. In his 2002 work 'The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought'
329
, 
Arkoun sets out to analyse the modern and contemporary «focus on the achievements 
of reason», and «on the critical control of the rationalities» that aims at setting «the 
spatial limits assigned to the thinkable». In this sense, any tradition, be it Islam, 
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Christianity, or modernity allow for only certain thinkable discourses, thus limiting 
and discarding other arguments as irrational. On a political level, he argues that 
«when we speak today about the modes of communication required by political 
correctness, we are clearly referring to limits imposed by political and social 
pressures on the innovative and critical faculties of reason»
330
. As Arkoun puts it: 
A number of ideas, values, explanations, horizons of meaning, artistic creations, initiatives, 
institutions and ways of life are thereby discarded, rejected, ignored or doomed to failure by 
the long-term historical evolution called tradition or 'living tradition' according to dogmatic 
theological definitions. Voices are silenced, creative talents are neglected, marginalized or 
obliged to reproduce orthodox frameworks of expression, established forms of aesthetics, 
currently received rules of judgement, evaluation, communication, transmission, teaching, 
relating to others...
331
  
In case a particular tradition is left unchanged for a long time, «the field of the 
unthinkable is expanded and maintained for centuries» thus making the intellectual 
and critical field narrow and weak and «there is little space left for the thinkable».  
Arkoun's understanding is strongly connected to the language in which such thought 
and unthought matters are conceived, since he believes that different languages 
restrain or deploy thinking in different ways: 
The unthought is made up of the accumulated issues declared unthinkable in a given 
logosphere. A logoshpere is the linguistic mental space shared by all those who use the 
same language with which to articulate their thoughts, their representations, their collective 
memory, and their knowledge according to the fundamental principles and values claimed as 
a unifying weltanschaung. I use this concept to introduce the important dimension of the 
linguistic constraints of each language on the activities of thought
332
.  
A 'logosphere' for Arkoun should not be intended however as a particular national 
language, but rather as a discursive context in which thought and thinkable matters 
can also be expanded and changed. In his view, when an increasing number of people 
«with different cultural backgrounds» comes to use the same language,  
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it becomes a common logosphere which will affect the configuration of the faculties of the 
human mind and, consequently, will contribute to the creation of frontiers between the 
thinkable and the unthinkable, the thought and the unthought
333
. 
Arkoun claims that, in Muslim countries, the unthinkable and the unthought are 
subject to «a dual censorship», not only exercised by the state, but also  «imposed by 
public opinion, especially on matters related to religion». Muslim intellectuals thus 
interiorise «this dual control in the name of the Nation, or the religion, adding self-
censorship to that already imposed from outside»
334
. 
Viewed in this way, the unthinkable and the unthought depend on «any discursive 
statement», because «any proposition is an act of power whether followed by a result 
or not». In this sense, all kinds of linguistic utterances imply a «selection from the 
range of significations in any tradition, thus an orientation of meaning in a particular 
direction from all the possible horizons of expectation of any given speaker of a 
particular language»
335
. Through the linguistic act of power, any person can 
contribute to the establishment of what should be the thinkable and the unthinkable: 
From clan leader, tribal chief or village mayor to king, caliph, sultan, emperor or president, 
from the smallest republic or kingdom to today's United States; from bishop, rabbi, village 
imam to pope, chief mufti or chief rabbi: all of these exercise control over the thinkable and 
the unthinkable, over the selection of what is thought in the orthodox line, and over what has 
to be eliminated and remain unthought if intellectually subversive
336
. 
In 2003 seminal paper ' Rethinking Islam Today'
337
, Arkoun further argues that 
«Islamic revivalism and the activities of those who are its real or perceived 
proponents have monopolized the discourse on Islam», leaving silent the large part of 
Muslim thinkers and intellectuals. In this sense, he claims that human and social 
scientists «have failed to liberate Islamic studies from pro- and anti-Orientalism 
cliches», because Islam and the West mutually recognise themselves as unchanging, 
fixed realities. He thus argues for the need to study Islam with an epistemological 
approach that would allow for rethinking Islam starting not from singular historical or 
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political events, but from a broader contextual inscription of those happenings
338
. 
According to the Algerian scholar, 
there is a need to encourage and initiate audacious, free, productive thinking on Islam today. 
The so-called Islamic revivalism has monopolized the discourse on Islam; the social 
scientists, moreover, do not pay attention to what I call the "silent Islam"-the Islam of true 
believers who attach more importance to the religious relationship with the absolute of God 
than to the vehement demonstrations of political movements. I refer to the Islam of thinkers 
and intellectuals who are having great difficulties inserting their critical approach into a 
social and cultural space that is, at present, totally dominated by militant ideologies
339
. 
The expanding focus on Islam in such a monopolistic revivalist fashion has left 
unspoken, as well as unthought «all the cultures and systems of thought related to 
pagan, polytheistic, jahili (pre-Islamic), or modern secularized societies»
340
 thus 
accommodating in the category of the thinkable orthodox Islamic thought only their 
revivalist creeds. 
In a more comprehensive analysis of the Islamic thought, examined in comparison 
with a variety of other Eastern and Western cultural understandings, Arkoun argues 
that, in the contemporary world, the space once covered by religious interpretations is 
now growingly being occupied by secular scientific understandings: 
The social-historical space in which religions emerged, exercised their functions, and shaped 
cultures and collective sensibilities is being replaced by the secular positivist space of 
scientific knowledge, technological activities, material civilization, individual pragmatic 
ethics and law
341
. 
However, since «scientific knowledge is divided into separate, technical, highly 
specialized disciplines», a 'nostalgia' for the universal and overarching understanding 
power of religion generates religious revivalism in a variety of contexts. In this sense,  
positivist scientific knowledge has discredited or eliminated religious functions in society 
without providing an adequate alternative to religion as a symbol of human existence and a 
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source of unifying ethical values for the group. This happened in Western societies under the 
name of secularism (or laicisme in French), liberalism, and socialism
342
.  
Arkoun gives secularism a strong significance in order to «overcome fanatic divisions 
imposed by the dogmatic, superstitious use of religion», but he also thinks that «the 
specific role of religion as a source for symbols in human existence» should be 
recognised. In this sense, he asserts that «Islam is not better prepared than 
Christianity to face the challenge of secularism, intellectual modernity, and 
technological civilization»
343
. In his understanding,  
the so-called religious revivalism is a powerful secular movement disguised by religious 
discourse, rites, and collective behaviors; but it is a secularization without the intellectual 
support needed to maintain the metaphysical mode of thinking and to search for an ethical 
coherence in human behavior
344
.  
The Algerian scholar thus calls for the constructive building of a new humanism to 
integrate religions as cultures and not as dogmas for confessional groups. This would 
also entail the use not only of traditional theological or sociological interpretations, 
but also of «semiotics and linguistics», which, in his view, could «create the 
possibility of reading religious texts» with a new epistemological approach. Such 
intellectual investigations should aim at discovering the «increasing domination of 
Western patterns of thought which have not been duly criticized, controlled, or 
mastered in Western societies themselves»
345
. 
In such understanding, Arkoun gives particular attention to the fact that any political 
action is based on what people could identify as meaningful: 
Man agrees to obey, to be devoted, and to obligate his life when he feels a "debt of meaning" 
to a natural or a supernatural being. This may be the ultimate legitimacy of the state 
understood as the power accepted and obeyed by a group, community, or nation. The crisis 
of meaning started when each individual claimed himself as the source of all or true 
meaning; in this case, there is no longer any transcendent authority
346
.  
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In this sense, political power is viewed as dependent upon the capacity to build a 
meaningful and sustainable world of significations, that could be in any case and any 
time «manipulated by forces devoted to the conquest of power»
347
. Thus, the 
linguistic and epistemological study of such forces would provide for a better 
understanding of the strategies and the consequences of the ongoing processes of 
power construction in the world. 
 Similarly to Arkoun's methodology, in 'Reformation of Islamic Thought'
348
, 
the Egyptian Qur'ānic scholar Nasr Abu Zayd employs a hermeneutic approach to the 
study of the Qur'ān, claiming that «there is neither an objective, nor an innocent 
interpretation». In this sense, he analyses the Qur'ān from a historical critical 
perspective and observes that the hermeneutical principle of Islamic thought based on 
distinguishing between what are «‘ambiguous’ or ‘revocable’ (mutashabih) verses on 
the one hand, and ‘clear’ or ‘irrevocable’ (muhkam) verses on the other» is on the 
practical level untenable.  
Abu Zayd explains that even if Islamic scholars «logically agreed that the irrevocable 
should be the norms to interpret, or rather to disambiguate, the revocable, [...] when it 
came to the implementation of this principle they disagreed [...], and so, the Quran 
became a battlefield for the adversaries to situate their political, social and theological 
positions»
349
. In this sense, when analysing the Qur'ān as a discourse, instead of a 
text, it is possible to notice that «the jurists’ work was basically to unfold the 
meaning» of Qur'ān and «to re-encode this meaning in various social contexts». 
However, the Qur'ān should not be considered as a binding legal document since the 
legal stipulations in it «are expressed in discourse style, and these reveal a context of 
engagement with human needs in specific times»
350
.  
By contextualising the Qur'ān, the immediate change in perspective would open up 
«the appropriation of the intended ‘meaning’ into every paradigm of meaning» and 
provide «multiple options and a variety of solutions, as well as an open gate of 
understanding»
351
. Abu Zayd thus concludes that  
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to claim that the body of sharia literature is binding for all Muslim communities, 
notwithstanding time and space, is simply to ascribe divinity to the human historical 
production of thought. If this is the case, there is no obligation to establish a theocratic state 
claimed as Islamic. Such a demand is nothing but an ideological call to establish an 
unquestionable theo-political authority; this would recreate a devilish dictatorial regime at 
the expense of the spiritual and ethical dimension of Islam
352
. 
After disconnecting the Qur'ān from its legal understanding, it is also possible to 
analyse the concept of shūrā as «a practice pre-dating Islam and Islamic society, [...] 
an instrument of social ethics that involved discussion among tribal elders regarding 
actions in a given situation»
353
. Shūrā has not been introduced by Islam, but it was 
rather a tribal practice: 
It is a historical phenomenon, and I would leave it as a historical practice. And what I would 
observe in contextualizing the Quran in this instance would be that in the pre-Islamic context 
the heads of tribes used to meet in specific places called dar al-Nadwa, places of congress. 
They might meet on several occasions to discuss the problems of the new Prophet. [...] 
However, shura cannot be developed into something democratic because it is traditional. 
More generally, political theory should be based on the fact that in Islam, in the Quran, there 
is no political theory; there are no political principles, not even for traditional society. What 
is mentioned about traditional society is rather descriptive
354
.  
According to Abu Zayd, since the practice of shūrā was a pre-Islamic practice 
encroached with tribal society, it could never be considered as equivalent to Western 
political theory and more than that, it could not be regarded as carrying legal binding 
consequences. In this sense, in the Quran there could never be any political system, 
because rather than telling «Muslims what they should do» or mentioning «the state 
or its governance», it basically describes traditional rules and customs of that 
historical period. From this stems the Abu Zayd's claim that «it is open to Muslims to 
choose whatever they wish, and thus it is not Islam that stands against democracy, 
progress or modernity»
355
. Such critical approach to Islamic history brings him to 
think that  
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just like the classical theologians, both the modernists and their opponents are trying to 
situate their position in the Quran by implicitly or explicitly claiming its status as a text. As a 
text, it should be free of contradiction, given that God is the author. Whatever the interpreter 
wanted to prove, historical background was always employed in verification or justification; 
after all, history is also open to miscellaneous readings
356
.  
In this sense, he argues that in the same way classical jurists and theologians provide 
their interpretation of the Qur'ān, «the proponents of modern hermeneutics endeavor 
to articulate their positions by creating a focal point of gravity that can be claimed as 
universal – the irrevocable and the eternal truth», while «the anti-modernist would 
merely shift the focal point of gravity to claim the opposite»
357
. Such way of dealing 
with the Qur'ān only as a text, entails that  
the Quran is at the mercy of the ideology of its interpreter; for a communist, the Quran would 
reveal communism, for a fundamentalist the Quran would be a highly fundamentalist text 
and for a feminist it would be a feminist text
358
. 
Abu Zayd thus proposes to develop a different notion of Qur'ān, considering it as a 
discourse rather than only a text, and analysing its 'horizontal dimension', which 
entails the a broad canonization of Islam as an «act of the Prophet’s gradual 
propagation of the message of the Quran, after he had received it»
359
. By following 
such a horizontal dimension, the Islamic scholars' unoriginal analysis of specific 
verses of the Qur'ān does not contribute to the establishment or questioning of the  
mainstream interpretation: 
For Muslim scholars, the Quran was always a text from the moment of its canonization until 
the present moment. Yet, if we pay close attention to the Quran as discourse or discourses, it 
is no longer sufficient to re-contextualize one or more passages in the fight against literalism 
and fundamentalism, or against a specific historical practice that seems inappropriate for our 
modern context. Similarly, it is not enough to invoke modern hermeneutics to justify the 
historicity and hence the relativity of every mode of understanding, while in the meantime 
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claiming that our modern interpretation is more appropriate and more valid. What these 
inadequate approaches produce is either polemic or apologetic hermeneutics
360
. 
In this view, rather than producing sterile apologetic or polemic interpretations, it is 
necessary to rethink the Qur'ān «without re-invoking its living status as a ‘discourse’, 
whether in academia or in everyday life»
361
. Only in such a way would it be possible 
to achieve «democratic and open hermeneutics» that would allow for the definition of 
«the meaning of life»
362
. In order to avoid the manipulation of religious thought and 
to allow for the construction of meaning, it is necessary to empower communities 
through a democratic hermeneutics, that requires people to be involved in the 
dialogical power: 
If we are serious about freeing religious thought from power manipulation, whether political, 
social, or religious, and want to empower the community of believers to formulate 
‘meaning’, we need to construct open democratic hermeneutics. The empirical diversity of 
religious meaning is part of human diversity around the meaning of life in general, which is 
supposed to be a positive value in the context of modern life. To reconnect the question of 
the meaning of the Quran to that of the meaning of life, it is now imperative to note that the 
Quran was the outcome of dialogue, debate, augment, acceptance and rejection, both with 
pre-Islamic norms, practices and culture, and with its own previous assessments, 
presuppositions and assertions
363
. 
Abu Zayed considers the Qur'ān as the result of debates and interpretations stemming 
from acceptance and refusal of different viewpoints from the pre-Islamic to the 
modern age. In this sense, in order for the Qur'ān to make sense in present times, it is 
necessary to democratise the interpretive tools by extending their use to the whole 
community of believers, who, each through their religious diversities, can make sense 
of the Sacred Text again. 
 Following this brief overview of the concept of democracy in the Arab world 
it is now possible to describe general provisional characteristics and factors that have 
contributed to build the understanding of democracy in such region. 
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Firstly, the notion of democracy in the Arab world is not only a simple transfer of the 
word and procedure of democracy from the experience of the French Revolution into 
a colonised area, which in turn has been inspired by the principles of freedom and 
equality. Such process of transfer is rather part of a larger and deeper economic and 
political situation influenced by the crisis of the Ottoman Empire. 
Secondly, the very notion and possibility to actually transfer a concept from one 
culture into another should be carefully considered. In this regard, it seems plausible 
to conclude that it would be impossible to account for all the aspects and factors that 
contribute to the shaping of a concept such that of democracy in any culture, be that 
what today is called 'Western' or 'Arab'. The very impossibility to define once and for 
all such historical, social, linguistic, geographical and cultural concepts would make 
any conclusion in the transfer of meaning only provisional.  
Thirdly, there seems to be in the notion of democracy in the Arab world a gradual 
process of redefinition and questioning of the concept which in modern times has 
started with its appearance as a significant and relevant concept in the Arab region. 
Such redefinition has been carried out, according to the historical period, by different 
scholars of classical Islam, academic intellectuals and political activists.  
Fourthly, such thinkers could be grouped according to their general attitude toward 
modernization and its satellite concepts of freedom, equality, democracy, human 
rights, and the like, into different strands of thought such as modernist, Salafist, 
reformist, liberal reformist, secularists, socialist etc., based on the specific historical 
period in which they have lived and interpreted the concept of democracy. 
In the next paragraph, such aspects will be used to define the more specific context of 
the notion of democracy in the twenty-first century Egyptian uprisings and in the 
period in which the 2012 Egyptian Constitution was formulated, issued and approved, 
as well as perceived, questioned and debated worldwide. 
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3 .3  Ca se  S tudy:  The 2 012  Egy pt ia n  Co nst i t ut ion  a nd i t s  
tra ns lat io n  into  Eng l i sh  by  Dr .  N ivien  Sa leh  
  
 In the previous paragraphs, a brief overview of the concept of democracy in 
the accounts of non-Western and post-colonial scholars was provided, with a specific 
final focus on the concept of democracy in the Arab World. Such overview made it 
possible to conclude that the renewed interest into the concept of democracy is part of 
a process of redefinition to make it more inclusive of new 'non-Western' political and 
cultural diversity. In this paragraph, a translational approach will be used to evaluate 
how and to what extent, through the politics of translation, the modern concept of 
democracy acquires different meanings according to the cultural context in which it is 
used. In this sense, a specific representation of  democracy will be examined, which is 
the translation into English of the 2012 Egyptian Constitution by the Egyptian-
German scholar, Nivien Saleh, in her professional website. As has already been stated 
in the first chapter, translation will not be intended as a transfer of meaning from a 
source to a target text, so that they have the same meaning, but it will rather be 
viewed as a process of communication that gradually changes the meaning of an 
original to adapt it to the receiving cultural context. As a consequence, the aim of 
such analysis will not be to find out whether the concept of democracy in the 2012 
Egyptian Constitution has the same meaning in one of its translations into English, 
since this could never be the case. Equivalence here is considered a political space of 
negotiation of meaning that introduces an acceptable amount of newness in the 
receiving culture while inscribing it in local discourses. As a consequence, translation 
will be viewed as a personal interpretation of a text, and, as such, it could never be an 
objective one. In this way, the main aim will be to find out what the cultural context 
and the purpose for translating might be, and how, at a language level, such 
motivations could contribute to building broader discourses on democracy and 
ultimately influence its definition at an international level.  
 In the next paragraph, the translational methodology chosen for such analysis 
will be introduced and explained. In the second paragraph the actual analysis of the 
case study will be carried out, while in the concluding third paragraph some 
preliminary remarks on the findings will be given.  
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3 .3 .1  Ana ly s ing  the  po l i t i ca l  aspec t s  in  t ran s la t ion  s tud ie s:  
t he  so c io -narra t i ve  th eory  
 
 As already asserted in the previous chapters, the notion of translation in this 
work does not refer to an operation of transferring meaning from a source to a target 
text, so that the original value is preserved. This is because, even though translators 
could deliberately aim at safeguarding authenticity and know, understand and speak 
the languages they work with at a mother-tongue level, they would never be able to 
translate 'objectively'. Partial/personal translation is inevitable due to the impossibility 
to control a large number of variables that include, but are not limited to, cultural 
aspects related to the translator's training, their interests and opinions and, ultimately, 
to their experiences in life. More generally, one should also take into account the 
interventions of the individuals who interact while writing, editing, retranslating, 
publishing, reading, interpreting and receiving the translated texts. In this sense, 
translation is always influenced by factors that inevitably cause a textual 
transformation in the first place.  
Secondly, such textual transformation always results in a cultural and political 
intervention, because any text can influence, modify and definitively impact on its 
own production environment. Considered as such, the political import of a translated 
text could be defined as its impact on a broader cultural receiving context, in terms of 
its affecting the behaviour of individuals and groups, based on the kind of narrative it 
establishes, supports, and/or rejects.  
 Such definition of translation requires an approach that could effectively 
connect textual analysis to the texts' broader context of production and reception, 
considering democracy not only as a single word to be transferred into a translated 
text, but also as a broader discourse that is not limited to textual representation. Most 
of translational analytical tools used in different fields of Translation Studies are 
devised to analyse literary translated texts and usually presuppose a comparison 
between two texts into two different languages. Such texts are assumed to address 
generally similar audiences both in the original and the receiving culture and focus on 
the analysis of the internal coherence of literary translated texts, based on the types of 
translational choices made by translators. These tools also postulate an equivalence 
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between the original and the translation that could be assessed based on the analysis 
of translation shifts of meaning
364
. Other models presuppose that it is possible to infer 
a series of more or less general assumptions, standards or norms
365
 against which it 
would be possible to compare translated texts, and ultimately seem to support a 
notion of equivalence that, even though could be negotiated at any given time and 
place, it would still retain a certain degree of predictability. In this sense, by 
considering all the variables that influence the translation process, it would be 
possible to establish a quality standard to be used for the sake of comparison. 
Translation could also be analysed through functionalist models
366
, that aim at finding 
the objectives for carrying out such translation, also through register, style and 
discourse analysis
367
. In an attempt to integrate additional variables to the act of 
translation, some models define and predict translational choices using a variety of 
methods based on the role of the translator as an agent, influenced by external 
happenings and constrictions, as well as internal preferences and orientations
368
. In 
other cases, the analysis of the degree of deviance is assessed based on statistically 
relevant amounts of translated texts through the use of software and corpora
369
. Other 
analytical tools seem to propose to analyse some words as culturally-oriented items, 
with culture intended as a stable and well defined system of references and 
meanings
370
. In all these types of models, some or, at times all, aspects related to the 
cultural and contextual background of the original texts, as well as those of their 
translations and ultimately of the translators, editors, and readership involved in the 
process must perforce be considered as fixed, uniform and unchanging. Text analysis 
is thus carried out trying to remove some of the variables in an attempt to produce 
more precise predictions. Even if some of the analytical tools try to integrate cultural 
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variables and connect the texts with broader cultural contexts, a more flexible 
approach, which requires analysis of broad cultural discourses, instead of only texts, 
appears to best adapt to the definition of translation given above. According to 
Hermans, it is necessary to realise that the very fact «that the study of translation 
translates translation, and does so in compromised and compromising ways, obliges 
us to reconsider not just what we know, but how we know»
371
. In this sense, even if 
such analytical tools could effectively produce relevant outcomes at a textual level, a 
more comprehensive method would allow to better address the epistemological 
assumptions of translation. 
 For these reasons, and based on the definition of translation given above, it 
appears to be more relevant to consider a constructivist approach to translation that 
takes into account the unpredictability of variables and that stems from the 
consideration of the translator's situatedness. The analysis of the case study will thus 
be carried out using the socio-narrative theory devised by Mona Baker for 
translational purposes in her work 'Translation and Conflict: A Narrative Account'
372
. 
In her work, Baker defines narratives as 'dynamic entities' that «change in subtle or 
radical ways as people experience and become exposed to new stories on a daily 
basis». In this sense, a narrative theory would assume that «people's behaviour is 
ultimately guided by the stories they come to believe about the events in which they 
are embedded, rather than by their gender, race, colour of skin, or any other 
attribute». Furthermore, since narratives are dynamic, a person's «positioning in 
relation to other participants in interaction» depends on «a variety of divergent, criss-
crossing, often vacillating narratives». Finally, the dynamic nature of narratives also 
entails that, since our understanding of the world continually changes through our 
experience, they have a «'significant subversive or transformative potential'»
373
 in that 
they introduce new concepts into mainstream discourses either supporting and/or 
contrasting them. 
 Narrative in this sense should not be considered a specific literary genre, but 
an overarching idea based on the assumption that any kind of text is first of all 
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accounted for, told, and interpreted by an agent who is embedded into a specific 
context and vision of the world. In this sense, Baker describes narrative as 
overlapping «to some extent with Foucault's 'discourse' [...] especially in its emphasis 
on the normalizing effect of publicly disseminated representations». However, she 
continues, «the concept of narrative is much more concrete and accessible, compared 
with the abstract notion of discourse as a vehicle for social and political processes» 
and «much more so than discourse, the notion of narrative is not restricted to public 
representations but applies equally to individual stories»
374
. In this sense, «narrative 
tends on the whole to be treated as the principal and inescapable mode by which we 
experience the world»
375
. Drawing on the notion of narrative theorised by Jerome 
Bruner
376
, Walter Fisher
377
 and Somers and Gibson
378
, Baker defines narratives as 
«public and personal 'stories' that we subscribe to and that guide our behaviour, [...] 
the stories we tell ourselves, not just those we explicitly tell other people, about the 
world(s) in which we live»
379
. 
An advantage for using such method is the fact that «categories, whether scientific or 
otherwise, do not exist outside the narrative within which they are constituted». In 
this sense, also scientific texts are always included in specific narratives that carry 
political consequences: 
The process of (narrative) categorization is far from disinterested, even in the most abstract 
and apparently 'objective' of sciences, such as statistics. Scientific theories and reports are 
narratives in the sense that they are ultimately 'stories' that have a beginning, middle and end. 
More specifically, narrative does much of the work that we identify with 'objective' scientific 
discourse. It is narrativity that turns the continuous flow of experience into a set of delineated 
categories that can be processed in various ways, and this [...] includes scientific 
categories
380
. 
Another important consequence of such method is that «it acknowledges the 
constructedness of narratives»
381
 by making it possible  
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to deal with the individual text and the broader set of narratives in which it is embedded, and 
it encourages us to look beyond the immediate, local narrative as elaborated in a given text or 
utterance to assess its contribution to elaborating wider narratives in society
382
.  
Narrative is thus more broadly intended as a way to flexibly categorise «the world 
into types of character, types of event, bounded communities» and systematize 
«experience by ordering events in relation to each other – temporally, spatially, 
socially». As a consequence, narratives also intervene in classifying «behaviour along 
a moral and socially sanctioned cline into valued vs. non-valued, normal vs. eccentric, 
rational vs. irrational, legitimate vs. non-legitimate, legal vs. criminal». In this sense, 
all narratives, included the scientific ones are inscribed into a «process of legitimation 
and justification that is ultimately political in import». Thus, whether or not 
translators are aware of such political import, they ultimately contribute in 
legitimising and supporting certain political actions and positions in the world that 
«can be highly threatening in a direct political sense»
383
. 
Narrativity should ultimately be considered as a way to normalise «the accounts it 
projects over a period of time, so that they come to be perceived as self-evident, 
benign, uncontestable and non-controversial»
384
. In the same way, narratives 
participate in «constructing or deconstructing an enemy, 'an other who is so foreign 
and distant that who becomes it». Translators participate in such construction or 
deconstruction when «circulating and resisting the narratives that turn the whos of our 
time into the its whose suffering is either justifiable or at best simply 'regrettable'». 
Most of the times, they might do it without completely noticing, pretending to be 
simply neutral or objective when they translate: 
Bennett and Edelman (1985:159) remind us that 'stock political narratives disguise and digest 
ideology for people who prefer to represent themselves as passive or objective reporters of 
the world around them'. It is also stock political narratives that we often digest, translate and 
circulate 'passively', without stopping to consider their implications for those we readily 
relegate to the category of it, the 'regrettable' victims of collateral damage
385
. 
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This aspect is caused by the fact that nobody can avoid to give coherence to their own 
experience of the world, looking for coherent patterns, assuming  that «events and 
happenings are verifiable by reference to some 'reality'» and attributing believability 
to a specific narrative: 
The assumption of the constructedness of narratives means that in practice we can neither 
isolate and independently assess individual elements in a narrative nor assume that a default, 
chronological or logical storyline can be fully separated from the perspective of a given 
narrator. At the same time, because we have to take a position in relation to a variety of 
public, historical and personal narratives in order to act in the real world, we have to make 
judgements about the veracity and credibility of narratives that touch our lives. In other 
words, the constructedness of narratives and our embeddedness in them do not preclude us 
from reasoning about them
386
.  
In such a view, one could never appeal to an only shared vision of the world, or to 
some kind of objectivity, but should rather accept the existence of different, and at the 
same time coherent visions of the world: 
The assumption of constructedness does not simply mean the rejection of a truth in relation 
to a given set of events or the assertion that no one has direct access to a reality. Rather, 
acknowledging the constructed nature of narratives means that we accept the potential 
existence and worth of multiple truths. This is a key issue in claiming that narratives have 
political import and that they can unsettle and contest hegemonic views of the world
387
. 
The presence of many truths also encompasses the possibility that while some 
narratives «may be completely at odds with each other; some may differ only in 
minor details or points of emphasis». In any case, however, depending on the 
contexts, some narratives may become more widely accepted than others «through 
various processes of reinforcement and contestation». Both the reinforcement and 
contestation, however, entail the return to past traditions and narratives by reviving 
them: 
To contest and challenge the present, both individuals and communities will draw on past 
narratives to highlight salient features of the current situation as elaborated in their narrative 
of the here and now.  
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Such recourse should not be intended as a simple representation, and reinterpretation, 
but also as «a means of control» which «socializes individuals into an established 
social and political order», by limiting «the stock of identities from which individuals 
may choose a social role for themselves».  
The process of inscribing oneself into a specific narrative could happen in a more or 
less informed fashion, so that some people could end up being less aware of their 
position: 
When people invest very heavily in specific versions of a narrative, giving up or adjusting 
those versions could result in major personal trauma for them. In this case, they simply 
cannot entertain other versions of the narrative nor agree a resolution to a conflict informed 
by a competing narrative. Eventually, they may end up isolating themselves within their own 
narrative communities, circles of people who subscribe to a similar version of the 
narrative(s) they regard as central to their lives. 
Baker argues that translation should be viewed as an extremely important activity in 
the construction of narratives «especially given the fact that most conflicts today are 
not restricted to specific monolingual communities but have to be negotiated in the 
international arena». In this sense, «even local, domestic conflicts now typically have 
to be negotiated cross-culturally and cross-linguistically in view of the multicultural 
composition of most societies»
388
. Thus, translators play a key political role in their 
reshaping texts according to well-established or resisting narratives of the world, and 
in reformulating some of them based on different worldviews and with culturally-
blended features: 
Every time a version of the narrative is retold or translated into another language, it is 
injected with elements from other, broader narratives circulating within the new setting or 
from the personal narratives of the retellers. The embellished version in turn may get retold 
in – and 'contaminate' – versions of the narrative in other languages and settings. 
At the translational level, this could happen in different ways and could envisage that 
aspects and elements from different narratives «are added, emphasised, downplayed 
or simply suppressed through numerous processes of mediation»
389
. In such an 
understanding, an increased awareness of such processes or at least examination of 
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«assumptions encoded in narratives» could help bring to light obscured «patterns of 
domination and oppression that exclude the experiences of large sectors of society 
while legitimating and promoting those of the political, economic and cultural elite». 
With this regard, Baker acknowledges that «there is also general agreement in the 
literature that narrative both reproduces the existing power structures and provides a 
means of contesting them», but she also admits that «the dynamics of this intricate 
interplay between dominance and resistance is difficult to capture»
390
.  
 In this sense, the ultimate purpose for choosing the case study of a translation 
into English of the 2012 Egyptian Constitution moves in the direction of eventually 
finding not only elements of domination in the mainstream discourse about 
democracy, but also factors of resistance. To this extent, instead of analysing a typical 
postcolonial case study in which the ethnocentric notion of democracy is imported 
into a postcolonial country, I propose to study here the translation of the concept of 
democracy from a postcolonial country, culture and language, that is Egypt, into a 
'Western', mainly academic context.  
It seems also worth mentioning that, since the eighteenth century's cultural and 
economic relations with European countries, the resort to constitutions in the Arab 
world in general, and in Egypt in particular, has always been extremely effective in 
managing and fostering the establishment or the repression of winning or opposing 
political groups
391
. In that respect, the analysis of a constitution is a way to examine a 
specific representation of a period in the Egyptian political debate in which, after the 
uprisings that led to Mubarak's ousting, a new political group tries to protect and 
represent its political interests. 
In the following paragraph I will use some analytical categories of Baker's socio-
narrative theory to look for eventual changes and redefinitions of the concept of 
democracy in the light of the analysis of the local contexts in which the Constitution 
and its translation have been produced.  
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3 .3 .2  A  t rans la t iona l  ana ly s is  o f  d emocra cy  
 
 The following analysis will consider democracy as a narrative that informs 
different large or small cultural contexts. As showed in Chapter 1 and in paragraphs 
3.1 and 3.2, democracy has always served as a gathering point of different values and 
interpretations of political and social justice. As a consequence, the notion of 
democracy will be defined at the same time as a universal value, as part of a local 
discourse, and finally as an individual understanding. Instead of considering such 
views on democracy as distinct and separate entities, I will treat them as different 
layers or spheres of meaning that can continually influence each other and that are 
also affected by other external narratives, thus contributing to establish and ultimately 
modify the broadest notion of democracy. I will then analyse how the conception of 
democracy as a secular universal value can be inscribed into a particular local 
context. Within such brief analysis, I will examine the way in which narratives 
communicate and exchange meaning through translation in order to identify 
politically-relevant strategies of meaning and translating. What follows is a 
breakdown of democracy into three different narrative typologies that could be 
significant for the case study according to Baker's narrative theory. 
 In the first stance, democracy can be defined here as a meta- or master 
narrative. Baker defines master/meta-narratives as those «'in which we are embedded 
as contemporary actors in history … Progress, Decadence, Industrialization, 
Enlightenment, etc.'»
392
. In such definition, a meta- or master narrative started as a 
more limited narrative that was later extended to other contexts and places. Thus, in 
this sense, democracy as intended in modern times could be thought to have been 
initiated or, rather, perceived to have gained relevance in the late eighteenth century 
in the United States, and to have gradually been disseminated into other areas, such as 
Europe, lately being transferred into further broader regions in the world. As shown 
in the first chapter, nowadays democracy is considered to be an undisputable and 
incontestable universal value that anyone should hold valid independent of their 
personal beliefs. As Baker argues, a meta/master-narrative is such because it «has 
persisted for decades and [...] the lives of ordinary individuals across the planet have 
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been influenced by it»
393
. She also propounds an explanation for the establishment of 
a specific meta/master-narrative, arguing that «political and economic dominance 
may indeed be the prime factor determining the survival and circulation of political 
meta-narratives»
394
. In this sense, it is possible to identify different trends at varying 
levels and periods of time that might be relevant for the analysis of the case under 
consideration.  
 Firstly, according to a widespread political postcolonial narrative, democracy 
is today viewed as a result of the United States' economic and cultural politics of 
control over various parts of the world. Similarly, at a more circumscribed local level 
in the past, it could also be observed that, in the nineteenth century, the wealthy 
modern imperialist European countries started relations with the Ottoman Empire and 
Egypt as part of their struggle for power over the Mediterranean Sea. On the other 
hand, however, one should also mention that the Ottoman Empire, by employing 
modernization strategies and military innovations taken from European colonial 
powers and accepting to relate itself to such culturally-diverse peoples, was seeking 
to regain control over its large uncontrolled territories, and, at the same time, to 
defend itself from the very same European military intervention. Such acceptance of 
cultural models may have served as a less conflicted way to allow for the inescapable 
political and economic influence of the foreign powers over the Empire. At this level, 
the welcoming of newness in different contexts always appears a contested one, and 
entails enthusiastic support, resolute rejections and mixed selective 
reinterpretations
395
. From such broad range of outcomes and reactions, innovation and 
change are always the result of a complex blend of patterns of acceptance and 
resistance. 
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 In this sense, it seems interesting to consider «the way in which a 
longstanding, established meta-narrative may be used to lend weight and 
psychological salience to a developing public or meta-narrative»
396
. Baker defines 
public narratives as «stories elaborated by and circulating among social and 
institutional formations larger than the individual, such as the family, religious or 
educational institution, the media, and the nation»
397
. According to Baker, 
the effects of invoking established meta-narratives, with their own specific histories, to 
promote new ones can never be predicted, because these histories can release different 
associations and details in the minds of one's immediate audience as well as the opponents 
that the evoked meta-narrative is meant to subdue or discredit
398
. 
To this regard, since the effects of such extension of the meta-narrative of democracy 
could not be entirely predicted, it is necessary to envisage the possibility that meta-
narratives may be contested or accepted in a variety of different modes, even in the 
same cultural contexts. It should thus be expected that democracy as a universal value 
could also be partly or completely questioned by a great variety of public narratives 
which aim at adapting it to local contexts. While maintaining an overlapping structure 
on the meaning of democracy, public narratives also introduce, through different 
strategies, some innovative aspects and concepts in the general meta/master-narrative 
of democracy as a universal value. Deliberative and participatory democracy, Bell's 
illiberal democracy, the Indian subaltern studies' notion of democracy, as well as the 
Latin American
399
 one could be such examples. 
In the case considered here, democracy in the twentieth century Arab world could be 
imagined as the result of a variety of conflicting public narratives, among which 
blended liberal, socialist, nationalist, secular, anti-capitalist and Islamic narratives of 
democracy have been proposed. During the 1980s and 1990s, Islamist political parties 
increased their visibility through a growing involvement of grassroots cultural, 
economic and political movements
400
.  
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For instance, Ismail
401
 explains that 
the fortunes of Islamism as a political movement are conditioned by the structures of 
opportunities, and by political configurations and contingent identities. In their interaction 
with the state, and other political and social actors, Islamists have adopted a multitude of 
strategies, ranging from outright confrontation and violent action to agitation in the public 
sphere to infiltration of societal spaces
402
. 
In the wake of the twenty-first century, this led Islamist political movements to win 
elections in a variety of Arab countries such as Palestine, Lebanon and Egypt, as a 
result of an extensive recourse to electoralism
403
. In particular, political Islam in 
Egypt is considered one of the most powerful movements in the Arab world
404
. These 
major strategic changes could be accounted for by a variety of factors, such as the 
influence of the liberal Islamic thinkers that started in the 1970s
405
, the exacerbation 
of the conflict with Israel, as well as the need to counter Western imperialist politics 
with a strong and appealing Islamic alternative, after the failure of nationalist and 
pan-Arab movements
406
.  
According to El-Ghobashy, in Egypt, such transformations were prompted by «a 
decisive move away from the uncompromising notions of Sayyid Qutb [...] toward a 
cautious reinterpretation of the ideas of founder al-Banna», that made the Society of 
the Muslim Brothers shift «from a religious mass movement to what looks very much 
like a modern political party». The electoralist turn of the Muslim Brothers led them 
to confront and be influenced by «common institutional variables on the organization 
and ideology of both secular and religious political parties»407. This also caused 
among the Islamist political parties in Egypt disdain and reproach, with the 
accusations from the anti-secular and anti-capitalist movement Jama'at al-Islamiyya 
of «helping to build the institutions of the secular regime»
408
. Similarly, El-Ghobashy 
explains that the notion of democracy propounded by the Muslim Brothers was an 
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appropriation of the discourse regarding the compatibility of democracy with Islamic 
principles supported by liberal Islamic thinkers in the 1980s: 
A related innovation is the Ikhwan’s appropriation of moderate Islamist thinkers’ works 
authenticating democracy with Islamic concepts. Democracy here is defined as (1) broad, 
equal citizenship with (2) binding consultation of citizens with respect to governmental 
personnel and policies, and (3) protection of citizens from arbitrary state action
409
. 
The Muslim Brothers' contemporary public narrative about democracy could be 
considered as the result of a specific adaptation of certain elements of democracy as a 
universal value to the Arab Egyptian electoral context. In this sense, the Muslim 
Brothers claimed the compatibility of democracy with the principles of Islam. As 
Baker puts it:  
Which variant of a narrative persists and acquires currency is of course largely a question of 
the power structures in which the various narrative versions are embedded as well as the 
determination with which their proponents promote and defend them
410
. 
Thanks to the engagement of large parts of the Egyptian civil society that was 
previously excluded from political participation, the Muslim Brothers gradually 
managed to build a wide and diversified political consensus that led them to become 
the first opposition party in the 2005 parliamentary elections. After the 2011 Egyptian 
Revolution
411
, which forced President Hosni Mubarak to resign and led to 
presidential elections in June 2012, Muhammad Morsi, the candidate for the ' بزح 
ةلادعلاوُ ةيرحلا‎ ', ['The‎Freedom‎and‎Justice‎Party'],‎an‎exponent‎of‎ the‎Society‎ of‎
the‎Muslim‎Brothers,‎was‎elected‎as‎the‎fifth‎President‎of‎Egypt.‎A‎product‎of‎
such‎public‎narrative‎of‎ the‎Muslim‎Brothers‎ principles‎ is‎ the‎2012‎Egyptian‎
Constitution412.‎ 
The‎adjective‎ 'يطارقميد' ['democratic', BQ] appears five times, more precisely twice in 
the Preamble; once in Part 1, Chapter 1, Article 1; and once respectively in Part 2, 
Chapter 2, Articles 52 and 53. From a comparative analysis of the preceding 1971 
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Constitution, the 2012 and the 2014
413
 ones, it is possible to observe that reference to 
democratic rule and principles can be retrieved in the preambles of all the texts. It is 
also possible to conclude the same for the first article defining the State in each 
Constitution
414
, as well as for the articles that regulate the rights to form syndicates 
and trade unions
415
. 
However, what appears remarkable for the sake of analysis is that the noun 'ةيطارقميد' 
['democracy', BQ] can be found only once and, more specifically, reference to 
democracy is in Part 1, Chapter 1, Article 6. Quite‎differently‎from‎what‎is‎stated‎not‎
only‎in‎the‎previous‎1971‎Egyptian‎Constitution,‎but‎also‎in‎the‎following‎2014‎one,‎
in‎ Part‎ 1,‎ Chapter‎ 1,‎ Article‎ 6‎ of‎ the‎ 2012‎ Egyptian‎ Constitution,‎ the‎ form‎ of‎
government‎ is‎ defined‎ as‎ based‎ « ىروشلاوُ ةيطارقميدلاُ ئدابمُ ىلعُ ,ةنطاوملاو », ['on the 
principles of democracy and shūrā, and citizenship', BQ]416.  
In such definition of the form of government, it is possible to notice a juxtaposition of 
the word 'ةيطارقميد', which is a transliteration of the English term 'democracy' or 
possibly of the French word 'démocratie', and the term 'ىروش ' , ['shūrā', BQ]417 
typically considered an Islamic concept for meaning 'consultation'
418
. According to 
Baker, the specific narrative feature of  'relativity' or 'hermeneutic composability' 
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concentrates on the fact that «it is impossible for the human mind to make sense of 
isolated events or of a patchwork of events that are not constituted as a narrative»
419
. 
Bruner thus argues that 
this hermeneutic property marks narrative both in its construction and in its comprehension. 
For narratives do not exist, as it were, in some real world, waiting there patiently and 
eternally to be veridically mirrored in a text. [...] The events themselves need to 
be constituted in the light of the overall narrative
420
. 
Such combination appears to be instrumental while attempting to reinscribe the meta-
narrative of democracy as a universal value into the Muslim Brothers' public narrative 
that purported the compatibility between democracy and Islamic principles. Their 
choice attempts at normalising a religious concept, namely shūrā, by inscribing it into 
a binding and official document such as the Constitution of an entire nation, and 
using it to define a form of government together with the term 'democracy'.  
Another aspect that seems to support such strategy of normalisation is the fact that the 
word shūrā is repeated many times in the 2012 Constitution, and it is mostly used to 
talk about the 'ىروشلا سلجم ', or 'Majlis Ash-shūra' ['Shura Council', BQ] the upper 
house of the Egyptian Parliament. Introduced in the 1980 through a constitutional 
amendment, the 'ىروشلا سلجم ' has now been abolished. Such institution appears to play 
an important role in supporting the Muslim Brothers' narrative of compatibility 
between democracy and shūrā421.  
This process of normalisation should be also considered as a way not only to formally 
and legally support the introduction of a new concept into the Egyptian political 
understanding of government and democracy, but also to start a process of 
legitimation According to Baker, while «public narratives may initially be 
elaborated within a narrow, domestic context», in order to survive they also need to 
be «articulated in other dialects, languages, and non-domestic contexts»422. In her 
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view, in order for public narratives to endure and be recognised as such, the role of 
translation is extremely important: 
It goes without saying that narratives do not travel across linguistic and cultural boundaries, 
and certainly do not develop into global meta-narratives, without the direct involvement of 
translators and interpreters. [...] It is also worth pointing out that growing numbers of 
professional and non-professional translators and interpreters are now actively setting out to 
elaborate alternative narratives that can challenge the oppressive public and meta-narratives 
of our time
423
.  
As stated by Baker, «individuals in any society either buy into the official or semi-
official versions of such public narratives or dissent from them»
424
, thus choosing, 
whether consciously or not, to reinterpret such public narratives or to question them 
by hindering their representations. More often than not, such reinterpretation is not 
mutually exclusive and would rather initiate a process of partial representation in 
which, independently of public narratives being considered worth to be reproduced or 
not, some aspects are given more resonance than others.  
 With regard to translation, Baker states that the role of professional and non-
professional translators is extremely important when reinterpreting non-mainstream 
marginal public narratives. In this sense, from the stance of  democracy as meta-
narrative, the public narrative holding that democracy is compatible with Islamic 
principles should be interpreted as a marginal understanding that is currently trying to 
develop into a broader public narrative and to influence the meta-narrative of 
democracy as a universal value. Professional and non-professional translators could 
thus reinterpret and revive public narratives through their individual, ontological 
ones, which can be defined as «personal stories that we tell ourselves about our place 
in the world and our own personal history»
425
. In the case outlined here, the personal 
narrative of doctor Nivien Saleh appears to be closely connected to her broader 
understanding of democracy. Baker argues that such personal stories should be 
thought of as connected to more broadly shared or collective narratives, which could 
be considered here local public narratives, that allow an individual to make sense of 
their life. Although ontological narratives 
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ultimately remain focused on the self and its immediate world, they are interpersonal and 
social in nature, because '[t]he person has to exist, to tell their story, in a social world – they 
are a situated, located self'
426
. In concrete terms, this means that 'even the most personal of 
narratives rely on and invoke collective narratives – symbols, linguistic formulations, 
structures, and vocabularies of motive – without which the personal would remain 
unintelligible and uninterpretable'
427
.  
Personal and collective narratives are thus mutually interrelated because, while, on 
the one hand, ontological narratives determine the constitution of more widely shared 
public narratives; on the other hand, such social narratives influence and restrain the 
individuals' ones: 
Ontological narratives, then, are dependent on and informed by the collective narratives in 
which they are situated. But they are also crucial for the elaboration and maintenance of 
these same narratives. In the first instance, shared narratives, the stories that are told and 
retold by numerous members of a society over a long period of time, provide the blueprints 
for ontological narratives, including the blueprints for the social roles and spaces that an 
individual can inhabit. Indeed, we are as constrained by these shared narratives as by 
concrete forms of oppression from which we might suffer on a daily basis
428
. 
In the case of Dr. Nivien Saleh, her ontological narrative is retold in her personal 
professional website
429
 in which she identifies herself as a bicultural person, who has 
managed to coalesce Islamic and secular European elements: 
Born to a mother from the Black Forest and a father from Alexandria, Egypt, she grew up on 
the German-Swiss border. By blending the starkly divergent backgrounds of her parents, she 
developed a bicultural perspective that combines Islamic Middle Eastern and secular 
European ideas and that shapes her writings to this day
430
. 
In this sense, it is possible to imagine that her personal narrative is influenced by at 
least two different cultural stances, that she herself describes as divergent.  
From her introduction, it is also possible to infer her personal and professional 
interest with reference to democracy, since she also writes: «She is an expert on the 
politics and culture of the Middle East, ways of democratizing governance at the 
                                                         
426
 Whitebrook, 2001:24, in Baker, 2006: 104,0/630. 
427
 Ewick & Silbey 1995:211–212, in Baker, 2006: 104,0/630.  
428
 Baker, 2006:104,0/630. 
429
 Saleh, http://niviensaleh.info/, last accessed: 21/02/2015. 
430
 Saleh, http://niviensaleh.info/about/, last accessed: 21/02/2015. 
257 
 
national and global level, and the use of information technology for advancing 
democracy»
431
. Furthermore, her position on democracy can be easily observed in her 
brief description of her 2010 work 'Third World Citizens and the Information 
Technology Revolution'
432
:  
Its major finding is that the rule-making processes of the information technology revolution 
have profoundly disenfranchised the residents of poorer world regions and in particular of 
Egypt. If Third World citizens are to be empowered, the solution must go beyond support for 
democracy at the national level. It must include democratization of global governance as 
well
433
. 
Her view of democracy could be defined as a 'progressive narrative' which  «depicts a 
pattern of change for the better»
434
 and «offers the opportunity for people to see 
themselves and their environment as capable of improvement»
435
. Another aspect that 
should be observed is the fact that Saleh is an Assistant Professor of Global Studies at 
the Thunderbird School of Global Management in the United States, Arizona, and, as 
such, she is a member of the American academic scholarship that actively contributes 
to the redefinition and discussion of the concept of democracy in the contemporary 
political thought. In her website, Saleh proposes a translation into English of the 2012 
Egyptian Constitution
436
.  
Baker explains that ontological narratives usually tend to be «in line with specific 
collective narratives» to support and legitimize them. However, she also argues that 
«personal narratives can be deliberately used to unsettle the social order. They can be 
'rescued' and emphasised in order to resist dominant narratives, to elaborate an 
alternative narrative of the world»
437
. In analysing Saleh's translation, it seems 
relevant to classify textual elements into two different categories. 
The first series of aspects deals with formal and paratextual features. According to 
Baker, translators  
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resort to various strategies to strengthen or undermine particular aspects of the narratives 
they mediate, explicitly or implicitly. These strategies allow them to dissociate themselves 
from the narrative position of the author or speaker or, alternatively, to signal their empathy 
with it.  
To this regard, translators can «accentuate, undermine or modify aspects of the 
narrative(s) encoded in the source text or utterance». Considering Saleh's translation, 
a relevant feature is the translator's 'repositioning in paratextual commentary', which 
according to Baker allows the translator to take a stance in a specific collective 
narrative: «introductions, prefaces, footnotes, glossaries [...] are among the numerous 
sites available to translators for repositioning themselves, their readers and other 
participants in time and space»
438
. With this regard, Saleh introduces her translation 
by openly explaining the reason why she decided to translate the Constitution: 
After reading an English translation of the constitution that Egypt Independent published in 
stages beginning November 30, 2012, the day the constitutional assembly adopted the final 
draft, I was startled by critical comments that people who had read both the original and 
English versions made in the feedback section of the page. In hindsight I believe that this 
translation – an excellent one considering that it was produced on the fly – was actually of an 
earlier constitutional draft. 
So I decided to do my own translation. Its source is a document I downloaded 
from AlJazeera Mubasher – or AlJazeera Live. AlJazeera Mubasher posted it on November 
30, 2012, affirming that it was indeed the final draft. 
  
So does the constitution deserve the bad reputation it has had among rights activists? I 
suggest you judge for yourself!
439
 
From the preceding introduction, it is possible to conclude that Saleh decided to 
translate the Constitution because she was surprised by the generally negative and 
critical reactions to the approval of the Constitution. In the last paragraph, the 
rhetorical question: «So does the constitution deserve the bad reputation it has had 
among rights activists?», appears to be conducive to conclude that she generally 
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thinks that rights activists who criticised the Constitution overstated its failing to 
respect human rights. 
Another interesting reflection on the formal plane is her choice to make the 
translation hyperlinked so that one could navigate within and outside the website to 
easily reach other texts related to the debate. Such feature suggests that readers could 
be free to choose the topics they are interested into and opens up to the possibility to 
reconstruct the debate over the constitution in a more independent fashion. This sense 
of openness to opinion formation is also present in her final invitation: «I suggest you 
judge for yourself!». However, this aspect contributes to establish a sense of freedom 
of choice that is also fostered by the idea that Saleh's translation is a transparent and 
objective rendition. Readers are thus encouraged to assume that her translation is the 
direct equivalent of the Egyptian Constitution. 
 The second sets of reflections are more specifically related to the translation 
of Article 6 in Chapter 1 of the Constitution in which the form of government is 
defined as based on the 'principles of democracy and shūrā, and citizenship'440. 
Nivien Saleh's translation of those words is the following: «based on the principles of 
democracy, consultation (shura), and citizenship», with the bracketed word 'shura' 
hyperlinked and sending to the English Wikipedia page for 'shura'. It appears to be 
significant to consider Saleh's translation of these words with reference to the feature 
of 'relativity' or 'hermeneutic composability' mentioned above. Baker argues that 
translators «necessarily reconstruct narratives by weaving together relatively or 
considerably new configurations in every act of translation». As a consequence, 
translators, according to their personal standing with regard to the text that they have 
to translate, choose the appropriate strategy to support or question the narratives 
inscribed in the source text. To this extent, translating the Constitution into another 
language and culture «inevitably results in a form of 'contamination', whereby the 
original narrative itself may be threatened with dilution or change». On the other 
hand, however, it is not always the case that keeping some concepts unchanged in the 
source language would not limit their loss of meaning, since readers of the translated 
texts, will try to find a consistent interpretation of such unknown foreign terms. In 
this sense,  
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retaining key concepts in a foreign language cannot suppress relationality and its 
consequences. For one thing, foreign words simply get pressed into service as another 
resource for addressing existing needs, as elaborated in local narratives
441
.  
Far from considering such process that we could call cultural translation good or bad 
in itself, Baker argues that «relationality functions both as a constraint and as a 
resource for elaborating new narratives»
442
. In this sense, «the use of this one element 
from the narrative world of the target culture triggers a set of interpretations that are a 
function of its own relational context in the public narratives of the target readers»
443
. 
In the case of Saleh's translation of the Constitution, it seems plausible to say that she 
translates 'shura' with 'consultation', to provide an immediate meaning to the readers, 
so that they can directly relate the word 'consultation' to the similar 'democracy' in 
terms of their cultural context. Moreover, in order to limit contamination of an 
Islamic politically-relevant term, she adds in brackets the transliterated Arabic word 
'shura'. Furthermore, since the Arabic word could sound foreign, but still not 
necessarily Islamic and political to some readers, she also hyperlinks the word 
sending it to the Wikipedia explanation of 'shūrā'. It thus seems reasonable to assume 
that in providing a translation of 'shūrā' as 'consultation', while still introducing 
reference to the Islamic principles more explicitly, Saleh is attempting to further 
disseminate the debate that stemmed from the comparison between democracy and 
shura that could be unknown to other people.  
To provisionally sum up the analysis carried out so far, it could be concluded that, 
based on formal and substantive findings, Saleh's translation of the Egyptian 
Constitution conveys a notion of democracy that supports the public narrative of the 
Muslim Brothers. 
In the next paragraph, the analysis carried out so far will be placed into a broader 
context to show the consequences of such politics of translation and to highlight the 
import and relevance of the translational study of political concepts. 
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3 .3 .3  Conc lud ing  rema rks  on  the  ana ly s i s  
 
 Democracy nowadays has become a undisputable concept that, to a greater or 
lesser extent, influences political systems throughout the world. In a more inclusive 
fashion, democracy is considered a universal value that everybody should pursue and 
foster in order to gain freedom and equality. In this sense, only democratic regimes, 
states and governments are thought to grant freedom and equality to their citizens, 
also resulting to be the only good political institutions. The standards that anyone 
should abide by in order to be deemed democratic are devised according to the 
normative political theory of liberal democracy. Such notion of democracy proposes 
to evaluate the degree of democracy of a country based on what are claimed to be 
objective and value-free standards, ultimately arguing for their compatibility with the 
whole variety of differences and values globally. However, when such standards have 
come to be applied with the aim of democratising other countries, various difficulties 
and considerable resistance have arisen, also uncovering problems in dealing with 
other kinds of internal 'national' diversities.  
Even if the concept of democracy has always been a contested one, a new wave of 
criticisms was initiated in the late twentieth century, proposing to redefine such 
standards in a more inclusive way. This was the case with the notion of deliberative 
and participatory democracy, Bell's concept of illiberal democracy and the notion of 
Islamic democracy in the Middle East; as well as the questioning of the normative 
political theory by the Indian and the Latin American subaltern groups.  
In the present work, a translational approach has been used to study how such 
criticisms try to gain more relevance in the international arena, thus attempting to 
redefine the notion of democracy in a more inclusive manner. With this regard, the 
process of redefinition of the concept of democracy has been examined through 
translation and transfer into different cultural settings. What follows is a brief account 
of the outcomes produced by translational analysis of a single case, namely the 
concept of democracy in the 2012 Egyptian Constitution and in its translation into 
English by doctor Nivien Saleh.  
The case considered here shows one of the possible ways in which the universal 
secular notion of democracy can be inscribed into a local political context, namely the 
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Egyptian constitutional narrative into Arabic, thus being also partly redefined and 
adjusted to local political demands. Furthermore, its retranslation into English has 
been studied as a means to propose a concept of democracy, reshaped by a different 
political understanding, so that it could survive at an international level and get to 
influence the concept of universal secular democracy. Such process is visually 
represented in Figure 1 below and can be summed up as follows, along two loosely 
defined trajectories. 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 Firstly, the meta-narrative of democracy as a secular universal value that 
influences the notion of good government of each individual, in Egypt, affects 
political thinkers in the twentieth century. Such political scholars and intellectuals 
produce different public and collective narratives to adapt the notion of democracy as 
a universal secular value to the current political situation of the country. One of such 
public narratives is that of the Society of the Muslim Brothers, which, since its 
founding by Hasan Al-Banna in 1928 and throughout the twentieth century, has 
undergone changing fortunes. Having been constituted as a mass movement inspired 
by the return to the principles of Islam in order to counter the cultural and political 
profligacy of modernization, the Society of the Muslim Brothers has gradually 
evolved into a proper political party, highly knowledgeable about procedural electoral 
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politics. Further than that, the Muslim Brothers have created a public narrative that is 
deeply connected with the emerging Islamic liberal thought, while seeking 
compatibility of Islamic principles with democracy. Their current public narrative is 
thus disseminated to a large part of the population and strengthened thanks to the 
engagement of grassroots cultural, religious and political movements during the 
1980s and 1990s. Such electoral politics has brought the Muslim Brothers to be the 
strongest opposition party in 2011, and, after the Egyptian Revolution, it has allowed 
the Freedom and Justice Party to win the presidential elections with their candidate 
Muhammad Morsi. As a result, the Muslim Brothers, inspired by liberal political 
thought, in the 2012 Egyptian Constitution have recurred to relationality to propound 
a form of government based on the principles of democracy and shūrā. Such 
document results to be in line with their public narrative of compatibility and 
officially legitimates their Islamic political import.  
 The second narrative line entails the translation of the 2012 Egyptian 
Constitution by the German-Egyptian scholar Nivien Saleh. Following  her blended 
Islamic and secular European political convictions on democracy, and agreeing on the 
worth of the Muslim Brothers' public narrative, Saleh decides to create an English 
version of the Constitution in her personal professional website. Such translation aims 
at making the 2012 Egyptian Constitution more accessible to its detractors, hoping to 
provide a more informed and comprehensive account of such public narrative. The 
Egyptian Constitution has thus been translated into English and devised in order to 
foster its dissemination through the narrative features of repositioning and relativity 
in translation. With regard to repositioning, Saleh has openly explained the reason for 
translating the Constitution and has created a broadly hyperlinked version of the 
document that includes further information on traditional Islamic political concepts 
and on the ongoing debate on the 2012 Egyptian Constitution. As for the translation 
of the article related to the form of government based on the principles of democracy 
and shūrā, she has provided an educational version in which an English term 
'consultation' is accompanied by the transliterated and bracketed 'shura', hyperlinked 
to its English Wikipedia explanation. Considering that Saleh works at an American 
prominent academic institution with a focus on Global Management, in which she is 
an Assistant Professor of Global Studies, her translation of the Egyptian Constitution 
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could be plausibly considered as an example of resistant ontological narrative. This is 
because in a traditional American academic setting the mainstream notion of 
democracy could be expected to be a secularised one, usually incompatible with 
Islamic principles. Finally, her intervention in support of the Muslim Brothers' public 
narrative could be well inscribed into a developing shared narrative that accepts 
'moderate' Islamist political thought as a relevant political interlocutor with 
mainstream liberal democracy, with which, given her initial statements on her 
personal website, she is expected to be in close contact. In this sense, she could also 
be considered to be in a favourable position to influence the ongoing process of 
redefinition of the meta-narrative of secular universal democracy based on current 
Islamic liberal thought that, to varying degrees, purports the compatibility of Islamic 
and democratic principles. 
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Conclusions 
 
 The ongoing debate over the compatibility of Islam with democracy and about 
the possibility to carry on the process of democratisation in the Middle East in general 
and in the Arab countries in particular encompasses a variety of positions, opinions 
and convictions
1
. The present work does not aim at demonstrating the validity of any 
of such stances, but it rather assumes that it is impossible and yet at the same time of 
little help to find out whether such political, cultural and religious concepts are 
compatible or not. In this sense, it seems more interesting to assume that their 
compatibility can be both argued for and against at the same time, depending on the 
political and economic demands of local groups and individuals.  
Drawing on such assumption, this work rather suggests that firstly the question of 
compatibility presupposes the will to extend certain democratic models and concepts 
to contexts in which such forms of government are not perceived to be present and 
operating.  
Secondly, such transfer of political concepts into different cultural settings should not 
be considered as a value-free linguistic translation, nor as a neutral way to enhance 
common political understanding or promote the common good. Rather, the very fact 
that such supposedly scientific equivalence is ensured and perceived to be as such is a 
consequence of the political imports of translation. With this regard, equivalence is 
illusorily established to extend the meaning of a concept to other contexts also 
determining a change in its descriptive potentials. This also entails a will to control 
what is recognised as other which exists not only in the economic, cultural, and 
political fields, but first and foremost in language.  
In his 1970 paper 'Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics'
2
, Giovanni Sartori 
argues against what he calls 'conceptual stretching, or straining' in the comparative 
studies of political concepts. According to him, the use of vague and loosely distinct 
categories devised by social scientists to define political concepts and ultimately to 
include foreign contexts and experiences denotes a lack of awareness in research 
methodology. In his view, this process would result in such indeterminacy that might 
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make political concepts lose their original meaning thus being of little use for 
empirical research.  
From a linguistics perspective, however, a language's tendency to change could also 
be interpreted as a way of adjusting words to the changing world in which individuals 
live. Political scientists, as any other individuals, might feel the need to rediscuss 
traditional categories in order to include those differences that they perceive to be 
politically relevant
3
. Language change, as well as the ongoing redefinition of 
categories, could thus be considered as an incessant process of modification that 
contributes to the establishment and extension of certain politically-relevant values.  
In addition, as also Sartori puts it, the will to extend and contaminate other cultural 
contexts could be conceived as a means to control otherness and newness. Such 
determinations and actualisations of language in translation however should not only 
be considered part of a neocolonial imposition coming from the most powerful 
countries to the detriment of the colonised ones, but rather as a two-way strategy for 
the political exchange of meanings and political significance as well as power and 
resources
4
.  
With this regard, even though it is possible to recognise an asymmetrical distribution 
of power, strategies of resistance should not be disregarded nor underrated since they 
make it possible to negotiate the meaning of key internationally-recognised political 
concepts
5
, thus contributing to change, or, as Sartori would put it, stretch the shared 
meaning of a concept. The case study considered in this work is only one example of 
how the renegotiation of meaning takes place in ways that, despite their revealing 
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Browers, 2006:216).  
5
 Esposito & Voll, 1996 state the importance to learn from the competing definitions of democracy, 
including the notion of 'Islamic democracy'. 
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patterns of asymmetrical power relations, cannot be completely predicted, 
determined, and controlled. 
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PREAMBLE 
We the People of Egypt, 
In the name of God, the Merciful, and with His assistance, state: 
This is our Constitution, the document of the revolution of January 25, 2012, which our 
youth began, around which our People gathered, and with which our armed forces sided. 
Having rejected in Tahrir Square and across the country all forms of injustice, subjugation, 
tyranny, despotism, exclusion, plunder, corruption, and monopoly; 
Having publicly claimed our right to “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice, and Human Dignity” 
through the blood of our martyrs, the pain of our injured, the dreams of our children, and the 
struggle of our men and women; 
Having regained the spirit of our mighty culture and our luminous history – we constructed 
the most ancient of states on the banks of the eternal Nile, one that knew the meanings of 
citizenship, equality, and absence of discrimination, and that gave the world its first alphabet, 
launched the monotheistic faith, established the knowledge of the Creator, embraced God’s 
prophets and heavenly messages, and embellished the pages of human history with a parade 
of inventions -; 
Continuing our pure revolution that united Egyptians in order to build a modern democratic 
state; 
Declare our adherence to these principles: . 
First: The People is the source of all powers. It generates the powers; they derive their 
legality from the People and are subject to its will. The responsibilities and authorizations 
that these powers entail are a duty one fulfills, not a privilege behind which one hides. 
Second: The system of government is democratic. It entrenches the peaceful transfer of 
power and deepens pluralism in politics and among parties. It includes fair elections and the 
People’s contribution to national decisions. 
Third: The dignity of the person is equivalent to the dignity of the homeland. There is, 
moreover, no dignity for a homeland in which the woman does not enjoy dignity; for women 
are the sisters of men and partners with respect to national achievements and responsibilities. 
Fourth: Freedom of thought, creativity, opinion, housing and property is a right. So is the 
freedom to choose between staying in a place or leaving. The Creator rooted this freedom in 
the movement of the cosmos and in human nature. 
Fifth: Equality of opportunity is there for all, both for male and female citizens. There is no 
discrimination, intercession, or favoritism when it comes to rights and duties. 
Sixth: The rule of law is the foundation for individual freedom, the legitimacy of power, and 
the state’s respect for the law. No voice will drown out the force of what is right. The 
judiciary is independent and has the supreme task to protect the Constitution, carry the scales 
of justice, and guard rights and freedoms. 
Seventh: National unity is a duty. It is the cornerstone on top of which the modern Egyptian 
state and its movement toward progress and development are built. It is solidified by the 
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values of tolerance, justice, and moderation, and by the guarantee of rights and freedoms for 
all citizens without discrimination. 
Eighth: Defending the homeland is an honor and an obligation. Our armed forces are a 
neutral, professional national institution that does not interfere in the political process. It is 
the country’s defensive shield. 
Ninth: Security is a great blessing. It is guaranteed by a police that works for the sake and 
protection of the People. The police imposes justice, for there is no justice without security 
and no security without security institutions that respect human dignity and the rule of law. 
Tenth: Unity is the hope of the Arab community (umma). It is history’s call, an invitation 
into the future, and a fixed destiny. It is strengthened by integration and friendly cooperation 
with the states of the Nile basin and the Islamic world, both being a natural extension of 
Egypt’s strategic status and the venue through which Egypt claims its place in the world. 
Eleventh: Egypt’s intellectual and cultural leadership express the nation’s soft power. They 
also form a model of providing by granting freedom to creators, intellectuals, universities, 
scientific and linguistic associations, research centers, journalism, arts and letters, the media, 
the national Church, and lastly the noble Azhar, which throughout history has been 
responsible for shaping the identity of our homeland, has served as patron to the eternal 
Arabic language and the glorious law of Islam (sharia), and stood as a beacon for moderate, 
enlightened thought. 
We the People of Egypt, 
Believing in God and His messages, 
Recognizing our responsibility towards the homeland and the (Arabic or Islamic) community 
(umma), 
Conscious of our national and human responsibility, 
Commit to being guided by the principles of this Constitution, which we adopt and grant 
ourselves, affirming our steadfast determination to submit to it and defend it, and pledging 
that all state authorities as well as the People shall guard and respect it. 
 
PART ONE: ELEMENTS OF STATE AND SOCIETY 
C h a p t e r  1 :  P o l i t i ca l  E l e m e n t s  
Article 1 
The Arab Republic of Egypt is an independent, united sovereign state that cannot be divided. 
Its system is democratic. 
The Egyptian People forms part of both the Arab and the Islamic community (umma). It is 
proud to belong to the Nile basin and the African continent, reach into Asia, and contribute 
positively to human civilization. 
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Article 2 
Islam is the state’s religion, and Arabic is its official language. The principles of Islamic law 
(sharia) form the main source of legislation. 
Article 3 
For Egyptian Christians and Jews, the principles of their religious law will be the main source 
in regulating their personal status, matters pertaining to their religion, and the selection of 
their spiritual leadership. 
Article 4 
The noble Azhar is an independent Islamic institution of higher learning. It handles all its 
affairs without outside interference. It leads the call into Islam and assumes responsibility for 
religious studies and the Arabic language in Egypt and the world. The Azhar’s Body of 
Senior Scholars is to be consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law (sharia). 
The state guarantees the financial means needed to fulfill these tasks. 
The Sheikh of the Azhar is independent and cannot be dismissed from his position. The law 
determines the process by which he is selected from among the members of the Body of 
Senior Scholars. 
All this will proceed as stipulated by law. 
Article 5 
Sovereignty belongs to the People. The People will practice and protect it and preserve 
Egypt’s national unity. The People is the source of power, as stipulated in the provisions of 
the Constitution. 
Article 6 
The political system is based on the principles of democracy, consultation (shura), and 
citizenship, which together regulate public rights and duties among the citizens. It is also 
based on pluralism in politics and among parties, the peaceful transfer of power, the 
separation and balance of powers, the rule of law, as well as respect for human rights and 
freedoms; all this happens according to the provisions of this Constitution. 
No political party may be based on discrimination of gender or origin or religion. 
Article 7 
Keeping the nation safe is an honor and a sacred obligation, so is the defense of the homeland 
and the protection of its soil. Armed service is compulsory, as regulated by law. 
 
C h a p t e r  2 :  S o c i e ta l  a n d  M o ra l  E le m en t s  
Article 8 
The state guarantees the ways of realizing justice, equality and freedom. It commits itself to 
facilitating the expression of compassion and solidarity among members of society. It 
guarantees the protection of individuals and their families and of property. It works toward 
securing the basic necessities for all citizens, as prescribed by law. 
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Article 9 
The state commits itself to providing security, tranquility and equality of opportunity for all 
citizens, without discrimination. 
Article 10 
The family is the foundation of society. The family’s foundations are religion, morality, and 
patriotism. 
Both state and society seek to preserve the inherent character of the Egyptian family, its 
cohesion, stability, and moral character, and to protect the family as specified by law. 
The state guarantees mother-and-child services that are free of charge and pledges to 
reconcile the woman’s duties toward her family with her work in the public sphere. 
The state provides special protections for female breadwinners, divorced women, and 
widows. 
Article 11 
The state promotes morality, decency, and public order, as well as a high level of education 
and religious and patriotic values, scientific truths, the Arab culture, and the historical and 
civilizational patrimony of the People. 
All this as specified by law. 
Article 12 
The state protects society’s culture and language and works toward the Arabization of 
teaching, the sciences, and the nation’s knowledge base, as specified by law. 
Article 13 
The introduction of civilian rank titles is forbidden. 
 
C h a p t e r  3 :  E co n o m i c  E le m en t s  
Article 14 
The national economy aims at steady and comprehensive development, at elevating the 
standard of living and realizing welfare, at combatting poverty and unemployment, and at 
increasing job opportunities, production, and national income. 
The development plan works toward establishing social justice and solidarity, guaranteeing 
distributive justice, protecting the rights of the consumer, safeguarding the rights of the 
workers, engendering cooperation between capital and labor in defraying the costs of 
development, and ensuring a fair distribution of income. 
Earnings must be linked to production; income disparities must be lessened; a minimum level 
for earnings and pensions enabling a life of dignity for every citizen must be guaranteed, as 
well as an income cap for state agencies. There can be no exceptions unless this is grounded 
in law. 
Article 15 
Agriculture is an essential element of the national economy. The state commits itself to the 
protection of agricultural land and its reclamation. It works toward developing and protecting 
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crops, vegetables, animal products, and the abundance of fish. It will realize food security and 
provide what is required for agricultural production, improving its management and 
marketing, and supporting the agri-industry. 
The law regulates the use of state land in a way that realizes social justice and protects both 
the farmer and agricultural worker from exploitation. 
Article 16 
The state commits itself to developing the countryside and the desert and works toward 
raising the standard of living of farmers and desert dwellers. 
Article 17 
Industry is an essential component of the national economy. The state protects strategic 
industries, supports industrial development, and guarantees the introduction of modern 
technologies and their applications. 
The state sponsors both craft industries and small enterprises. 
Article 18 
The People owns the state’s natural wealth and is entitled to its returns. The state commits 
itself to safeguarding this wealth and its proper use and to respecting the rights of future 
generations. 
The disbursement of state funds, permission of their use, and privatization of public land and 
facilities are prohibited except for purposes specifically permitted by law. 
The state owns any property lacking an owner. 
Article 19 
The River Nile and its water constitute national wealth. The state commits itself to 
safeguarding and developing it and to prohibiting its abuse. The law specifies the ways of 
utilizing it. 
Article 20 
The state commits itself to protecting its beaches, oceans, waterways, and lakes; it guarantees 
the maintenance of monuments and nature reserves and the removal of whatever encroaches 
on them illegally. 
Article 21 
The state guarantees legal ownership, be it public, cooperative, private, or in the form 
ofreligious endowments, and protects it, as specified by law. 
Article 22 
The public funds are inviolable. Protecting them is a national obligation both for the state and 
society. 
Article 23 
The state sponsors cooperatives in all their forms, supports them, and guarantees their 
independence. 
Article 24 
Private property is inviolable. Managed ethically and without monopoly, it fulfills its societal 
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function by serving the national economy. The right to inherit private property is guaranteed. 
Property may only be confiscated in circumstances specified by law. This requires a court 
ruling and is permissible only if doing so is in the public interest and fair compensation is 
provided upfront. 
All this happens as specified by law. 
Article 25 
The state commits itself to reviving and encouraging the system of religious endowments. 
The law regulates religious endowments. 
It defines the process for founding them, administering their assets, investing these assets, 
and distributing their returns among the beneficiaries according to the rules specific to each 
endowment. 
Article 26 
Social justice is the cornerstone for assessing taxes and other ways of defraying public costs. 
The creation, amendment, and cancellation of the tax code can only happen through law. 
Only under circumstances specified by law may a taxpayer be exempted from taxation; and 
no one must be charged beyond these taxes and fees unless the law permits it. 
Article 27 
The workers have a share in the management of projects and their earnings. They commit 
themselves to developing production, safeguarding its tools, and carrying out the production 
plan in their work units, as stipulated by law. 
The number of worker representatives in the management assemblies of the public sector 
units must approximate fifty percent of total elected members. 
The law guarantees that small farmers and small craftsmen are represented with at least 80 
percent membership in the management assemblies of agricultural and industrial 
cooperatives. 
Article 28 
The state encourages the practice of saving and protects the savings and assets of insurance 
and retirement providers. 
This is regulated by law. 
Article 29 
Nationalization is illegal unless it occurs for the public good, in compliance with the law, and 
with fair compensation. 
Article 30 
The confiscation of public property is forbidden. 
The confiscation of private property is illegal unless it occurs with a court order. 
 
PART TWO: RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
C h a p t e r  1 :  P e r so n a l  R ig h t s  
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Article 31 
Every person is entitled to dignity. Society and state both guarantee that it will be respected 
and protected. 
No person must suffer insult or scorn. 
Article 32 
The Egyptian citizenship is a right. It is regulated by law. 
Article 33 
The citizens enjoy equality before the law. They have identical rights and public duties. There 
is no discrimination among them. 
Article 34 
Personal freedom is a natural right. It is inviolable and untouchable. 
Article 35 
Unless caught in the act, a person can only be arrested, searched, jailed, prevented from 
travel, or in any other way restricted in his freedom if doing so follows a court order. 
Anyone whose freedom has been curtailed is entitled to receive a written notice listing the 
reasons within twelve hours. Within 24 hours of the curtailment of his freedom, a person 
must be brought before the investigating authority. This must happen in the presence of his 
attorney. If he does not have an attorney, one will be provided for him. 
Anyone whose freedom has been constrained, and anyone else, has the right to lodge a 
complaint before the judge in regards to this procedure and receive a decision within a week. 
If a decision has not been issued within that time, the person must be released. 
The law specifies the rules for detention, its duration, its reasons, and for the right to 
compensation either for temporary detention or for the completion of a sentence that a court 
has revoked. 
Article 36 
Anyone who has been arrested, jailed, or restricted in his freedom in any form is entitled to 
being treated in a way that respects his dignity. He must not be tortured, threatened, or 
degraded. He must not be harmed physically or mentally. 
He must only be detained or jailed in locations that are hygienic and becoming to a human 
being and that are under judicial supervision. 
Any deviation from these instructions is a crime that will be punished, as stipulated by law. 
Any statement made under such illegal circumstances or elicited under threat of such 
circumstances shall be considered null and void. 
Article 37 
Prison is a place of correction, reformation, and rehabilitation. It is under judicial supervision. 
In it, anything that violates human dignity or exposes an inmate to health risks is forbidden. 
The state is responsible for the rehabilitation of the sentenced. Upon release, it eases their 
transition into a life of dignity. 
340 
 
Article 38 
Citizens’ private life is inviolable, and respect for its secrecy is guaranteed. Postal messages, 
telegrams, electronic messages, phone conversations, and other means of communication 
must not be intercepted or inspected. Only under circumstances specified by law and with a 
court order may they be intercepted for a defined duration. 
Article 39 
Homes are inviolable. Unless there is imminent danger, they must only be entered, searched, 
or put under surveillance under circumstances specified by law and with a court order that 
defines the place, time, and purpose of the intrusion. Before entry and search a warning must 
be issued to whomever is in the home. 
Article 40 
Living in safety is a right. The state guarantees it to anyone living on its soil. The law protects 
the human being from any criminal threats. 
Article 41 
The human body is inviolable, and trade in its parts is prohibited. No medical or scientific 
experiments may be carried out on it unless the person’s free consent has been reliably 
obtained. Such experiments must be grounded in the stable foundations of the medical 
sciences. Details are stipulated by law. 
Article 42 
The freedom of movement and the choice to stay or leave are guaranteed. 
No citizen may be removed from the state’s territory or be prohibited from returning to it. He 
must not be prohibited from leaving the state, and he is under no obligation to reside on its 
territory against his will, unless by court order and for a limited time. 
 
C h a p t e r  2 :  C i v i l  a n d  P o l i t i ca l  R ig h t s  
Article 43 
The freedom of belief is inviolable. 
The state guarantees the right to practice one’s religious rites and establish places of worship 
for the heavenly religions. Details are specified by law. 
Article 44 
It is forbidden to insult any messengers or prophets. 
Article 45 
The freedom of thought and opinion are guaranteed. 
Every person has the right to express his opinion in speaking, writing, image, or otherwise. 
Article 46 
Every citizens has the right to creative expression in its various forms. 
The state promotes the sciences and the arts and letters. It sponsors creators and inventors, 
protects their creations and innovations, and works toward applying these creations for the 
good of society. 
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The state takes the necessary measures for preserving the nation’s cultural heritage and works 
toward spreading cultural services. 
Article 47 
Citizens have the right to access information, data, statistics, and documents, and to disclose 
and circulate them. The state guarantees this right. The right is constrained by the 
inviolability of private life, the rights of others, and exigencies of national security. 
The law specifies the principles by which public documents are accessed and archived. It 
determines how information is acquired and complaints against information denials are 
lodged. It also specifies how accountability for such denials is established. 
Article 48 
The freedom of journalism, the press, the publishing industry, broadcasting, and other media 
is guaranteed. Their free and independent message serves society, expressing, forming, and 
directing public opinion. All this happens within the framework of the essential elements of 
state and society, the preservation of rights, freedoms, and societal duties, respect for the 
sanctity of citizens’ private lives, and the requirements of national security. It is forbidden to 
censor, terminate, or sequester the media without a court ruling. It is illegal to censor material 
that the media are putting out. An exception is limited censorship in times of war or public 
mobilization. 
Article 49 
The right to issue and own newspapers in all their forms is guaranteed to any natural or legal 
Egyptian person that provides notification. 
The law regulates the establishment of broadcasting and television stations as well as digital 
and other media. 
Article 50 
The citizens have the right to organize public gatherings and engage in peaceful, unarmed 
demonstrations. This requires a notification as stipulated by law. 
The right to private gatherings is guaranteed, and no notification is necessary. Security 
personnel must not be in attendance, nor may they eavesdrop on the gatherings. 
Article 51 
The citizens have the right to create associations, institutions, and parties. Only notification is 
necessary. They practice their activities freely and are legal persons. 
The authorities are prohibited from dissolving their administrative organs unless under court 
order. This is specified by law. 
Article 52 
The freedom to establish syndicates, unions, and cooperatives is guaranteed. They are legal 
persons, arise from democratic foundations, and freely engage in their activities. They serve 
society, raise the level of competence among its members, and defend their rights. 
Only in execution of a court ruling may the authorities dissolve them or their management 
assemblies. 
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Article 53 
The law regulates the professional syndicates and ensures their democratic management. It 
defines their financial resources and the method by which syndicate members, in exercise of 
their professional activities, are held to high ethical standards. There can be only one 
professional syndicate per profession. 
Only in execution of a court ruling may the authorities dissolve a syndicate’s management 
assembly, and they may not put them under surveillance. 
Article 54 
Each person has the right to petition the public authorities in writing and with his own 
signature. Only associations that are legal persons can have an individual submit a petition on 
their behalf. 
Article 55 
It is a national duty for citizens to participate in public life. Every citizen has the right to vote, 
run for election, and express his opinion through a referendum. The law specifies these rights. 
The state commits itself to entering each citizen who is eligible to vote into the voter registry 
without requiring an application. 
The state guarantees the peacefulness and integrity of referenda and elections. State organs 
that interfere in these processes with the goal of influencing them are committing crimes 
punishable by law. 
Article 56 
The state represents and protects the interests of citizens living abroad, and it guarantees their 
rights and freedoms and holds them to fulfilling their public duties towards the Egyptian state 
and Egyptian society. It encourages their contribution to developing the homeland. 
The law regulates their participation in elections and referenda. 
Article 57 
The state grants asylum to foreigners deprived in their home country of rights and freedoms 
that are guaranteed by the Constitution. 
The extradition of political refugees is prohibited. 
Details are specified by law. 
 
C h a p t e r  3 :  E co n o m i c  a n d  S o c ia l  R ig h t s  
Article 58 
Every citizen has the right to a high-quality education. It is provided free of charge at its 
various levels at all state-owned educational institutions. Basic education is mandatory. The 
state takes all necessary measures to make higher educational stages mandatory as well. 
The state supports and encourages technical education. It oversees all aspects of education 
and allocates to it a sufficient share of the national budget. 
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All educational institutions, be they public, private, communal, or a combination thereof, 
commit themselves to the state’s educational plan and its goals. All this happens to enhance 
the linkage between education and the needs of both society and production. 
Article 59 
The freedom of scientific research is guaranteed. Universities, scientific and linguistic 
associations, as well as scientific research institutes are independent. The state assigns them 
an adequate share of the national budget. 
Article 60 
The Arabic language is an essential subject in the various stages of education. This applies to 
all educational institutions. Religious education as well as national history form essential 
subjects at all levels preceding the university. 
The universities commit themselves to teaching the norms and ethical foundations at the heart 
of their various scientific specializations. 
Article 61 
The state commits itself to devising a comprehensive plan for combatting illiteracy among 
males and females, spanning the age groups. It works towards eradicating its causes. With 
participation from society, it implements the plan within ten years from the date this 
Constitution enters into effect. 
Article 62 
Every citizen has the right to health care, and the state assigns a sufficient share of the 
national budget to its provision. The state commits itself to providing health care services and 
health insurance through a system that is both just and of high quality. These services will be 
free of charge to those unable to pay. 
All health establishments commit themselves to providing emergency treatment in its various 
forms to every citizen. 
The state supervises all health establishments and ensures the quality of their services. It also 
supervises all resources, products, and forms of communication having to do with health. 
It initiates the pertinent legislation and takes all necessary measures to accomplish its 
supervisory mandate. 
Article 63 
Every person has the right to a healthy, undamaged environment. The state commits itself to 
the inviolability of the environment and its protection against pollution. It also commits itself 
to using natural resources in a way that will not harm the environment and to preserving the 
rights of all generations to it. 
Article 64 
Work constitutes a right, a duty, and an honor for every citizen. The state guarantees it on the 
basis of equality, justice, and equality of opportunity. 
Forced labor is permissible only to the extent stipulated by law. 
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The public servant works to serve the People; the state awards government employment to 
citizens according to merit, without favoritism. Any deviation from this is a crime punishable 
by law. 
The state guarantees every worker’s right to a fair income and vacation days. It also 
guarantees pensions, social security, health care, protection against occupational hazards, the 
availability of safety provisions in the work place, in accordance with the law. 
Workers may only be fired under circumstances that are specified by law. 
Peaceful strike is a right, regulated by law. 
Article 65 
The state honors those who fell or were injured during the January 25 Revolution, during the 
wars, or while otherwise serving in the line of duty. It guarantees the necessary care for their 
families, the injured themselves, the veterans, the families of those who went missing in 
action during the wars and similar situations. They, their children, and their spouses have 
priority in employment. 
Details are specified by law. 
Article 66 
The state guarantees social insurance services. 
Every citizen has the right to social security, which guarantees a minimum level of 
sustenance, if he does not have the means to provide for himself or his family, is unable to 
work, unemployed, or of old age. 
Article 67 
The state works toward providing adequate pensions for small farmers, non-unionized 
agricultural workers, and all those who lack access to the system of social security. 
Details are specified by law. 
Article 68 
Adequate housing, clean water, and healthy nourishment are guaranteed rights. 
The state issues a national housing plan. Its cornerstones are social justice, the encouragement 
of individual initiative, and housing cooperatives; The state uses state land for purposes of 
construction if doing so advances the public good and preserves the rights of future 
generations. 
Article 69 
Physical exercise is a right for all. 
It is the task of both state institutions and the society to discover talented athletes and nurture 
them and to take the necessary measures to encourage physical exercise. 
Article 70 
Every child, upon birth, is entitled to a proper name, care by his or her family, nutrition and 
shelter, health services, religious, emotional, and intellectual development. 
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The state commits itself to the child’s care and protection in the case of loss of family. It 
guarantees the rights of the handicapped child, his socialization, and the child’s absorption 
into society. 
Before children have reached the age at which the compulsory stage of education is 
completed, they must not be put to work in occupations that are not age-appropriate. It is 
further forbidden to prevent them from completing their education. 
A child may only be detained for a limited period and must be given legal assistance. He 
must be detained in an appropriate location. Such a location observes the separation of the 
sexes, takes into account the developmental stages of youth offenders and the nature of their 
crimes, and keeps them removed from adult detainees. 
Article 71 
The state guarantees care for children and youth. It ensures that they develop and are being 
prepared for their role in society, both spiritually, morally, culturally, intellectually, 
physically, psychologically, socially, and economically. 
Article 72 
The state commits itself to providing health care, education, and care for the physically, 
mentally, economically, and socially handicapped. 
The state commits itself to providing healthcare, education, economic help, and social 
support for the handicapped, to providing employment opportunities for them and to 
improving societal perceptions of them, and to making public facilities accessible to them. 
Article 73 
Compulsion in all its forms is prohibited. This includes the exploitation of human beings and 
sex trade. The law treats these acts as crimes. 
 
C h a p t e r  4 :  G u a ra n t e e s  t o  P ro t e c t  R ig h t s  a n d  F r e ed o m s  
Article 74 
The supreme rule of the law is the foundation of government in the country. 
The independence of the judiciary and the immunity of judges both guarantee the protection 
of rights and freedoms. 
Article 75 
The right to a trial is inviolable and guaranteed to all. 
The state commits itself to making the courts coordinate their work and to ensuring that cases 
are decided swiftly. 
No action or administrative decision is immune to judicial review. 
A person must only be tried before his assigned judge. Exceptional courts are prohibited. 
Article 76 
Sentences must be personal. There can be no crime and no sentence unless it is laid down in 
the Constitution or in law. A sentence can only be assessed by judicial verdict. A law cannot 
penalize actions that predate the law’s passage. 
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Article 77 
Except under circumstances defined by law, criminal proceedings are only to be undertaken 
under order from a competent judicial authority. 
The suspect is innocent until proven guilty in a just legal trial that grants him the right to 
defense. Every felony suspect must receive an attorney that defends him. The law defines the 
misdemeanors that necessitate legal representation for the suspect. 
The law regulates the appeals procedures for both felonies and misdemeanors. 
Where appropriate, the state provides protection for the victims of a felony, the witnesses, the 
suspects, and informants. 
Article 78 
The right to defense – either self-defense or defense by an attorney – is guaranteed. 
To the financially strapped the law guarantees recourse to the judiciary and the ability to 
defend their rights in front of it. 
Article 79 
Verdicts are issued and executed in the name of the People. A competent public servant who 
fails to execute a ruling or unnecessarily delays it is committing a crime punishable by law. 
In that case the harmed party has the immediate right to bring a felony suit to a competent 
court. 
Article 80 
There is to be no statute of limitations in criminal or civil law when it comes to assaults on 
rights or freedoms granted by this Constitution. The state guarantees just indemnification to 
anyone who has suffered such an assault. 
The harmed party immediately wins the right to launch criminal proceedings. 
The National Council on Human Rights is to inform the Public Prosecutor of any violation of 
these rights; it may join the harmed party in civil proceedings and help it obtain remedy. 
Article 81 
The rights and freedoms that attach to the citizen must not be impaired. No law regulating the 
practice of these rights and freedoms may narrow their intent and essence. 
The rights and freedoms are to be practiced in such a way that they do not conflict with the 
provisions of Part One of this Constitution, which covers the elements of state and society. 
PART THREE: THE PUBLIC POWERS 
C h a p t e r  1 :  T h e  L eg i s la t i v e  P o w e r  
FIRST SECTION: COMMO N PROVISIONS  
Article 82 
The legislative power consists of the House of Representatives and the Consultative 
Assembly. 
Each exercises its authority in accordance with the Constitution. 
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Article 83 
It is forbidden to be at once a member in the House of Representatives and the Consultative 
Assembly. The law defines other cases in which the accumulation of public offices is illegal. 
Article 84 
Unless exceptional circumstances defined by law warrant it, the members of the House of 
Representatives and the Consultative Assembly are to devote themselves fully to the tasks 
arising from their membership. Their employment or occupation is to be held open for them, 
as specified by law. 
Article 85 
The member represents the People in its entirety. His role as representative is not to be 
constrained in any way. 
Article 86 
Before beginning his term of office, the member delivers the following oath before his 
chamber: “I swear by God Almighty that I will faithfully preserve the republican system, that 
I will respect the Constitution and the law, that I will fully devote myself to defending the 
People’s interest, that I will guard the independence of the nation and integrity of its soil.” 
Article 87 
The Court of Cassation decides on the validity of membership for the members of both 
chambers; any challenge is to be submitted within thirty days after the final announcement of 
the election results. Upon receiving a challenge, the Court has sixty days to reach a verdict. 
If it annuls a membership, that annulment shall take effect on the day the chamber in question 
is informed of the ruling. 
Article 88 
During their tenure, members of either chamber must not – either in person or by proxy – 
purchase or rent state property. They must not sell or rent out their own property to the state 
or engage in a barter transaction with the state. Neither must they enter a contract with the 
state in which they figure as a supplier or contractor. 
The member is to provide a financial disclosure statement when his membership takes effect, 
when it ends, and at the end of each year during his tenure. The statement is to be presented 
to the member’s chamber. 
If the member receives a monetary or in-kind gift as a result or on the occasion of his 
membership, the gift becomes the property of the state treasury. 
All this happens as specified by law. 
Article 89 
The member must not be questioned over opinions he expresses in relation to his work in the 
chamber to which he belongs. 
Article 90 
Unless the member is caught red-handed in a criminal act, it is only permissible to bring 
criminal proceedings against him if his chamber has given its consent. If the chamber is not 
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in session, the consent of the chamber’s administrative office must be obtained. The chamber 
itself must be notified at its first meeting of the measures that were taken. 
In all cases, the decision on the request for launching criminal proceedings against the 
member must be made within thirty days. If within that time frame no decision is made, the 
application for launching criminal proceedings is considered granted. 
Article 91 
The member shall receive a remuneration that is defined by law. 
Article 92 
Both the House of Representatives and the Consultative Assembly convene in Cairo. 
Under exceptional circumstances either chamber may hold its sessions in a different location, 
provided that the President of the Republic or a third of the chamber’s membership have 
requested so. 
Any meeting of the chamber in contravention to these principles is invalid. The same is true 
for decisions issued under these circumstances. 
Article 93 
The sessions of the House of Representatives and the Consultative Assembly are public. 
Either chamber may hold a closed session, provided that the President of the Republic has 
demanded so, or the government, or the president of the chamber, or at least twenty of its 
members. In that case the chamber decides if the matter before it shall be discussed in open or 
closed session. 
Article 94 
The President of the Republic invites both the House of Representatives and the Consultative 
Assembly to begin their regular annual session before the first Thursday in October. If the 
two chambers do not receive an invitation, both will convene on that day under mandate from 
the Constitution. 
The regular legislative session lasts at least eight months. The President of the Republic ends 
the legislative session with the agreement of the two chambers; the House of Representatives, 
however, must not be dismissed before passing the state’s general budget. 
Article 95 
Either of the two chambers may convene for an extraordinary session in order to consider an 
urgent matter. This happens following an invitation by the President of the Republic, or the 
Government, or the request of at least a tenth of the chamber’s membership. 
Article 96 
A session of the House of Representatives or the Consultative Assembly is valid only if a 
majority of chamber members are present. Only then are its decisions valid. 
Unless circumstances call for a qualified majority, the chamber issues its decisions with an 
absolute majority of those present. In case of a tie, the matter under vote is considered 
rejected. 
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Article 97 
During the first meeting of the first regular annual session of the chamber’s term, each 
chamber elects a president and two deputies from among its voting members, to hold that 
office for the entire legislative term in the House of Representatives, and half the legislative 
term in the Consultative Assembly. If either of them vacates their seat, the chamber will elect 
a replacement for the remainder of the predecessor’s term. 
During the first meeting of either chamber’s regular annual session a third of its members 
may call for new elections for either the chamber president or his deputies. 
Article 98 
If the president of either the House of Representatives or the Consultative Assembly 
temporarily assumes the post of the President of the Republic, the older of the two deputies 
assumes the post of chamber president for that same period. 
Article 99 
Each chamber compiles its internal statutes to govern its work and carry out its specific 
responsibilities. It then publishes them in the Official Gazette. 
Article 100 
Each chamber is to preserve its own internal order. The chamber’s president carries the 
responsibility for that. 
No armed forces are permitted to enter either chamber or reside in its vicinity unless the 
chamber’s president has requested so. 
Article 101 
The President of the Republic, the Government, and every member of the House of 
Representatives may propose legislation. 
Each legislative bill is referred to the appropriate specialized committee within the House of 
Representatives, both for the purpose of examining the bill and for presenting a report about 
it to the full chamber. 
A bill introduced by a member must not be referred to the appropriate committee unless the 
Bill Assignment Committee authorizes it and the chamber agrees to it. If the Bill Assignment 
Committee refuses referral, its decision must be accompanied by reasons. 
A bill that the chamber has rejected must not be reintroduced in the same legislative session. 
Article 102 
Neither the House of Representatives nor the Consultative Assembly may pass a law without 
voting on it. 
Each chamber has the right to amend bills before it and to segment both bills and proposed 
amendments. 
Each bill approved by one chamber is passed on to the other. The second chamber must make 
its decision on the bill within sixty days and prior to the legislative recess. A bill does not 
become law unless approved by both chambers. 
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Article 103 
If the two chambers disagree on legislation, they form a joint committee of twenty. Each 
chamber chooses half that number from among its members, in response to candidacies from 
its Committee of the Whole. The goal is to propose changes to the disputed text. 
These proposals are submitted to both chambers. If neither of them agrees to it, the matter is 
referred to the House of Representatives, which makes the final decision with the majority of 
its members. 
Article 104 
The House of Representatives informs the President of the Republic of every bill that has 
passed the chambers, so that the President can sign it into law within fifteen days of receipt. 
If the President of the Republic vetoes the bill, he returns it to the House of Representatives 
within thirty days of receipt. 
If he does not return the bill by that deadline, or if the House of Representatives overrides his 
veto by a two-thirds majority, the bill becomes law and is issued. 
If the House fails to override the presidential veto, four months must pass from the date of the 
failed override vote before the bill may be reintroduced within the same legislative session. 
Article 105 
Each member of either chamber may direct questions about a topic of public interest to the 
Prime Minister, one of his deputies, or one of the ministers. 
Article 106 
Twenty members of the House of Representatives or ten members of the Consultative 
Assembly may demand discussion of a topic of public interest to clarify the government’s 
policy towards it. 
Article 107 
Each member of the House of Representatives or the Consultative Assembly has the right to 
obtain statements or information that relate to his work in the chamber. This right must be 
exercised in accordance with Article 47 of this Constitution. 
Article 108 
Every citizen may address written proposals about issues of public interest to either the 
House of Representatives or the Consultative Assembly. 
He may direct complaints to either chamber, which in turn transmits them to the competent 
ministers. The ministers must provide explanations pertaining to the complaint, if the 
chamber demands it. The complainant gets notified of the outcome of his complaint. 
Article 109 
The Prime Minister, his deputies, the ministers, and their deputies may attend the sessions of 
both chambers or their committees. They must attend if either chamber has demanded it. 
They may enlist the assistance of high ranking government officials. 
They must be heard whenever they wish to speak. They must answer on any topic that is 
under discussion, but they do not have voting rights. 
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Article 110 
Each chamber accepts the resignation of its members, which must be submitted in writing. 
The chamber may only accept the resignation if it has not launched measures to strip the 
resigning member of his membership. 
Article 111 
No member may be stripped of his membership in either chamber unless he has lost trust and 
respect or unless he no longer meets the criteria that were prerequisites for his election, or if 
he violated one of them. 
Revocation of a membership requires a two-thirds majority within the chamber to which the 
member belongs. 
Article 112 
If a member of either chamber vacates his membership at least six months before his term 
expires, the vacancy must be filled in accordance with the law. This must happen within sixty 
days from the date on which the chamber reported the vacancy. 
The term of the substituting member lasts until the term of the vacating member is completed. 
SECOND SECTION: THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTAT IVE S 
Article 113 
The House of Representatives is composed of no fewer than 350 members, elected by 
universal, secret, and direct ballot. 
To be eligible for membership in the House of Representatives, a candidate must be 
Egyptian, enjoy all civil and political rights, and have acquired at least his certificate of basic 
education. By the date the registration of candidates opens, he must be at least 25 years of 
age. 
The law specifies other conditions for membership, the voting system, and the definition of 
electoral districts in such a way that it ensures the just representation of the population and 
the governorates. 
Article 114 
The term of membership in the House of Representatives is five years; It begins on the date 
of the term’s first meeting. The elections for the following term are held in the sixty last days 
of the current term. 
Article 115 
The House of Representatives wields the power to approve the public policy of the state, the 
public plan for economic and social development, and the general budget of the state. It also 
exercises oversight over the actions of the executive. All this happens in accordance with the 
provisions of this Constitution. 
The law defines how the public plan for economic and social development is to be drafted 
and how it is to be presented to the House of Representatives. 
Article 116 
The general budget of the state must contain all revenues and expenditures without exception. 
352 
 
The draft budget is to be presented to the House of Representatives at least ninety days before 
the fiscal year begins. It does not become operational unless the House has agreed to it. The 
vote on the budget occurs chapter by chapter. 
The House of Representatives may alter the expenses listed in the draft budget with the 
exception of those that occur in response to a defined payment obligation of the state. If the 
budget amendments result in an increase of expenditures, the House and the Government 
must agree on revenue sources that will return the budget to balance. The budget is passed as 
a law, and provisions to balance the budget may be contained in amendments. If the new 
budget is not passed before the new fiscal year, the old budget will continue to apply until the 
new budget has been passed. 
The law defines the fiscal year, the procedure of compiling the general budget, and the 
budgeting and bookkeeping rules for the public institutions and organizations. 
Article 117 
The consent of the House of Representatives is required before any sum can be moved from 
one chapter of the general budget to another. It is also required before any expenditures can 
be made that are not contained in the general budget or before expenditure estimates can be 
adjusted upwards. The consent is issued by law. 
Article 118 
The law regulates the principles that govern the raising of public funds and the procedures for 
spending them. 
Article 119 
The law governs the principles for awarding salaries, pensions, compensations, subsidies, and 
bonuses that are taken from the state treasury. The law also defines the exceptions to these 
principles and the authorities in charge of their application. 
Article 120 
Without prior consent from the House of Representatives the executive is prohibited from 
borrowing, obtaining financing, or engaging in a project that commits funds from the state 
treasury into the future. 
Article 121 
The closing account of the general state budget must be presented to the House of 
Representatives no later than six months after the fiscal year has expired; the annual report of 
the Central Accounting Office and its comments on the closing account will accompany it. 
Voting on the closing account takes place chapter by chapter, and is passed as a law. 
The House may demand any additional statements or reports from the Central Accounting 
Office. 
Article 122 
The House may either form a special committee or assign one of its standing committees to 
investigate public projects or the activities of an administrative department or organization, in 
order to determine the facts of the topic at hand. The committee then informs the chamber of 
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the financial, administrative, or economic situation, or of the progress it has made in 
investigating past or other activities. On these grounds the chamber decides upon the proper 
course of action. 
In order to carry out its mandate, the committee may collect evidence and demand to hear the 
statements it deems necessary. All departments must comply with its demands and submit 
any documents and other materials it requires. 
Article 123 
Every member of the House of Representatives may direct questions at the Prime Minister, 
one of his deputies, or one of the ministers, about any topic that falls in their purview. It is 
their duty to answer these questions. 
The member may withdraw his question at any time, but he may not turn his question into an 
interrogation. 
Article 124 
Every member of the House of Representatives may request information or urgent statements 
from the Prime Minister, one of his deputies, or one of the ministers about important matters 
of public interest. 
The government is obliged to respond. 
Article 125 
Every member of the House of Representatives may direct questions at the Prime Minister, 
one of his deputies, or one of the ministers, in order to hold them accountable for the matters 
falling within their purview. 
The chamber debates the questions seven or more days after they have been submitted. In 
urgent cases and after agreement with the government, the chamber may debate them sooner. 
Article 126 
The House of Representative may decide to withdraw confidence from the Prime Minister, 
one of his deputies, or one of the ministers. 
Only after questioning may a motion to withdraw confidence be introduced. Doing so 
requires the support of ten percent of the chamber’s membership. The chamber makes its 
decision no later than seven days after discussing the questioning. The withdrawal of 
confidence requires a majority of members. 
It is, in all cases, forbidden to withdraw confidence over a matter that the chamber decided in 
the current legislative session. 
If the chamber decides to withdraw confidence from the Prime Minister or from one of the 
ministers, and if the Government declared its allegiance to him before the no-confidence 
motion was put to a vote, the Government must resign. 
If a motion to withdraw confidence is targeted at a Government member and the motion 
passes, then that Government member must resign. 
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Article 127 
The President of the Republic may only dissolve the House of Representatives after justifying 
his decision and successfully subjecting it to a referendum. 
The chamber must not be dissolved during its first annual session, and it may not be 
dissolved for the same reason that justified the dissolution of the last chamber. 
The President of the Republic has at most twenty days to both suspend the chamber’s session 
and hold the referendum about the chamber’s dissolution. If in the referendum the majority of 
citizens submitting a valid ballot agree with the dissolution, the President of the Republic 
issues the decision to dissolve and an invitation to early elections. Elections are to happen at 
most thirty days after the dissolution has been announced. The new chamber gathers within 
the first ten days after the final election result has been announced. 
If the majority of citizens submitting a valid ballot fails to support the dissolution, the 
President of the Republic must resign from his position. 
If the referendum or the elections do not happen within the required time frame, the chamber, 
without prompting, returns to its session on the day after the deadline has expired. 
TH IRD SECTION: THE C ONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY  
Article 128 
The Consultative Assembly is composed of no fewer than 150 members, elected by universal, 
secret, direct ballot. In addition, the President of the Republic may appoint the equivalent of 
at most one tenth of the elected membership. 
Article 129 
A candidate for the Consultative Assembly must be Egyptian, enjoy his civil and political 
rights, and hold at least a certificate of higher education. By the date the registration of 
candidates opens, he must be at least 35 years of age. 
The law specifies other conditions for membership, the voting system, and the definition of 
electoral districts. 
Article 130 
The term of membership in the Consultative Assembly is six years; It begins on the date of 
the term’s first meeting. Fifty percent of the members stand for election every three years, in 
accordance with the law. 
Article 131 
If the House of Representatives is dissolved, the Consultative Assembly assumes the 
legislative responsibilities that were previously shared; the bills that the Consultative 
Assembly passes during this period of dissolution will be submitted for decision to the House 
of Representatives as soon as it is back in session. 
If neither chamber is in session and it is important that measures be taken swiftly, the 
President of the Republic may issue decrees that assume the force of law. They are submitted 
to the House of Representatives and the Consultative Assembly, as the situation permits, 
within fifteen days of the date they resume their session. 
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If the decrees are not submitted to the two chambers, or if they are submitted but not passed, 
they lose their legal power with retroactive effect, unless the chamber affirms their validity 
for the previous period, or unless it addresses the decree’s consequences in a different 
manner. 
 
C h a p t e r  2 :  T h e  E x e cu t i v e  P o w e r  
FIRST SECTION: THE P RESIDENT OF THE REPU BLIC 
Article 132 
The President of the Republic is the head of state and the leader of the executive power; he 
pursues the People’s interests, preserves the independence of the homeland and its territorial 
integrity, and upholds the separation of powers. 
He carries out his responsibilities in accordance with the Constitution. 
Article 133 
The President of the Republic is elected for a four-year term, which begins on the day after 
the term of his predecessor has expired. He may be reelected once. 
The process of electing the President of the Republic begins at least ninety days before the 
previous presidential term expires. The election result must be announced at least ten days 
before the previous presidential term expires. 
The President of the Republic must not hold any party office during his presidency. 
Article 134 
A candidate for the presidency must be Egyptian and have two Egyptian parents; he must 
never have held the citizenship of another state; he must enjoy his civil and political rights 
and must not be married to a non-Egyptian spouse. By the date the registration of candidates 
opens, he must be at least 40 years of age. 
Article 135 
To be electable, a candidate must receive endorsements from at least twenty of the combined 
elected membership of the House of Representatives and the Consultative Assembly, or enlist 
the  endorsements of at least twenty thousand citizens from at least ten governorates who are 
entitled to vote. At least 1,000 endorsements must come from each of ten governorates. 
Nobody may endorse more than one candidate. This is specified by law. 
Article 136 
The President of the Republic is elected by universal, secret, and direct ballot. The candidate 
who attracts the absolute majority of valid ballots wins. The law specifies the procedures for 
electing the President of the Republic. 
Article 137 
The President of the Republic, before both the House of Representatives and the Consultative 
Assembly, and before beginning his term of office, delivers the following oath: “I swear by 
God Almighty that I will faithfully preserve the republican system, that I will respect the 
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Constitution and the law, that I will fully devote myself to defending the People’s interest, 
that I will guard the independence of the nation and integrity of its soil.” 
If the House of Representatives is dissolved, the oath of office is taken before the 
Consultative Assembly. 
Article 138 
The law defines financial transactions permissible to the President of the Republic. He must 
not receive a second salary or other compensation. While in office, he must not – either in 
person or by proxy – engage in a free profession or work in the trade, finance, or industry 
sector. He must not purchase or rent state property. He must not sell or rent out his own 
property to the state or engage in a barter transaction with the state. Neither must he enter a 
contract with the state in which he figures as a supplier or contractor. 
The President of the Republic is to provide a financial disclosure statement when his 
membership takes effect, when it ends, and at the end of each year during his tenure. The 
statement is to be presented to the House of Representatives. 
If the President, either in person or by proxy, receives a monetary or in-kind gift as a result or 
on the occasion of his membership, the gift becomes the property of the state treasury. 
All this happens as specified by law. 
Article 139 
The President of the Republic selects a Prime Minister and directs him to form a Government 
and submit its program to the House of Representatives within at most thirty days. If the 
Government does not win the chamber’s confidence, the President of the Republic appoints 
another Prime Minister from the party that holds the greatest number of seats in the House of 
Representatives. If that Prime Minister’s Government does not win confidence within the 
same time frame, the House of Representatives elects a Prime Minister, whom the President 
of the Republic then tasks with forming a Government, in the hopes that it wins the 
chamber’s confidence within another thirty-day period. If this does not happen, the President 
of the Republic dissolves the House of Representatives and calls for elections of a new 
House. The election is to happen within sixty days from the date the decision to dissolve was 
issued. 
The combined time periods set forth in this article must not exceed 90 days. 
If the House of Representatives is dissolved, the Prime Minister presents his Government and 
its program to the incoming House of Representatives. This happens during the chamber’s 
first meeting. 
Article 140 
The President of the Republic, with participation from the Council of Ministers, sets out 
official state policy. Then both supervise its implementation in accordance with the 
Constitution. 
Article 141 
The President of the Republic wields his powers through the person of the Prime Minister, his 
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deputies, and the ministers. This does not apply to the areas of defense, national security, and 
foreign policy, and for the powers set forth in articles 139, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149 of this 
Constitution. 
Article 142 
The President of the Republic may delegate some of his competencies to the Prime Minister, 
his deputies, the ministers, or the governor. This happens in accordance with the law. 
Article 143 
The President of the Republic may invite the Government to deliberate important matters in a 
cabinet meeting; he presides over the meetings and charges the Prime Minister with 
compiling whatever reports on public affairs he deems necessary. 
Article 144 
As soon as both the House of Representatives and the Consultative Assembly have begun 
their annual legislative session, the President of the Republic may convene a combined 
meeting of the two chambers and deliver an address about the public policy of the state. 
If necessary, the President may make other statements or address either of the two chambers. 
Article 145 
The President of the Republic represents the state in its foreign relations. He concludes 
treaties. Once both chambers agree to the treaties, they are considered ratified. Once issued, 
these treaties have the force of law, in accordance with agreed-upon rules. 
Peace treaties, pacts, and all treaties dealing with the rights of sovereignty must be passed 
with a two-thirds majority in both chambers in order to be considered ratified. 
No treaty must be adopted that violates the rules of this Constitution. 
Article 146 
The President of the Republic is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Only after a 
vote in the National Defense Council and the agreement of the majority of the House of 
Representatives may he declare war or send the armed forces beyond state borders. 
Article 147 
The President of the Republic appoints both civilian and military public servants, and he 
dismisses them. He appoints the state’s diplomatic representatives and removes them from 
office. He also receives the diplomatic representatives of foreign states and the appointees of 
foreign organizations in accordance with the law. 
Article 148 
After consultation with the Government and in accordance with the law, the President of the 
Republic declares the state of emergency. This declaration must be submitted to the House of 
Representatives within the following seven days. 
If the declaration is made while the House is in recess, it must promptly be called back into 
session. If the chamber has been dissolved, the declaration must be made to the Consultative 
Assembly and within the seven-day period stipulated in the previous paragraph. 
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For the state of emergency to take effect, the consent of the majority in each of the two 
chambers is necessary. The declaration is valid for a specified period not to exceed six 
months. It can be extended once and for a period of similar length. Such an extension requires 
the prior consent of the People, expressed in a public referendum. 
The House of Representatives must not be dissolved while the state of emergency is in effect. 
Article 149 
The President of the Republic has the power to issue a pardon for a crime or reduce a 
sentence. 
A universal pardon is valid only if passed as a law. 
Article 150 
The President of the Republic may call for a referendum to decide upon important questions 
of the highest national interest. 
If the referendum covers more than one topic, each topic requires its own vote. 
The result of the referendum is binding for all state powers and the public. 
Article 151 
To tender his resignation, the President of the Republic must submit it in writing to the House 
of Representatives. 
Article 152 
The President of the Republic is impeached for felony or high treason if at least a third of the 
members of the House of Representatives sponsor a motion of impeachment, and the House 
passes the motion with a two-thirds majority. 
As soon as the impeachment is in effect, the President of the Republic stops all work. This 
stoppage is treated as the result of a temporary hindrance that prevents the President of the 
Republic from assuming his responsibilities. It ends once the verdict is announced. 
The President of the Republic is to be tried before a special tribunal headed by the President 
of the High Council of Judges and staffed by the senior deputies of the President of the High 
Constitutional Court and the State Council, and the two most senior presidents of the appeals 
courts. The Public Prosecutor assumes the role of prosecutor. If the most senior person is 
unable to play his part, the person next in seniority takes his place. 
The law specifies the procedures of the trial as well as the sentence. If found guilty, the 
President of the Republic is relieved of his duties. This does not preclude additional penalties. 
Article 153 
If a temporary hindrance prevents the President of the Republic from exercising his powers, 
the Prime Minister takes over his responsibilities. 
If the position of the President of the Republic is vacant, be it due to resignation, death, long-
term disability, or any other cause, the House of Representatives declares the position vacant 
and notifies the National Elections Commission. The President of the House of 
Representatives temporarily assumes the powers belonging to the President of the Republic. 
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If the House of Representatives is dissolved, the Consultative Assembly assumes its 
responsibilities, and the President of the Consultative Assembly assumes the responsibilities 
of the President of the House of Representatives. 
The new President of the Republic must be elected within a time frame not exceeding 90 days 
from the date the position was declared vacant. 
The person temporarily shouldering the duties of the presidency cannot be a candidate for 
that office. He cannot demand amendments to the Constitution, dissolve the House of 
Representatives or dismiss the Government. 
Article 154 
If the presidency is vacant while a referendum or an election for either the House of 
Representatives or the Consultative Assembly are being prepared, the election of the 
President of the Republic takes priority. The respective chamber will remain operative until 
the presidential election is completed. 
SECOND SECTION: THE GOVERNMENT 
Article 155 
The Government consists of the Prime Minister, his deputies, and the ministers. The Prime 
Minister heads the Government, supervises its work, and directs it in the performance of its 
duties. 
Article 156 
To qualify for being Prime Minister or a member of the Government, a person must be 
Egyptian, enjoy his civil and political rights, and be at least thirty years of age. He must not 
have held the citizenship of another state or must have renounced it within one year after 
turning eighteen. 
It is forbidden to combine a membership in the Government with a membership in either the 
House of Representatives or the Consultative Assembly. Should a member of either chamber 
be appointed into Government, his seat becomes vacant from the date of the appointment, and 
the rules of Article 112 of this Constitution apply. 
Article 157 
Before assuming their positions, the Prime Minister and the members of the Government 
deliver the following oath before the President of the Republic: “I swear by God Almighty 
that I will faithfully preserve the republican system, that I will respect the Constitution and 
the law, that I will fully devote myself to defending the People’s interest, that I will guard the 
independence of the nation and integrity of its soil.” 
Article 158 
The law defines the financial transactions permissible to the prime minister and any member 
of the Government. Neither of them must receive a second salary or other compensation. 
While in office, he must not – either in person or by proxy – engage in a free profession, or 
work in the trade, finance, or industry sector. He must not purchase or rent state property. He 
must not sell or rent out his own property to the state or engage in a barter transaction with 
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the state. Neither must he enter a contract with the state in which he figures as a supplier or 
contractor. 
The member is to provide a financial disclosure statement when he takes office, when he 
leaves office, and at the end of each year. The statement is to be presented to the House of 
Representatives. If any member of the Government receives a monetary or in-kind gift as a 
result or on the occasion of his position, the gift becomes the property of the state treasury, in 
accordance with the law. 
Article 159 
The Government has the following responsibilities: 
1. Together with the President of the Republic, it draws up the state’s public policy and 
supervises its implementation. 
2. It directs the work of the ministries, and of organizations that are affiliated with them, 
and it coordinates among them. 
3. It prepares bills and motions. 
4. It issues administrative decrees in accordance with the law and monitors their 
execution. 
5. It prepares the general budget of the state. 
6. It prepares the general plan of the state. 
7. It contracts loans and grants in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 
8. It pursues the execution of the law, preserves national security, and protects the rights 
of the citizens and the interests of the state. 
 
Article 160 
Within the general policy framework of the state, each minister designs the general policy of 
his ministry, pursues its execution, monitors, directs, and controls it. 
Article 161 
Any member of the Government may deliver a statement about a matter within his purview 
before the House of Representatives, the Consultative Assembly, or one of their respective 
committees. The chamber or committee discusses that statement and issues an opinion about 
it. 
Article 162 
The Prime Minister issues the regulations necessary for implementing the law. He does so 
without obstructing or altering the mandate contained in the law or creating exemptions to 
that mandate. He may delegate the right to issue regulations, unless the law itself stipulates 
who shall issue the regulations necessary for its implementation. 
Article 163 
The Prime Minister issues the regulations to establish facilities, enable public services, and 
directs them both with the consent of the Council of Ministers. If this creates new burdens on 
the state treasury, the agreement of the House of Representatives is required. 
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Article 164 
To issue regulations, the Prime Minister needs the consent of the Council of Ministers. 
Article 165 
The law defines the power to hire and dismiss civilian public servants and creates job 
descriptions at the senior level of public service. It defines the responsibilities and rights of 
public servants and the guarantees granted them. 
Article 166 
The President of the Republic, the Public Prosecutor, and one third of the House of 
Representatives may submit a motion to impeach the Prime Minister or a member of the 
Government for crimes committed during or because of their tenure. 
The decision to impeach is made if two thirds of the membership of the House of 
Representatives support the impeachment motion. A person who has been impeached is 
relieved of his duties until a verdict is reached. That a Government member terminates his 
service without being prosecuted does not preclude the possibility of bringing charges against 
him at a later time. 
Article 167 
If the entire Government or only one of its members tenders their resignation, they must 
submit it in writing to the President of the Republic. 
 
C h a p t e r  3 :  T h e  J u d i c ia l  P o w e r  
FIRST SECTION: GENERAL RULES 
Article 168 
The judicial power is independent. It is exercised by the courts of varying specializations and 
levels of jurisdiction. They pass their rulings in accordance with the law. The law determines 
their jurisdictions. Interference in the affairs of the courts is a crime that has no statute of 
limitations. 
Article 169 
Every judicial body administers its own affairs and has its own budget. On legislative bills 
governing their affairs these bodies are to be asked for their opinion. This happens in 
accordance with the law. 
Article 170 
The judges are independent. They cannot be terminated. They are beholden to no authority 
other than the law, and they are equal in rights and duties. 
The law prescribes the conditions and procedures of their employment, and it stipulates how 
judges are to be held accountable. A judge can only be appointed with a full mandate, both 
with respect to his jurisdiction and with respect to the powers that the law has granted him. 
This is to happen in a manner that preserves the independence of the judiciary and its ability 
to do its work. 
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Article 171 
Court sessions are public unless a court, out of considerations for public order or decency, 
decides to conduct its proceedings in closed chambers. The verdict is to be pronounced in 
open session. 
SECOND SECTION: THE JUDIC IARY AND THE PU BLIC  
PROSECUTION  
Article 172 
The judiciary adjudicates all disputes and crimes except those adjudicated by a separate 
judicial branch. It also rules on disputes over the affairs of its members. 
Article 173 
The Public Prosecution is an integral part of the judiciary. It investigates, indicts, and 
prosecutes criminal cases other than those exempted by law. The law defines additional 
competencies. 
The Public Prosecution is led by the Public Prosecutor. He is appointed by the President of 
the Republic, who chooses from among the deputies to the President of the Court of 
Cassation, the presidents of the appeals courts, and the assistant public prosecutors. The 
appointment is made upon recommendation from the High Council of Judges. It is valid for 
four years or until the appointee reaches retirement age, whichever happens sooner. He may 
only be appointed once during his professional life. 
TH IRD SECTION: THE STATE COUNCIL  
Article 174 
The State Council is an independent judicial branch. It alone adjudicates administrative 
disputes and disputes over the execution of its verdicts. It is responsible for disciplinary 
proceedings and their appeals. It issues judicial opinions on legal questions to the venues that 
the law defines. It reviews and rewords bills and legislative decisions that are referred to it, 
and it reviews contracts in which the state is a party. 
The law defines its other competencies. 
FOURTH SECTION: THE HIGH CONSTITUTION AL COURT 
Article 175 
The High Constitutional Court is an independent judicial branch. Its seat is in the city of 
Cairo. It alone decides on the constitutionality of laws and regulations. 
The law defines its other competencies and regulates the procedures that are to be followed 
before the Court. 
Article 176 
The High Constitutional Court is composed of the president and ten members. The law 
defines the judicial bodies and other judicial branches that nominate these members. It also 
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defines the procedure of their appointment and the conditions they must meet to quality. 
Justices are appointed by decree from the President of the Republic. 
Article 177 
The President of the Republic or the House of Representatives submit the bills that govern 
political rights as well as presidential, legislative, and local elections to the High 
Constitutional Court before issuing them, so that the Court may examine their 
constitutionality ex ante. It issues its decision on this matter within 45 days of receiving it. If 
the Court does not issue a ruling, the bill becomes law. 
If the Court rules that parts of the bill are unconstitutional, its ruling must be implemented. 
The laws referred to it for ex ante review are not eligible for the ex post review covered by 
Article 175 of the Constitution. 
Article 178 
The rulings of the High Constitutional Court are published in the Official Gazette. The same 
is true for the decisions it issues during its ex ante review of bills governing political rights, 
as well as the presidential, legislative, and local elections. 
The law determines what happens to a legislative text that has been found unconstitutional. 
F IFTH SECTION: JUDIC IAL BODIES 
Article 179 
The State Affairs Body is an independent judicial body. It pursues civil claims on behalf of 
the state and legally represents the state in disputes. It supervises the legal affairs of the state 
bureaucracy. 
It prepares contracts and settles disputes in which the state is a party, in accordance with the 
law. 
The law defines its other competencies. 
The members of the State Affairs Body receive the guarantees and have the rights and duties 
that attach to all members of the judiciary. 
Article 180 
The Administrative Prosecution is an independent judicial body. It investigates financial and 
administrative irregularities, launches disciplinary proceedings before the courts of the State 
Council, and takes legal action to address shortcomings of public facilities. The law defines 
its other competencies. 
Its members have the guarantees, rights, and duties that attach to all members of the judiciary. 
 
S IXTH SECTION: THE LEGAL PROFESSION  
Article 181 
The legal profession is a free profession and indispensible for achieving justice. Attorneys 
enjoy independence as they practice law. While engaged in their professional work, they 
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enjoy the guarantees that ensure their protection and that enable them to do their work 
effectively. This happens in accordance with the law. 
SEVENTH SECTION: EXP ERTS 
Article 182 
Notaries, practitioners of forensic medicine, and judicial experts are independent as they 
conduct their work. The law grants them the guarantees and protections that are necessary for 
their work. 
 
C h a p t e r  4 :  T h e  S ys t em  o f  L o ca l  A d m in i s t ra t io n  
FIRST SECTION: THE LOCAL ADMIN ISTR ATIVE D IV ISION OF TH E 
STATE  
Article 183 
The state is divided into local administrative units that are legal persons: governorates, 
regions, cities, districts, and villages. A local unit may contain several villages or districts, 
and it may establish additional administrative units that are legal persons in their own right. 
This happens in accordance with the law, the principle of decentralization, and the desire to 
empower the administrative units to provide good local facilities and services, achieve 
advancement and realize good governance. 
Article 184 
The state guarantees the necessary technical, administrative, and financial assistance to the 
local units, as well as a fair distribution of facilities, services, and resources. The state, in 
accordance with the law, is to even out disparities in development and living standards 
among the units. 
Article 185 
The local units support their operations with original and supplementary taxes and fees that 
are local in nature. In collecting these dues, the units follow the principles and procedures that 
apply to collecting funds for the state. 
All happens in accordance with the law. 
Article 186 
The law regulates the cooperation among local units on activities of common interest. It also 
regulates the cooperation between the units and organs of the state. 
Article 187 
The law regulates the selection of the governors and the selection of the leaders of the other 
local administrative units. It also regulates their competencies. 
SECOND SECTION: THE LOCAL ASSEMBLIES  
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Article 188 
Each local unit elects an assembly through universal, secret and direct ballot. The assembly’s 
mandate lasts four years. 
A candidate for a seat in the local assembly must be at least 21 years of age by the date the 
registration of candidates opens. 
The local assembly includes the local representatives of the executive. These representatives 
have no vote. 
Every assembly elects its president and his vice president from among its elected members. 
The law specifies other conditions for candidacy as well as the election procedures. 
Article 189 
The local assembly deals with all matters that are of concern to the unit it represents. It 
establishes and directs local facilities, and it conducts economic, social, health-related, and 
other activities in accordance with the law. 
Article 190 
Decisions that the local unit reaches on matters within its purview are final. The executive 
may only interfere in them for the purpose of preventing the assembly from going beyond its 
purview or to secure the public good or the good of the other local assemblies. 
In the case of disputes over the competencies of these assemblies, the board for legislation 
and advisory opinions of the State Council makes a swift ruling, based on the law. 
Article 191 
Every assembly draws up its own budget and issues a final account, in accordance with the 
law. 
Article 192 
The local assemblies may not be dissolved by blanket administrative decree. 
The law governs the procedure for dissolving a local council and calling for a new election. 
 
C h a p t e r  5 :  N a t io n a l  S e cu r i t y  a n d  D e f en s e  
FIRST SECTION: THE N ATION AL SECURITY COUNCIL 
Article 193 
A National Security Council shall be created, to be chaired by the President of the Republic. 
Its membership includes the Prime Minister, the presidents of the House of Representatives 
and the Consultative Assembly, the ministers of defense, interior, foreign affairs, finance, 
justice, and health, the Director of General Intelligence, the chairmen of the committees for 
defense and national security in both the House of Representatives and the Consultative 
Assembly. 
The Council authorizes the strategies for ensuring the security of the country, deals with 
disasters and crises in all its forms, and adopts the necessary measures for containment. It 
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identifies the threats to homeland security within and beyond the national borders and the 
measures and steps that both the state and the People must take to thwart them. 
The Council may invite additional persons with the requisite expertise and competence to its 
meetings. The invitees do not have the right to vote. 
The law defines additional competencies of the Council and its operating procedures. 
SECOND SECTION: THE ARMED FORCES 
Article 194 
The armed forces are owned by the People. Their role is to protect the country and preserve 
the security and integrity of its soil. The state alone creates such forces. It is forbidden for any 
person, group, or association to create formations or squadrons, or either military or 
paramilitary organizations. 
The armed forces have a high council, as specified by law. 
Article 195 
The Minister of Defense is the general commander of the armed forces. He is appointed from 
among the officers. 
Article 196 
The law regulates the system of conscription, and it defines the conditions for service, 
promotion, and retirement in the armed forces. 
The judicial committees for officers and personnel of the armed forces alone decide on all 
administrative disputes internal to the armed forces. 
TH IRD SECTION: THE N ATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL 
Article 197 
A National Defense Council shall be established, to be chaired by the President of the 
Republic. Its membership includes the Prime Minister, the presidents of the House of 
Representatives and the Consultative Assembly, the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, 
finance, and interior, the Director of General Intelligence, the Chief of Staff of the Armed 
Forces, and the commanders of the airforce, navy, and air defense, as well as the Director of 
the Body of Armed Force Field Operations and the Director of War Intelligence and 
Reconnaissance. 
The Council examines all matters pertaining to preserving the safety and integrity of the 
country. It discusses the budget of the armed forces. It must be consulted on legislative bills 
that relate to the armed forces. 
The law defines its other competencies. 
The President of the Republic may invite persons with competence and expertise to the 
meetings of the Council. They do not have the right to vote. 
FOURTH SECTION: THE MILITAR Y JUDIC IARY  
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Article 198 
The military judiciary is an independent branch of the judiciary. It alone decides on all crimes 
related to the armed forces, their officers, and personnel. 
Civilians may not be tried by the military judiciary unless they are accused of crimes that hurt 
the armed forces. The law specifies these crimes as well as other competencies of the military 
judiciary. 
Members of the military judiciary are independent. They cannot be dismissed, and they have 
the guarantees, rights, and duties that attach to all members of the judiciary. 
F IFTH SECTION: THE P OLICE 
Article 199 
The police is a disciplinarian civilian organization with the President of the Republic as its 
highest leader. It carries out its duties in the name of the People, and its loyalty is to the 
Constitution and the law. It preserves public order, security, and decency, and implements the 
law and executive decrees. It guarantees to the citizens tranquility and the protection of their 
dignity, their rights and freedoms. All this happens in accordance with the law and in a way 
that allows police officers to carry out their duties. 
 
PART FOUR: INDEPENDENT BODIES AND SUPERVISORY ORGANS 
C h a p t e r  1 :  C o m m o n  P ro v i s io n s  
Article 200 
The independent bodies and supervisory organs listed in the Constitution are public legal 
persons that are neutral and technically, administratively, and financially independent. 
The law governs the other independent bodies and supervisory organs. 
All bodies and supervisory organs must be consulted on legislative bills and draft decrees 
relating to their domain of work. 
Article 201 
All independent bodies and supervisory organs must submit the reports they compile to the 
President of the Republic, the House of Representatives, and the Consultative Assembly. This 
must happen within thirty days of publication. 
Upon receipt of the reports the House of Representatives has six months to review them and 
take appropriate action. Then it submits the reports to public opinion. 
The supervisory organs inform the competent executive organs of any evidence of 
wrongdoing, irregularity, or crime. This happens in accordance with the law. 
Article 202 
The President of the Republic appoints the chairmen of the independent bodies and 
supervisory organs after agreement with the Consultative Assembly. The appointment lasts 
for four years and can be renewed once. The chairmen can only be fired with the agreement 
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of a majority in the Consultative Assembly. The same prohibitions that govern ministers 
apply to them. 
Article 203 
The law regulates the composition of each independent body or supervisory organ. It defines 
additional competencies that have not been listed in the Constitution and specifies their 
operating procedures. It grants their staff members the guarantees necessary for their work. 
The law defines the procedures for employment, promotion, accountability and dismissal. It 
specifies other conditions that guarantee the neutrality and independence of staff members. 
 
C h a p t e r  2 :  T h e  S u p e rv i so r y  O rg a n s  
FIRST SECTION: THE N ATION AL COMMISSION TO COMBAT 
CORRUPTION  
Article 204 
The National Commission to Combat Corruption specializes in fighting corruption and 
eliminating conflicts of interest. It also spreads the values of integrity and transparency, 
setting standards for both. It draws up the national strategy dedicated to these goals and 
ensures its implementation in cooperation with the other independent bodies. It supervises the 
organs that the law identifies as relevant. 
SECOND SECTION: THE CENTRAL ACCOUNTING O FFICE 
Article 205 
The Central Accounting Office monitors the state funds and other offices that the law 
specifies. 
TH IRD SECTION: THE C ENTRAL BANK  
Article 206 
The Central Bank lays down the monetary, credit, and banking policy and supervises its 
implementation. It monitors the performance of the banking sector and works to achieve price 
stability. It alone has the right to issue currency. All this must happen within the general 
economic policy of the state. 
 
 
 
C h a p t e r  3 :  T h e  E co n o m i c  a n d  S o c i a l  C o u n c i l  
Article 207 
The Economic and Social Council supports the participation of social groups in the drafting 
of economic, social, and environmental policies, and it aims to strengthen societal dialogue. 
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The Government, the House of Representatives, and the Consultative Assembly must solicit 
the opinion of the Social and Economic Council on these very policies and on legislative 
proposals that are related to them. 
The Council consists of 150 members at a minimum. They are chosen by the elected 
syndicates, unions, and associations of farmers, workers, professionals, and other social 
groups. Workers and farmers must have at least fifty percent representation in the Council. 
It is forbidden to combine a membership in the Council with a membership in the 
Government or one of the parliamentary chambers. 
The law specifies how the Council is to be formed, how its president is to be elected, how it 
does its work and how it submits its recommendations to the state authorities. 
 
C h a p t e r  4 :  T h e  N a t io n a l  E l e c t io n s  C o m m i ss io n  
Article 208 
The National Elections Commission alone is responsible for administering referenda, as well 
as presidential, parliamentary, and local elections. Their mandate includes preparing the voter 
registry, providing input into the division of electoral districts, defining limits on election 
financing and spending, and announcing these limits. It also covers other measures and ends 
with the announcement of results. 
The Commission may also be entrusted with supervising the elections to syndicates and other 
representative organizations. 
Details are specified by law. 
Article 209 
The National Elections Commission is led by a council composed of ten members. They are 
selected evenly from among the deputies of the President of the Court of Cassation, the 
presidents of the courts of appeals, deputies of the presidents of the State Council and the 
State Affairs Body, and the Administrative Prosecution. They are elected by the High 
Council of Judges and the special councils of the afore-mentioned bodies. These bodies 
cannot vote for their own members. The mandate to work for the council is full-time and lasts 
for one term of six years. The council is chaired by the most senior member that comes from 
the Court of Cassation. 
In elections that are to be held every three years, half of the council’s seats are to be opened 
to election. 
The Commission may call upon public figures or experts in the field of elections, and it has 
its own executive organ. Details are specified by law. 
Article 210 
Individuals affiliated with the National Elections Commission manage the process of voting 
and vote counting for the referenda and for elections that are under the Commission’s 
auspices. In that, they are supervised by the council of the National Elections Commission. 
They are granted the necessary guarantees to do their work with neutrality and independence. 
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As an exception to this rule the Commission assigns the supervision of voting and vote 
counting to members of the judiciary and of judicial bodies. This mandate lasts at least ten 
years from the Constitution’s entry into force. Details are specified by law. 
Article 211 
Decisions by the National Elections Commission that relate to referenda, the parliamentary 
and presidential elections, and their results are appealed to and decided by the High 
Administrative Court. Local elections are appealed to an administrative court. 
The law specifies the appeals procedures in a way that does not disrupt the electoral process, 
which includes the announcement of the final results. The final results of referenda and 
presidential elections must not be appealed once they have been announced. 
The final results must be announced no later than eight days after the polls have closed. 
 
C h a p t e r  5 :  T h e  I n d ep en d en t  B o d ie s  
FIRST SECTION: THE H IGH BODY FOR RELIG IO US ENDOWMENT 
AFFAIRS  
Article 212 
The High Body for Religious Endowment Affairs organizes its public and 
privateendowments, supervising and monitoring them. It ensures their adherence to standards 
of managerial and fiscal prudence and popularizes religious endowments among society. 
SECOND SECTION: THE HIGH BODY FOR HERITAGE  
PRESERVATION  
Article 213 
The High Body for Heritage Preservation organizes the protection of Egypt’s civilizational, 
architectural, and cultural heritage. It supervises all heritage sites, and it documents the 
maintenance of artifacts. In addition, it raises awareness of the contribution that this heritage 
has made to human civilization. 
The High Body also documents the Revolution of January 25 and the other Egyptian 
revolutions that happened in the modern era. 
TH IRD SECTION: THE N ATIONAL COUNC IL FOR EDUCATION AND  
SC IENTIFIC RESEARCH  
Article 214 
The National Council for Education and Scientific Research designs a national strategy for 
education in all its forms and stages and works toward deepening their integration. It 
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revitalizes scientific research, and sets national standards for excellence in teaching and 
research. It then pursues the implementation of its strategy. 
FOURTH SECTION: THE INDEPENDENT BODIES FOR JOURNALISM 
AND THE MEDIA  
Article 215 
The National Media Council organizes the affairs of radio and television, and it organizes the 
press, be it disseminated in print, by digital means, or otherwise. It preserves the pluralism of 
the media, preventing their concentration or monopolization, and it protects the interests of 
the public. The permissions and standards it creates ensure that the different media abide by 
norms of professionalism and decency, preserve the Arabic language, and observe the values 
and constructive traditions of society. 
Article 216 
The National Body for the Press and the Media administers and develops the journalism and 
media establishments owned by the state. It also ensures their commitment to professionalism 
and managerial and fiscal prudence. 
 
PART FIVE: FINAL AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS 
C h a p t e r  1 :  C o n s t i tu t io n a l  A m en d m en t s  
Article 217 
Both the President of the Republic and the House of Representatives may request an 
amendment to one or more articles of the Constitution. In their request, each must specify the 
articles that are to be amended and the reasons for amendment. If the request comes from the 
House, it must be signed by at least one fifth of its membership. 
Both the House of Representatives and the Consultative Assembly complete their discussion 
of the amendment request within thirty days from the date of receipt. Each chamber can 
decide to accept the request in whole or in part. This decision requires support from the 
majority of the chamber’s membership. 
If the request is rejected, it may not be reintroduced in the current legislative session. 
Article 218 
If both chambers agree to the amendment request, each chamber discusses the articles whose 
amendment is sought. It does so sixty days from the date of agreement. If each chamber 
accepts the amendment with a two-thirds majority, the amendment will be subjected to a 
popular referendum no later than thirty days after the date of acceptance. 
The amendment becomes operative on the date its adoption by referendum is announced. 
 
C h a p t e r  2 :  G en e ra l  P ro v i s io n s  
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Article 219 
The principles of Islamic law (sharia) include general evidence, the foundational principles 
of Islamic jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), the reliable sources from among the Sunni schools 
of thought (madhahib). 
Article 220 
Cairo is the capital of the state. The decision to move the capital to another location must be 
passed as a law. 
Article 221 
The law determines the state flag and emblem, as well as the state medals and badges. It 
defines the state’s seal and the national anthem. 
Article 222 
All laws and decrees issued before the Constitution was passed remain in effect. They may 
only be amended or canceled in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 
Article 223 
No later than fifteen days after its passage, a law is to be published in the Official Gazette. It 
enters into effect thirty-one days from the date of publication, unless it specified a different 
date. 
Legal provisions apply only once the law in question has entered into effect, not retroactively. 
Exceptions are possible for laws that do not apply to crime or taxation. In that case the law 
must pass the House of Representatives with a two-thirds majority. 
Article 224 
Elections to the House of Representatives, the Consultative Assembly, and local councils are 
based on a single winner voting system , a list system , a combination thereof, or any other 
electoral system specified by law. 
Article 225 
The Constitution enters into effect on the date its popular adoption by referendum has been 
announced. The Constitution is considered adopted if it garners the majority of valid ballots. 
 
 
 
 
 
C h a p t e r  3 :  T ra n s i t i o n a l  P ro v i s io n s  
Article 226 
The current term of the President of the Republic ends four years after his taking office. He 
may be reelected once. 
Article 227 
In any office for which the Constitution or the law specifies a limited term, be it single or 
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once-renewable, the term begins on the date on which the office is assumed. The term always 
ends once its incumbent reaches the legal retirement age. 
Article 228 
The High Elections Committee in existence at the time this Constitution enters into effect is 
responsible for supervising the first legislative elections thereafter. Its funds and those of the 
High Committee for the Presidential Elections pass over to the National Elections 
Commission once it is established. 
Article 229 
The procedures for electing the first House of Representatives begin no later than sixty days 
after the Constitution enters into effect. Its legislative term begins no later than ten days after 
the final election results have been announced. 
In this House, the workers and farmers are to have at least fifty percent representation. 
Any individual who works for another and receives a wage or a salary is considered a worker. 
Any individual who worked in agriculture for a period of at least ten years prior to his 
candidacy to the House of Representatives is considered a farmer. 
The law specifies the standards and permissions that qualify a candidate as a worker or 
farmer. 
Article 230 
The current Consultative Assembly assumes all legislative powers starting on the date the 
Constitution enters into effect and ending when the new House of Representatives is seated. 
Once the House of Representatives is elected, all legislative powers pass over to it until the 
new Consultative Assembly is elected, which is to happen within a year after the House of 
Representatives is seated. 
Article 231 
In the legislative elections that follow the entry into effect of the Constitution, two thirds of 
the seats are to be filled through the list system. One third is to be filled through the single 
winner system. Parties and independent candidates may run under either of the two systems. 
Article 232 
Leaders of the dissolved National Democratic Party are banned for a period of ten years after 
the Constitution enters into effect from engaging in political work and standing for 
presidential and legislative elections. Anyone is considered a leader of the National 
Democratic Party who, on January 25, 2011, was a member of the party’s general secretariat 
or the policies committee or the political bureau, or who held a seat in the People’s Assembly 
or the Consultative Assembly during the two legislative terms preceding the Revolution. 
Article 233 
Once the Constitution enters into effect, the first High Constitutional Court is composed of its 
current president and its ten most senior members. The remaining members return to the 
positions they held prior to being appointed to the Court. 
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Article 234 
The special provision for appealing verdicts on crimes that are listed in the third part of 
Article 77 of the Constitution apply for one year after the Constitution enters into effect. 
Article 235 
The current system of local administration remains in existence until the system provided in 
the Constitution is implemented. This is to happen in stages over a period of ten years after 
the Constitution enters into effect. 
Article 236 
All constitutional declarations that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the 
President of the Republic issued between February 11, 2011, and the entry into effect of the 
Constitution are hereby repealed. But their effects on the past remain in existence. 
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Notes on Transliteration 
 
  
 In the Arabic alphabet there are 28 letters, which in words are generally bound 
one another and are written from right to left. These aspects make the writing of 
Arabic using the Latin alphabet a difficult enterprise, not only because of 
orthography, but also for differences in phonetics and pronunciation.  
There exists a wide range of transliteration and transcription standards that also 
reflect the way the Latin alphabet is pronounced in different languages. For instance, 
transliteration into the English alphabet is usually different from that which is carried 
out into the French, Spanish, German or Italian alphabets. This is because there are 
noticeable differences in the pronunciation of each letter also in languages that share 
the very same Latin alphabet.  
 For this reason, it is important to remind the reader that Arabic terms 
mentioned in this work might be retrieved and read with different transliteration 
systems and standards. This is because, even though I have attempted to use one and 
the same standard to write Arabic terms, other authors cited in the dissertation might 
choose to follow a different one. To avoid further confusion, in the glossary in the 
next pages I have added possible variants of transliteration where necessary. 
The following Notes and table illustrate the transliteration standard I have chosen to 
use. Such system is the official Library of Congress
6
 one, which, in my opinion, 
appears to be one of the most common and intuitive transliteration systems for 
English speakers. 
 
 
                                                         
6
 Further information available on the Library of Congress website 
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/romanization/arabic.pdf , last accessed: 21/02/2015. 
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Glossary 
 
ʿulamāʾ / 'ulama / ulama / ulema': literally 'scholars', also generally used for 
traditional scholars of Islam, experts in sharīʿah and all the religious 
educated people of Islam. 
 
dār al-Nadwa / dar an-Nadwa : assembly hall of Makkan elite consultation during 
prophet Muhammad's Makkan period. 
 
fiqh/fikh: Islamic jurisprudence; the result of sharīʿah and sunna interpretation 
carried out by the 'ʿulamāʾ; human understanding of sharīʿah. 
 
hadīth / hadith: report of the teachings and sayings of the prophet Muhammad. 
 
hajj / ḥajj / ḥaǧǧ: pilgrimage. 
 
hijra / hijrah / hiǧrah / hiǧrah: migration of the Muslims from Makka to Medina in 
622. 
ijtihād / ijtihad: independent judgement, creative intellectual effort by Islamic 
scholars and jurists who interpret sharīʿah to make laws. 
 
jāhilī / jahili / ǧāhilī: literally 'ignorant', it refers to the pre-Islamic period. 
 
Makkan/Meccan (period): the period from 570 to 622 a.D., in which the prophet 
Muhammad stayed in Makka  and received the first 
revelation before his migration (hijra) to Medina. 
 
mu'min / mumin (plur: mu'minūn / muminun): Muslim believer. 
 
mujtahid: Islamic scholar who interprets sharīʿah through ijtihād 
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muhkam: decisive, clear; it refers to the Qur'ānic verses that are unquestionably clear 
and are not open to interpretation. 
 
mutashabih : allegorical, figurative; it refers to the Qur'ānic verses that are symbolic 
and are thus open to interpretation. 
 
nahḍah / nahda: awakening, renaissance. It usually refers to a period of cultural 
renaissance which started in the late nineteenth century in Egypt, and that 
influenced the whole Arab world. 
 
Qur'ān / Qur'an / Quran / Koran: the sacred book of Islam. 
 
risāla / risala / risalah: message, letter; it refers to a message which connects God 
and the mankind usually containing Islamically-interpreted guidelines, rules 
and suggestions and written by 'ʿulamāʾ and other educated scholars. 
 
sharīʿ / shari'/ shari / šarīʿ: accepted by or compatible with the revealed law of 
Islam. 
 
sharīʿah / shari'a/shari'ah/sharia / šarīʿah: the revealed canonical law of Islam. 
 
shaykh / sheik / sheikh / shayk: honorific term, in the past used to denote the leader 
or the ruler of a tribe. 
 
shūrā / shura: consultation. It refers to the Islamic concept of consultation, 
mentioned in the Qur'ān, that, when making decisions that involve other 
people, suggests to discuss such common affairs together.  
 
sunna / sunnah: collection of the prophet Muhammad's teachings and practices in of 
his life considered as a prescriptive lifestyle model for Muslims. 
 
ṣūrah /sura / surah: chapter of the Qur'ān. 
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tafsīr / tafseer: interpretation, analysis.  
 
taqlīd / taqleed: imitation. It refers to the Islamic legal practice of following the 
guidelines of an Islamic scholar, mujtahid who interprets sharīʿah . 
 
umma / ummah: community, people, nation. It generally refers to a group of people 
with a common culture. It is also used in the Qur'ān to indicate the religious 
Muslim community of believers. 
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